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This work explores the relationships between individual differences
and anomalous experience. The research reported here also identifies and
explores possible commonalities between some reports of paranormal expe¬
riences and clinical research on hallucinations. In particular, a distinction is
made between imaginative cognitive style and intolerant cognitive style.
Both of these modes of thinking and judging have been associated with
paranormal experience, paranormal belief and psychopathology.
These factors are explored experimentally, descriptively and phenome-
nologically in order to provide as full an account as possible. On the basis
of experimental and correlational studies it is proposed that an experiential
as opposed to a rational mode of thought underlies these experiences. This
experiential pattern of thought is characterised by high levels of imaginative
absorption and magical ideation.
Furthermore, these tendencies provide a rich context for the reception
of unusual perceptions and ideas and a fundamentally creative, metaphori¬
cal and analogical understanding of those 'anomalous' cognitions. The
recent developments in the field of conceptual metaphor offer a theoretical
context for understanding these experiences and an account of this is pro¬
posed based on a metaphorical understanding of reality.
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Extended Abstract
Chapter one: A consideration of conceptual issues surrounding the
reality status of anomalous phenomena.
This chapter addresses the reality status of unusual phenomena. A dis¬
cussion of the liminal nature of paranormal experience is undertaken in
terms of fraud, unreliability of effect, and links to psychopathology. Notions
of reality testing are examined and the relationship of this process to halluci¬
nations as well as definitions and constructions of reality is considered.
Chapter two: Rationality and imagination: Bias and fantasy in unusual
experiences
Two main categories of explanations of reality testing failure: bias and
fantasy, are discussed. The discussion of bias considers the role of heuristics
and other judgement biases such as ambiguity intolerance and impulsivity.
The fantasy category includes a range of imaginative tendencies and in par¬
ticular, imaginative absorption. These categories are considered in terms of
a dimension which may be mediated by levels of arousal. This is discussed
in terms of Gelernter's concept of low and high focus thought.
Chapter three: Three psychometric studies
Three questionnaire-based studies are presented. These psychometric
studies focus on the relationship of a range of psychological variables to
reports of paranormal experience. These variables reflect the bias and fanta¬
sy categorisation discussed in chapter one. The three studies indicate that
fantasy and schizotypy variables discriminate between participants who
report paranormal experience and those who do not, whereas the bias vari¬
ables such as ambiguity intolerance and impulsivity were much less effec¬
tive at discriminating between these groups. Exploratory factor analyses
and a cluster analysis in the final study provide indications that paranormal
phenomena have a good deal in common with positive symptoms in schizo¬
typy. Particular kinds of paranormal experiences such as those which are
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characterised by an external influence seem more related to schizotypal
experiences than other types of paranormal experience.
Chapter four: An experimental decision task
This chapter describes the development and execution of three experi¬
mental studies. Two similar tasks required participants to make judgements
in relation to different types of ambiguous display. In the decision task,
they were asked to identify ambiguous pictures which gradually became
clearer. In the imagery task they were asked to report on visual sensations
in response to an animated visual noise display. The patterns of scoring
across the three studies suggested a weak and partially replicated tendency
among paranormal experients to make more errors and produce more
guesses in both tasks. These results were not statistically significant but are
tentatively interpreted as supportive of a general creative/imaginative
capacity which leads paranormal experients to report more hypotheses (and
perhaps mental images) in response to ambiguous displays.
Chapter five: A phenomenology of unusual experiences
The phenomenology of reported paranormal experiences is examined.
These experiences originate from a small number of experience reports.
These experiences are categorised in relation to the form of experience and
also in terms of their magnitude. These accounts provide insights into the
ways in which experients conceptualise their experiences and they also may
provide some indications of underlying schematic and preconceptual struc¬
tures. This section also includes some details on unusual experiences
reported as happening in childhood; some of these bear strong similarities
with dissociative-type experiences.
Chapter six: A possible alleviative role for paranormal explanations in
the experience of hearing voices
A small survey of the Hearing Voices Network (a user-led support
group for people with hallucinatory experiences) is presented in this chap-
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ter. Possible links between psi and psychopathology are briefly covered.
The study is described which involved the administration of a small ques¬
tionnaire dealing mostly with the phenomenology of the hearing voices
experience, in addition some items measuring paranormal belief were
included. A wide variety of explanations of the experience are reported.
Hearers reporting higher levels of control over the voices employed more
paranormal explanations than the low control hearers. Relationships were
also found between the degree to which these experiences were considered
negative and paranormal belief, with those hearers reporting higher levels
of paranormal belief reporting less distressing experiences.
Chapter seven: An integrated approach
An attempt is made to conceptually integrate the personality traits and
cognitive styles identified in the previous studies through the concept of an
experiential mode of cognition. Hypnagogia and Synesthesia are described
as possible characteristics of an experiential mode of cognition and the role
of metaphor is considered as a representation of experiential cognition. The
mind and paranormal experience are considered from this experiential posi¬
tion and the usefulness of metaphor in structuring these experiences is
explored.
Chapter eight: Metaphor and the paranormal
In the first section of this chapter a review of the parapsyetiological
and psychical research literature is reported. This review reports on the con¬
sistent use of three core conceptual metaphors in relation to paranormal
experiences; intrusions, transmissions, and connections. These metaphors
are explained in relation to a wide range of contributions to the paranormal
literature.
The second section of the chapter is concerned with an empirical study
addressing the use of these metaphors in relation to experiential reports. A
content analysis of short responses to three questions regarding the explana-
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tion of different paranormal phenomena was carried out. It was found that
respondents did favour the core conceptual metaphors identified in the first
section and that experients used a higher proportion of metaphors in rela¬
tion to literal explanations compared to the non-experients.
Chapter nine: The concept of "energy" - a core conceptual metaphor
in constructing paranormal experiences
An interview with a practising medium is reported in this chapter. A
range of explanations are offered of psychic experiences but primary in
many of these experiences is the concept of 'energy'. This concept is used to
structure and provide explanations of psychic experience and it is allied
with the second core metaphor of transmissions.
Chapter ten: Approaching the meaning of unusual experiences
This chapter provides a conclusion to this work and indicates possible
future directions in which this kind of research may be taken. The broader
implications of considering experiential and metaphor accounts in relation
to unusual experiences (paranormal and psychopathological) is discussed.
Finally, the need for assessment of this kind of meaning in relation to sci¬
ence itself is briefly outlined.
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Introduction
Thoughts on the approach to the thesis
Many approaches have been taken to the kinds of phenomena dis¬
cussed in this thesis (unusual perceptual and ideational experience). One
reason for this is that para psychological questions offer themselves to inter¬
disciplinary study; another relates to the benefits of a more holistic approach
over the inevitable fragmentation incurred through overly specialised study.
It is probably a truism to say that the kinds of methods used inevitably dic¬
tate the form of the findings. In this study, a number of approaches are
developed including empirical and quantitative assessments as well as more
phenomenological approaches and more importantly all of these are set
within a context of the recognition of the importance of the constructive
nature of thought and the reliance on the figurative nature of mind.
Any research approach implicitly employs metaphors which are conso¬
nant with the main paradigm or model within which that approach oper¬
ates. Currently within psychology the cognitive or information processing
approach holds pride of place. There have been cognitive interpretations of
most phenomena including those unusual experiences examined in psy-
chopathology and those in parapsychology. Usually lip service is paid to
the role of metaphor and eventually the metaphors are often interpreted as
literal realities.
From the perspective offered by contemporary metaphor theorists, any
metaphor may offer a degree of lucidity but implicit in this position is that
other metaphors may illuminate a phenomenon more (or less). As a
metaphor illuminates certain facets of a phenomena it also inevitably hides
others and this provides a powerful argument for 1) being sensitive to the
metaphors used to describe any domain and 2) the need to recognise the
important role that different metaphors can play in elucidating any domain.
In this work the importance of examining the metaphors involved in
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unusual experience is assessed in a number of ways. Firstly, the objective-
subjective split which is often touted as of primary importance in these
kinds of experiences is reassessed from the metaphor view and the construc¬
tive role of the mind accorded recognition. Secondly, metaphor is interpret¬
ed as a mode of experiential thinking and these unusual experiences are
examined in relation to this experiential mode of cognition and also in rela¬
tion to related personality constructs. Finally, metaphor is examined in
terms of the particular instances of metaphor use in relation to different phe¬
nomena.
A meta-perspective has been taken in this work which was partly a
development of the realisation of how important a role metaphor plays in
the development of lay and academic theory alike. It should be noted that
the overall perspective offered here is one which highlights the fact that all
research is inevitably framed and contextualised by particular conceptual
metaphors (something which is becoming more widely accepted; see
Ortony, 1993).
This approach affords a number of benefits:
1. As Bohm (1980) notes:
fragmentation is continually being brought about by the almost uni¬
versal habit of taking the content of thought for a description of the
world as it is! (p. 3).
This is primarily what will be called here the objectivist position. This view¬
point assumes that the categories used by humans to conceptualise the phe¬
nomenal world exist independently of human cognition. Bohm notes fur¬
ther that:
it is crucial that man be aware of the activity of his thought as such;
i.e., as a form of insight, a way of looking, rather than as a 'true copy
of reality as it is', (p. 7)
We have thus to be alert to give careful attention and serious consid¬
eration to the fact that our theories are not 'descriptions of reality as
it is' but, rather, everchanging forms of insight, which can point to or
indicate a reality that is implicit and not describable or specifiable in
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its totality, (p. 17)
This approach is more holistic; it negates the requirement for the
assessment of the absolute truth status of concepts and theories (indeed it
supposes that this is a state of affairs which is impossible to achieve — as
truth status as a concept only makes sense when taken in the context of the
conceptual framework offered by a particular cultural and historical set¬
ting).
2. It encourages a much more creative approach to scientific under¬
standing and research by permitting multiple views of a phenomena each of
which has validity in a relative sense when seen from a particular
metaphorical stance.
This thesis often presents metaphor as reality, blurs the boundaries
between the literal and metaphor and generally argues that metaphorical
accounts are extremely valuable in understanding all phenomena and
human experience. In a sense, this is not that much different from a cogni-
tivist who focuses on the articulatory loop or working memory, the physicist
who explores the nature of quarks or even the economist who formulates an
equation for the financial economy. In most of these examples the
researcher supposes that they deal with an objective and literal reality in
which each of these phenomena and the responses made to them actually
exist in the form they suppose. In this thesis, the point is made clearly that
any perspective is inevitably couched in metaphorical thought.
In one sense it could be argued that metaphors are the most appropri¬




A consideration of conceptual issues surrounding the reality
testing of anomalous experience.
The parapsychologists and other anomalies researchers are still
locked in a "to the death battle" over whether or not these experi¬
ences "really" took place. Popular culture, on the other hand, seems
to start from the assumption that they do. And many scholarly disci¬
plines go by the rule that if a person believes that something is real,
for that person it is real, and one moves on from there. White (1993)
p.ll
This chapter describes a movement between two perspectives. It
begins by depicting a rather orthodox position which is concerned with the
role of reality testing of anomalous experiences (the obvious supposition
here that reality is what is consensual and limited to demonstrations of
objectivity). As the chapter progresses, by the very nature of its investiga¬
tion, it addresses some relatively new contributions originating in work on
conceptual metaphor and imagination which permit a more flexible
approach to subjective experience and suggest that we should consider
reassessing the definitions of reality validation which are currently held.
Firstly a brief discussion of the legitimacy of paranormal phenomena is
undertaken in an attempt to briefly register the main points summarising
the marginal nature of paranormal and psychopathological experience in
Western culture. Following this we proceed to explore some salient points
concerning the construction and monitoring of reality.
Anomalous phenomena
People have always had unusual and anomalous experiences which
they sometimes attribute to paranormal causes. The term 'paranormal' is
often used to define different ranges of phenomena. Here this term will be
used in relation to those reports of phenomena which are currently inexplic-
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able within the constraints of contemporary scientific knowledge. These
phenomena seem to have remained relatively constant in the forms they
adopt over the period of recorded history and generally across cultures.
Early representations of this have been largely informed by notions of some
other world and entities that populate it (ancestors, spirits, deceased rela¬
tives, etc.) and who sometimes return to our world (Eisenbud, 1989). Other
categories of such experiences include knowing and perceiving without the
aid of any identified communication channel, this is commonly expressed as
extrasensory perception (ESP). The apparent mental influence of matter
without motor activity is commonly termed psychokinesis (PK). The phe¬
nomena associated with ESP and PK are often subsumed under the general
category of psi. These three classes of experience form the basis for modern
discussion of ostensible paranormal phenomena. Experiences like these are
also commonly recorded in the reports of those diagnosed as suffering from
some forms of psychopathology (notably schizophrenic experience) which
provide another rich vein of liminal experiences. These experiences require
judgement, some assessment of whether or not the experience was real, and
it is to this question, which has been a constant source of sometimes quite
heated argument, we now turn.
Debate over the reality of psi phenomena
There has been much debate over the last century or so over the reality
status of phenomena such as apparitions; ESP and PK. These are the core
paranormal phenomena; sometimes broader definitions are used which may
even include concerns over the existence of extraterrestrial life. While there
has been some progress in the experimental investigation of some kinds of
phenomena, and some would argue that there is evidence for accepting the
existence of these phenomena (Bern & Honorton, 1994; Honorton, 1977),
others find these kinds of studies less persuasive and still debate the find¬
ings of research in this area (Hyman, 1989). Still others have recommended
we move from an empirical approach to focus more on the experiential
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issues related to reports of such events (White, 1985).
The liminal status of paranormal phenomena
In discussing the reality status of paranormal phenomena I will use the
term liminal' to describe the nature of psi; by this 1 mean that psi often
exists as a borderline concept, or is viewed as existing outside of the ortho¬
dox positions on reality. The term 'liminal' was introduced to anthropology
by van Gennep (1960), in that sense it meant a middle or transitional zone. I
use the term to indicate a middle position where concepts enjoy both real
and unreal status. Most people have some awareness of what paranormal
phenomena are, hold beliefs about their existence and even perhaps have
had experience of them but in spite of this, these phenomena enjoy a certain
status of unreality with the continual promise that 'the truth is out there'
(but always tantalisingly just out of reach!)
A number of factors may be described as contributing to doubts about
the reality status of paranormal phenomena. A good deal of debate sur¬
rounds these controversial topics and some of the arguments for the liminal
nature of paranormal experience are outlined below.
Fraud
One of the main arguments fielded by counteradvocates of paranormal
phenomena is that experimental results and mediumistic phenomena have
on occasions been proved to have involved fraud. In the past the motiva¬
tion and stakes for producing psi have allegedly led some investigators to
engage in manipulation of the data (Pratt & Woodruff, 1961). It is also likely
that many investigations of mediums identified fraudulent activity on the
behalf of the medium and accomplices (Wiseman, 1992). To complicate
things further it has been speculated that fraudulent activity in a mediu¬




Producing replicable results has always been a desirable goal for para-
psychologists. This has proved very difficult. A number of reasons may
exist for this.
Firstly, not enough is known about the conditions necessary to success¬
fully demonstrate psi — although a recipe for success is perhaps more likely
in the light of process oriented research focusing on personality factors and
the circumstances of the experimental situation (Irwin, 1994; Van Kampen &
Bierman, 1994).
ESP and PK seem to demonstrate very small effects in most laboratory-
based studies and require large samples and sensitive measures to detect
such effects. Where numbers of individual studies have been combined in
meta-analyses it has been found that the effects, although small, do seem to
be replicable (Honorton, 1985; Honorton & Ferrari, 1989).
Subjective paranormal experience
The majority of these experiences are private, transitory, coloured by
personal beliefs and often difficult to verify. By far the most common mode
of experience is probably during or near sleep states (Irwin, 1994; Glicksohn,
1990). Neppe (1983) introduced the term 'subjective paranormal experience'
(SPE) to cover the reported experiences which are attributed to paranormal
causes but which have not been verified or are perhaps impossible to verify.
Marginality position
From a sociological position paranormal belief and experience have
been viewed as a result of social marginality (Bainbridge, 1978; Wuthnow,
1976) and from an anthropological position as a delusory way of exerting
control over nature based on magical thinking and superstition
(Malinowski, 1954). These accounts portray the objectivist position that reli¬
gious and supernatural interpretations of the phenomena arise as a natural
defence against uncertainty and have no real existence.
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Links to psychopathology
Long term links exist between the study of psychopathology and the
study of parapsychology. Similar kinds of experiences are reported in both
fields. It has been speculated that major psychoses result from the intrusion
of psychic content (Erhenwald, 1948). In addition, consistent relationships
have been demonstrated between measures of psychopathology and those
of paranormal belief and experience (Thalbourne, 1984; 1994). Beliefs or
delusions of paranormal abilities are part of the criteria for diagnosing psy¬
chosis. On the basis of a similarity between paranormal and psychopatho-
logical experiences it is possible that examination of paranormal beliefs and
experiences have important implications for understanding more severe
forms which appear in psychopathology (Glicksohn, 1990). This link
between madness and paranormal belief and experience has proved attrac¬
tive to counteradvocates wishing to argue against the existence of the para¬
normal (Maddox, 1991).
Definitions of reality
The philosopher C D Broad (1969) responded to the notion of paranor¬
mal phenomena with what he called basic limiting principles'; these are
arguments against the existence of paranormal phenomena employing what
we already know scientifically about the laws of nature. Definitions of reali¬
ty drawing on these principles arguably leave no room for such phenomena.
In contrast to this position many sources see the developments in quantum
physics as validating psi phenomena and providing possible analogies as to
how ESP and PK may occur (Jahn & Dunne, 1987; von Lucadou, 1994).
Each of these points mentioned above contribute to a sense of liminali-
ty of psi phenomena in terms of academic consideration and debate, they
also begin to provide a sense of the manner in which the paranormal has
been constructed in relation to academic definitions of reality. Each of these
arguments contribute to individual and social assessments of what consti¬
tutes reality in the case of paranormal phenomena. In the next section the
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process of defining reality will be examined in more detail.
To briefly summarise: ostensible paranormal phenomena have largely
been categorised in two ways:
1. They are real events characterised by some form of as yet unidenti¬
fied communication channel in the case of ESP or some form of unknown
energy in the case of PK. In spite of the lack of a discernible mechanism or
model, parapsychologists have documented a wide range of reasonably con¬
sistent features which are characteristic of psi. From this perspective, both
process and proof-oriented research are likely eventually to validate this
concept.
2. From a more skeptical position psi is an illusion. People mislead
themselves under certain conditions and may even demonstrate personality
characteristics such as being over-imaginative and / or lacking reasoning
ability which make this more likely. From a social or cultural position reli¬
gious affiliation and/or philosophical proclivities can also lead to attribu¬
tions of paranormal causes to anomalous events. Of course there may be a
combination of these in which it may be argued that real psi exists alongside
these numerous false alarms or misjudgements.
Both of these broad interpretations of paranormal phenomena stress
the liminal nature of psychic experience and belief. They also illustrate the
objectivist desire to prove a phenomena to be true or false. These kinds of
experiences have always been the debating ground for definitions of reality
and I will go on further to argue that these experiences and the conditions
of their occurrence are a proving ground in another sense. These experi¬
ences, by their very ambiguity and liminality and in spite of cultural inter¬




Human kind cannot bear very much reality. (Eliot, 1944, p. 14)
In the relative sense, then, the sense in which we contrast reality with
simple unreality, and in which one thing is said to have more reality
than another, and to be more believed, reality means simply relation
to our emotional and active life. This is the only sense which the
word has in the mouths of practical men. In this sense, whatever
excites and stimulates our interest is real; whenever a object so
appeals to us that we turn to it, accept it, fill our mind with it, or
practically take account of it, so far as it is real for us, and we believe
it. Whenever, on the contrary, we ignore it, fail to consider it or act
upon it, despise it, reject it, forget it, so far it is unreal for us and dis¬
believed. (James, 1890, p.294 — in Bartholomew, Basterfield &
Howard 1991).
Beliefs about reality, and exposure to unreal experiences such as hallu¬
cinations obviously influence reality testing. This process involves the diffi¬
cult and philosophically sticky question "how do we decide when our expe¬
rience is real and when it is unreal?" With a subject as seemingly obvious
and yet inherently slippery as this perhaps it is wise (if somewhat formal) to
begin with a definition. The term reality arrived on the scene in the 16th
century, its origins were in the medieval Latin word realis, the Anglo-
Norman real and the old French reel which all referred to things actually
existing or present. In this form it is obvious that real distinguishes objec¬
tive states, events and entities from subjective equivalents, in our culture we
usually employ real as a way of describing what is important and tend as a
consequence to disregard or at least devalue subjective experience.
Subjective experiences can sometimes have the power and impact of
external sensory impressions — when this occurs we talk about hallucina¬
tions. The first use of the word hallucination in English occurred in a transla¬
tion of a tract by Ludwig Lavater (1570/1572), who wrote of "Ghostes and
Sprites walking by nyght, and of strange noyses, crakes, and sundry for-
warnynges, whiche commonly happen before the death of menne, great
slaughters & alterations of kyngdomes" (Sarbin, 1990, p.314)
According to Sarbin (1990), Lavater was referring to apparitions and
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using the word hallucination, an anglicised version of the Latin word alluci -
natio which refers to idle talk or a wandering of the mind. This suggests that
an unusual loosening of the ties which bind thought and perception to the
objective and external reality has taken place. A similar case might be made
for the origins of the term delusion which obviously stems from the Latin
verb ludere — to play; in this sense we can take it to mean to play falsely. In
both cases, it seems that we take subjective experience to be objective when
the mind plays too freely.
Philosophers have always struggled with the dichotomy of subjective
and objective experience. It perhaps posed more of a problem for the
empiricist tradition in philosophy. Locke drew a distinction between prima¬
ry and secondary qualities, the former existing in reality regardless of occa¬
sions of observation and the latter consisting entirely of the subjective con¬
tribution of an observer. Once an analysis of commonsense reality is under¬
taken it is only a short step to undermining our preconceptions and expecta¬
tions about objectivity.
Fischer (1975), considering the reality status of hallucinations, goes on
to question fundamental objectivity.
At this point, we may ask whether state-bound flashbacks, deja vu
experiences, and depersonalisation phenomena are perceptions or
hallucinations. This of course depends on the definitions given for
perception and hallucination.
Are the physicist's tracks produced in cloud chambers, bubble
chambers, or nuclear emulsions, hallucinations because they are
"perceptions without an object", thus conforming to Lhermitte's
(1951) definition of hallucinations? And what about other forms of
energy (e.g., pulsed microwaves that induce the hearing of hissing
and clicking sounds, or magnetic fields provoking phosphenes)?
And did the Apollo astronauts, while in translunar flight, hallucinate
the flashes of light evoked by the action of cosmic rays, which are
definitely not "objects" (Charman & Rowlands, 1971). Evidently,
selective attention is to be paid to the very logic of language and to
that logic which is based on sensory observation—or first-order inter¬
action—and willed motor verification—or second-order interaction—
with the observed, (p. 203)
As Fischer argues, defining what constitutes an object is not even as
simple as it ordinarily seems to be. It seems that distinctions between objec-
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tive and subjective, although seemingly something we are all capable of, are
perhaps more subtle than we would think.
Subjective phenomena also have effects and so a claim on reality
(Sarbin, 1967). Reality is often synonymous with materiality, yet the imma¬
terial can have very real effects. Sarbin recounts a story of ten young boys
telling ghost stories to each other at a halloween party. In a suitably dark
and lantern-lit room the boys sat in circle which closed from 11 to 3 feet in
diameter during the course of the story telling.
Al-Issa (1978) reviewing the status of hallucinations cross-culturally
argues that there are difficulties in deciding upon criteria for categorising
reality and fantasy. The predominant criteria are based around the question
of materiality, if it has no measurable material basis it does not exist. As Al-
Issa notes, reality defining criteria can change with time and place and also
experients may be using different criteria when they act as if their imagin¬
ings are real. Whose criteria are we to accept?
Reality definitions are inevitably subject to cultural and societal limita¬
tions. Sarbin (1967) here again expresses his doubts about the usefulness of
concepts such as hallucination and schizophrenia. For instance, for a Native
American the kinds of vivid experiences which follow the ceremony, isola¬
tion and fasting involved in spirit seeking, are considered real by the tribal
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members (similar experiences are shared by other members of the tribe —
affording consensuality, one of the criteria for objectivity) but would no
doubt be classified as hallucinations by Western psychologists and psychia¬
trists. According to Peat (1995) the Western mind focuses on the surface
while the indigenous heart, mind and being seeks the inscape in a relational
rather than rational and participatory rather than detached mode of experi¬
encing. Another important point made by this example is that hallucina¬
tions can take place outside of an illness context.
Holt (1964) describes the position that imaginative experiences obtain
in our culture.
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In a factually oriented, skeptical, anti-intraceptive, brass-tacks culture
like ours, where the paranormal is scoffed at and myth and religion
are in decline, the capacity for vivid imagery has little survival value
and less social acceptability. We live in an age of literalism, an era
that distrusts the imagination, while at the same time it develops its
beat fringe of avid seekers after drugs that may artificially restore the
capacity for poetic vision. It is little wonder that children rapidly
lose their eidetic capacity and that adults are made uneasy by the
admission that they can experience things that are not factually pre¬
sent. (p. 262)
A wide range of studies provide some support for this constructive
rather than representational view of experience (e.g., Edge, 1994). We can
never free ourselves of our interpretations, and perception is interwoven
with imagination and the interpretative structures we impose upon it. It is
obviously important that some form of assessment takes place with the pur¬
pose of delineating objective (externally generated public experience medi¬
ated by sensory processes) from subjective (internally generated private
experience mediated by imaginative processes) experience.
Kruse (1989) notes that the process of cognition in Western philosophy
has been understood for the most part as a process of representation and
informational input. Reality from this perspective is objective and indepen¬
dent of perception and is discovered through the perceptual process and
through action — the organisation, stability and richness of the phenomenal
world is considered to be a feature of the organisation, stability and richness
of an external world. Von Glaserfeld (1981) compared this to religion and a
metaphysical realism. Perceptual oddities such as multistable or ambiguous
figures like the Necker cube illustrate that the process of perception is not
simply one of subjective representation of the object in the external world;
rather it is autonomous creation of order in the visual system (Kruse, 1989).
Meaning, perspective, figure and ground, all need to be constructed — they
are not given.
For what Kruse calls the curious phenomena (multistability, suggestion,
hypnosis) a "Kantian change" in psychology must take place; where the
phenomenal world would no longer be seen as a more or less direct repre-
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sentation but as a construction of the cognitive system itself. The recent
development of self-organisation in physics, chemistry and biology has pro¬
moted a similar view of a constructivist and autonomous cognitive system
(Maturana & Varela, 1980). From this viewpoint it is difficult if not impossi¬
ble for the organism to assign true or false to the relations of innerorganis-
mic events (sensory and motor); it can only consider them as possible or
impossible. Cognition therefore applies to the simplest of organisms such as
amoebae. In the most complicated of nervous systems—the human brain—
cognition should be described as a process of relating relations of relations
of relations etc. The brain is an open system concerning its exchange of
energy and substance but a closed or self referential system concerning the
creation of meaning. The ontological reality is considered to be a limiting
factor to the self organisation process, but there is no way of knowing any¬
thing about it.
Of particular relevance to this discussion, Kruse notes that the radical
constructivist's view has a bearing upon the process of reality testing.
Hallucinations and hypnotic suggestion are illustrative of the constructive
process. Shepard (1984) suggests aptly that he likes to "caricature percep¬
tion as externally guided hallucination, and dreaming and hallucination as
internally simulated perception." Kruse suggests that in this light the theo¬
retical differences between perception and hallucination fade away. Instead
of clearcut differentiation between the subjective and objective we are left to
answer the following questions.
1. "How does the cognitive system normally distinguish between per¬
ceptual phenomena, dreams, and hallucinations if this distinction cannot be
regarded as the trivial consequence of the representation of perception."
2. "And, if there are some inner-systemic mechanisms responsible for
this discriminative ability, what happens to them during suggestion and
hypnosis?"
In fact, paranormal experiences provide more problems in dealing
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with this division because while ESP may constitute a wholly subjective
experience, it has by definition objective relevance in that it ostensibly
relates to a real event or stimulus outside of the experient's perceptual field.
On the other hand the same experience may occur but not be linked with a
relevant objective event in the case of subjective paranormal experience.
The matrix of both subjective and objective experience requires some
kind of attribution process and the successful performance of this process
will be dependent upon on a number of factors and be responsible for our
sense and understanding of reality. Of course, as we have seen, the defini¬
tions of reality offered by a particular culture and time will naturally pro¬
vide filters for this process. These filters provide the definition for an ecolo¬
gy of perception and hypothesis where subjective and objective are less dif¬
ferentiated.
In more traditional cultures this subjective and objective split is of
much less consequence, "with people perceiving reality in a much fuller
sense, they receive visions, inner journeys, fly in the air, converse with rocks
and trees and interact with energies and spirits" (Peat, 1995, p.287).
These are all experiences which might be labelled broadly as magical
and in our culture are certainly considered to be liminal and quite possibly
indicative of psychopathology. Instead more concern is placed on assessing
what is real and 'out there' from what arises subjectively.
Reality testing
The contemporary view of hallucinations is that they are internally
generated experiences which are misattributed to external origins (Bentall,
1990). It seems reasonable that many reported paranormal experiences can
be viewed in the same way. Podmore (c. 1909), subscribing to this objec-
tivist position, expresses some concern about this common failure of
humans to accurately describe reality.
Man, as has been said by someone, is not naturally a veridical ani¬
mal. It is not in fact an easy thing to tell the truth. It is the most dif-
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ficult of all arts, and one of the latest acquirements of the most civi¬
lized races. There are in the first place defects and excesses in narra¬
tion caused by self interest, or by the dramatic instinct, the love of
telling a good story. But defects of this kind are generally recognised
and proportionately easy to guard against. The real danger is more
subtle. Not only our memory but our very acts of perception are
shaped by our preconceptions and prejudices. To put it crudely,
what we see and what we remember is not actually what happened,
but what we think ought to have happened or what was likely to
have happened, p. 4
Podmore believes that although there may be room for apparitions in
this as yet not fully understood world it is likely that these experiences are
in fact hallucinations.
These concerns for categorising real as opposed to hallucinatory expe¬
riences have been made the core of a number of research efforts. The crite¬
ria used in testing the reality of a stimulus are likely to involve such factors
as intensity —- the more an object stands out from its ground then the more
real it is — (Kruse, 1989). Spatial, contextual, sensory and semantically
detailed attributes have also been isolated in reality monitoring research
(Johnson, Hastroudi & Lindsay, 1993).
Aggarnaes (1972) summarises the components of sensory and subjec¬
tive experience and how these are employed in making decisions and judge¬
ment about the reality of such experiences.
Table 1 showing the seven reality characteristics (in the form of bipolar
contrast) proposed by Aggernaes (1972).













It can be seen that real events should possess the qualities in the left
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column of table 1 and imaginary events should possess those in the right.
So a real event should incorporate a perceptual quality, it should be accessi¬
ble to others and it should be independent of the actions of the observer.
On the other hand, the imaginary experience should be less vivid than a
perception, be inaccessible to other potential observers and should be reliant
upon the psychological conditions in the experient. It is in situations when
some of these qualities are contravened that confusion over origin of the
experience can take place.
It seems likely that there is a developmental progression in assessing
and categorising experience in terms of its objective and subjective status in
reality assessment and monitoring. Research in developmental psychology
has indicated that this is a gradual acquisition. Young children often con¬
fuse private with public experience (Flavell, 1979; Flavell, 1986). This ten¬
dency to confuse subjective with external experience is also evident in
adults.
Of particular interest for discussion here is the work of Johnson and
colleagues (e.g., Johnson & Raye, 1981). In a variety of studies they assessed
the kinds of factors involved in reality monitoring, which can be viewed as
a metacognitive process involving the categorisation and discrimination of
internal (private) and external (public) experience as they are perceived,
imagined, and remembered. This process can be subsumed under the cate¬
gory of source monitoring which is the process involved in making attribu¬
tions about the origins of memories, knowledge and beliefs (Johnson,
Hastroudi & Lindsay, 1993).
Johnson has provided an outline of how the absence of various cues
usually associated with perception or the act of imagining are used to recall
whether or not an event was private or public. These cues such as vivid¬
ness, location within a particular series of events and a sense of effortless¬
ness contribute to an attribution that an event was objectively perceived.
On the other hand, feelings that the image was less vivid, unconnected to
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contemporaneous events, and accompanied by a sense of effort would con¬
tribute to it being classified as subjective and imaginary. When these cues
are for some reason absent or unattended to; difficulties in assessing what is
real and what is imaginary will naturally ensue. This might be more com¬
mon to some people than to others. They propose that two types of process¬
es are called upon in reality monitoring decisions. The first involves a rela¬
tively fast general category decision (heuristic) about the stimulus (often a
memory trace) probably focussing on the basic tenor of the experience (pos¬
sibly employing some of the criteria proposed by Aggernaes (1972). The sec¬
ond is a slower and more time consuming (systematic) process which is
based on more extended reasoning, drawing on supporting memories and
knowledge.
A wide range of studies have demonstrated the failure of this monitor¬
ing process in a number of different areas, such as recalling and identifying
one's own and others' dreams (Johnson, Kahan & Raye, 1984); in stereotype
maintenance (Slusher & Anderson, 1987); in discriminating between per¬
formed and imagined actions (Markham, 1991); reality monitoring in rela¬
tion to psychotic hallucinations (Bentall, Baker & Havers, 1991) amongst
others.
There are a number of factors which have been demonstrated to influ¬
ence this reality monitoring process. These would include such events as
the experience of stress or divided attention and any event that reduced the
likelihood of embedding the stimuli or event in the matrix of other events.
Presumably, although not discussed by Johnson, there is the possibility that
certain personality characteristics which relate to changes in arousal or
altered cognitive functioning may contribute to these errors in distinguish¬
ing between internal and external events. At the forefront of this position is
the proposal that reality is not given directly in perceptual and memory rep¬
resentation but is a product of judgement processes (Johnson et al. 1993).
Interference and biases influencing this judgement process will obviously
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direct and inform any decisions about the source and reality of the represen¬
tations. In terms of delusions and unusual beliefs there is usually a tenden¬
cy to unbidden thoughts and a reduced sense of voluntarity in their genera¬
tion; this would contribute in Johnson's view to a sense of external rather
than internal locus (Johnson, 1988). It might be argued that this could be
considered to operate in a similar way for paranormal beliefs about
ideational experiences, such as reports of ESP (especially where there is a
imagery component) as well as in a more perceptual sense for apparitional
experiences where the appearance of an entity is reported.
Although this research has been valuable in delineating the problems
and difficulties involved in discriminating the reality and source of experi¬
ences, in some cases it unfortunately tends to present a one-sided picture
emphasising the error in the uncontrolled free play of the mind. From the
viewpoint of most of this research reality monitoring or testing has obvious
connotation;, it supports a objectivist reality position. Bentall (1990), obvi¬
ously recognising this, employed the term reality discrimination in order to
try and obviate some of the pejorative connotations of the term reality
testing. Even further than this, the general approach fails to appreciate the
important constructive role played by the imagination (although Johnson
and colleagues do admit that reality is the product of judgement processes).
This must largely be attributed to the general tendency to avoid considering
the less rational characteristics of thought such as imagination and affect. A
powerful argument is being fielded by contemporary researchers which con¬
tends that imagination, far from being inconsequential, is actually funda¬
mental in providing the categories and schemas used to understand the
world (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980); this will be more fully explored in a later
section.
In dealing with psi experiences it is obvious that reality testing or mon¬
itoring paradigms are more readily linked with sensory-like experiences
such as apparitions but it may be argued that they are also valuable in
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understanding more ideational experiences such as ESP. Although ESP
experiences (by definition) occur without the experient identifying an exter¬
nal perceptual locus, it could be argued that there would be an association
with a particular external event. So that even if the event occurred without
any form of perceptual registration it has an association with external enti¬
ties and locations: a person, place or event. This is particularly worth con¬
sidering when, as in the case of ESP experiences, delusions and some hallu¬
cinatory experiences are not image rich and sensory-like but instead rich in
affect and numinosity.
In summary, it seems that many paranormal experiences like halluci¬
nations can be considered to be failures of adequate reality testing. It is like¬
ly that there are worthwhile issues to explore in this kind of argument, how¬
ever they are not likely to be resolved in terms of naive realism where the
objectivist position is considered of paramount importance. There are also
particular consequences contingent upon examining the subjective/objective
distinction which lead to definitions of reality, objects and experiences.
Paranormal and psychopathological paranormal experience may actually
fall into a number of categories, some being due to perceptual and ideation¬
al error as well as those which may be considered as veridical accounts.
It is almost impossible to play down the importance of the role of con¬
structive processes and the particular weltanschaung involved in objective
descriptions of the world as well as in a paranormal view of the world. As
Edge (1994) says it is difficult to ignore the changes which are occurring
across a range of disciplines which focus on the constructive nature of mind
and reality. This position does not require a stance of absolute relativism, on
the contrary the world is out there but how we relate to it and describe it are
dependent upon what we bring to the perception in terms of images,
metaphors, expectations, models and preconceptions.
The next few chapters explore the role of personality traits in relation
to unusual perceptions and thoughts (used here as an alternative way of
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discussing subjective paranormal and psychopathological experiences).
These are followed by a more speculative and obviously tentative descrip¬
tion of these experiences at a fundamental level in terms of the processes
and metaphors of cognition. This approach is intended to question the
indubitably simplistic distinction between objective and subjective classifica¬





bias and fantasy in unusual experiences
Having briefly examined concepts of reality and reality testing and
having seen that there are inevitable philosophical problems attached to
such processes, we shall now examine research on correlates of paranormal
and anomalous experience which may be indicative of individual differ¬
ences, and important in predicting the tendency towards such experiences.
White (1990) recommended that research should be undertaken to elaborate
possible variables which relate to paranormal experience and belief.
Paranormal belief and experience are dealt with together here, it is relatively
difficult to isolate which of these variables takes precedence — although this
work implicitly points to experiential precedents in paranormal belief.
A wide variety of personality variables have been explored in relation
to paranormal experience and belief. This review will concentrate on vari¬
ables which can be considered to occupy two broad categories, designated
here as bias and imagination as they seem to sum up the two main cognitive
avenues to understanding and explaining attributions of paranormal and
anomalous experience. In these two sections the literature from parapsy-
chological, psychological and clinical areas of research will be surveyed con¬
tinuing the theme of suggested possible similarities between abnormal and
paranormal experience and belief.
Concepts of bias
Within the clinical literature on hallucinations and delusions there are
suggestions of a cognitive bias being responsible for these misattributions.
A similar case has been proposed (although to a lesser degree) in relation to
research on paranormal experiences and beliefs. This bias may be construed
in a number of forms relating to a number of psychological variables and be
sensitive to other moderating variables such as arousal and stress; these will
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be discussed where necessary in conjunction with the background informa¬
tion on these variables.
Rules of thumb and judgement bias
Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky (1981) initiated a deep foray into the
role of bias in decision making. In contrast to early cognitive and social psy¬
chological theories which assumed that humans may act as lay scientists or
even human processors of information there is strong evidence to suggest
that humans are actually wary of processing commitments, preferring
instead to employ rough guidelines or heuristics instead of rigorous effort¬
ful procedures. This work indicates rather unsurprisingly that humans
make mistakes in assessing probability and randomness which they could
avoid if they employed statistical strategies such as Bayesian analysis. The
implications of this have been taken seriously in the experimental work of
Blackmore and Troscianko (1985) and Brugger, Landis and Regard (1990).
However, it should be mentioned that this negative view of human cogni¬
tion has largely been informed and structured through an over-reliance on
the mechanistic computational metaphor in cognitive psychology. Recent
commentaries summarised by Watt (1990-91) indicate that Kahneman,
Slovic and Tversky's findings are perhaps too damning and inherently
unfair in their representation of human cognition.
Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky's writings evolved from a considera¬
tion of heuristics to a passionate acceptance of bias conveying a much more
critical and negative image of everyday cognitive abilities (Watt, 1990-91).
In addition their criticism has been targeted at the specific tasks set by
Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky in relation to understanding probabilities,
with phrasing and problem choice playing an important role in determining
the kinds of responses received. It is worth noting that similar tasks were
employed by Epstein and colleagues (Epstein, 1994) but without such nega¬
tive interpretations.
A related explanation of deficits has been proposed which would bias
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the judgement of paranormal believers. This focuses notions of reduced lev¬
els of critical thinking and reasoning in believers in the paranormal (Alcock
and Otis, 1980; Wierzibicki, 1985). Irwin (1993) expressed some concern that
the outcome of some of these studies may well have been contingent upon
the skeptical position of the experimenter, with the paranormal believers
with good critical abilities downplaying their beliefs in the face of obvious
skepticism. In a study of his own, Irwin (1991) found that strong religious
but not paranormal beliefs were related to poor reasoning, supporting his
claim.
Intolerance of ambiguity
A bias which has shown some promise in distinguishing between hal-
lucinators and non-hallucinators is that of intolerance of ambiguity
(Heilbrun, 1972; Heilbrun & Blum, 1984). Intolerance of ambiguity reflects
the tendency towards a more rigid and dogmatic rather than flexible cogni¬
tive style. It seems worthwhile exploring this variable in relation to reports
of paranormal experience and also to performance in parapsychological
experiments. Much of the pre-experimental protocol in free response ESP
tests such as the Ganzfeld (a partial sensory deprivation paradigm,
Honorton, 1977) aims to encourage a flexible cognitive approach to the task
through relaxed attention to mentation; anything that comes to mind is
reported with little attention diverted to making sense of the images experi¬
enced. Participants with a tendency towards low tolerance of ambiguity
would respond in line with personal preferences when faced with weak and
almost certainly ambiguous signals. Also regarding reports of paranormal
experiences which are closer in form to hallucinations, it might be assumed
that individuals who are more intolerant of ambiguity may carry out judge¬
ments relatively rapidly on ambiguous stimuli and as a consequence possi¬
bly draw unreliable conclusions.
Frenkel-Brunswik (1949) provided an early description of tolerance of
ambiguity as a personality variable, she was predominantly interested in the
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relation of this variable to authoritarianism and prejudice. It was defined by
Frenkel-Brunswik as a "tendency to resort to black-white solutions, to arrive
at premature closure as to valuative aspects, often at the neglect of reality,
and to seek for unqualified and unambiguous over-all acceptance and rejec¬
tion of other people" (p. 115). The maintenance of such solutions implies
that information potentially threatening to the solution would be actively
avoided. It should be stressed that the close interaction of cognitive and
valuative factors be envisaged here. "It is this problem of 'reality adequacy'
vs. 'reality inadequacy' which injects a distinctly cognitive element into the
broader sphere of the problem of ambivalence" (Frenkel-Brunswik 1949, p.
115). If a person prefers not to think about probabilities, instead choosing
the concrete, this is indicative of intolerance of ambiguity. This bias toward
premature judgement occurs both in social and cognitive/perceptual
spheres, and tolerance of ambiguity according to Frenkel-Brunswik might
be evidence of the incapability to see things in two or more different ways.
In an early study, which Frenkel-Brunswik (1949) describes as a 'tenta¬
tive experiment' looking at prejudiced people (which might be a manifesta¬
tion of tolerance of ambiguity) revealed that they preferred to maintain ini¬
tial judgements on identifying ambiguous drawings (e.g., a dog which
changed over a series of presentations to a cat). They responded more slow¬
ly to changes in the stimuli, they tended not to see the features of later pre¬
sentations which did not harmonise with their prior judgement, they also
avoided the use of any transitional judgements on the nature of the stimu¬
lus. When the perseverance with a particular judgement could not be main¬
tained these subjects seemed to engage in haphazard guessing or 'a blocking
by the uncertainties inherent in the situation', (p. 128) It would seem that
the general characteristic isolated by these studies was that prejudiced
(more intolerant) participants remain with what is familiar rather than
avoiding novel solutions or judgements compared to unprejudiced partici¬
pants.
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(Heilbrun & Blum, 1984). Differences were found between reactive (good
premorbid, predominantly external attentional focus) and process (poor pre¬
morbid, predominantly internal attentional focus) psychiatric patients (see
De Wolfe, 1974) on tolerance of ambiguity and upon availability of unusual
meanings.
The main focus for this result: reactives tend to focus their attention
towards external events (with the possible risk of stimulus flooding, where¬
as process patients focus upon the internal environment restricting the
deployment of attention towards external stimuli). This would mean that
they would more likely to show deficits in this type of cognitive function¬
ing. Heilbrun (1984) notes that excessive outward deployment of attention
may create the risk of auditory hallucinations in some people whereas
excessively inward-directed attention may do the same in others. Assuming
that this would be facilitated by the tendency towards limited processing of
possible sources of stimulation (either real or imaginal) this would no doubt
incur the possibility of misinterpretation or elaboration of these sources.
Heilbrun (1972) examined the tolerance of ambiguity in late adolescent
males in relation to the development of paranoid behaviour. He argued for
a model in which paranoid behaviour develops out of a particular style of
interaction of mother and son. Heilbrun notes that the open-adaptive style
which is "characterised by a vigilance towards social cues and the imposi¬
tion of meaning in the absence of clarity is disposed to broad-scanning of
the social environment and a narrow scanning of symbolic cues". The major
attentional disposition is towards external happenings rather than thinking
through their meanings. These tendencies in the open style adaptor, both
the orientation and sensitivity to extrinsic evaluation and the liability to
impose meaning on unclearly communicated messages combine to make
him intolerant of ambiguity in the meaning of external cues. Further,
Heilbrun suggests that this tendency toward premature evaluation and attri¬
bution of meaning can contribute towards episodes of disorganised thinking
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There have been very few attempts to explore paranormal belief in
relation to ambiguity intolerance (although studies have been undertaken
employing related measures such as rigidity and dogmatism (Alcock & Otis,
1980;Tobacyk & Milford, 1983). Nanko (1986) took ambiguity tolerance as
one of three measures of critical thinking and related these to paranormal
belief. Ambiguity tolerance was not significantly related to global paranor¬
mal belief but was negatively correlated with sub-factors such as supersti-
tiousness and traditional religious belief. Clearly this finding supports early
research (e.g., Budner, 1962) which demonstrated links between ambiguity
intolerance and traditional religiosity. It seems possible that ambiguity
intolerance may be viewed as a dimension upon which high scorers at
either end are inclined to report unusual experiences and beliefs.
In a recent study, Thalbourne, Dunbar and Delin (1995) explored a
wide range of possible correlates of paranormal belief. They examined dog¬
matism as measured by Rokeach's scale (1960) and ambiguity tolerance
using McDonald's (1972) scale. Correlating scores on these measures with
both the 10 item Australian Sheep-Goat Scale (ASGS—Thalbourne, 1981)
and the Paranormal Belief Scale (PBS—Tobacyk, 1988) they obtained small
to medium positive correlations between dogmatism and the PBS but no
relationship with the ASGS. Ambiguity tolerance showed a small positive
but non-significant relationship with the ASGS, no relationship with total
score on the PBS and a small negative relationship with the traditional reli¬
gious belief subscale.
Keinan (1994) in a study of the effects of stress in the war zone envi¬
ronment of Israel during the Gulf conflict, found that intolerance of ambigu¬
ity interacted with stress resulting in higher levels of magical thinking. In
particular, he examined two laws of magical thinking: the law of contagion
— the notion that something once in contact remains in contact, and the law
of similarity — which holds that things that resemble each other share fun¬
damental properties. Keinan found that both measures of magical thinking
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correlated positively with stress and negatively with ambiguity tolerance. It
was also found that magical thinking was more likely to emerge in high
stress conditions in those individuals with low levels of tolerance of ambi¬
guity.
Paranormal belief, according to some researchers, is a method of cop¬
ing with uncertainty. Zusne (1985) has argued that such beliefs are a way of
dealing with uncertainty and cognitive dissonance. Schumaker (1990) takes
this idea to its logical conclusion. For Schumaker, belief in the paranormal
is an important evolutionary development, a delusion which heads off the
anxieties and fears associated with death.
Pronounced levels of intolerance of ambiguity are probably related to
categorisation processes largely informed by emotional defensiveness and
intellectual rigidity; pronounced levels of ambiguity tolerance are likely to
promote a labile and weak boundaried form of categorisation permitting the
overlap of a wide number of concepts. The association of anomalous expe¬
rience and belief with ambiguity intolerance seems to depend on the kinds
of phenomena inherent in rigid philosophical and religious systems. On the
other hand, the relationship of these kinds of experiences to ambiguity toler¬
ance seems to be related to alternate states of cognitive processing.
Impulsivity
The descriptions of the bias present in hallucinators as offered in the
literature (Heilbrun & Blum, 1984; Bentall, 1990) suggest that ambiguity
intolerance is characterised by rather fast judgements with a disregard for
cautious assessment. This is comparable with definitions of ambiguity intol¬
erance offered by Frenkel-Brunswik (1949) who notes that individuals high¬
er on intolerance tend to make premature judgements. Another variable
which is worth examining here is that of impulsivity. Impulsivity as defined
by Dickman (1990) indicates a tendency to enjoy making fast judgements.
In contrast to Eysenck & Eysenck's (1978) concept of impulsivity Dickman
addresses both functional and dysfunctional aspects of this trait. In
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Dickman's view impulsivity may confer certain advantages when it is func¬
tional and hinder when it is dysfunctional.
According to Dickman, dysfunctional impulsivity is related to the fail¬
ure to use slower more methodical approaches under certain circumstances.
He also suggests that stressful circumstances may interfere with a dysfunc¬
tional impulsive's ability to engage in slower and more accurate information
processing strategies.
In a particularly pertinent study, Brunas-Wagstaff, Berquist, Morgan &
Wagstaff (1995) found that dysfunctional impulsives performed poorly on a
task which required them to view ambiguous pictures and ascertain alterna¬
tive interpretations. Functional impulsives however, performed much better
than the dysfunctionals on this task. Brunas-Wagstaff et al. interpret this to
mean that dysfunctional impulsives have difficulty in inhibiting competing
information; instead they become fixated. This does seem to be a rather
similar interpretation to that offered by Frenkel-Brunswik in relation to
intolerance of ambiguity.
Summary
This discussion of bias has attempted to provide a focused view of
decision making. It is worth considering this briefly in a dynamic context.
Heilbrun assumed that intolerance of ambiguity arose in individuals who
were exposed to certain family dynamics especially where a parent demon¬
strated high levels of control. This situation, according to Heilbrun, leads to
a paranoid cognitive style which is highly vigilant and prone to make judge¬
ments quickly as a form of defence. This cognitive style might be seen as a
rather rigid one which relies on strong conceptual and categorical bound¬
aries as opposed to weaker more fluid boundaries. Hartmann's (1991) work
on conceptual boundaries is relevant here. Thin boundaried people are con¬
sidered to demonstrate fluid thinking which does not separate things out or
make a sharp distinctions between themselves and the rest of the world
(this would of course incur reality monitoring failures if we view this from a
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cognitive perspective). On the the other hand, thick boundaried people will
be more defensive and show marked distinctions between themselves, oth¬
ers and the world in general. This dimension seems to readily ally itself
with interpretations of a five-factor model of personality (the so-called big
five; McCrae & John, 1992). McCraeand John describe a factor which they
call 'openness to experience'. People who score highly on this factor tend to
be more imaginative, open to ideas and seek aesthetic stimuli as opposed to
being closed and somewhat rigid in their thinking. This echoes Hartmann's
concept of boundaries. This is also interesting because of the distinction
made here between judgement bias (characterised above by ambiguity intol¬
erance) and imagination (characterised mainly by absorption). This is per¬
haps less of a dichotomy and more of a dimension, with people adopting
different positions and making more or less errors (or possibly even errors
of different kinds — one arising from a lack of categorical thinking and the
other from an over dependence upon personal categorical thinking) in their
reality monitoring. Or to take another perfectly legitimate interpretation,
the more fluid and thinner boundaried imaginative people are making cre¬
ative perceptions of the world which may have a reality as well but one
which jars with currently accepted definitions of consensual reality. In fact
these perceptions may be the basis of much of our creation of facts via the
construction of new ways of seeing reality and creating meaning.
Imagination
There are a number of threads of evidence which suggest that an imag¬
inative style of cognition is relatively common amongst experients of the
paranormal (Irwin, 1993). There is also what might be identified as an
imaginative tendency in a number of forms of psychopathology (Ingram,
1990) — this is particularly implicated in the concept of schizotypy where
pronounced levels of unusual perceptual and ideational content are defining
characteristics. The term imagination will be used here to organise a discus¬
sion of a range of phenomena which have been associated with paranormal
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experience as well as hallucinatory experiences as discussed in the clinical
literature.
Fantasy Proneness
An orientation towards an imaginative cognitive style in experients of
the paranormal was identified in a classic study by Wilson and Barber
(1983). A number of secretarial students who were described as excellent
hypnotic subjects were classified by Wilson and Barber as fantasy-prone' (a
term with unfortunate negative connotations). The characteristics of fantasy
proneness include high suggestibility (without the aid of hypnotic induction
procedures) and the frequent occurrence of hallucinatory experiences which
sometimes are taken for reality; in addition a good number of these fantasy
prone individuals (estimated at 4-5% of the population) reported paranor¬
mal beliefs and experiences. According to Wilson and Barber 65% of their
fantasy prone personality group reported that their fantasies were as real to
them as their sensory experiences:
They see sights equally well with their eyes opened or closed. Also,
imagined aromas are sense, imagined sounds are heard, and imag¬
ined tactile sensations are felt as convincingly as those produced by
actual stimuli.... almost all of the fantasy prone subjects have vivid
sexual fantasies that they experience "as real as real" with all the
sights, sound, smells and emotions, feelings, and physical sensa¬
tions.... [and they] are so realistic that 75% of the fantasizers report
that they have had orgasms produced solely by sexual fantasies.
(Wilson & Barber, 1983, p. 351).
The fantasy prone personality possesses pronounced imaginative abili¬
ties and according to Wilson and Barber 92% of the fantasy prone personali¬
ties in their study considered themselves to be psychic. It is obvious that
these imaginative capacities, where subjective experience is "real as real",
could lead a person to believe that they had had an experience which could
also be described in terms of a reality monitoring failure discussed earlier.
From a skeptical and objectivist position paranormal experience is readily
associated with over-imaginativeness (Alcock, 1981). However given the
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obvious imaginative abilities of creative populations and their unparalleled
achievement in ESP ganzfeld studies (Honorton and Ferrari, 1989) it may
also be that this kind of imaginative processing provides a labile form of
cognition that would be open to real psi influence.
Fantasy proneness is positively related to global paranormal belief (as
measured by Tobacyk's, 1988, paranormal belief scale) and to its subcompo¬
nents with the singular exception of superstitiousness (Irwin, 1990). Fantasy
proneness also occupies a prominent position in a model offered by Irwin
(1993) which describes the developmental context of paranormal belief. He
sees fantasy as a response to traumatic childhood experience and to parental
encouragement of fantasy and as providing a sense of control over often
uncontrollable events. Further discussion will be oriented around the con¬
cept of imaginative absorption (Tellegen, 1982) which is highly correlated
with fantasy proneness (as measured by the inventory of childhood memo¬
ries and imaginings). This is more useful in that it provides a clearer con¬
cept of this imaginative attentional style (in terms of the items used in the
scale) than fantasy proneness and in measurement relates to current rather
childhood experience. It should be kept in mind that according to Rhue and
Lynn (1987) fantasy proneness and absorption are not truly discriminable
constructs.
Imaginative absorption
Absorption as measured by the Tellegen Absorption Scale (which is
part of the multidimensional personality questionnaire, Tellegen, 1982; 1992)
is seen as a general capacity for entering experiential states which are char¬
acterised by a marked restructuring of cognition, this is demonstrated in a
narrowing or expansion of consciousness, deep involvement with the stimu¬
lus and a heightened sense of reality. According to Tellegen (1992):
Absorption appears to represent a disposition to enter under con¬
ducive circumstances psychological states that are characterised by
marked restructuring of the phenomenal self and world. These more
or less transient states may have a dissociated or an integrative and
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ty students along with a measure of subjective paranormal experience. The
results highlighted that absorption was important in discriminating experi-
ents from non-experients of the paranormal on a number of kinds of experi¬
ences (the only non-significant result was for experiences of psychokinesis).
People who attain high absorption scores tend to adopt a highly
focused experiential set which is reliant upon mental imagery and emotion¬
al contact with attentional objects. This intimate relationship between self
and the attentional object has led to the proposal that high absorption sub¬
jects tend to incorporate into their sensory experience events that are subtly
cued by their imaginings (Tellegen, 1981). The kind of increased reality of
internal events which is characteristic of this cognitive style, corresponds
well with some explanations of how hallucinations and delusions may origi¬
nate. For instance, this relates back to earlier discussion of reality monitor¬
ing where Johnson and Raye (1981) have noted that it is likely that we are
continually engaged in a metacognitive process of assessing the qualities of
private and public experience, in order to properly attribute it to internal or
external origins. On occasions this process fails and internal events such as
dreams or mental imagery may be misattributed to external sources.
Johnson, Hastroudi and Lindsay (1993) have proposed that this monitoring
process is particularly vulnerable to failure during periods of stress, distrac¬
tion or divided attention.
Absorption as a capacity to restructure one's phenomenal field, espe¬
cially the experienced self and its boundaries, can be seen as a function of
other personality characteristics (Tellegen, 1982). The experiences and imag¬
inings of high absorption persons will interact with their experiential histo¬
ry. Depending upon the interaction of personality characteristics and per¬
sonal history these experiences will be "primarily integrative or disruptive,
communal or alienating, pleasurable or distressing" (Tellegen, 1992, p.2).
There is also the suggestion that a hallmark of high absorption would be a
tendency to appraise information in such a way that links it to the self. One
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states. Parker notes how absorption seems to taps a psychopathological
dimension, specifically unusual perceptual, ideational experiences and
altered states of consciousness. According to Parker, the truly pathological
aspects of these experiences involve a sense of threat and a recognition of
lack of control.
He proposes that defensiveness may also play a role in leading indi¬
viduals to respond in a threatened way to these unusual experiences and
view them as alien to the self. He assumes that "schizophrenia is an
enforced state of perceptual absorption in inner conflicts leading to percep¬
tual aberrations which by nature of the individual's defensiveness are inter¬
preted as alien and become delusory" (p. 174).
He also speculates that people showing schizotypal traits such as pro¬
nounced levels of magical ideation would rather attribute more significance
to their chance experiences and if they took part in an ESP experiment the
same outcome would arise. However, Parker considers it unlikely that these
factors would allow any clear relationship to actual success on the ESP test
because they would often be so strongly coloured by personal needs.
Similar psychopathological correlates of paranormal belief were identi¬
fied some time ago in an early paper by Windholz and Diamant, (1974):
The believers have neurotic tendencies that express themselves in
subjective suffering and complaints about somatic symptoms. These
individuals also have a greater propensity to action, especially of the
impulsive sort rather than for deliberate, planned action.
Dissatisfied and impulsively motivated they have a tendency to
reflect, where their thought is of abstract rather than concrete nature.
Apparently, their general dissatisfaction expresses itself in the more
emotional rather than objective thought processes. Hence, the ten¬
dency is toward private, more fantastic contents of beliefs that char¬
acterise the schizophrenic thinking, (p. 126)
Schizotypy
Imaginative traits are considered as pathological if they lead to gross
impairments of reality testing and functional problems in daily living.
These have been discussed both in terms of schizophrenia and schizotypy (a
predisposition towards schizophrenia).
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In recent years there has been a considerable body of research which
has advocated a new view of schizophrenic symptomatology. Traditionally
schizophrenia has been viewed as a disease entity which is sharply differen¬
tiated as a gross and sudden deviation from normality. More recently there
has been a move to view psychosis as a trait or graded set of traits which
are widely distributed in the general population. In effect, many well
adjusted people will demonstrate milder forms of schizophrenic symptoma¬
tology but only a few of these will develop full blown psychosis. Claridge
(1985) has suggested that 'schizotypy', the term used to described this set of
traits, is analogous to the traits which increase the likelihood of coronary
problems. If you have high blood pressure and tend to respond badly to
stress then there will be a higher likelihood of your developing heart prob¬
lems. Higher levels of the symptoms of schizotypy make it more likely that
you will develop full blown schizophrenia if they are combined with suffi¬
ciently stressful life experiences. The concept of schizotypy has obvious
benefits in predicting the eventual development of psychosis (Chapman,
Chapman, Kwapil, Eckblad & Zinser, 1994).
Different sets of symptoms are observed in schizophrenia. Positive
symptoms' which relate to hallucinatory and delusional experiences and
'negative symptoms' which concern tendencies towards asocial behaviour
are both recorded to different degrees in different cases of schizophrenia.
Examinations of these symptoms on a much wider scale have been made
possible by the theoretical conjecture that these symptoms also exist on a
continuum in the normal population. Psychometric studies carried out on
samples from the normal population as well as student samples have pro¬
vided support for these two types of symptoms as well as for perhaps a
third set of symptoms which seem to be composed of both positive and neg¬
ative aspects. Bentall, Claridge & Slade (1989) reported a threefold structure
which included positive symptoms as tapped by scales measuring magical
thinking and hallucinatory experiences; negative symptoms as tapped by
49
measures of anhedonia and cognitive disorganisation or social anxiety
tapped by the neuroticism scale and by Claridge's schizotypal personality
scale. These symptoms can be exhibited to different degrees as shown in a
cluster analysis study by Williams (1991).
The construction of the schizotypy construct creates some concern over
deciding where 'merely unusual' experiences fade into symptoms and
become a clinical problem. Some have argued that the concept of schizo¬
phrenia as a discrete illness does not stand up to criticism (Bentall, Jackson
& Pilgrim, 1988). Another possible issue which can be raised in terms of
these sets of symptoms is the degree to which these are specifically related
to psychiatric problems and to what degree they are manifestations of
already recognised general personality traits. Eysenck has provided a
robust three factor model of personality (E,P & N) which tends to account
for most traits which compose larger factorial models of personality. It is
noticeable that N is related to the cognitive disorganisation and social anxi¬
ety factors of schizotypy and E is clearly evident in the asocial character of
negative symptoms. Eysenck's P scale tends to characterise antisocial and
perhaps sociopathic behaviour and sits outside of the usual schizotypy
structure. If instead of using Eysenck's taxonomy we adopted a five factor
model of personality then it seems reasonable to draw parallels between the
openness to experience trait and the positive symptoms of schizotypy.
There does seem to be a reasonable fit between the factors of schizotypy and
the broader models of personality which raises the question once more
'when and under what circumstances do these traits become pathological'?
Magical ideation and hallucinations are those facets of schizotypy
which are most closely related to paranormal belief and experience. In fact,
in the DSMIIIr there are specific references to belief in paranormal causation
or perception which pathologise the experience or belief.
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Imagery
In both the spontaneous paranormal experiences and in experimental
studies it has been found that imagery is predictive of spontaneous experi¬
ence and also of psi performance (George, 1981). For example, strength of
imagery has been considered as important variable in the out of body expe¬
rience (Blackmore, 1984). Irwin (1985) notes that absorption in a somoaes-
thetic image (which may be synesthetically transformed into visual image)
may underlie OBE's.
Particular experimental paradigms which emphasise conducive condi¬
tions for performance, for instance the highly successful ganzfeld paradigm
(Honorton, 1977) provides the right conditions for effortless attention to
internal states. Greater exposure to these states, to imaginative involvement
in themes relevant to paranormal phenomena, would feasibly increase the
likelihood of both experiences and conviction in the reality status of those
experiences — in effect, imagining is believing (see Koehler 1991).
A number of researchers have proposed that abnormally vivid imagery
might on occasions be thought to have a sensory origin (Mintz and Alpert,
1972; Horowitz, 1975; Jakes and Hemsley, 1986; 1987; Barrett, 1993).
Attempts have also been made to assess the preferred mode of imagery
(e.g., Heilbrun et al., 1983). These investigations have focussed on both nor¬
mal and psychiatric subjects and as Bentall (1990) remarks in his review of
hallucinations research that the findings have been inconsistent. More
recently, the work of Barrett (1993) has indicated that verbal hallucinations
are quite common in a student population and that these may be caused by
imagery vividness. He found that as many as 25% of students responded to
a questionnaire admitting that they had experienced frequent auditory hal¬
lucinations. Employing questionnaire measures of vividness of imagery,
Barrett found that hallucinators rated their imagery as significantly more
vivid than non-hallucinators. It might be suggested that these results could
possibly be attributed to demand characteristics. However, a second study
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carried out by Barrett showed a similar pattern of results to the first, with
hallucinators reporting more vivid imagery than non-hall ucinators, while no
difference was detected in control of imagery between the two groups.
Mintz and Alpert (1972) proposed that the experiences of hallucinators
are due to abnormal' vivid imagery and impaired reality testing. Horowitz
(1975) argued that it may be possible that hallucinators, while experiencing
vivid imagery at the time of their hallucinations, probably are deficient in
imagery at other times and they mistake occasional vivid imagery to have
the kinds of cues and "realism" expected of external stimuli.
'Transliminality'
In hallucinations research it has been proposed that the seepage of pre-
conscious or subconscious material into conscious awareness can account
for hallucinations (West, 1962). A more recent theory with a similar con¬
tention implicates the failure of cognitive filters which normally offset this
seepage (Frith, 1979). Irwin (1986) proposes that high levels of hypnotic
suggestibility and low levels of psychodynamic defensiveness characterises
individuals who are responsive to this subconscious content. Irwin howev¬
er, prefers to translate these concepts into terminology more appropriate to
a cognitive perspective.
The relationship between schizophrenia, magical thinking and para¬
normal belief, although explicit in the diagnostic criteria of the DSMII1
(APA, 1980), was empirically assessed by Thalbourne (1985). Thalbourne
found that much to his surprise the magical ideation scale — a measure of
schizotypy (Eckblad & Chapman, 1983), was positively and significantly
related to paranormal belief as measured by the Australian Sheep-Goat
Scale (Thalbourne, 1981). In spite of the omission of possible overlapping
items from the magical ideation scale there was a residual significant corre¬
lation. Thalbourne, himself a manic depressive, concluded that believers in
the paranormal seemed more likely to demonstrate schizophrenia-like expe¬
riences; he recently replicated this finding (Thalbourne, 1994). In a more
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recent study Thalbourne and Delin (1994) explored the relationship of para¬
normal belief to a variety of other variables including degree of creativity,
mystical experience and aspects of psychopathology (magical ideation,
hypomania, and symptoms representing mania and depression). A princi¬
ple components analysis yielded a single factor which they tentatively name
transliminality in an attempt to communicate a tendency and willingness to
experience the contents of preconscious, subconscious regions of the mind.
This factor, according to Thalbourne and Delin, indicates a 'largely involun¬
tary susceptibility to, and awareness of, large volumes of inwardly generat¬
ed psychological phenomena of an ideational and affective kind'. The corre¬
lates of this factor include religious experience and interest in dream inter¬
pretation as well as a proneness to hallucinations. They conjecture that if
subsequent research validates this construct then paranormal belief and
experience will be seen as one type of consequence among many of a mind
possessing high transliminality.
Cognition and anomalous experiences
In the preceding discussion there has been a general review of person¬
ality variables and their relation to anomalous experiences, both paranormal
and psychopathological. It was conjectured that there were two main cate¬
gories of personality factors (bias and imagination) which have been associ¬
ated with hallucinations, anomalous and paranormal experience, and fur¬
ther that these may be indicative of a broad dimension which is charac¬
terised at one end of the spectrum by sharp boundaried categorisation as
opposed to more fluid and blurred categorisation at the other. In this sec¬
tion the phenomenological aspects of these cognitive styles will be discussed
with particular attention paid to the role of arousal in the generation of
these experiences.
It seems likely that as well as these preferential cognitive styles there
will be a tendency towards these kinds of styles as shifts in arousal take
place. West (1962) described a model in which hallucinations could take
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place at high or low levels of arousal. At low levels of arousal they occur in
a similar way to the onset of dreams and at high levels they occur as a
response to what West calls 'jamming of the circuits'. Slade and Bentall
(1988) discuss how arousal is likely to play an important part in the genera¬
tion of hallucinations. More generally Friedland and Keinan (1991) hypoth¬
esised and received support for the notion that stress would strengthen the
tendency of individuals to apply causal explanations to events of any kind,
including events that do not directly affect them or are unrelated to their
condition. Relaxed states also incur unusual perceptual and ideational con¬
tent, Mavromatis (1987) describes the stark similarity of hypnagogic experi¬
ences to both hallucinations and psi experiences.
If we take an abstract and hypothetical example of normal everyday
states of awareness, we might presume that cognition for most people is
characterised by a relatively alert attentional state which deals optimally
with both internal and external experience. The distinction between percep¬
tions of self, body boundaries etc. are salient but are not pronounced. From
a reality monitoring perspective it is likely that attention shifts between
internal and external features of this experiential ecology and engages in
processing both salient and relatively unavailable associated material
(Ingram, 1991). Taking this hypothetical norm as a bench mark we should
be able to plot possible changes in the environment or personality traits that
drive attention to (high) narrow or (low) broader focus with associated
changes in cognition, experience of self, body boundaries, and experienced
reality. It is argued that major changes in cognition which appear in strong
altered states of consciousness and in psychotic states obviously incur
changes in the construction of reality for the person experiencing them.
Heightening and lowering the focus
The pattern and dynamics of cognition change, we might picture it, as
a stream of consciousness ranging from a fast flowing brook which throws
separate droplets of water into the air as it crashes over stones to a slow
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moving river where the only movements on the surface are signs blurring
tensions between deeper currents.
Gelernter (1994) presents a valuable discussion of the range of cogni¬
tion or 'mental focus' with its shift between narrow focus and higher detail
to broader focus and a more diffuse pattern of detail. According to
Gelernter science is a high focus activity, it requires the detection of differ¬
ences, borders and polished details and is characterised by honing in, and
suppressing individual idiosyncrasies in favour of common features. The
narrow attentional beam in high focus thought which deals with details
tends to neglect context and ambience which are the watchwords of low
focussed attention with it's much broader attentional beam. Gelernter fur¬
ther describes the differences between these two modes of cognition. Low
focus attention is like drifting off into associations while reading (normally a
high focus activity — except perhaps when a measure of low focus thought
is needed while reading poetry). High focus thought can keep us awake at
night focussed on details rather than permitting the usual move down¬
stream to more blurred associations.
High focus thought has become something of a standard for the mod¬
ern mind, it is associated with rational, analytic thought, and with science.
It is highly likely that the ancient mind relied much more on the low focus
end of the spectrum. High focus thought relies less on association and so is
more removed from emotion and creativity; of course, for most people there
is a flow between these two modes of thought. Sharp, analytical thinking
requires the blurred boundaries of low focus thinking in order to provide
inspiration and answers to problems. Although high focussed thought sets
the question it is often in the reflective pause that ensues that the answer
arrives.
As low focus thought becomes more prominent there is a shift
towards more global thinking where emotion and affect play a role.
Whereas in the rational analytic mode of high focus thinking there are dis-
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crete entities, clear boundaries and logical entailment the logic of low focus
thought is reliant on imagery rather than words and metaphorical rather
than literal relationships. According to Gelernter this provides us with par¬
allels with an older way of thinking. He also notes that you can see the evi¬
dence of this mind in the writings of the distant past. For instance in
ancient literature such as the bible you can see this tendency to have a plas¬
tic illogical constructed quality.
There is an obvious antithesis, then between the mental universe of
antiquity; dream and child and the analytic rigour of "rational man."
But it isn't by a long shot merely the timevvorn, threadbare antithesis
between "metaphoric thought" and "logical thought." There is the
whole rich world of mental phenomena that accompanies the nonra-
tional states of mind. It is a strange-seeming world, uncanny even, in
which thoughts are vivid (verging on hallucinatory) and thought-
streams can be oddly and illogically built, where unexpected connec¬
tions emerge like the features of a moonlit landscape as you grow
used to the dark, and memories are slippery: it's hard to recall just
what happened, and where you have been... (p. 13)
Movement down the cognitive continuum to lower focus thought
results in problems:
ranging from a loss of control over the thought-stream to an
increased propensity to have creative insights and to encounter vivid
imaginings or even hallucinations, a relaxation of logic, a loss of
"goal-directedness" and all directedness, and the emergence of emo¬
tion as the main glue of thought. But it is essential to grasp that this
is no mere jumble of thoughts that just happen (allegedly) to be cor¬
related. These are all consequences of one underlying event. They
are all consequences of the relaxation or lowering or widening of the
crucial property I have called mental focus. Lowering mental focus
causes all of these processes to occur, (p. 14)
We have tended to emphasise a very narrow view of thinking and cog¬
nition in contemporary cognitive science and psychology. This consequent¬
ly leads to narrow views and definitions of reality and thought exemplified
by Gelernter (1994):
When the cognitive psychologist Robert Sternberg (1982, 225) writes
that "reasoning, problem solving, and intelligence are so closely
interrelated that it is often difficult to tell them apart," he is trying to
tell us something: that intelligent thought is directed at a goal, dedi¬
cated to the rational solution of a problem. Anyone who has ever
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looked out of his window, let his mind wander and realised that
indeed he is still, right now, manifesting his intelligence, knows that
this is false. From my perspective, the mainstream's view of thought
is a parody. Thinking is vastly richer than that. A thought theory
that never comes to grips with intuition, hallucination, spirituality or
dreaming cannot possibly be a serious account of cognition, (p. 15)
This unfocussed attention generates unexpected connections and a
sense of relationship and it strikes us because amongst other things it is
involuntary, vivid and meaningful. In a sense^ the aggregate of the charac¬
teristics of hallucinations (Aggarnaes' criteria) as experienced are moulded
in terms of a metaphorical and affective form.
Gelernter argues that this lowered focus is also indicative of creative
states. Lowering the focus permits the connection of usually unconnected
things as well as permitting new insights to be obtained through analogistic
and metaphorical states — seeing things in a new light.
Lowering your mental focus allows creativity to happen, then it must
encourage the discovery of unexpected connections. Analogies,
metaphors, unexpected connections start to emerge as we make our
way down-spectrum Unexpected connections are also part of
childhood cognition ("chaining," metaphor); and are central to
dreaming, (p. 16)
Not only is this lowered focus characteristic of older frames of mind it
is a common state for children. Gelertner argues that children have vivid
imaginations, they commonly hallucinate and they are very good at free
associating, all of these are characteristics of cognition which are experien¬
tial and complement more logical, rational, sharply focused thought. He
also notes that it is this logical level of mentation which children are charac¬
teristically bad at. Adults can relive some of this ancient and childlike way
of thinking as they progress towards a state of sleep. When this happens
thinking is more concrete, more real. Nelson (1989) in reference to what he
calls the Ontic Shift (a change in the perceived reality which becomes the
basis for decisions about reality) argues a similar point.
This distinction is further apparent in discussion of memory recall.
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Whereas memories formed at high focus are recalled by focusing on details,
low focus memories on the other hand are whole events, thought is concrete
instead of abstract.
The breadth and inclusiveness of memories recalled at low focus give
those recollections their potentially hallucinatory power to transport
the thinker to another time and place. The breadth and inclusiveness
of memories formed at low focus makes them slippery. What
emerges isn't detail but ambience. If a memory is formed, not of any¬
thing in particular but of everything in general, then, other things
being equal, it's hard to grasp such a memory; hard to find any men¬
tal handhold. (The very quirk that makes memories slippery is the
same quirk, of course, that makes thought vivid and potentially hal¬
lucinatory; and makes thinking not abstract but concrete.) (p. 23)
This is of particular importance in relation to the kinds of experiences
under discussion here. During episodes of low focus thought, cognition is
characterised by the generation of subjective yet concrete mental representa¬
tions which are low in perceived voluntariness and high in the perceived
sense of reality. These are precisely the conditions which according to
Aggarnaes (1972) define objective experience and according to Johnson &
Raye (1981) will lead to reality monitoring failures.
Although these experiences are concrete with a certain fleshiness of
reality they can also partake of a strange quality which singles them out
from experience in the normal bandwidth of thought. They are likely to pos¬
sess metaphorical structures informed by affect. To provide a clarifying
example here, we might assume, for instance, that an apparition appearing
to someone in bed late at night can have all the features of a sensory event,
seem solid, detailed, animated and seemingly with a volition and indepen¬
dence of its own, yet be related to the current emotions of the experient. If
the experient is distressed the apparition can give advice and reassurance, if
the experient feels guilty it might admonish and reprimand. Its appearance
or communication may also bear testimony to the emotional and metaphori¬
cal matrix in which it was born. Many of the alien contact experiences bear
characteristic dream-like logic where the aliens' appearance and what they
say or do is strangely incongruous (Vallee, 1988). The creativity involved in
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low focus thought is also likely to inform psychotic episodes and may
account for the complex accounts provided by the experients. To give
another example here, it has been found that paranoia is partially defined
by normal attribution processes. According to a cognitive psychological
view the individual displaying paranoia makes external attributions, he/she
simply blames others rather than him/her self (Bentall, Kaney & Dewey,
1991). But it tends not to be a simple attribution to another person or event,
it is often a drama of more epic proportions that is reported by the paranoid
individual. This suggests a role for low focus thought and particularly for
the further indications of the metaphorical and analogical structure of such
thought.
According to Gelernter the links and associations between thought are
based on affective tenor — emotions are the glue which binds thoughts
together. He quotes Coleridge on this matter:
I hold, that association depends in a much greater degree on the
recurrence of resembling states of Feeling, than on Trains of Ideas ... 1
almost think, that Ideas never recall Ideas, as far as they are Ideas—
any more than Leaves in a forest create each other's motion—The
Breeze it is that runs through them; it is the Soul, the state of
Feeling— (p. 27)
It has also been suggested that dream images and the memory traces
they represent may be associatively linked by a capacity to evoke the same
emotions (Resier, 1990). It is clear then, that conceptual metaphor can be
seen as operating as a primary process which is largely preconceptual,
prelinguistic and enactive. It is likely that this syncretic activity, primary
process, low focus, experiential thought is allied not only to metaphor but to
an earlier and more primary process of synesthesia (Osgood, 1980).
Synesthetic processing is metaphor without the words; it uses one
domain to structure and inform another. It draws on similarities and differ¬
ences across sensory and conceptual domains to construct forms. This
metaphorical construction process will be discussed more fully in a later
chapter, suffice it to say that synesthesia and metaphor are likely to struc-
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ture sensory, conceptual and linguistic domains in low focus thought.
The low focus attentional state or style is linked by Gelernter with cre¬
ativity and spirituality and is viewed as largely mediated by emotion.
Emotion permits the association of memories whose contents are completely
different. Emotion is a content-transcending abstraction. We have already
mentioned the typical creative insight where the idea comes from nowhere,
possibly following a period of concentration on a problem. Low focus
thought is tied to spirituality because the former infuses the latter with a
sense of interconnectedness — the sense that all life is linked — which is the
root of spirituality. Whereas creativity is sudden fleeting connection
between two formerly separate domains, spirituality is a sustained process
of connection. Creativity is seeing connections and spirituality is a sense of
connectedness, of wholeness (Gelernter, 1994).
The primacy of wholeness at this level of thought relates to what Bohm
(1980) called the implicate order, where mind and matter are more closely
related. Chadwick (1988; 1992) reports his own psychotic experiences in
terms of what he calls the 'borderliner'—this is a person who occupies a
transliminal realm which is close to the creation of reality — they exist near
to a matrix of imaginative flux where the traditional objects we know are
fluid and in which new forms are nascent. It is at this level that creativity
and its vehicle metaphor define and construct what we later take as reality.
Chadwick (1992) notes that he felt he had discovered the truth in terms
of the structuring rules of rational mind:
it was how rational mind had to think in order to have any purchase
on the world in the first instance. And yet this was a bias, the true
'reality' back of all this was undifferentiated. In many ways my
thinking was similar to that articulated by David Bohm (1985) who
speaks of the 'implicate' and 'explicate order', the former being the
ground which contains all forms in a kind of holographic potential,
p. 33
According to Chadwick the higher levels of creativity exhibited in psy-
chotics helps them "... to access a domain beyond that reachable by the aver-
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age brain." Chadwick proposes that this domain could be similar to the
psychoid level described by Jung or the implicate order described by Bohm.
In either case matter and mind are merged and Chadwick supposes that an
...understanding of the creative process and associated relational
judgemental processes will give an insight into the deepest (or high¬
est) levels of reality. 1988, p. 21
Also:
... in the mystical-creative or borderline state one has a direct appre¬
hension of reality—one feels "at one" with the Truth. This is quite
different from the realm of discourse appropriate to talking about a
spade digging. The person in the mystical or the related delusional
psychotic state is not doing but being, not operating but resonating,
not diving but floating, not changing or manipulating but experienc¬
ing an essence; mapping onto, establishing an absorbed state of pari¬
ty. Here there is no demarcation between res extensa and res cogitans.
Given the quality of the experience it is possible that some insight
into how this is permitted and into what happens when it occurs will
give us a glimpse of what we are resonating to or what we are estab¬
lishing an absorbed parity with. In this endeavour the study of psy¬
chology may take us to what Niels Bohr (e.g. 1958) often referred to
as deep truth. 1992, p. 98
This distinction between high and low focus thought provides a useful
context in which to view the general personality patterns we have discussed
in relation to anomalous experience. The high focus thought discussed by
Gelernter is a kind of baseline state such as Tart's (1975) discrete state of
consciousness (d-SoC) and in Gelernter's discussion is an adaptive mental
state. Movement downstream to low focus thought is very close to the
kinds of cognition indicated by such traits as absorption. This would partic¬
ularly be the case as one reaches the bedrock of low focus thought —
dreaming. Movement beyond the adaptive states of high focus thought
boosted by high levels of arousal may lead to conceptual rigidity and possi¬
bly incur the jamming of the circuits discussed by West (1962).
Arousal and mental focus
Accepting the movement up and down the mental focus spectrum
described by Gelernter (1994) we can examine the driving force of such tran-
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sitions between different modes of thought. As arousal increases there are
changes in the way attention is allocated. Easterbrook (1954) noted that as
arousal increases beyond normal levels there is a tendency to focus on those
salient details which are easily accessible and some difficulty in entertaining
alternative less salient interpretations.
Fischer (1975) proposed in his cartography of inner space that a contin¬
uum exists between meditation, perception and hallucination which is a
function of changes in physiological arousal. Ergotropic arousal leads to
states such as creativity, anxiety and beyond these (in hyperarousal) to
schizophrenic states and eventually to ecstatic states. Moving from the nor¬
mal state to the other end of the spectrum in terms of trophotropic arousal
the individual experiences relaxed states eventually progressing to medita¬
tive states and (in extreme hypoarousal) samadhi. Each of these lead to a
gradual turning inward toward a mental dimension at the expense of the
physical state of normal consciousness and awareness. Irwin (1995) has pro¬
posed that high or low levels of cortical arousal evoke a state of high
absorption and this can lead to OBE's.
Not only is it likely that marked increase or decrease in arousal from a
normal baseline will change decision making and judgement criteria,
according to Fischer (1975) arousal may also influence the basics of experi¬
ence and be responsible for changing perceptions of constancies such as
size, hue, colour etc.
These information or signal noise ratios (i.e. dimensionless qualities)
are part of our learned projections associated with physical space-
time and daily routine levels of arousal. Other constancies, or invari¬
ants, such as those of size, hue, colour, and taste, are also gradually
transformed or unlearned when one progresses on the perception-
hallucination continuum from the normal through the creative, psy¬
chotic, and, ultimately, to the ecstatic state. The further we progress
on the continuum, the more complete is the transformation, or
unlearning, of the constancies of the physical dimension. Thus St.
Teresa of Avila tells us in her autobiography that at the peak of a
mystical experience, The soul neither hears or feels. While it lasts,
none of the sense perceives or knows what is taking place'. Space
and time, then, which were gradually established in ever-widening
circles during childhood, gradually contract with increasing arousal
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and ultimately disappear.
With rising levels of ergotropic and trophotropic arousal, interpre¬
tive behaviour becomes increasingly dependent on (or less free of)
the subcortical substratum that generates it. p. 208
According to Fischer the separateness of object and subject disappears
with movement along the:
perception-hallucination continuum of hyperarousal from the I
toward the self and reflects the integration of cortical and subcortical
activity on the one hand and the preferential information processing
in the visuospatial, nonverbal hemisphere on the other. In this state
of unity, the separateness of subject and object implicit in dualistic,
Aristotelian logic and language becomes increasingly meaningless;
only an analogical or postlogical, a visuospatial mode of computation
can convey the experience of intense meaning, p. 220
This means that at these unusual levels of experience everyday lan¬
guage loses it's adequacy and that:
During the Self or analog state of highest levels of hyper- or
hypoarousal, meaning can no longer be expressed in dualistic terms,
since the experience of unity is born from the integration of interpre¬
tative (cortical) and interpreted (subcortical) structures. Because this
intense meaning is devoid of specificities, the only way to communi¬
cate its intensity is the metaphor; hence only through the transforma¬
tion of objective sign into subjective symbol in art, literature, and reli¬
gion can the increasing integration of cortical and subcortical activity
be communicated, (p. 221)
Fischer makes a distinction between hyper- and hypoaroused states
and in terms of subject and object relations. In the former there is a tenden¬
cy for the subject and object to lose any sense of separateness and their
fusion becomes the main aspect and content of the experience. In the latter
case it is the detachment of subject from object which suffuses the experi¬
ence and a sense of unity — self reference without content.
Arousal levels not only indicate how an individual will change in
terms of the low or high focussing of thought and in terms of attentional
resources they will determine to what extent an individual depending upon
personality will be inclined to adopt an internal or external perspective.
One example that is useful here is offered by Silverman (1964). He suggests
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that process and reactive schizophrenics differ in that the former seems to
avoid anxiety by taking a predominantly internal perspective relying on
fantasy and hallucinations, while the latter adopts a predominantly external
perspective which is defensive and perceptually vigilant. This external vigi¬
lant approach seems to be associated with more rigid and narrowly
focussed attentional style. While this state is not simply the turning
inwards described by Fischer it is heavily reliant on personal preconceptions
and beliefs to structure perceptions and certainly likely to generate conclu¬
sions which are heavily biased as a result.
A less lofty view of arousal is summarised by Chadwick (1992). He
notes that hyperarousal tends to increase confidence levels and incurs risky
judgement styles, especially in situations where the stimulus is ambiguous.
This particular model hinges heavily on concepts of information processing
capacity and leads to a preference for salient properties at the expense of
more delayed consideration. Chadwick interprets psychotic behaviour in
the light of these tendencies and views the psychotic as displaying early clo¬
sure on perceptual and ideational content and not tolerating ambiguity.
This in turn leads to a risky criterion which maximises hits and minimises
misses. The delusional seeks to confirm his delusions and avoids patterns
which offer disconfirmation.
Summary
To summarise this chapter, it was proposed that phenomenological
similarities exist between unusual perceptions and thoughts which are con¬
sidered as being paranormal and those considered as psychopathological. A
number of personality variables were discussed which were organised
under two general categories of bias and imagination. It was further specu¬
lated that these two categories may function as two different locations on a
single dimension with position on this dimension being dictated by arousal.
The work of David Gelerntner (1994) was discussed as being useful as it
offered a broad principle of low- versus high focus thought. Low focus
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thought was considered to be more experiential and likely to support figu¬
rative and syncretic thought of the kind evidenced in hypnagogia and in
synesthesia. High focus thought on the other hand is what is currently val¬
ued more highly as rational and analytical. Extreme high arousal may also
impair high focus thought and lead once more to low focussed thought and
a higher rate of anomalous experiences, perhaps characterised by a defen¬




Overview of psychometric studies
The three studies that follow all involved presenting respondents with
a range of psychological measures which predominantly address three areas
of interest: 1) paranormal experience, 2) general and cognitive personality
traits and 3) traits indicating predisposition to psychopathology. This range
of measures provide a means of locating paranormal experience in relation
to other personality and cognitive variables as well as particular kinds of
experience (assuming different kinds of experiences may show associations
with different personality traits). As well as permitting indications of asso¬
ciation with other variables, the reasonably large samples and the range of
measures assessed permitted exploratory factor analysis. This again pro¬
vides an idea of the structure of psychometric space in which paranormal
experiences occur.
All three studies presented here were carried out on opportunity sam¬
ples of students. As a result it is difficult to claim any gross principles of
generalisation. However, it may be claimed that the very general processes
and traits which are addressed here would be reasonably represented in
these kinds of populations. Add to this the fact that a large number of stud¬
ies in the area of schizotypal research have been conducted on similar kinds
of samples. The representation of people with zero and low levels of para¬
normal experience was encouraged in each of the studies in order to max¬
imise a range of responses; and to avoid the potential biases of a high return
rate only from those interested in the study because of their high levels of
experience, and a low return rate from those who assume they have little to
say on the matter because they have had no such experiences.
These studies constitute the broad beginnings of the overall investiga¬
tion. These three psychometric studies provide an opportunity to assess the
relationship between a wide range of psychological variables and paranor-
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mal belief and experience. The variables already mentioned in chapter 2
dealing with bias and imagination are examined here in conjunction with
other similar variables. For instance, the imagination variables are com¬
posed of Tellegen's (1992) absorption scale as well as the self consciousness
scale (Fenigstein, Scheier & Buss, 1975). The tendency towards more patho¬
logical forms of imaginary experiences are tapped by the Magical ideation
(Eckblad & Chapman, 1983)and hallucination scales (Launay & Slade, 1981).
The bias variables are measured in each of the different studies by the ambi¬
guity tolerance scales (Norton, 1975; McDonald, 1972; & Geller, Tambor,
Chase & Holtzman, 1993) as well as by the impulsivity scales (Dickman,
1990) in the last two studies and the cognitive failure questionnaire
(Broadbent, Cooper, Fitzgerald & Parkes, 1982).
In addition to assessing the two themes of bias and imagination, a
number of other measures were explored as they have also been argued to
contribute to the generation of hallucinations and paranormal experiences.
For instance, vividness of visual imagery (Marks, 1973) and auditory
imagery (Gissurarson, 1992) was explored.
Initially, the broader personality dimensions as measured by Eysenck's
EPQ were explored. Being a large measure this was omitted in the two later
studies and replaced by a more expansive set of schizotypy measures. The
measurement of schizotypal traits was limited to positive symptomatology
in the first two studies where the magical ideation scale (Eckblad &
Chapman, 1983); the perceptual aberration scale (Chapman, Chapman &
Raulin, 1978) and the Launay Slade hallucination scale (Launay & Slade,
1981) were used. Later the schizotypy measures used included a measure of
hypomania (Eckblad & Chapman, 1986) and a broader measure of schizo¬
typy measuring positive, negative and cognitive disorganisation traits (the
survey of attitudes and experiences) used by Venables & Bailes (1994).
These provide opportunities to assess the interrelationships between a
wide variety of variables as well as narrow down and identify the most
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robust relationships where two or more measures of the similar variables
are used. Over the three studies, measures were sometimes replaced by
shorter versions where they seemed to play a minimal role in paranormal
experience (e.g. ambiguity tolerance) which permitted conceptual replica¬
tion. Sometimes the measures were expanded (e.g. schizotypy measures
were more comprehensive in the later studies) where they had shown some
promising relationships and fine tuning could take place to identify particu¬
lar subgroups of traits.
General format of questionnaires
For all three psychometric studies there are some common elements
which are worth mentioning in advance of specific differences between the
three. The three studies each used measures of paranormal experience and
belief (although these changed somewhat across the three occasions in an
attempt to maximise clarity of responses). The three studies each employed
psychometric measures of predisposition to psychopathology. Again these
differed in precisely what form they were delivered, becoming more com¬
prehensive in the third study. The measures used are described below with
reference to relevant conceptual and empirical issues in their administration.
Overview of questionnaire measures.
Imagination and attention to self
Self consciousness scale (SCS, Fenigstein, Scheier and Buss, 1975)
The self-consciousness scale of Fenigstein, Scheier and Buss (1975)
draws on Jung's concept of introversion (1933) and Mead's notion of the
individual's experience of self as a social object (1934). The global concept
of self-consciousness was divided into three domains 1) private self con¬
sciousness SCSA; 2) public self consciousness SCSB; and 3) social anxiety
SCSC. The first subscale is similar to Jung's introversion factor, it addresses
attention to self concerns and a private mulling over the self. The second
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subscale is focussed on the person's ability to adopt another person's per¬
spective and view self as a social object. The final subscale is concerned
with discomfort in the presence of others. According to Fenigstein et al.
social anxiety may result from a reduced ability to handle public self con¬
sciousness.
Darvill, Johnson & Danko (1992) note parallels between self conscious¬
ness and the exhibition of guilt and shame ("sensitivity of conscience").
Significant relationships were obtained between private self-consciousness
and the psychoticism scale of the EPQ-R (r = .31); between public self con¬
sciousness and neuroticism (r = .60) and between social anxiety, extraversion
(r = -.40) and neuroticism (r = .38). Significant positive relationships were
noted between public self-consciousness and shame; and social anxiety and
shame.
Franzoi, Davis & Markwiese (1990) examined motivational issues relat¬
ed to private self-consciousness. They suggest that individuals who score
higher on private self-consciousness place a higher value on accurate self-
knowledge than do those who score lower on private self-consciousness.
Two tentative explanations in terms of motivations are offered by Franzoi et
al.) that the low private self-consciousness individuals have a need for self-
defence which outweighs the need for self knowledge, while the high pri¬
vate self-consciousness individuals have a need for self knowledge which is
greater than their need to protect their self esteem.
The norms for males are reported for private self consciousness (M =
25.9, SD = 5.0); public self consciousness (M = 18.9, SD= 4.0); social anxiety
(M = 12.5, SD = 4.1) and total scale (M = 57.7, SD = 9.2). For females the
norms are private (M= 26.6, SD = 5.1); public (M = 19.3, SD = 4.0); social
anxiety (M = 12.8, SD = 4.5) and for the total scale (M = 58.7, SD = 8.9).
The Tellegen Absorption scale (TAS; Tellegen, 1982, 1992)
Tellegen (1992) provides self descriptions of high and low absorption
scorers. A high scorer:
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Is emotionally responsive to engaging sights and sounds; is readily
captured by entrancing stimuli; thinks in images and has synaesthetic
and other "crossmodal" experiences; can summon and become
absorbed in vivid and compelling recollections and imaginings; expe¬
riences episodes of expanded (extrasensory, mystical) awareness and
other altered states.
A low absorption scorer:
Is not easily caught up in sensory and imaginative experiences; does
not readily relinquish a realistic frame of reference.
The MPQ is composed of eleven primary scales of which absorption is
one. These primary scales are subsumed by three higher order factors: posi¬
tive affectivity — concerned with well being, social potency and achieve¬
ment; negative affectivity — consisting of stress reaction, alienation and
aggression; constraint — which incorporates control, harm-avoidance and
traditionalism. In a factor analysis of the eleven scales absorption was
found to load primarily on the second factor of negative affect.
In a note on the structure and meaning of the MPQ Tellegen (1992) pre¬
sents the results of a factor analysis of the MPQ absorption scale (Tellegen,
1981; Tellegen 1982). This resulted in a six factor oblique simple structure
rotation of a matrix of tetrachoric correlations (N = 2000). Tellegen also
reports on an "element centred"nonmetric scaling procedure, Escal, which
produced a result congruent with the factor analysis. The six factors were
plotted in terms of two dimensions labelled "internal versus external focus"
and "narrowing versus expansion of consciousness". The six factors identi¬
fied by Tellegen include: 1) 'Responsiveness to engaging stimuli': this con¬
tains seven items which are predominantly concerned with absorption in
external sensory stimuli; 2) 'Synesthesia': this has seven items which gener¬
ally relate to cross modal experiences; 3) 'Enhanced cognition': seven items
dealing with the unusual sense of presence, precognition and effortless
imagery; 4) 'Oblivious/dissociative involvement': six items which are con¬
cerned with immersion in an experience or dissociation; 5) 'Vivid reminis¬
cence': three items concerned with vivid memories; 6) 'Enhanced aware-
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ness': four items related to changes in the experience of self and boundaries
and an increased sense of significance.
The norms for females are (M = 21.4, SD = 6.9; N = 500) and for males
(M = 19.6, SD = 7.3; N = 300). Thirty day test-retest interval on a sample of
75 college females and male was .91.
2. Mental imagery
The vividness of visual imagery questionnaire (VVIQ, Marks 1973)
Assessing differences and accuracy of verbal reports of vividness of
visual imagery is extremely difficult. In an attempt to remedy this Marks
(1973) designed the VVIQ. The scale employs descriptive verbal images
which subjects are asked to visualise. Each of these four images develops
over four stages. The response scale requires the subject to tick a five point
scale with lower scores being obtained from better visualisation.
The responses were:
1 'perfectly clear and as vivid as normal vision'
2 'clear and reasonably vivid'
3 'moderately clear and vivid'
4 'vague and vivid'
5 'no image at all, you only "know" that you are thinking of the object'
Marks reports that the scale has a test-retest reliability coefficient of
.74 (n=68) and a split-half reliability coefficient of .85 (n=150). Marks reports
that the lowest scorers (good visualisers) in his study had a mean of 1.64
and highest scorers (poor visualisers) had a mean of 3.25.
In the present study the scale was altered so that high scores indicated
vivid imagery.
Auditory imagery scale (Gissurarson, 1992).
Gissurarson (1992) designed a short questionnaire measuring auditory
imagery. The scale consists of seven questions addressing auditory imagery.
The AIS requires subjects to engage in imagery sounds which change in
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intensity, becoming louder or fainter such as 'the sound of footsteps coming
up a stair'; sounds which are prolonged and static such as 'the sound of
water dripping' or short sounds such as the 'sound of snapping twigs'; and
complicated noises such as 'conversation as if there was a party next-door'.
Each item is scored on a four point rating scale with stronger reports of
imagery being given smaller scores (this was altered in the administration in
this work so that a stronger degree of imagery yielded larger scores):
1 'very clear sound / noise'
2 'moderately clear sound/noise'
3 'vague sound/noise'
4 'no sound/noise at all'
The reliability of the AIS is reported as good by Gissurarson; split-half
reliabilities were .81 for the AIS and Cronbach's alpha demonstrated a relia¬
bility coefficient of .80. A principal components factor analysis of the seven
questions produced a single factor, with each of the items loading with val¬
ues higher than .50. The correlation between the AIS and the VVIQ was r
(158) = .48, p < .001.
3. Paranormal belief and experience
1. The revised paranormal belief scale (PBS; Tobacyk, 1988)
The PBS is a widely used measure of paranormal belief encompassing
seven factors: 1. traditional religious belief (four items); 2. psi belief (four
items); 3. witchcraft (four items); 4. superstition (four items); 5. spiritualism
(three items); 6. extraordinary life forms (three items); 7. precognition (four
items) — 26 items in total. The measure uses a 7-point response scale with
responses ranging from strongly agree (7) to strongly disagree (1).
The PBS has been employed to assess paranormal belief in a wide
range of studie,s including assessing belief in the paranormal in a wide
range of settings, incuding amongst others; ethnic populations (Tobacyk,
Miller, Murphy and Mitchell, 1988), reasoning ability (Wierzbicki, 1985;
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Irwin, 1991); dissociation (Irwin, 1994); psychological adjustment and fanta¬
sy proneness (Irwin, 1991); schizotypy (Williams & Irwin, 1991); temporal
lobe signs and paranormal belief (Persinger & Makarec, 1987).
In spite of its wide use this measure has recently been criticised as suf¬
fering from a number of problems including poor methodology in its con¬
struction, item selection, and validity for measuring paranormal belief
(Lawrence, 1994; Thalbourne, Dunbar &Delin, 1995).
2. The Australian sheep goat scale (Thalbourne, 1981).
Thalbourne's sheep-goat scale is more focussed on the extent of psi
related beliefs and is directed in large part at specific kinds of psi experi¬
ences such as telepathy, apparitions, and PK. The scale has been employed
to examine the relationship between paranormal belief and schizophrenia-
relevant measures (Thalbourne, 1985; 1994). The scale consists of 13 items
and responses are usually scored in the form of yes (2), unsure (1) and no
(0).
3. Paranormal experience
These included eight questions assessing different types of paranormal
experience: telepathy, clairvoyance, precognition, PK, vision, ghost, OBE,
these questions were drawn from the Koestler participant information
forms. They provide a context for brief, relatively clear answers to whether
or not the respondent had experienced a particular kind of experience. An
example of the question form is: Have you ever had an experience which is best
explained by telepathy? The response format included a 7-point scale which
ranges between yes, uncertain and no, with intermediate positions between
the extremes and the central uncertain position. These questions were pre¬
sented with a short clear definition of the terms such as telepathy used in
the questions.
In the last study a broad measure of paranormal or unusual experience
was employed; the inventory of ascribed paranormal experience (APEX;
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Longhurst & Morgan, 1995). This incorporates a relatively large number of
different kinds of questions (fifteen in all) about unusual experiences, rang¬
ing from telepathy through divination and contact with non-human entities.
The 15 questions require that the respondent answers on a 3-point
scale regarding their confidence that they have had such an experience, the
frequency of the experience and whether or not they believe the experience
is explicable in terms of contemporary science. Each of these answers are
multiplied together to provide an overall score for each dimension. This
measure was used in study three; as experiences rather than beliefs about
the adequacy of science were of interest the last values regarding the experi¬
ence being explained by modern science were omitted.
An example question from this measure is:
I have on occasion had a premonition (either dreaming or awake) ofa future
event tliat subsequently became true.
4. General personality factors
Eysenck personality questionnaire (EPQ, Eysenck and Eysenck, 1984).
The Eysenck personality scales in the various forms of the EPQ have
been used over the last 40 years; they have demonstrated good reliability
(the psychoticism scale has received some criticism for low internal reliabili¬
ty, low range of scores and skewed distribution but the revised version of
the scale, Eysenck, Eysenck & Barrett, 1984 sought to remedy this) and
validity. Kline (1993) remarks upon the replicable clarity of the Eysenckian
personality factors.
5. Schizotypy
The schizotypy scales below were all devised with the intention of tap¬
ping unusual experiences which may be viewed as milder versions of the
experiences reported in schizophrenia. The Mgl, PAb and SoA scale been
successfully used to identify psychosis proneness (Chapman, Chapman,
Kwapil, Eckbald & Zinser, 1994). The following scales, two by Chapman
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and colleagues (Eckblad & Chapman, 1983; Chapman, Chapman & Raulin,
1978), one by Launay and Slade (1981) and one by Venables and Bailes
(1994) are most often used with dichotomous true/false response scales.
The magical ideation scale (Mgl, Eckblad and Chapman, 1983)
The magical ideation scale is a 30-item true-false scale which addresses
the 'belief in forms of causation that by conventional standards are invalid'.
A number of these items refer directly or indirectly to paranormal-like expe¬
riences, in fact Thalbourne (1985) produced a reduced form of the scale by
removing 8 items which were specifically related to paranormal beliefs or
experiences. This was not undertaken in these studies and so the resulting
relationships are likely to be slightly inflated through content overlap. This
strategy was not adopted because Thalbourne (1985; 1994) has shown that
although content overlap between the two scales accounts for a portion of
the shared variance the effect remains relatively robust even when the modi¬
fied scale is employed.
The perceptual aberration scale (PAb, Chapman, Chapman & Raulin,
1978).
The PAb scale consists of 30 items which are concerned with unusual
bodily sensations and distortions in body-image. Although direct overlap is
less likely for this scale than for the Mgl scale it is possible that it coincides
with standard paranormal belief scales especially if they address OBE type
experiences. The items of the scale were constructed around various experi¬
ences of body-image aberration as reported in the clinical literature. The
kinds of experiences tapped include changes in body size, unusual spatial
relationship of body parts, feelings of estrangement from one's body, and
unclear boundaries of the body.
Mgl and PAb have been found to be positively correlated .68 for male
subjects (n = 2500) and .70 for females (n = 3067), Chapman, Chapman &
Miller (1982).
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The survey of attitudes and experiences (SAE, Venables and Bailes,
1994).
This is a schizotypy scale meant for use with more normal popula¬
tions. It is compilation of a number of the other recognised schizotypy
scales including the ones already mentioned here. It incorporates four dif¬
ferent sets of questions (found through factor analysis) which address the
different components of schizotypy: positive symptoms, social anxiety/ cog¬
nitive disorganisation, physical and social anhedonia.
The Launay Slade hallucination scale (LSHS, Launay and Slade, 1981).
The Launay Slade hallucinaton scale is a twelve item scale which mea¬
sures the predisposition to hallucinatory experiences. It includes both items
related to pathology and items related to subclinical forms of hallucinatory
experience. Launay and Slade (1981) found that high and low psychoticism
scoring prisoners showed significantly different scores on the hallucination
scale. Scores on the hallucination scale were positively correlated with P-
scores from the EPQ (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1975). They report mean scores
and standard deviations for two normal control groups (M = 1.77, SD = 1.66)
and (M = 2.71, SD = 2.37); non-hallucinating schizophrenics (M = 3.17, SD
=2.08) and for hallucinating patients (M = 7.57, SD = 2.44).
The hypomania scale (HoP, Eckblad & Chapman, 1986).
This forty item true-false scale measures a range of experiences which
are characterised by a gregarious, overactive personality with racing
thoughts, who experiences episodes of hypomanic euphoria. For 713 men
the HoP score was 21.08 (SD=8.19) and the reliability coefficient was .87.
For women, the mean was 22.40 (SD = 8.12) and alpha was .87.
6. Ambiguity intolerance
Three different measures were used over the three different studies as
a consequence of the smaller role this variable seemed to play. A large mul-
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tifactorial measure devised by Norton (1975), the MAT-50, was employed in
the first study. The older and shorter McDonald's AT 20 (McDonald, 1970)
was employed in the second study and in the final study a much more
recent and quite short modified measure (Geller, Tambor, Chase &
Holtzman, 1993) was used.
The internal reliability was .86 (split-half). Correlations of -.42 and -.41
were obtained between the AT-20 and Rokeach's measure of dogmatism
(Rokeach, 1948) and a measure of rigidity (Gough and Sanford, 1957). Test
retest reliability was reported as .63 over a six month period. The scale
employs a dichotomous response scale with the tags true-false.
Norton (1975), after an extensive foray into possible meanings of the
term ambiguity, devised a 61 item measure (drawing on some of the items
used in previous measures such as McDonald (1970)) which addresses eight
different domains in which ambiguity tolerance can be expressed: philoso¬
phy, interpersonal communication, public image, job-related, problem solv¬
ing, social, habit, art forms. Norton reports high reliability (internal reliabil¬
ity r = .88; test-retest reliability after 10-12 weeks = .86) and validity (correla¬
tions between .07 and .57 with different measures of ambiguity tolerance
and rigidity). The scale is answered using a 7-point scale.
Geller et al. (1993) carrying on the strong tradition within medical
research to assess physician's tolerance for ambiguity devised a short scale
of 10 items which selected items largely from the McDonald and Norton
scales. An overall internal reliability of .72 was achieved they do not report
test-retest reliability, nor do they show criterion related validity, although it
should generally behave in a similar fashion to the other measures reported
since it draws on many of the items of these scales. Geller et al. employed a
six point response scale (in the study presented here this was reduced to a
dichotomous scale in order to produce more consistency in answering meth¬
ods — this will obviously result in reduced variability). These scales are
usually scored high for tolerance, in each of the studies presented here the
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opposite scoring pattern was employed.
7. Impulsivity
The Dickman impulsivity scale (Impulsfunc/dys Dickman, 1990)
This scale was designed to clarify the nature of impulsivity. It possess¬
es two subscales, one which measures functional impulsivity (a tendency to
enjoy making fast reponses with little forethought) and also dysfunctional
impulsivity (a variant on the same behaviour which has negative conse¬
quences in terms of producing errors).
The functional impusivity subscale consists of 11 items scored true or
false and the dysfunctional scale consists of 12 items scored in the same
way. The two scales correlate with each other (.23), the internal consistency
of the functional scale was assessed at .74 and the dysfunctional scale at .85
(Cronbach's alpha).
8. Cognitive failure
The cognitive failure questionnaire (Broadbent, Cooper, Fitzgerald &
Parkes, 1982).
This measure addresses the behaviours involved in everyday cognitive
failure in the perceptual, memory and motor domains. The response scale
addresses the frequency of behaviour on a five point scale. Small correla¬
tions were observed between this measure and the EPQ measures but only
that between EPQ-N and the CFQ is worth noting (.28). Other positive cor¬
relations were recorded with the Spielberger (Spielberger, Gorsuch &





In this first correlational study an attempt was made to place' paranor¬
mal belief and experience in relation to general personality variables such as
Eysenck's EPN model as well as more specific variables related to imagina¬
tion (e.g. Tellegen's 1991 absorption scale) and bias (e.g. Norton's MAT-50
scale).
This provides a general picture of the relationship between paranormal
belief and experience and a wide range of psychological variables. It also
provides a preliminary attempt to assess whether paranormal experience
and belief are more strongly related to cognitive styles emphasising imagi¬
nation or bias.
A rather large battery of measures was distributed in order to provide
an indication of where the strongest relationships existed. An attempt was
made to find a number of measures tapping the same or similar dispositions
in order to later refine the number of measures needed in the following con¬
firmatory studies and reduce the size of the measures if they failed in their
multifactorial forms to adequately relate to measures of central interest. As
an example, the Norton MAT-50 is a eight factor measure of ambiguity toler¬
ance, it was used in this correlational study presupposing that this would be
a more sensitive instrument than a unidimensional measure. As this
showed little relationship with paranormal experience it was replaced in the
second study by a unidimensional measure; this still allowed conceptual
replication and afforded the introduction of further measures of interest by
virtue of the reduction in the number of items caused by omitting the larger
measure.
Participants and procedure
Three hundred questionnaires were distributed to student volunteers
to complete. These respondents were recruited through 1st and 2nd year
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Three additional questions were included which addressed related
experiences such as lucid dreaming, deja vu, and dream recall, responses
ranged on a 7-point scale similar to that used in the questions assessing
paranormal experience.
A further 6 questions were included for heuristic purposes. These
drew upon the general orientations of attentional style offered by Nideffer
(1976). These questions generally assessed internal versus external locus of
attention, broad versus narrow attention, as well as the degree of overload
in cognition. Overall these resulted in low correlations and they are not
reported here.
Results
Comparisons of groups were made on the basis of a high, low and no
experience split of the participants according to their self reported level of
paranormal experience. This provides a rough assessment of the changes in
scoring on the range of psychological variables according to level of para¬
normal experience. As the participants were responsible for indicating the
number of experiences they had had the number of experiences could range
from 0 through to any number. The participants were allocated to three
groups which would provide some range of experience, from none (where
the participant had reported no experience) through low levels of experi¬
ence (where the participant had reported between 1 and 4 experiences) to
high (where the participant had reported 5 or more experiences). There are
some difficulties with this allocation process: in the first instance there were
noticeably some participants who reported only 1 or 2 experiences but these
were ones which might be considered quite profound; on the other hand
you may have a participant who reports have 20 or 30 experiences but these
may actually be of rather minor significance. Using this system of allocation
will undoubtedly bias the membership of the comparison groups. It is diffi¬
cult to envisage how these kinds of problem may be avoided without resort¬
ing to actual interviews in order to more properly assess each experience.
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These misgivings aside this division in terms of experience at least provides
some indications of general differences between the groups.
Occasionally respondents did not indicate in numerical terms their
estimates of the number of experiences they had but indicated they had 'a
few' or 'many'. In order to translate these into a usable numerical form the
convention 'few' or 'several' = 5, 'many' or 'lots' = 10 was used.
Descriptive statistics were calculated for different types of experiences,
the numbers involved in each of these calculations vary according to the
number of completed scales. Using these figures as an indicator of reported
frequency it seems that experiences attributed to telepathy were reported
more frequently and those attributed to clairvoyance less so (See Table 2).
For comparison the respondents were divided into three groups: a no-
experience group (no PE, N = 30) who reported no experiences, a low expe¬
rience group (low PE, N = 30) reporting fewer than five experiences and
high experience group (high PE, N = 36) consisting of respondents who
reported five or more experiences (three respondents neglected to indicate
how many experiences they had had).
Descriptive data for the personality measures along with the results of
Univariate ANOVA comparisons are displayed in Table 3. Pronounced dif¬
ferences are obvious between the three levels of paranormal experience and
their scores on absorption (high PE mean = 23.89; low PE mean = 18.43; no
PE mean = 14.20; F = 28.97, pc.OOl). A clear difference was also found for
magical ideation (high PE mean = 10.91; low PE mean = 7.77; no PE mean =
4.90; F = 16.46, pc.OOl). On both absorption and magical ideation there
were clear trends, with values increasing across the three groups in line with
higher levels of reported experience. The scores on the social anxiety scale
of the self consciousness scale were also significantly different across the
three experience groups (high PE mean = 18.03; low PE mean = 18.97; no PE
mean = 21.17; F = 4.16, p<.02). The trend this time suggested increasingly
higher levels of social anxiety as the groups report fewer experiences.
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Finally, differences were also apparent for scores on the private self con¬
sciousness scale (high PE mean = 34.64; low PE mean = 34.30; no PE mean
= 30.83; F = 3.68, p =.03) and the Launay Slade hallucination scale with high¬
er scores on these scales occurring in the higher experience groups (high PE
mean = 5.43; low PE = 4.20; no PE mean = 3.57; F = 5.31, p = .007).
Table 2 showing percentage of respondents reporting they were certain or
possibly may have had various paranormal experiences.
Telepathy Clairvoyance Precognition Apparition OBE
<%) 46 13 33 25 28
These results seem to confirm previous findings of higher levels of
absorption and magical ideation in experients of the paranormal. The other
variables that discriminated to a lesser extent included the private self con¬
sciousness and social anxiety scales of the SCS as well as the Launay Slade
hallucination scale. These all seem to indicate distinguishing differences in
terms of cognitive style between experients of the paranormal and non-
experients. More specifically this difference seems to lie in the patterns of
attentional and imaginative style displayed by experients and non-experi-
ents.
Interestingly, paranormal belief did not discriminate between the three
levels of experience. Of course, an individual can hold paranormal beliefs
without having had experiences to initiate those beliefs, although it does
seem more likely that paranormal experience is likely to be the main cause
of paranormal belief. Another reason for this apparent failure of paranor¬
mal belief to correspond to levels of experience can be traced back to the
particular measure employed here. The PBS (Tobacyk, 1988) addresses a
wide range of phenomena which a number of critics have argued are not
necessarily paranormal (Lawrence, 1994; Thalbourne, Dunbar & Delin, 1995)
which may have led to this unpredicted finding.
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Table 3 showing means and standard deviations of personality measures
for different levels of paranormal experience.
Variable High Low No F (df) P<
experience experience experience
E 14.65 (3.73) 12.33 (5.12) 12.50 (4.50) 2.70 (2,89) .07
P 5.12 (3.27) 4.60 (2.18) 4.77 (2.82) .28 (2,91) .75
N 13.46 (4.98) 13.40 (5.28) 12.37 (4.87) .45 (2,91) .63
L 5.17(3.38) 5.37 (3.09) 5.33 (3.30) .03 (2,92) .97
SCSA 34.64 (5.71 )a 34.30 (7.30) 30.83 (5.29)b 3.68 (2,93) .03
SCSB 25.58 (3.69) 24.33 (5.48) 24.67 (4.33) .69 (2,93) .50
SCSC 18.03 (3.90)a 18.97 (5.68) 21.17 (3.65)b 4.16 (2,93) .02
VVIQ 62.28 (8.37)a 57.60 (10.62) 56.10 (10.66)b 3.59 (2,93) .03
AIS 23.86 (2.82) 22.60 (3.98) 23.80 (2.91) 1.49 (2,93) .23
MGI 10.91 (5.12)a 7.77 (3.69)b 4.90 (3.50)c 16.46 (2,92) .001
LSHS 5.43 (2.66)a 4.20 (2.33)b 3.57 (1.96)b 5.31 (2,92) .007
PBS 97.78 (22.67) 96.50 (24.06) 89.07 (31.47) 1.02 (2,91) .34
TAS 23.89 (4.42)a 18.43 (5.83)b 14.20 (5.21)c 28.97 (2,92) .001
MAT50 256.80 (28.46) 264.63 (32.95) 267.45 (29.24) 1.09 (2,91) .34
Note the sample size vanes in the high and no experience groups across the variables due to missing
data. Different letters indicate values which are significantly (p < .05) different from each other using
post hoc comparisons (Duncan test).
Although ambiguity intolerance has been identified as an important
factor in predicting unusual experiences such as hallucinations it does not
seem to successfully discriminate between different levels of paranormal
experiences. In addition, the trend is the opposite of that reported in the
study of hallucinations, with those respondents reporting the lowest levels
of ambiguity intolerance reporting more paranormal experiences.
The distributions for the personality measures were normal and
Pearson correlations were calculated between personality measures and
types of reported experience. These were calculated prior to carrying out
factor analysis and missing data were replaced with variable means, the cor¬
relation matrix displayed in Table 4 and the factor analysis displayed in
Table 5 are based on these imputed data replacements.
As with the univariate comparisons it is evident that magical ideation
and absorption are robustly related to ratings of different paranormal expe¬
riences, with values of r ranging between .39 and .51 for magical ideation
and between .25 and .54 for absorption (see Table 4). The different kinds of
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paranormal experience show consistent small positive relationships with the
Launay Slade hallucinations scale (values of r range between .18 and .34).
Small positive relationships were also obvious for clairvoyant and precogni¬
tion experiences with neuroticism (.22 and .20). Small positive values of r
were obtained between the ratings of paranormal experience and the private
self consciousness (SCSA) scale (and less so for the public self consciousness
(SCSB) and social anxiety (SCSC) scales, which frequently demonstrated
smaller correlations which were negative for SCSC). Consistent positive
relationships ranging between r = .17 and r = .24 were found between SCSA
and the different paranormal experiences.
The measures of imagery vividness (the VVIQ and the AIS) produced
small positive relationships with paranormal experience ratings, however
none of these are of sufficient magnitude to be considered as indicating reli¬
able relationships.
Table 4 Pearson correlation coefficients between ratings of different para¬
normal experiences and 12 personality measures
Tel Clair Precog Appar OBE Total PE
Pbs .16 .24 .29 .24 -.02 .15
E -.02 -.07 .02 -.05 .02 .13
P -.03 -.08 -.04 .13 -.05 -.03
N .03 .22 .20 .15 .05 .04
L .02 .04 .11 .10 .09 .15
SCSA .23 .22 .18 .24 .18 .17
SCSB .01 .08 .15 .26 -.05 .08
SCSC -.05 -.00 -.07 -.06 -.06 -.11
Vviq .09 .10 .18 .15 .09 .18
Ais -.09 .03 .04 -.04 -.03 .02
Mgl .43 .39 .39 .49 .39 .51
Lshs .30 .31 .19 .23 .18 .34
Tas .43 .25 .38 .38 .40 .54
MAT-50 -.13 .11 -.07 .07 -.02 -.08
Note: Values of r greater than .22 are significant at p = .05
Note: Variable means were substituted for missing values
In order to summarise the relationships between these variables and to
explore the structure of paranormal experience in relation to them they were
entered into a principal components factor analysis with a root curve selec-
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tion criterion using Statview™.
The root curve selection criteria employed in statview follows the same
principles as Cattell's Scree test. In the scree test the eigenvalues are plotted
and a cut-off point is selected where the curve generated by plotting these
values starts to flatten out' or change slope. This method of selecting the
number of factors to rotate is considered to be a better solution than adopt¬
ing the overly liberal eigenvalues greater than one' solution (Kline, 1994).
This analysis yielded 3 eigenvalues of 4.715, 2.425 and 1.885 which
accounted for 24%, 12% and 9% of the variance respectively (45% overall).
Statview provides both orthogonal and oblique solutions and provides
an opportunity to choose the solution with the simplest structure. In this
case the oblique solution provided the simplest structure, these factors and
their loadings are presented in Table 5.
Factor 1 shows high positive loadings from the paranormal experience
variables as well as magical ideation, the Launay Slade hallucination scale
and the Tellegen absorption scale. This factor clearly relates to unusual per¬
ceptual and ideational experiences.
High loadings were obtained on factor 2 from the neuroticism scale
and the public self consciousness scale as well as a more moderate loading
from the private self consciousness scale. This factor seems to represent an
anxiety related internal attention state.
The final factor was strongly positively loaded by the extraversion
scale of the EPQ along with a more moderately sized negative loading from
the social anxiety scale of the self consciousness scale. In addition, both
mental imagery measures demonstrated substantial positive loadings.
These three factors clearly represent unusual experiences, anxiety relat¬
ed states and extraversion. This general factor pattern tends to appear in
analyses related to schizotypal variables. For instance, in Bentall, Slade &
Claridge (1989) a threefold factorial structure was found comprising positive
symptomatology (unusual thoughts and perceptions); negative symptoma-
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schizophrenia and paranormal belief and experience. The PBS failed to load
significantly on any of the factors and showed a small to moderate loading
on both factors 1 and 2 indicating that it has components which relate to
unusual perceptions and ideation as well as social anxiety and disorganised
mental states.
In summary, the general findings of this psychometric study suggest
that reports of paranormal experiences are related to measures of imagina¬
tive experience such as absorption, as well as to those measures such as the
magical ideation scale which assess a predisposition to psychopathological
states of magical thinking. This was demonstrated by definite trends
observed in the ANOVA comparisons as well as in the correlations between
particular ratings of paranormal experiences, and finally in the factor struc¬
ture of the variables.
In relation to the initial hypotheses it seems that imaginative thinking
exists in a robust relationship with paranormal and schizotypal experience.
The perceptual and ideational bias, ambiguity intolerance, does not seem in
the light of the present study to be as important a variable in relation to
anomalous experiences, although a marginal association between ambigui¬
ty intolerance and reports of paranormal experience was identified, with
lower levels of intolerance relating to higher levels of paranormal experi¬
ence.
These findings suggest that the role of imaginative processes associat¬
ed with absorption and magical thinking are more likely to be involved in
generating experiences which are interpreted as paranormal experience than
are judgement biases linked with ambiguity intolerance and dogmatism.





The second psychometric study was intended to provide some confir¬
mation of the findings in study 1 while providing further opportunities for
refining the selection of measures. Following the failure of Norton's (1975)
MAT-50 to indicate substantive relationships with paranormal experience
this was replaced by a shorter measure McDonald's (1970) AT20. This
replacement freed up space which permitted the inclusion of Dickman's
(1990) measures of impulsivity which may be considered to share certain
characteristics with ambiguity intolerance.
This second study was also carried out in order to extend the number
of variables examined in the first study. This was made possible by omit¬
ting some general variables as offered by the Eysenck Personality
Questionnaire (Eysenck, Eysenck & Barrett, 1984) and including further
measures such as Dickman's impulsivity questionnaires and a further mea¬
sure of schizotypy: the perceptual aberration scale (Chapman, Chapman &
Raulin, 1978).
The measures that were included in the second questionnaire booklet
included:
1. The measures ofparanormal experience, which consisted of nine ques¬
tions about various experiences from telepathy to OBE and requiring
respondents to rate the confidence in having had such an experience on a 7-
point scale. Included in this section was a question assessing total number
of experiences as well as a question regarding the respondents' preference in
not viewing such experiences as paranormal.
The paranormal experience questions were followed by the 10 ques¬
tions of the Australian Sheep Goat Scale (Thalbourne, 1981). This was used
in preference to the PBS in this study because it has fewer questions which
are more specific to paranormal belief and experience.
2. Measures ofself consciousness and vividness of imagenj. The SCS was
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presented next followed by the AIS and the VV1Q. Each of these was pre¬
sented in discrete sections, partly because they used different response
scales and partly because the imagery questions would have been difficult
to incorporate among other question types as they required a slightly more
participatory response in imagining the auditory and visual scenarios.
3. hnagination and schizotypal measures were incorporated in the next
section with a number of scales all employing dichotomous responses.
These included the magical ideation, absorption, and hallucination scales
employed in the first psychometric study. The perceptual aberration scale
(Chapman, Chapman, & Raulin, 1978) was also included here. The MAT-50
which was rather a large multi-factor scale which in the previous study had
not offered any discriminable power in terms of the overall measure of
ambiguity tolerance, nor in terms of its subfactors, was omitted from this
study. This was replaced by the AT20 (McDonald, 1970), a shorter scale
comprising a single factor measure of ambiguity tolerance.
Another new variable was introduced in this study, that of impulsivity.
The Dickman impulsivity scale (Dickman, 1990) was included in order to
assess the possibility that the bias characteristics of hallucinators which had
been identified as ambiguity intolerance (in other studies such as Heilbrun
and Blum, 1984) may actually be more akin to a fast response style more
related to impulsivity.
Participants and Procedure
Participants were drawn from a range of psychology classes in 1st and
2nd year psychology courses at the University of Edinburgh as well as 1st
year courses in introductory psychology at Napier University, Edinburgh.
Some additional participants were drawn from the Koestler Chair's subject
pool (these were all people who had at some time expressed a desire to take
part in experiments related to parapsychology).
The participants included 60 females and 33 males, mean ages for
females = 20.82 (SD = 4.59) and or males = 22.42 (SD = 6.22). A number of
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the participants also took part in the experimental studies mentioned in the
next section. Those that undertook the experimental tasks either completed
the questionnaire prior to participation or they completed the booklet fol¬
lowing their participation in the experiments. These experiments took place
over an extended period of time during 1994 and 1995. The questionnaire
provided information about relative levels of paranormal experience which
was used for allocating the participants to comparison groups following the
completion of the study.
The questionnaire measures were presented in a single A4 booklet and
the respondents were asked to complete the booklet in private in one ses¬
sion or over two days. The booklets were returned when the participant
arrived to take part in the experiment or afterwards at a time following the
experiment. Following return of the booklets the respondents were
debriefed (except for those respondents who completed the booklets prior to
the experimental task, they were debriefed following their completion of the
task). Debriefing included a general description of the aims of the task and
some clarification of the nature of the questionnaire measures.
Analysis and Results
Some changes were made to scoring experiences since in study 1 a
number of participants did not indicate the number of experiences they had
had. In this study the question specifically required the respondent to
answer a multiple choice format question ranging from 0, 1, 2-5, 6-10, and 11
or more. This firstly took the emphasis off the respondent having to pick a
number out of the air' and secondly forced them to consider their experi¬
ences within a specific range. This range provided a reasonable set of com¬
parison categories for univariate analysis. The last category of 11 or more
experiences was so poorly represented that it was combined with those who
reported 6-10 experiences. These four categories were then used in univari¬
ate comparisons.
Those that reported no such experience formed the first group (n = 32),
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those reporting a single experience formed the second (n = 17), those report¬
ing medium levels of experience (between 2-5 experiences) (n = 27) made up
the next group and finally those reporting the highest levels of experience
(ranging above 5 experiences) formed the last group (n = 15). A fourfold
grouping of the PE variable was undertaken in order to maximise the possi¬
bility of identifying possible differences between participants who report a
high number of experiences and those who report fewer or none at all.
Descriptive data for the various personality measures and paranormal
belief and experience are displayed in Table 6 along with values for univari¬
ate ANOVA comparisons of four different levels of paranormal experience.
Table 6 showing univariate comparisons of personality variables across
four levels of paranormal experience
High Medium Low No F (df) p <
PE (15) PE (27) PE (17) PE (32)
Asgs 13.13 (3.07)a 10.77 (3.30)b 8.59 (3.84)c 5.90 (3.68)d 17.25 (3.85) .001
Scsa 26.53 (5.49)a 25.33 (6.36)a 21.35 (5.65)b 22.13 (4.70)b 3.97 (3.87) .011
Scsb 17.27 (4.27) 17.81 (5.60) 19.47 (4.99)a 16.13 (4.58)b 1.77 (3.87) .157
Scsc 13.40 (4.08) 12.19 (5.26) 13.65 (3.62) 12.50 (4.46) .49 (3.87) .68
Ais 23.60 (3.46) 23.41 (3.05) 24.88 (2.98)a 21.81 (4.14)b 3.02 (3.87) .03
Vviq 61.40 (6.83) 59.48 (8.77) 58.94 (9.71) 57.19 (8.62) .88 (3.87) .45
LShs 4.50 (2.41) 4.92 (2.45) 4.00 (2.03) 3.41 (1.97) 2.38 (3.83) .075
Mgl 12.71 (6.29)a 10.77 (5.52)a 6.25 (3.91)b 6.22 (3.93)b 8.87 (3.84) .001
PAb 11.84 (6.43) 10.00 (6.30) 6.60 (6.54) 3.88 (3.75) 9.05 (3.81) .001
AT20 9.64(1.60) 9.96 (2.66) 9.75 (2.84) 9.94 (3.37) .05 (3.83) .983
Tas 25.71 (4.89)a 21.36 (4.86)b 19.69 (6.90)c 14.97 (7.19)d 11.12 (3.83) .001
ImpF 5.00 (2.86) 6.08 (3.03) 4.56 (2.56) 4.50 (3.01) 1.59 (3.84) .198
ImpD 6.14(3.28) 5.00 (3.60) 4.37 (3.76) 3.91 (2.91) 1.59 (3,84) .198
Note: Different letters indicate values which are significantly (p < .05) different from each other using
post hoc comparisons (Duncan test).
As expected pronounced differences were noted between the four
groups on paranormal belief as measured by the ASGS (F = 17.25, p< .001).
The comparisons yielded a similar pattern of findings to those found in
study 1. Strong differences were found between the groups on absorption
(F = 11.12, p<.001), magical ideation (F = 8.87, pc.OOl) and a less pro¬
nounced difference between the groups on private self consciousness (Scsa)
(F = 3.97, pc.011). The newly introduced perceptual aberration scale yielded
stronger differences across the four groups (F = 9.05, pc.OOl) than the magi-
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cal ideation scale. Scores on each of these scales increased along with
increased levels of reported paranormal experience.
Supporting the findings of the previous study it was found that ambi¬
guity intolerance did not discriminate between different levels of paranor¬
mal experience. Although once again the lowest levels for intolerance of
ambiguity were exhibited by the high PE group, these differences were neg¬
ligible. Significant differences in scoring were found between groups in
relation to AIS. All of the paranormal experience groups scored more highly
than the no-experience group. A similar but non-significant trend was
observed for the VVIQ (see Table 6). Non-significant trends for higher lev¬
els of both kinds of impulsivity being related to higher levels of PE were
found. The trend was more pronounced in the case of dysfunctional impul¬
sivity.
In order to highlight possible individual relationships between differ¬
ent kinds of PE and the personality variables Pearson correlation coefficients
were calculated and are displayed in Table 7
Table 7 Pearson correlation coefficients between ratings of paranormal
experiences and different personality measures.
Tel Clair Precog PK Vision Appar OBE Total
ASGS .60 .44 .62 .44 .41 .40 .35 .60
SCSA .14 .30 .27 .20 .27 .25 .27 .30
SCSB .09 .05 .12 .04 .07 .14 .08 .09
SCSC -.01 .08 .14 .11 -.07 -.00 .06 .03
AIS -.03 .05 -.01 .27 .03 .06 .14 .15
VVIQ .17 .13 .17 .10 .04 .05 .11 .15
LSHS .14 .19 .29 .13 .27 .20 .20 .24
MGI .39 .30 .41 .28 .36 .38 .45 .45
PAB .33 .32 .40 .16 .27 .21 .41 .48
At20 .04 -.02 .15 .09 .09 -.01 -.03 -.02
TAS .41 .31 .32 .24 .30 .38 .45 .51
IMPF -.08 .02 -.02 .07 .08 15 .19 .13
IMPD .20 -.06 .01 -.10 .04 -.06 .08 .19
Note: correlations are based upon variable means substituted for missing values.
Values of r exceeding .20 are significant at p=.05.
As in the Anova comparisons it is apparent that pronounced relation-
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ships exist between the schizotypy measures, imaginative absorption and
various paranormal experiences. Absorption, along with magical ideation,
showed the highest degree of relationship with the different types of para¬
normal experiences, r ranging between .24 and .45. Magical ideation was
the most strongly related of the schizotypy variables with values of r rang¬
ing between .28 and .45. Values of r for perceptual aberration and the differ¬
ent paranormal experiences ranged between .16 and .41. As in study 1 pri¬
vate self consciousness (SCSA) seemed to show a consistent relationship
with different types of paranormal experiences (values of r ranging between
.14 and .30), while the other two subscales of the self consciousness scales
yielded smaller relationships (for Scsb values of r ranged between .04 and
.14 and for social anxiety (SCSC) r ranged between -.01 and .14).
Imagery vividness as measured by the VVIQ and the A1S show low
relationships with reports of vision experiences (r = .04 and r = .03), sup¬
porting the findings so far that imagery vividness does not seem to play a
significant role in the experience of visual paranormal phenomena (similar
small relationships were observed with apparitions).
The out of body experience was most strongly related to schizotypy as
measured by the magical ideation (r = .45) and perceptual aberration (r =
.41) scales, although reports of precognitive experiences came a close sec¬
ond (magical ideation, r = .41; perceptual aberration, r = .40 and hallucina¬
tions scale, r = .29).
For each of the types of PE in turn it can be seen that absorption, magi¬
cal ideation and perceptual aberration tended to exhibit the strongest rela¬
tionships.
In order to further explore the factorial structure of these variables as
examined in study 1 another exploratory factor analysis was carried out.
A principal components analysis was undertaken using the root curve
extraction criterion. Four factors which account for 54% of the variance are
displayed below as an oblique solution in Table 8. The eigenvalues for these
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four factors were 6.042, 2.303, 1.576 and 1.393 and the respective proportions
of variance explained are 29%, 11%, 7.5% and 6.6%.
Most of the paranormal experience measures loaded positively upon
the first factor although higher loadings were obtained for PK and OBE on
other factors. It is also noticeable that unlike in the previous factor analysis
the schizotypy variables showed only small loadings on factor 1.
Factor 2 shows high positive loadings from public self consciousness
and the social anxiety scales of the self consciousness scale. Negative load¬
ings were also found for the vividness of imagery variables and functional
impulsivity, indicating that low scores on these measures are associated
with high levels of social anxiety.
The third factor relates to positive symptomatology, with high loadings
from unusual perceptual and ideational experiences as measured by the
schizotypy measures PAb, Mgl and LShs. Absorption and private self con¬
sciousness also load highest on this factor.
The last factor has positive loadings from PK and from OBE, dysfunc¬
tional impulsivity loads negatively here as well.
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Table 8 Factor loadings for paranormal experiences and psychological
variables (highest loadings for variables are shown in bold figures).
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4
Telepathy .664 -.002 -.124 -.175
Clairvoyance .571 -.001 -.137 .150
Precognition .529 .149 .022 - 102
PK .238 -.046 -.020 .601
Visions .554 -.039 -.112 .087
Apparition .499 -.065 -.105 .321
OBE .209 -.098 .188 .367
Total .585 -.077 .034 -.062
ASGS .596 .045 .042 .025
SCSA (private) -.116 .339 .533 .272
SCSB (public) -.272 .651 .560 .059
SCSC (social anx) -.043 .708 .029 .298
AIS -.215 -.425 .319 .401
VVIQ -.008 -.446 .243 .003
LSHS -.015 -.075 .523 -.162
MGI .215 -.012 .464 -.068
PAB .066 -.076 .598 -.176
TAS .058 -.087 .574 .113
AT20 .026 .562 .079 .017
ImpulsFunc -.034 -.636 .081 .212
impulsDys .012 -.130 .249 -.571
In this analysis, the various kinds of paranormal experiences load on a
separate factor from the other personality variables except in the case of
OBE and PK. It is particularly apparent that these PE measures loaded on
their own factor as did the imaginative experience/schizotypy variables
(TAS, Mgl, PAb). This must partly be attributed to the number of variables
included in this study; increasing the number of both PE variables and
schizotypy variables made it possible to differentiate these two aspects of
experience from each other, whereas in the previous analysis they shared a
common factor.
The factors are still interpretable to some extent in terms of the struc¬
ture of the analysis in study 1. Factors 1 and 3 represent unusual perceptual
and ideational experiences. Factor 2 is related to social anxiety and cogni¬
tive disorganisation, with high loadings from variables such as the social
anxiety scale of the self consciousness scale and ambiguity intolerance. It is
also noticeable that functional impulsivity loads reasonably highly and neg-
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atively on this factor suggesting an inability to make fast accurate decisions.
Factor 4 is unusual in that it is loaded most highly by PK and negatively by
dysfunctional impulsivity. This negative loading of dysfunctional impulsiv-
ity suggests a tendency to avoid fast inaccurate judgements.
Discussion
This study largely supports the findings from study 1. It indicates
dominant roles for imaginative factors (identified here by TAS and Mgl)
compared to a negligible role played by bias variables such as ambiguity
intolerance or impulsivity. Neither of these variables show reliable associa¬
tion with paranormal experience.
Admittedly there is a degree of content overlap between the Mgl and
TAS scales and the kinds of measures used to determine paranormal experi¬
ence and this will artificially raise the size of the association. Thalbourne
(1985, 1994) found that the size of the relationship was reduced slightly
when a modified version of the magical ideation scale was used which omit¬
ted the items which had some bearing on paranormal experience. It is
noticeable that the PAb scale, which has far fewer (if any) items which
might be considered to overlap with paranormal experience, showed slight¬
ly reduced levels of association but remained worthy of notice in terms of
the relationships with most of the paranormal experience measures.
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Correlational study 3
In order to broaden the scope of the research further and also to con¬
solidate the findings so far, a final survey was undertaken which incorporat¬
ed many of the variables used in the two previous studies.
A final correlational study was carried out using some of the same
measures from study 2 but once again refining the choice by excluding the
AT20 in favour of another shorter measure (Geller et alv 1993). A more com¬
prehensive assessment of schizotypal traits was included (Venables and
Bailes, 1994), which expanded to include negative symptoms as well as the
cognitive disorganisation and social anxiety aspects of the symptomatology
along with positive symptoms which had already been included in studies 1
and 2. In addition a more extensive measure of paranormal experience
(Longhurst & Morgan, 1995) was included which focused on a range of
experiences from the usual ESP and PK through to more novel items includ¬
ing contact with nonhuman entities.
Participants and procedure
Questionnaire booklets were distributed during first year psychology
methodology classes. One hundred and forty completed booklets were
returned.
One hundred and five females took part (mean age 22.11 years, SD =
6.60) and thirty four males (mean age 25.00 years, SD = 9.53). The partici¬
pants were all undergraduate students at Liverpool Hope University
College. The booklets were either completed at the end of a methodological
class and collected by the individual tutor taking the session or they were
taken home by the students and completed and returned the next week.
Materials
A range of personality measures were included in the questionnaire
booklets; these were completely randomised (in an effort to reduce the like-
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lihood of response bias) except for two measures which had markedly dif¬
ferent response scales (cognitive failure Broadbent, 1985 and the Paranormal
experience measure APEX, Longhurst and Morgan, 1995) which were
administered at the end of the booklet.
Included among the personality measures were the Tellegen absorp¬
tion scale, Dickman's functional and dysfunctional impulsivity scales
(Dickman, 1990), a measure of hypomania (Eckblad & Chapman, 1986), a
measure of different schizotypy factors (Venables & Bailes, 1994) and finally
a short measure of ambiguity tolerance (Geller et aJ., 1993). All of the scales
except for the cognitive failure questionnaire and the paranormal experience
scale required dichotomous true-false answers. The cognitive failures ques¬
tionnaire employed a six point scale and the APEX measure of paranormal
experience employed a three point scale for each of three subquestions fol¬
lowing a general probe concerning whether or not the respondent had had
that particular experience. For example, the respondent is asked to answer
a question such as "\ have experienced moving or affecting a physical object
by the influence of my mind alone" with a yes or a no . If the answer was
positive then the respondent is asked "how certain are you that this hap¬
pened? very sure, fairly sure or not very sure" The respondent was similarly
asked how often this experience had happened: very often, fairly often, or
rarely. Finally the respondent was asked whether or not they thought this
experience could be explained by normal science. These three questions are
multiplied together to obtain a total score for each experience—this provides
a weighting value depending upon the relative levels of certainty and fre¬
quency of the experience and to what degree these can be addressed by nor¬
mal science. In this study the data from the last question was omitted and
the certainty and frequency scores were multiplied to provide an experience
score.
Coding and analysis
Instead of addressing differences between high, low and no paranor-
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mal experiences a completely correlational approach was taken in this study.
Since a number of findings were consistent from study 1 to study 2 (for
instance, the high relationships between positive symptoms, imagination
and paranormal experiences and the low relationships between paranormal
experience and ambiguity tolerance) the structure of paranormal experience
was explored in more depth by employing a wider measure (Longhurst and
Morgan, 1995). In addition, the use of factor and cluster analysis permitted
some tentative propositions regarding different phenomenological forms of
experience with different associations.
The questionnaires were coded and Pearson correlations between all
personality measures were calculated (see Table 9).
As in studies 1 and 2, of all the psychological measures absorption
seemed to show the highest level of relationship with the various items
measuring paranormal experience (followed by positive symptomatology
and hypomania). Absorption was most highly correlated with the measures
of fate (r = .39, pc.OOl) and OBE (r = .35, p<.001). The other relationships
between absorption and the paranormal experience items ranged between r
= .07 for precognition and r = .24 for clairvoyance.
No substantial relationships were recorded between ambiguity intoler¬
ance and the paranormal experience measures, except perhaps for a small
correlation between AT and PK (r = -.19, p<.03). The measures of impulsivi-
ty performed marginally better in this respect, with a number of small sized
correlations reaching .15 in the case of dysfunctional impulsivity and heal¬
ing and .26 in the case of functional impulsivity and premonitions.
Hypomania and positive symptomatology showed a similar pattern of
relationships with the paranormal experience measures showing values of r
ranging between -.01 and .36. These two measure did differ somewhat in
relation to the association with PK (r = .03, for positive symptoms and a
much stronger .20 for hypomania).
The cognitive failure measure showed the strongest relationship with
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experiences related to fate (r = .26).
Table 9 Pearson correlations between types of reported paranormal expe¬
rience and psychological variables.
AT TAS ImpDys ImpF HoP Pos SocAnx Ph.An Soc.An CogFail
Premon -.12 .21 .18 .26 .36 .18 -.10 .14 -.07 .04
Precog -.03 .07 .10 .16 18 .14 -.06 .18 .08 .18
Telepathy -.05 .19 -.01 .10 .24 .22 -.06 -.01 -.03 18
Clairvoyance -.10 .24 -.08 .07 .17 .12 -.14 .25 15 .15
Reincarnation .01 12 .01 .04 .10 .08 -.11 .16 ,11 .24
Luck .01 .06 .03 -.11 .01 .35 -.01 .07 .05 .18
Heal .10 .20 .15 -.02 .25 .27 .14 .07 -.02 .12
PK -.19 .25 .09 .08 .20 .03 - 26 -.03 -.04 13
Superstition .09 .09 .16 .07 .13 .24 .05 .10 -.20 .19
Ghost -.06 .21 .11 .12 .13 .17 -.01 -.05 -.09 .14
Divination -.04 .18 -.04 .04 .12 .21 -.13 -.03 -.12 .04
NonHuman -.07 .13 -.03 .11 .10 .09 -.18 07 .11 .11
OBE -.00 .35 .16 -.05 .14 .18 .10 .04 .20 .23
Fate -.03 .39 .14 -.06 .33 .27 .06 -.07 -.03 .26
PG -.02 .12 .05 -.04 16 .01 -.04 .16 -.00 .21
Note: values of r greater than .16 are significant at p = .05
The APEX measure of paranormal experience addresses a wide range
of paranormal experiences, employing a broader definition of the paranor¬
mal than usual. The provides the advantage of a wider assessment than
was possible in studies 1 and 2 and explores how these other kinds of expe¬
riences under a broader definition of the paranormal might be related to
schizotypal experience. It became apparent in studies 1 and 2 that even
when provided with definitions of certain phenomena the respondents tend
to construe the experience in an idiosyncratic way (for instance in at least
one case the respondent considered dowsing to be fundamentally similar to
PK and both can be seen as a psychic response based on physical responses
and movement). In order to examine the structure of these experiences the
data were submitted to a principal components analysis with oblique rota¬
tion on Statuiew for Macintosh. Four factors were obtained using the root
curve method of extraction. The values for the four eigenvalues were 3.583,
1.702, 1.302 and 1.168. These four factors explained 51.7% of the total vari¬
ance. The factor loadings are displayed in Table 10.
The first factor explained 23.9% of the variance and was highly posi-
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tively loaded by both PK and poltergeist items which strongly suggests a
physical psi factor. This factor also has a number of medium-sized loadings
from other variables such as the premonition, clairvoyance, ghost and div¬
ination items; this suggests that this factor could be designated as relating to
experiences which are commonly conceived of as sharing a kind of force
which may be physical (in the case of PK) or more informational (in the case
of clairvoyance).
Factor 2 explained 11.3% of the total variance and was highly positive¬
ly loaded by items referring to experiences which might be interpreted as
reincarnation memories and also by meetings with non-human entities.
This suggests an otherness factor which is both related to other entities and
distinctly different states of consciousness in the individual. It also worth
noting that the OBE item which loaded most on this of all the factors as did
luck, again this suggests a state of otherliness. This encounter with otherli-
ness is likely to occur in relation to chance or to arise involuntarily in some
other form.
The third factor explained 8.7% of the total variance and was charac¬
terised by high loadings from superstition and telepathy items which seems
to suggest a rule or pattern finding factor which characterises a strong inter¬
pretative sense in relation to identifying unusual causes. This would also
probably be related to magical thinking.
The final factor accounted for 7.8% of the total variance. Two items
loaded strongly on this factor, one related experience of unusual healings
and the other was related to the influence of fate. This was labelled as an
external influence factor as it suggested influences outside of the self and
beyond one's control. This would seem to indicate a lack of personal con¬
trol over circumstances and a reliance on outside influences but ones which
in contrast to factor 2 are ordered or intended.
Any factor analysis is of course dependent upon the kinds of variables
included in it. This rather unusual pattern is no doubt a result of the range
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of unusual experiences which make up the APEX. It was considered impor¬
tant however that an extended number of experiences be included here
because these provide a fuller indication of the patterns that may exist in
terms of unusual experience. Some of these may be considered outside of
normal parapsychological concerns but may resemble or be related to cer¬
tain paranormal experiences. For instance, the item relating to meetings
with nonhuman entities is curiously more related to OBE's and reincarna¬
tion memories than to apparitional experiences.
In the previous analyses the paranormal experience variables tended to
load on the same factor and in some instances load on the same factor as
unusual perceptual experiences associated with schizotypy (see study I and
Thalbourne and Delin, 1994). This factor structure perhaps provides some
indication of the underlying experiential phenomenology of unusual experi¬
ences which could only be achieved through examining a wide range of
such experiences.
These factors bear a resemblance in some cases to the metaphors and
schemas considered in chapter 8. For instance, factor 1 labelled as 'force'
here is similar to the transmission metaphor and perhaps there is a certain
similarity between factor 2 'otherness' and intrusions.
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Table 10 Factor pattern matrix for paranormal experiences
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4
'Force' 'Otherness' 'Patterns 'External
& rules' influence'
Premonition .51 -.09 .39 .14
Precognition -.13 .20 .42 .29
Telepathy .15 .09 .65 .08
Clairvoyance .52 .48 -.04 .11
Reincarnation -.07 .74 -.01 -.06
Luck -.11 .42 .31 .00
Healing -.00 -.06 -.10 .82
PK .71 .01 -.05 .04
Superstition .31 -.23 .76 -.16
Ghost .39 .29 .25 -.17
Divination .49 .29 .01 .10
NonHuman .08 .73 .01 .03
OBE .23 .61 -.10 .02
Fate .16 .03 .20 .68
Poltergeist .71 -.10 .33 -.05
The fourth factor in the factor analysis showed reasonable loadings
from only two items; while this verges on marginal evidence for a discrete
factor (Kline, 1994). It has been retained in this analysis because it shows the
only real loadings of two of the paranormal experience items 'healing' and
fate'. This means however that the fourth factor which has been tentatively
named 'external influence' while possessing high loadings from these two
variables must be interpreted cautiously. This factor is interesting since it is
the focus for different patterns of scoring in the following cluster analyses
and gives the possibility of identifying the more pathological types of para¬
normal experience. However this analysis is maintained only for heuristic
purposes and it remains for further replicative work to provide more defi¬
nite interpretations.
To further explore the relationship between the other psychological
variables and the paranormal experience factors a k-means cluster analysis
was carried out on Statistica for Macintosh. The clusters were calculated
using the factor scores from the previous factor analysis. In order to assess
the role of the schizotypy variables, 2, 3, 4 and 5 cluster solutions were
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examined in order to identify the cluster solutions which suggested high
levels of schizotypal experience.
The role of the schizotypy variables, particularly the hypomania and
positive symptoms measures, were pronounced in the four cluster solution.
A mean plot for four clusters in presented in figure 1.
Cluster 1 with 28 members shows a slightly higher mean score for the
patterns and rules factor and relatively similar mean scores for the other fac¬
tors. Cluster 2 had 7 members and shows low levels of scoring for the first
three factors but a pronounced pattern of high scoring on the external influ¬
ence factor. Cluster 3 with 82 members shows a relatively low level of scor¬
ing on all four factors with the lowest level of scoring found on the patterns
and rules factor. Finally cluster 4 with 23 members shows a pronounced
higher level of scoring on the force factor with scores on the other three vari¬
ables remaining lower, with a slight elevation for the patterns and rules fac¬
tor.
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These clusters were compared in univariate analyses of variance and the
results are presented in Table 11. Significant differences were found on
three schizotypy variables; hypomania (F= 5.90, p < .001), unusual experi¬
ences or positive symptoms (F= 4.83, p < .003) and social anxiety/cognitive
disorganisation (F= 3.40, p < .02).
From the mean scores of the four clusters on the four factors it is obvi¬
ous that cluster 2 shows the highest scores on each of these schizotypy vari¬
ables. Cluster 2 showed a pronounced elevation on the external influence
factor and this provides some tentative evidence for the possibility of para¬
normal experience in this category being most related to psychopathological
variables, at least those concerned with the schizotypal personality.









4 F (3,136) p-level
AT 5.04 6.86 5.24 4.71 2.08 .11
TAS 19.63 21.68 17.59 20.92 2.28 .08
ImpulsDys 7.04 7.86 6.23 6.67 1.14 .34
ImpulsFunc 5.68 4.14 5.10 6.50 1.81 .15
HoP 23.66 27.29a 19.67b 25.77a 5.90 .001
PosSymp 4.75 5.14a 3.80b 4.65 4.83 .003
CogDisorg 4.44a 4.71a 4.28 3.43b 3.40 .02
PhysAnhed 1.39 2.29 1.74 1.78 .94 .42
SocAnhed .39 .86 .68 .52 .75 .52
CogFailure 80.49 77.29 77.03 80.55 .65 .58
Note: Different letters indicates values which are significantly (p < .05) different from each other
using post hoc comparisons (Duncan test).
Duncan test post hoc comparisons were undertaken to determine sig¬
nificant differences between means. For hypomania it was apparent that the
mean scores for cluster 2 and cluster 4 differed significantly from cluster 3
but not from each other or cluster 1. Examining the means plot in figure 1,
it suggests that higher mean scores on the force factor and the external influ¬
ence factor may relate to higher levels of schizotypal experience.
It is also noticeable that the comparison of these clusters on the absorp¬
tion measure showed a trend towards significance; a further 5 cluster k-
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means analysis was undertaken to explore this pattern further. The mean
scores on the four paranormal experience factors are displayed in figure 2.
The five clusters obtained were similar to the four cluster solution
although membership did alter for some of these clusters. Cluster 1 had 18
members, cluster 2 retained 7 members, cluster 3 had 88 members, the new
cluster (cluster 4) had 5 members and shows a distinctive elevated score on
the otherness factor; finally cluster 5 had 22 members. Univariate analysis
of variance comparisons were undertaken and are displayed in Table 12. In
this analysis the most significant difference was found for absorption (F =
5.13, p < .001) followed by slightly reduced sized differences between the
clusters on the schizotypy variables. Hypomania again featured prominent¬
ly (F = 4.54, p < .002), followed by positive symptoms (F = 3.99, p = .004) and
cognitive organisation (F= 2.99, p = .002).






This analysis also suggested a trend for higher levels of intolerance of
ambiguity (F= 2.10, p = .084) particularly associated with cluster 2.
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5 F (4,136) p-level
AT 4.69 6.86 5.26 3.80 5.14 2.10 .084
TAS 20.85b 21.68b 17.24b 28.40a 19.91b 5.13 .001
ImpulsDys 6.83 7.86 6.23 6.72 7.32 1.03 .397
ImpulsFunc 6.13 4.14 5.06 7.40 6.05 1.68 .159
HoP 24.60 27.29a 19.76b 24.94 25.53 4.54 .002
PosSympt 4.39 5.14 3.83 5.00 5.00 3.99 .004
CogDisorg 3.39 4.71 4.33 3.24 4.36 2.99 .021
PhysAnhed 2.17 2.29 1.70 1.60 1.18 1.65 .165
SocAnhed .61 .86 .65 1.00 .22 1.13 .344
Cog Fail 79.07 77.29 76.40 83.52 84.47 1.69 .156
Note: Different letters indicate values which are significantly (p < .05) different from each other using
post hoc comparisons (Duncan test).
Post hoc comparisons of specific mean differences using Duncan's test
revealed a significant difference for absorption between cluster 4 and the
other four clusters. For hypomania there was a significant difference
between cluster 2 and cluster 3 but not between the other three clusters.
Although a significant value of F was obtained between the clusters when
compared on positive symptoms and cognitive disorganisation, this did not
provide specific significant mean differences through the use of more con¬
servative post hoc comparisons.
Generally, these findings serve to indicate that raised levels of paranor¬
mal experience are related to higher levels of schizotypal experience, con¬
firming the findings in the previous studies. Furthermore, there seems to be
a slight tendency for particular types of experience to show a stronger asso¬
ciation with such personality traits, specifically hypomania and unusual
perceptual and ideational experiences. In this case, in both cluster analyses
a small cluster of seven individuals showed a marked elevated score on the
external influence factor which was characterised by high loadings from the
fate and healing items. This may be taken as a tentative indication that
some experiences may be more related than others to psychotic states. It
seems intuitively plausible that those experiences which arise from without,
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are seen as alien and more characteristic of psychotic experience. Certainly,
there seems to be some evidence for this interpretation in the work of
Williams & Irwin (1994) and in the suggestions of Parker (1995).
A marked pattern was identified in the five cluster analysis for high
levels of absorption. High levels of absorption were associated exclusively
with cluster 4 which was characterised by an elevated score on the otherli-
ness factor. This factor was marked by experiences which related to encoun¬
ters with other entities or experiencing oneself as an other (for instance in
the case of memories or experiences which suggested past lives). This find¬
ing holds well with the description of absorption in the literature — which
suggests that highly absorbed individuals lose themselves in a marked
restructuring of phenomenal reality.
Summary
These three psychometric studies have provided evidence for the con¬
tention that an imaginative involved cognitive style seems to underlie both
paranormal experience and schizotypy. Much weaker and inconclusive
findings were obtained in relation to decision bias variables such as ambigu¬
ity intolerance and impulsivity.
Consistent small to medium sized relationships were found between
absorption, schizotypal positive symptoms such as magical ideation, percep¬
tual aberration and hypomania. These relationships tend to appear in the
factor analyses with these variables loading on the same factor in study 1. If
more variables are included they may separate, with paranormal experience
appearing on one factor and the schizotypy variables on another correlated
factor as in study 2.
A broad range of paranormal and unusual experience items were
incorporated into study 3 where factor and cluster analyses were employed.
These analyses suggest that particular kinds of unusual experience may be
related to schizotypy. Specifically, experiences which seemed to impinge on
the individual from an external source such as healing or fate, possibly
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An experimental decision task
Introduction
In the previous chapter three psychometric studies were reported
which attempted to identify relationships between a range of variables
which constitute the tendencies towards biased or imaginative styles dis¬
cussed in chapter 2. In this chapter three experimental studies are reported
which represent an attempt to formulate and implement a decision task
which taps similar traits to those measured in the psychometric studies.
This task employs a paradigm which requires the participant to identify
stimuli under ambiguous conditions as well as note any perceptual or
ideational responses to an ambiguous noise display.
Three versions of the task are reported here. The first is a direct com¬
parison of individuals reporting high levels of paranormal experiences or no
such experiences on these tasks. The second is an attempt to replicate the
results of the first study with more comparison groups ranging beyond a
simple high low split. The third also aims to do this but in addition
includes an arousal inducing stressor which was hypothesised to increase
the size of the effect. All of these studies use rather small samples (an inher¬
ent problem in these studies considering the time it takes to execute one
trial) and so the findings tend towards non-significance. The first study had
the most robust findings. This is partially a result of the nature of the sam¬
ple which was composed of selected participants from the top and bottom
end of the paranormal experience distribution. The results in both the sub¬
sequent studies were less robust (although some indications can be seen in
the descriptive statistics) and can be viewed as a result of a combination of
factors including the nonselected participants and small sample sizes.
A number of attempts have been made to assess the judgement style of
individuals in relation to ambiguous stimuli. Probably the earliest attempt
to develop such a task is described by Frenkel-Brunswik (1949). Her investi-
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gation of prejudiced children (these experiments were largely concerned
with the identification of personality and cognitive correlates of the authori¬
tarian personality — Adorno, Frenkel Brunswik, Levinson & Sanford, 1949)
indicated that judgement focussed on the maintenance of an early decision
even in the light of new disconfirming evidence. Eventually once the judge¬
ment became untenable the pattern of judgement would change to incorpo¬
rate random guessing. These studies involved a visual task consisting of
gradually changing images.
In a study carried out by Levitt (1953) this kind of paradigm was
developed into a decision location task. This involved participants being
presented with slides upon which an image was gradually built up of accu¬
mulating lines. The participants (children) were given deliberately ambigu¬
ous instructions which Levitt presumed would be interpreted by the chil¬
dren who were intolerant of ambiguity as 'guess as soon, and as much as
possible' (p.264). Intolerance was scored by summing the number of
responses other than 'don't know' prior to the point of clear perception (a
succession of correct responses). Levitt found positive correlations between
the decision location task scores and a measure of ethnocentrism and a mis¬
conceptions scale (another measure of ambiguity intolerance).
In a study which is particularly relevant, Draguns (1963) examined the
perceptual reactions of chronic, acute schizophrenics and nonschizophrenics
to ambiguous and sparse stimuli. One technique used was the presentation
of realistic drawings of objects or scenes which were blurred to different
degrees. Each individual was asked to respond when he thought that he
could identify the picture. The chronic group tended to make their judge¬
ments at a significantly earlier point in time than the nonschizophrenics and
made more perceptual recognition errors as well. The acute schizophrenics
performed at an intermediate level between the performance levels of the
chronics and nonschizophrenics.
Heilbrun & Blum (1984) found that reactive patients were less tolerant
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of ambiguity on an auditory task where they were asked to identify words
hidden by noise (in this case this was created by having two other voices
reading a passage at the same time). The word set consisted of 14 polysyl¬
labic words such as 'commerce', 'graceful'. Each of the stimulus words was
presented 9 times at the same volume before the next word was presented.
The masking noise was initially presented at the same volume as the word
itself but was reduced by one decibel with each presentation of the same
word thereby increasing the likelihood of recognition. The participants
were asked to guess the word as soon as they were 'reasonably sure' of it.
They were permitted to repeat that guess or change their guess after the
next presentation of the word but they received no feedback regarding their
accuracy. If the subject correctly identified any word three times before the
final presentation of that word the tape would move on without any expla¬
nation and a warning given that the next presentation would be a new
word.
The ambiguity tolerance score was derived from the total number of
word presentations on which a subject withheld a guess. Higher scores
indicated a greater tolerance of ambiguity. As intolerance implies rapid,
inaccurate judgements the authors noted that they had to take into account
rapid correct identifications of words which would seem to indicate a ten¬
dency towards low tolerance of ambiguity (but would also be rapid correct
identifications). To compensate for this error scores were also taken into
account as an index of a tolerance of ambiguity. A significant main effect
was found for premorbid status with reactives scoring lower than process
schizophrenics. The lowest value was for the hallucinating reactives but
this was not significant. Analysis of the error scores revealed again a main
effect of premorbid status with reactives making more errors than process
schizophrenics. In this analysis a significant interaction effect confirmed
that reactive hallucinators made more mistakes than any of the other
groups. This would seem to suggest that a more appropriate measure of tol-
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erance of ambiguity in these kinds of masking task might be the error score
rather than the overall raw (occasions of withholding a guess) score.
Reactive schizophrenic hallucinators showed a cognitive impairment in
their ability to delay attribution of meaning to the ambiguous stimuli pre¬
sented (and also in the availability of alternative meanings).
Chadwick (1988; 1992) carried out a visual analogue of this task where
participants were previously deluded psychotics, high and low neurotics.
Each volunteer was shown seven slides, each of these starting at a very
unfocussed state at first and gradually over six further stages becoming
focussed. Volunteers were asked to make a guess as to the nature of the
slide at each of the 7 focusing positions. In addition, the volunteers wrote
down their guess at each focusing position and reported their level of confi¬
dence in their hypothesis about the slide (ranging from 0 — 'pure guess'
through to 5 — 'certain').
Chadwick proposed that psychotics would be less responsive to stimu¬
lus factors than ideational factors and would identify the slides later (nearer
to the focused position). This was found to be the case for all of the slides
except one. Although psychotics did correctly identify the slides later than
the other group this was not a significant effect.
Assessing perceptual sensitivity Chadwick found that psychotics per¬
formed significantly less well than high N and low N groups on the slide
viewing task. The paranoid psychotics were slightly higher in sensitivity
than the non-paranoids but not more sensitive than the non-psychotics as
measured by perceptual sensitivity Am. In terms of decision making the
paranoids made the riskiest decisions as measured by judgement bias B and
the non-paranoids were the most cautious, although overall these differ¬
ences were very small. The confidence level of each volunteer was recorded
at each focussing position. Chadwick found that the psychotics were more




In addition to the decision task the empirical investigation also incor¬
porated an ambiguous visual display based on that developed by Jakes and
Hemsley (1986). They exposed subjects to a visual display with a changing
random pattern of dots and informed them that patterns had been pro¬
grammed to appear in the dots. Although no such pattern generation
process existed, the subjects reported both simple and complex visual sensa¬
tions.
The term 'reported visual sensation' was used by Zuckerman and
Cohen (1964) in preference to 'hallucination' or 'image'. It would seem rea¬
sonable to assume that these reported visual sensations would be related to
mental imagery when they arise in situations of unpatterned sensory stimu¬
lation and would be related to predisposition to some kinds of paranormal
experiences. It was found that the number of complex visual sensation
reports (but not simple visual sensation reports) correlated significantly
with both the N and P scales of the EPQ (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1975) and
with Launay and Slade's hallucination scale (Launay & Slade, 1981).
Feelgood & Rantzen (1994) examined the prevalence of hallucinatory
tendencies in a university undergraduate population using a paradigm
closely resembling that of Jakes and Hemsley as well as an auditory adapta¬
tion of the task. The number of simple and complex reports were recorded
(with some additional categorisation of different kinds of complex reports).
It was found that high scorers on the Launay Slade hallucination scale dif¬
fered significantly from those scoring low on the scale in terms of their fre¬
quency of both types (simple and complex — scored according to
Zuckerman & Cohen's criteria) of visual reports.
Another example of such a task was employed by Blackmore & Moore
(1994) in order to assess if tendencies to see things were associated with
paranormal belief. They used pictures of everyday objects embedded in
visual noise and presented via a tachistoscope (25ms) at 4 decreasing levels
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of noise. All of the 12 pictures used were presented at each level of noise
beginning with the most noise before proceeding to the next lower level of
noise. They found that non-believers in the paranormal tended to evidence
more accuracy on the task as a whole. At high and intermediate levels of
noise the believers were more likely to offer identifications than were non-
believers.
It is hypothesised in this study that those participants reporting higher
levels of paranormal experience should make early and frequent guesses
with higher error levels. Assuming that ambiguity intolerance plays a role
in attribution of paranormal experiences in a similar way to how it has been
proposed to influence hallucinatory experiences in clinical research it is like¬
ly that the performance of experients will not be as pronounced as the clini¬
cal hallucinators. The experients should also make more errors although
this is only likely to be a marginal difference compared with the clinical hal¬
lucinators.
In relation to the imagery/visual sensation task it is hypothesised that
those participants reporting paranormal experiences should report more
visual sensation reports and particularly those of a complex nature. These




Two groups of students reporting high and low levels of paranormal
experience were compared on both the picture identification task (proposed
to measure ambiguity intolerance) and imagery/visual sensation tasks.
These tasks were based on tasks used by Heilbrun and colleagues (1972,
1984) in the case of the former and Jakes and Hemsley (1986) the latter.
Three dependent measures were focussed upon in the ambiguity intolerance
task: 1) total number of guesses, 2) total number of incorrect guesses, 3) the
number of errors (misidentified pictures - one picture makes up one series);
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in addition the number of different incorrect guesses was recorded. The
dependent measures 1 & 2 were used in Heilbrun's studies. In the imagery
task, the number of reports of both simple and complex visual sensations
(the reports of patterns, images, etc. seen in the unpatterned visual noise),
and latency to first reports were employed as dependent measures. The
number of different reports for each type of reported visual sensations was
also recorded.
Subjects
Two groups of students were compared. The high experience group
numbering 15 students had reported between 2 and 20 experiences. The no
experience group (13 students) reported having no such experiences.
Subjects were invited to take part following their completion of a survey
(see chapter 3). The high experience group was drawn from the upper third
of the distribution of reported experiences and the no experience group
from the lower third. Twenty four females and 6 males took part in the
study; the high experience group consisted of 11 females and 4 males and
the no experience group of 12 females and 1 male. Mean age was 20.57
years.
Apparatus/materials
The picture identification task was presented using HyperCard and
run on an Apple Macintosh Colour Classic with the monitor set to mono¬
chrome. Each picture used in the experiment was part of a series of 25 pre¬
sented in an order which ranged from very noisy to completely clear. The
noise was administered in 24 regular steps to each picture using Adobe
Photoshop. The noise consisted of randomly located dots (black pixels)
which served to decrease the quality of the scanned image. The 12 pictures
used were obtained from a HyperCard stack of monochrome scanned
images which included, amongst others, a face, leaves, a jug, a space shuttle,
a dog.
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The imagery/ visual sensation task employed 30 frames of random
visual noise created in Adobe Photoshop. The noise had the same visual
effect as in the ambiguity intolerance task, it consisted of dots this time
against a white background. These 30 frames were animated in a loop pre¬
sented at 13 frames per second using the animation program Macromind
VideoWorks. Each of the frames had an equal level of noise but with a dif¬
ferent random distribution of that noise. This presentation speed provided
the illusion of a continually changing display.
A measure of belief in the paranormal (Australian sheep goat scale,
Thalbourne, 1981) was administered by computer prior to the main tasks.
These participants had all completed the booklet of psychological measures
approximately 12 weeks prior to testing. A number of psychological mea¬
sures were administered; these included amongst others: the VVIQ, measur¬
ing vividness of visual imagery (Marks, 1973); and the MAT-50, a measure
of ambiguity tolerance (Norton, 1975). Respondents were also asked to pro¬
vide estimates of the number of paranormal experiences they had had and
of what kind they were. The questions on experiences required respondents
to answer on 7 point scale (7= Yes, 4= Uncertain, 1= No) whether or not they
had had experience of telepathy, clairvoyance, apparitions etc. They were
also asked to indicate how many experiences they may have had in total
(see psychometrics studies in chapter 3 for full details).
Procedure
Participants were informed that this study was following up on the
questionnaire booklet that they had completed but they were only given
information about task requirements and were not led to believe that it was
a task involving psi performance. Prior to testing each participant was
given an outline of the task. Each participant undertook the test alone in a
cubicle. Participants observed the display at a comfortable distance (usually
70cm) and following instruction they were were left alone to complete the
task. Testing involved participants first completing a computerised measure
118
of paranormal belief (ASGS). This was followed by brief instructions on
how to complete the task. They were told to try to identify each picture,
moving through each series beginning at the noisiest picture and mention¬
ing aloud any thoughts they might entertain as to what the image might be.
Once they were "reasonably sure" that they could identify the picture they
were instructed to move on to the next one beginning again at the highest
level of noise.
The participant responded by clicking in the upper half of the screen to
continue in the same series and in the bottom half of the screen in order to
progress to the next picture series. They also made audible identifications
of the pictures which were recorded on audio cassette.
The instruction to finish a series when the participant was 'reasonably
sure' was intended to be open to interpretation by the subjects. Participants
decided themselves when to move to the next picture, this meant that it was
relatively rare that a subject would view all 25 presentations (most pictures
were identifiable by the 20th presentation). Following the completion of this
task the participant recalled the experimenter to reveal what the pictures
were and to introduce the imagery task. Participants completed 2 practice
trials before scoring was commenced in order to adapt to the task require¬
ments.
The imagery task employed a visual noise presentation which the sub¬
jects were told had images and patterns programmed to appear in it.
Participants were asked to identify aloud any patterns or images they
thought they could see. In fact, the noise animation did not include any
pre-programmed patterns or images and the suggestion that it did was
intended to provide the subject with a suitable context for reporting any
visual sensations. This part of the task ran for 10 minutes after which the
subject was debriefed.
Results
Since the two groups had been selected on the basis of the number of
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paranormal experiences they reported, and paranormal belief often follows
paranormal experience (Glicksohn, 1990), it was highly likely that the two
groups would be differentiated in terms of their paranormal belief.
Accordingly, it was found that the high experience group showed a higher
mean score on the ASGS: 11.33 (SD = 3.24) as opposed to a mean of 5.54 (SD
= 2.60) in the no experience group (Mann-Whitney U-test comparison, z =
3.84, p< .001). The majority of task indices were not normally distributed
and possessed kurtosis values in excess of 0, precluding parametric assess¬
ment.
Table 13 Mean scores and total scores on the picture identification task
measures across 9 pictures (SD in parentheses).
High exper No exper U adjusted z P =
Tot Correct 14.53 (3.02) 11.46 (2.57) 43.50 2.50 .01
Tot Incorrect 12.20 (11.22) 6.31 (7.30) 56.50 1.89 .06
Last Guess 18.63 (3.52) 20.22 (1.31) 72.00 -1.18 .24
Trial Error 1.00 (.85) .92 (.95) 90.00 .37 .71
Tot RVSA 7.53 (7.41) 7.23 (8.06) 88.50 .42 .68
Tot RVSB 12.67(15.39) 4.23 (4.17) 57.50 1.85 .07
RVSADiff 5.07 (3.91) 3.92 (2.72) 64.00 1.56 .12
RSBDiff 9.13 (9.40) 3.38 (3.69) 51.50 2.13 .03
TimeToA 88.93 (139.43) 181.17 (155.42) 42.50 -2.13 .03
TimeToB 154.50 (176.23) 187.80 (183.75) 53.00 -1.00 .32
Due to errors in the automatic recording of the data the results from
three pictures were omitted from the analysis. The results in table 13 show
the mean and total number of guesses and errors across the 9 remaining pic¬
tures for each group. The high experience group completed fewer trials
(mean = 165.93, SD = 24.48) than the no-experience group (mean = 181.92,
SD = 13.31), i.e. they made their decisions earlier on average but not signifi¬
cantly so (z = 1.55, p = .12).
The performance of the two groups differed on the identification task
(see table 13). As predicted, high experience subjects scored more highly
than the low experience group on all the measures related to guess produc¬
tion and took fewer trials to make guesses. Mann-Whitney U test compar-
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isons between groups yielded a significant difference for the number of total
correct guesses (z = 2.50, p = .01). Comparisons of the groups on incorrect
guesses (z =1.89, p = .06) were in the predicted direction but fell just short of
significance. Just over 45% of the total guesses of the experience group were
incorrect guesses compared with 35% for the no experience group. As can
be seen from table 13, both groups made very few complete misidentifica-
tions of pictures; as such, comparison of errors between groups was non¬
significant (z = .37, p= .71).
The experience group also showed a higher frequency of reported
visual sensations (both simple and complex) than the no experience group
on the visual noise presentation. A slight difference was noted for simple
visual sensations (z = .42, p = .68) and a more marked difference for com¬
plex visual sensations (z = 1.85, p =.07). The time taken to report a first
image was noticeably different between the two groups for the total number
of simple visual sensations, with the subjects in the experience group report¬
ing simple visual sensations sooner than those in the no-experience group (z
= -2.13, p = .03).
Times were somewhat more comparable in the case of complex visual
sensations, with the experience group reporting a few seconds earlier on
average than the no experience group (-1.00, p = .32).
The criteria for coding reports of visual sensations was based on
Zuckerman & Cohen (1964). Simple sensations (RVSA) were coded if the
response was simple shape such as circle or line, they were also recorded for
general observations of movement. Complex visual sensations were record¬
ed when more animated and recognisable objects were reported e.g., faces
humans, animals, plants. Correlation coefficients calculated for inter-
observer reliability on assessing simple and complex visual sensations were
high with values of rs = .97 and .99.
Relationships between paranormal belief and the various indices of the
two tasks are displayed in Table 14. Moderate to large correlations were
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found between paranormal experience and the total of correct (rs = .53, p =
.004) and incorrect guesses (rs = .42, p = .024) on the decision task.
Paranormal experience was also significantly related to the number of
reported visual sensations: total complex reports (rs = .48, p = .01) and even
more so to different complex reports (rs = .53, p = .004). The frequency of
trial error identifications (that is, the failure to completely identify a picture
which makes up one series) were marginally related to paranormal belief (rs
= .21, p = .29) and to reports of different simple visual sensations (rs = .18, p
= .37). These correlations between guess production in the decision task and
the frequency of reported complex visual sensations suggest that these
indices are measuring similar responses.
Paranormal belief as measured by the ASGS showed moderate positive
correlations with most of the indices on the two tasks. The strongest associ¬
ation was between ASGS and the total number of guesses on the decision
task (rs = .46).
Table 14 Spearman rank order correlation coefficients between decision
task and imagery task indices
Exp ASGS TotCorr Totlncorr TotGuess LastPic Trial Error
Exp 1.00 .76 .53 .42 .54 -.12 .00
ASGS .76 1.00 .28 .45 .46 -.15 .21
TotRVSA .14 .06 -.15 -.00 -.05 -.08 .10
TotRVSB .48 .20 .44 .51 .56 .18 .11
RVSADiff .37 .24 -.03 .17 .13 -.14 .18
RVSBDiff .53 .26 .48 .49 .55 .13 .01
In order to explore the relationships of the different indices of task per¬
formance an exploratory principal components analysis was undertaken.
The analysis, employing root curve selection criteron, resulted in three fac¬
tors which accounted for 72.4% of the total variance. The individual factors
explained 31.7%, 23.4 and 17.3% of the variance respectively. The factor
loadings of the task indices are represented in Table 15.
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Table 15 Factorial pattern matrix for picture identification and imagery
tasks.
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3
TotCor .07 .01 -.86
Totlncor .55 .13 -.29
Trial Error .10 .17 .80
Last Pic .52 -.12 .49
TotRVSA -.17 .93 .20
TotRVSB .88 .06 -.02
RVSAdiff -.01 .93 .14
RSBdiff .88 .02 -.00
TimeToA .02 -.68 .20
TimeToB -.64 .30 -.24
The first factor with high positive loadings from the frequency of
reports of type of visual sensations clearly relates to a tendency to the pro¬
duction of complex images in response to ambiguous stimulation. It is
noticeable that as well as the complex visual sensations reported in the
imagery task two indices from the decision task also loaded highest on this
factor — total number of incorrect guesses as well as the last picture viewed.
Overall this suggests that this factor relates to an easy production of com¬
plex imagery but often incorrect responses in the face of ambiguous presen¬
tations. This is reminiscent of the confirmation bias discussed by Chadwick
(1992).
Strong loadings from both total number and different reports of simple
visual sensations characterised factor 2. All the other variables exhibited
low loadings. This factor is interpretable in terms of reports of simple visual
sensations. This seems to indicate that simple visual sensations are qualita¬
tively different from the complex sensations.
The third factor relates to errors with a high loading from the measure
of the number of trials which were not identified. Also a strong negative
loading was observed for the total correct guesses; this suggests an overall
error factor somewhat distinct from that of factor 1. This is likely to be more
related to a complete failure to produce an identification, which may arise
for different reasons than those which incur a high frequency of incorrect
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guesses. It is noticeable that number of trials which were incorrectly identi¬
fied (trial error) correlated moderately with VV1Q scores (rs = .37, p = .05).
This suggests a conscious voluntary and possible vivid image producing
capacity which may provide partial solutions which hinder accurate identi¬
fication.
The factor analysis presented here relies on a very small sample. This
severely limits the interpretation or generalisation of the results, it is used
here simply as a heuristic device for exploring the structure and common
factors underlying performance on the computer based task.
Finally, correlations were calculated for a number of questionnaire
measures and the task indices: these are displayed in Table 16.
Table 16 Spearman rank order correlation coefficients between paranor¬
mal experience estimates, different task measures and questionnaire mea¬
sures
Exp ASGS TotCorr Totlncorr MAT-50 VVIQ AIS TAS MGI LSHS
Exp 1.00 .76 .53 .42 .19 .26 .11 .80 .79 .69
ASGS .76 1.00 .28 .45 .13 .22 .00 .66 .66 .54
TotCorr .53 .28 1.00 .44 .00 .02 .23 .50 .59 .38
Totlncorr .42 .45 .44 1.00 .00 .11 .16 .30 .43 .16
TotRVSA .14 .06 -.15 -.00 -.07 .28 .07 .06 -.03 .15
TotRVSB .48 .20 .44 .51 .21 .01 -.17 .41 .43 .41
RVSADiff .37 .24 -.03 .17 -.00 .43 .13 .28 .13 .30
RVSBDiff .53 .26 .48 .49 .27 -.10 -.06 .45 .49 .38
LastPic -.12 -.15 .01 .16 .00 -.33 -.27 -.11 .08 .10
Errors .00 .21 -.42 .29 .16 .37 -.07 .05 -.06 .14
The lack of relationship between complex visual sensations and the
VVIQ was quite noticeable (rs = .01, p < .98). By contrast, simple visual sen¬
sations do not seem to be related to the picture identification task measures
but were more strongly related to the VVIQ (rs = .28, p < .15). These results
bear out the differences suggested by the factor analysis and suggest that
there is a difference between reports of complex and simple visual sensa¬
tions, with the former being more closely related to the processes which pro¬
mote frequent guessing on the picture identification task, while the latter are
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more closely related to imagery vividness.
Surprisingly, no evidence was found of substantial relationships
between any of the measures for the picture identification task and the total
tolerance score of the MAT-50 measure of ambiguity tolerance except in the
case of total reports of complex visual sensations where the measure was
slightly related (rs = .21, p < .27) and slightly stronger in the different
reports (rs = .27, p < .16). The failure to find a relationship between a gener¬
al measure of ambiguity intolerance and the other performance measures of
the picture identification task throws some doubt on the validity of this task
as an indicator of ambiguity tolerance.
What is of interest here is the overall level of relationship between the
task indices and the measures of imaginative involvement and schizotypy.
Absorption was reasonably highly correlated with a number of indices of
the picture identification task and with the number of visual sensations
reported in the imagery task. Absorption showed a pronounced relation¬
ship to the total number of correct guesses in the picture identification task
(rs = .50, p < .007) and also to the number of complex visual sensations
reported (rs = .41, p < .03). The strength of relationship between this vari¬
able and the indices of the two experimental tasks suggests that they tap
imaginative involvement to a significant degree and provide evidence that it
is this rather than ambiguity intolerance which defines performance on
tasks such as this.
The magical ideation and the hallucinations scales both showed a simi¬
lar pattern to absorption, although in the case of magical ideation the rela¬
tionships were in some cases more pronounced. For instance, magical
ideation and the number of correct identifications that were made were pos¬
itively correlated (rs = .59, p < .002). There was also a similar sized relation¬
ship between magical ideation and the total number of incorrect guesses (rs
= .43, p < .03). A similar pattern was found in relation to the number of
complex but not simple visual sensations (rs = .43, p < .03; rs = -.03, p < .88).
125
The Launay-Slade hallucination scale correlated positively and signifi¬
cantly with the total number of correct guesses (rs = .38, p < .05); with the
the total number of incorrect guess to a much lesser extent (rs = .16, p < .42)
and also with reports of simple and complex visual sensations (rs =.15, p <
.44; rs = .41, p < .03).
It seems therefore, that the experimental task in both modes (picture
identification and visual sensation reporting) taps imaginative traits like
absorption as well as the related measures of schizotypal cognitions such as
magical ideation and hallucinatory experiences. In combination with the
finding that the measure of ambiguity intolerance was not widely related to
the measures but showed a singular relationship with frequency of complex
visual sensations, this finding casts some doubt on the role ambiguity intol¬
erance plays in the generation of these kinds of experiences.
Discussion
Generally, the predictions made with regard to performance measures
on the picture identification task and perceived imagery task seem to be
supported by the results. These show an interesting and suggestive pattern
of responses by the two groups, however, these findings are treated with
some caution due to the manner in which participants were selected by
prior completion of a battery of measures, including paranormal belief mea¬
sures which may have inclined them to respond according to their expecta¬
tions of how a sheep or goat would respond.
No significant relationship was found between the proposed measure
of ambiguity intolerance and the MAT-50. This provokes a reinterpretation
of the factors underlying such decision tasks. The work of Heilbrun (1972)
and Heilbrun & Blum (1984) on ambiguity tolerance used the number of tri¬
als on which guesses were withheld as well as the number of trials on which
errors were made (equivalent to the total of incorrect guesses in the present
study) as the indicator of ambiguity tolerance. Fewer guesses and fewer
errors would be expected of those subjects who were more tolerant of ambi-
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guity and more guesses and errors expected of those who are more intoler¬
ant. This is somewhat problematic, in that this pattern of results may also
be interpreted in the same spirit as a creativity test, where more guesses and
incorrect guesses or different interpretations, would indicate a higher level
of creativity. It would be expected that creativity would be positively corre¬
lated with ambiguity tolerance (Tegano 1990). However, in this case, the
weak correlations between the number of guesses, the number of incorrect
guesses and the MAT-50 do not provide clear support for the view that the
identification task is measuring creativity.
This interpretation of the results questions whether or not Heilbrun
and colleagues were themselves measuring ambiguity tolerance in their
studies. The definition of ambiguity tolerance that has generally been
accepted since the work of Frenkel-Brunswik (1949), is that a person with
low tolerance of ambiguity will react to an ambiguous situation by prema¬
ture categorisation and avoidance of that ambiguity. On the other hand, a
person who is more tolerant will not react so defensively to an ambiguous
stimulus or situation and some people may enjoy and even seek to sustain
ambiguity. In the present study, the subjects in the high experience group
tended to make their final identification of a picture somewhat earlier on
average (but not significantly so) than those in the low experience group.
Two main approaches to measuring ambiguity tolerance in a non-ver¬
bal task have been explored in the literature. Following Frenkel-Brunswik's
early work, one method examined the tendency to hold onto a premature
guess in spite of evidence to the contrary. In other studies such as that by
Levitt (1953) frequent and early guesses were considered as indicative of
intolerance. In the Heilbrun & Blum (1984) study, the number of errors
(equivalent to the number of incorrect guesses in the present study) and the
"withholding" of guesses (the opposite of frequent guesses when measuring
intolerance) was taken to measure ambiguity tolerance.
These two approaches to non-verbal testing of ambiguity intolerance
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suggest two seemingly incompatible views of an ambiguity intolerant
response. One would suggest a low number of guesses, the other a larger
number. However, Frenkel-Brunswik (1949) did mention that intolerant
people following early selection and a period of perseveration may also
show haphazard guessing. Patterns of frequent and early guessing as well
as perseveration need to be further investigated and clarified in order to dis¬
cern the best possible response measures of ambiguity intolerance in a non¬
verbal task.
The performance of subjects on the visual sensation/imagery task sup¬
ported the findings of Jakes and Hemsley (1986). Reports of complex visual
sensations but not simple sensations correlated with paranormal experience.
Jakes and Hemsley found that only complex visual sensations correlated
positively with scores on a measure of predisposition to hallucinations. In
the present study, complex perceived imagery was also found to be quite
strongly related to the performance measures on the picture identification
task. Those subjects showing more complex perceived imagery also made
more incorrect guesses on the picture identification task. This suggests a
common underlying response factor which was also indicated in the factor
analysis of the task indices.
Interestingly, complex visual sensations, unlike simple visual sensa¬
tions, did not show any association with vividness of imagery as measured
by the VVIQ. This distinction between simple and complex visual sensa¬
tions requires further examination. Most reports of hallucinatory or para¬
normal experiences have a degree of complexity; it makes sense to assume
that only if an internal experience is complex will it begin to share character¬
istics (and possibly be confused) with external experience. More puzzling is
the indication that the simple but not complex forms of visual sensations are
related to vividness of imagery. It would seem reasonable to assume that
the visual sensations arising from these kinds of tasks would be closely
related to vividness of visual imagery; however, this relationship looks
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doubtful, particularly with regard to complex visual sensations which are
perhaps more associated with involuntarily produced images/ representa¬
tions which are qualitatively more numinous than visually vivid. This
seems to be a valid interpretation when we consider that VVIQ perfor¬
mance, although related to imagery vividness, obviously requires a reason¬
able degree of control as well.
An additional obstacle to accepting these results at face value is the
possibility that participants were 'primed' to respond in line with their level
of belief and reported experience of the paranormal. Prior to the task, par¬
ticipants had completed a number of measures related to belief in the para¬
normal, vividness of imagery, etc. It might be considered that the comple¬
tion of these measures 'primed' participants to a particular mode of
response in the task itself. Participants may have tried to generate respons¬
es which would validate their prior admission of high/low level of paranor¬
mal experience and belief. This is possible if their assumption was to regard
the task as favouring a paranormal interpretation, however, if the partici¬
pant interpreted the task as being more skeptical in nature (which seems
equally likely) it might be thought that participants reporting paranormal
experience (sheep) might aim to make their responses more conservative. In
the following studies steps were taken to avoid this possible effect.
Despite possible problems with this study, it is proposed that there is a
basis for a biased response style among experients of the paranormal com¬
pared to non-experients, although this was characterised more by imagina¬
tive processes and characterised by variables such as absorption and magi¬
cal ideation than by ambiguity intolerance.
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Experiment 2
In order to replicate the findings from study 1 a second study with
increased sample size was carried out. Study 1 could be criticised on the
grounds of a possible order effect which may have influenced the perfor¬
mance on the decision and visual noise tasks. Participants were selected on
the basis of their reports of paranormal experiences. It is possible that when
they undertook the experimental task some weeks later they could have
estimated what the appropriate response would be like and acted in accor¬
dance with this. This information could have been gleaned from the content
of the questionnaire booklet which contained measures of schizotypy as
well as paranormal experience, belief and other personality measures.
It seems somewhat unlikely that this would be case because it requires
participants who report higher levels of paranormal experience to respond
to a largely skeptical experimental design. If the participants had wanted to
act in accord with their previous indication of paranormal experience, they
would probably want to demonstrate that this ability was in fact real and
would be less likely to act in such a way as to suggest that the experiences
relate to imaginative and schizotypal experience and performance. This
interpretation has to be given as much credit as the one which entails the
participants responding in such a way as to behave like sheep but actually
discredit their beliefs.
In addition, some changes are made to the introduction of participants
to the study. In study 1 loss of data had occurred which was a result of
inaccurate participant responses. Participants were given extra instructions
with emphasis placed upon the response zones on the monitor as this had
been one of the main reasons for lost data.
Participants and Procedure
Forty participants (12 males and 22 females) were drawn from under¬
graduate classes at the University of Edinburgh. The participants were
either in their first or second year which means that if they were taking psy-
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chology as one of their subjects they were unlikely to be theoretically famil¬
iar with the kind of experimental paradigm used here.
Some of the participants were recruited from those who had originally
returned questionnaires in psychometric study 1, the rest were recruited
from psychology classes at the University of Edinburgh. The first group
had already completed a questionnaire, so in order to counter the argument
that the results may have arisen from a response bias the additional partici¬
pants completed questionnaires after taking part in the experimental study.
Some of the newly recruited participants also completed the questionnaire
prior to the task in order to maintain equal numbers of participants who
had completed the questionnaire before and after the task.
The same procedure was used as in study 1. Participants carried out
the task in small experimental cubicles. They observed at a comfortable dis¬
tance from the computer screen (usually 70cm) and following instruction
they were were left alone to complete the task. Once again the participants
completed two trials to provide practice; these trials were not scored.
Each subject was presented with 12 pictures, each in a series of 25 pre¬
sentations, typically decisions were made before the 25th presentation was
reached except on occasions where the participant found the picture difficult
to identify). As in the previous study they controlled the speed of their pro¬
gression through the pictures themselves; they dictated this by clicking the
mouse in the upper segment of the screen to move forward in the same
series and in the lower segment to end that series and begin the next.
Results
On the basis of their reported levels of paranormal experience the par¬
ticipants were later allocated to four groups for comparison. Four groups
were chosen in order to maximise possible differences between the groups
in relation to paranormal experience.
As with experiment 1 a good number of the task indices were not nor¬
mally distributed with kurtosis values markedly in excess of 0, therefore
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nonparametric assessments were undertaken. Comparisons of four groups
related to different levels of paranormal experience are presented in table 17,
It can be seen that generally the high experience group produced more
correct and incorrect guesses than the other three groups but the magnitude
of these differences is rather small and they do not achieve significance. In
general scores were similar to those in study 1, with participants who
reported high levels of PE demonstrating more correct guesses than partici¬
pants reporting fewer experiences or no such experiences. The high PE par¬
ticipants also generated twice as many guesses as the non-experients. The
stage at which final guesses occurred later for experients than for non-expe-
rients the opposite trend to that found in study 1.
Similar patterns of scoring to those produced in study 1 were found
for the imagery task with high PE participants producing more simple and
complex visual sensations than no- PE participants. Once again these com¬
parisons were not statistically significant.
Summarising these findings descriptively, it seems that compared to
the other groups the high experience group produced more guesses in total,
and took longer to make their decisions; with mean last viewing position of
21.20 compared to means of 19 and 18 for the other groups. The high expe¬
rience group seemed to produce a longer interval between first guess and
last guess than the other groups, although the low experience group pro¬
duced an almost equivalent interval length.
With respect to both complex and simple visual sensations there were
much clearer differences between the groups (although they were not statis¬
tically significant) with the high experience group reporting more complex
and simple visual sensations in excess of the other three groups.
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Table 17 showing means and standard deviations on task indices for dif¬
ferent levels of paranormal experience.
High (N= 5) Medium (N= 17) Low (N= 6) No exp (N= 8) H (3,36) P<
Correct 18.60 (4.22) 13.18 (3.47) 13.66 (6.19) 16.38 (4.87) 6.75 .09
Incorrect 8.00 (6.04) 5.35 (5.99) 4.00 (2.19) 4.00 (3.38) 1.39 .71
Total 26.38 (6.69) 18.53 (8.54) 17.67 (7.99) 20.38 (6.72) 4.37 .22
Error Id's .80 (1.30) 1.00 (1.12) 1.83 (3.13) .50 (.76) 1.50 .68
First 13.20 (1.79) 14.15 (3.56) 12.75 (3.63) 13.75 (2.33) .53 .91
Last 21.20 (3.24) 18.76 (2.96) 19.08 (3.37) 18.56 (3.42) 2.80 .42
Interval 8.00 (2.31) 4.62 (4.33) 7.33 (2.34) 4.81 (4.52) 4.10 .25
RVSA 19.00 (15.12) 6.06 (6.96) 5.67 (4.23) 10.88 (18.73) 3.27 .35
RVSB 12.20 (9.47) 5.41 (7.33) 3.67 (3.88) 5.25 (5.92) 3.33 .34
These results do not clearly show a difference between the groups
reporting different levels of paranormal experience. A number of reasons
can be offered for the lack of significance in these comparisons. Firstly,
these results are not as pronounced as those in the first study; part of the
reason for this must lie in the inevitability of not being able to select partici¬
pants with higher levels of experience prior to the study. These participants
were allocated to groups dependent upon their level of experience following
the execution of the study. There were fewer participants reporting high
levels of experience compared to study one. Both of these studies and the
following one inevitably use small samples because of the extensive time
required in running these studies.
It is likely that the processes which are important for the demonstra¬
tion of these differences will be diluted by the artificiality of the experimen¬
tal situation. Certainly if imaginative ability is involved in generating these
kinds of results, which was suggested by the findings in study 1, it would
seem that factors such as these would be curtailed somewhat within the
requirements of an experimental situation. It is difficult to bring these kinds
of processes validly into the experimental situation and maintain their range
and magnitude of responses in the face of the demand characteristics of the
situation. In this particular paradigm very few participants actually
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guessed the reasoning behind the actual design of the study and it is likely
that they maintained a more deliberate control over their cognitive functions
than would be normal in a more naturalistic situation.
In spite of these weak differences in performance which generally fol¬
low predictions, it does seem apparent that there are distinct if small differ¬
ences demonstrated between the groups reporting different levels of para¬
normal experience.
The relationships between the task indices and the different types of
experiences reported indicated some relevant associations. Both reports of
telepathy (rs = .21, p <.22) and clairvoyance (rs = .32, p <.06) show small
positive relationships with the number of incorrect guesses on the decision
task. Precognition was most related to the last guess index (rs = .34, p <.05).
Apparitional experiences showed a small positive relationship with last
guess (rs = .21, p <.23) and a small negative relationship with the number of
reports of complex visual sensations (rs = -.24, p < .16). Out of body experi¬
ences was positively related to both the number of correct guesses (rs = .29,
p < .09) and also to last guess (rs = .24, p < .16). The total number of experi¬
ence reported by the participant showed the strongest relationship with the
number of misidentified pictures (trail error) (rs = .31, p <.08) and showed
no relationship with the number of reports of complex visual sensations (rs
= -.01, p <.94).
Table 18 Spearman correlation coefficients between ratings of different
experiences and task indices
Telepathy Clair Precog Appar OBE Total PE
Correct .06 -.11 -.06 .04 .29 .05
Incorrect .21 .32 .07 -.06 .03 .28
Trial Error .12 .16 .12 -.00 .10 .31
First -.22 -.09 .14 .15 .10 -.03
Last -.04 -.08 .34 .21 .24 .22
Interval .20 -.02 .14 .11 .03 .22
RVSA .02 .21 -.01 -.16 .17 .12
RVSB -.02 -.03 .09 -.24 .02 -.01
Asgs .34 .36 .62 .39 -.04 .68
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Generally, a number of reversals in terms of results appear in the find¬
ings of this study. For instance, total paranormal experience does not show
the same kind of relationships noted in the analysis of study 1. Instead of
showing medium sized positive relationships between PE and complex
visual sensations there is no evidence of relationship (rs = -.01, p <.94). This
may be due to the relatively high levels of reports of visual sensations of
both kinds reported by the non-experient group. Table 17 shows a decrease
in the reports of visual sensations across the groups as paranormal experi¬
ence decreases and a rise again in the no experience group. Small sized pos¬
itive though not significant relationships were found between total PE and
incorrect guesses (rs = .28, p <.ll), trial error (rs = .31, p <.08) and last guess
(rs = .22, p <.19).
In this analysis it appears that some relationships noted between para¬
normal experience and task indices are altered or reduced in magnitude.
Also the relationship between complex visual sensations and PE noted as
one of the more robust findings in study one disappeared completely in
study 2. However, the pattern of differences in scoring between groups
remain similar with high PE groups guessing more.
While the findings of this study show similar trends to those found in
study one it must be acknowledged that these are much weaker. There are
two reasons why this is likely to be the case; firstly, the sample did not con¬
tain participants who reported exceedingly high levels of paranormal expe¬
rience (it is these participants who provide the pattern of scoring which con¬
stitutes much of the experimental effect in the study) and the sample size
was smaller than that required to adequately demonstrate these effects at




The third study examined the same variables as studies 1 and 2. It dif¬
fered mainly in that it introduced an arousing variable in the form of white
noise which was administered using a clinical audiometer over headphones.
Slade (1976) describes how increased internal arousal (perhaps incurred
through some stressing event) is an important factor in triggering hallucina¬
tory experiences. White noise has been employed in a wide range of experi¬
ments exploring arousal (Eysenck, 1981) where high levels of noise
approaching 70 -lOOdb have a tendency to increase physiological arousal.
Bentall and Slade (1994) have suggested that higher levels of arousal will
lead to a more superficial information processing style focused on concrete
rather than semantic information and as a consequence increase the likeli¬
hood of reality discrimination errors.
White noise has been used at various levels in studies of hallucinations
with interesting effects. In a study by Margo, Hemsley, and Slade (1981)
hallucinating patients were given an auditory stimulus which varied from
silence through a voice reading to irregular blips and continuous white
noise. It was found that the complexity or meaningfulness of the signal had
a fundamental effect on duration, loudness and clarity of the hallucinations
experienced by the patients. The more complex the signal the less enduring,
loud and clear were the hallucinations and vice versa. These findings sup¬
port those of Alpert (1985) who also obtained increased levels of hallucina¬
tory experience along with the introduction of white noise as a stimulus; he
does however report that increased hallucinations are likely to be reported
with moderate rather than high or low levels of white noise.
Within the parapsychological field white noise has been employed as
part of a partial sensory deprivation state called the ganzfeld'. Typically
most people left to adjust their own white noise levels adopt a relatively low
level of noise which is comfortable for the 30 or minutes they spend in the
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state. In these studies the white noise provides an auditory equivalent of
the homogenous visual field of red light which is cast over the participant's
eyes during the session. This homogeneity of both auditory and visual
input is remarkably similar in function to the vague background noise
reported by hallucinators and by those who have experienced real life sen¬
sory deprivation. Where there is no figure but simply ground in perceptual
experience there is a tendency towards the creation of figure.
Primarily in this study the noise was used as a mild stressor which
was hypothesised to increase the power of the experimental effect. It was
hypothesised that the three levels of noise would increment the arousal level
experienced by the participant. Although descriptions of the level of
arousal differed from individual to individual, following discussion after
their participation there was general agreement that they found the
increased levels of noise more stressing and distracting than the lower lev¬
els.
Design
A mixed design was employed with one between subjects factor —
experience of the paranormal (high, low and no experience) and one within
subjects factor — level of arousal (white noise presented at three levels: 25,
40 and 60db).
Participants
A total of 38 students took part in the study. Due to a corruption of
coding data held on computer which would have permitted their allocation
to groups, only 20 participants are presented in the analysed data. This
severely limits the possible interpretation of the findings; as a result these
findings are discussed tentatively and descriptively. These participants all
volunteered for the study and most were recruited from psychology classes
in the Business School at Napier University, Edinburgh. A small number
were also recruited from the Koestler parapsychology unit subject pool and
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the first year psychology course at the University of Edinburgh. In all, 9
females ranging from 18-29 years in age (mean = 22.77) took part and 11
males ranging from 18 -31 (mean = 22.27). The participants were later cate¬
gorised into three groups for comparison: those reporting no experiences
(N=4); those reporting up to 5 experiences (N=11); and those reporting more
than 5 experiences (N=5).
Materials & Apparatus
In order to facilitate clear recordings of the participants' responses a
cassette recorder and clip microphone was secured on to the upper part of
the respondent's body. A clinical audiometer was employed to administer
the white noise (this was borrowed from the Audiology Unit at the Royal
Edinburgh hospital). The audiometer provided a range of possible signals
at different amplitudes. The unit was set to white noise, to both ears, at lev¬
els of 25, 40 and 60 decibels. The noise was delivered directly to the ears of
the participant using Telephonies TDH-39P headphones with ear cushions.
Procedure
Each subject was introduced to the picture identification task as out¬
lined in previous sections. Subjects were informed that they would be
administered white noise at different amplitudes over headphones. The
three levels of white noise were demonstrated prior to the task. Once the
subject had been given the outline of the task procedure measurement
began. The first three of the twelve trials were designated trials to provide
the participant with practice and to accustom them to the white noise levels.
During these first three trials the white noise was also presented in the same
order for all participants. For the first trial the noise was set at 25db, for the
second at 40db and for the third at 60db. Each of the following nine trials
during which results were recorded had been randomly allocated a noise
level of 25, 40, or 60db. As in studies 1 and 2, the respondents verbalised
any guesses they had during each trial. They controlled the progression of
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the program and presentation of pictures, taking as much or as little time as
they needed to reach a decision on identifying the picture.
Results and Discussion
The participants were allocated to groups for analysis based on the
number of experiences they reported. In experiment two the subects had
been divided into four groups consisting of high, medium, low and no expe¬
rience groups. This split is more sensitive to possible differences along the
dimension of paranormal experience. A four way split in experiment 2 and
a three way split in experiment 3 (where the sample size was smaller) per¬
mitted the possibility of detecting differences between individuals with dif¬
ferent levels of experience rather than a simple split in terms of high and
low experience where the more extreme differences between high and no-
experience individuals may be diluted. It was projected that substantive
differences would be more evident between the extreme scorers on paranor¬
mal experience and those reporting different degrees of experience. The
increased numbers of comparison groups is not without its costs; while it is
possible to see distinct differences in terms of means between the groups of
different variables these rarely achieve significance.
Due to the small number of usable data sets from 20 participants as
well as the under representation of non- and high-experients the data only
provides a very tentative description of the role of arousal in the decision¬
making process. The data from the task (as with all of the other studies)
was markedly skewed on a number of the measures precluding the use of
parametric ANOVA. The data was submitted to appropriate non-paramet¬
ric one-way ANOVA (Kruskal-YVallis for between-group comparisons and
the Friedman test for within-group comparisons).
Kruskal Wallis tests were carried out for comparisons of the three lev¬
els of reported paranormal experience and Friedman tests for different lev¬
els of white noise. The medians and test values are presented for all com¬
parisons in tables 19, 20, and 21. Table 19 shows the relevant values for the
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total number of guesses made.
Figure 3 Group medians for total guesses across three noise levels
No significant differences were found between the number of guesses
between the three groups or between the three noise conditions, although
there is a suggestive increase in the number of guesses incurred in the high
experience group as the noise increases. The number of incorrect guesses
did not discriminate between the three groups nor did the three noise condi¬
tions. There were however slightly more incorrect guesses made by the
high PE group.
Table 19 showing median scores and results of Kruskal-Wallis and
Friedman tests on total number of guesses and incorrect guesses across
the three levels of experience.
Total guess Incorrect Guesses
Group 25db 40db 60db Fr p= 25db 40db 60db iiolll
No Exp 5.00 5.00 7.00 .93 .63 0.00 0.00 0.50 .28 .86
Low 6.00 3.00 6.00 2.38 .30 0.00 0.00 1.00 4.20 .12
High 6.00 7.00 8.00 2.28 .32 2.00 2.00 2.00 1.85 .39
H .083 .085 .85 .71 1.44' 1.52
P= .96 .95 .65 .69 .48 .46
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The position at which first guess was made was compared and the
results are presented in table 20 along with the position at which guessing
was terminated. No significant comparisons were obtained but a slight pat¬
tern seemed evident that earlier guesses were made by the high group com¬
pared to the low and non-experient groups. In addition, there is a slight
pattern for earlier guesses across all groups during higher levels of noise.
Figure 5 Group medians of first guesses across three levels of noise
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The last position before moving on to the next trial is also compared
across groups and noise levels. Two significant results are shown in table
20, for the low experience group across the three noise levels (Fr = 6.84, p <
.03) and for the high noise condition (60db) across the three levels of experi¬
ence (H = 7.75, p = .02). There is a suggestion here again of earlier termina¬
tion of a trial by the high experience group compared to low and no-experi¬
ence groups. It seems possible to tentatively identify a trend for earlier
guesses and decisions by the high PE compared to medium and low PE
groups.
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Table 20 showing median scores and results of Kruskal-Wallis and
Friedman tests on first and last guesses across the three levels of experi¬
ence.
First Guess Last Guess
Group 25db 40db 60db Fr p= 25db 40db 60db Fr p=
No Exp 13.25 15.00 11.50 1.73 .42 20.65 21.16 20.66 1.08 .58
Low 14.33 15.00 12.33 2.18 .34 20.67 18.33 18.66 6.84 .03
High 10.33 11.33 10.33 3.60 .17 16.33 19.33 17.33 1.2 .55
H 4.16 .73 1.99 2.30 1.91 7.75
P= .13 .69 .37 .32 .39 .02
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Finally the number of complete misidentifications or errors were
recorded and compared, as well as the time taken to view pictures in sec¬
onds. Very few errors were found across any of the conditions which is
largely in keeping with the previous studies and is perfectly understandable
under the experimental circumstances. This is especially the case in this
particular version of the task since the experimenter occupied the cubicle
with the participant, which was likely to cause some inhibition and perhaps
an increase in task effort and accuracy. However it is the high PE group
which made marginally more errors than the other two groups.
Figure 7 Group medians of errors across three levels of noise
The time taken to observe individual pictures was recorded and yield¬
ed a significant comparison in low experience group across the three noise
conditions (Fr = 7.09, p< .02). Further slight trends are noticeable between
the three levels of experience with an increment in time taken in line with
the level of reported paranormal experience.
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Figure 8 Group medians of time (sees) taken across three levels of noise
Table 21 showing median scores and results of Kruskal-Wallis and
Friedman tests on number of errors (completely misidentified pictures)
and time taken to view a picture (sees) across the three levels of experi¬
ence.
Error Time taken
Group 25db 40db 60db Fr P= 25db 40db 60db Fr p<
No Exp 0.00 0.00 0.00 .00 1 1.49 1.69 1.72 .50 .78
Low 0.00 0.00 1.00 .86 .65 2.59 3.01 2.83 7.09 .02
High 1.00 1.00 1.00 .00 1 3.87 4.87 5.29 .31 .85
H .38 .98 1.23 1.56 2.32 2.28
P= .83 .61 .54 .46 .31 .32
The frequency of reported visual sensations of both simple and com¬
plex kinds were also compared across experience and noise levels, the find¬
ings are reported in Table 22. Once more no distinctly obvious differences
were noted although one reasonably significant value was obtained in the
Friedman comparison of the low experience group across the three levels of
noise for complex sensations (Fr = 8.67, p < .01).
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Figure 9 Group medians of RVSA responses across three levels of noise




Table 22 showing median scores and results of Kruskal-Wallis and
Friedman tests on number of RVSA (simple visual sensations) and RVSB
(complex sensations) across the three levels of experience.
RVSA RVSB
Group 25db 40db 60db Fr P< 25db 40db 60db Fr p<
No Exp 1.50 0.00 2.00 .18 .91 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.40 .50
Low 0.00 1.00 0.00 4.59 .10 0.00 2.00 0.00 8.67 .01
High 2.00 1.00 3.00 2.00 .37 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.6 .44
H .52 .66 .48 .64 1.53 .23
P= .77 .72 .79 .73 .46 .89
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Overall the results do not provide indications of definite patterns in
the various task variables in relation to reported level of experience or noise
level. Some suggestive trends may be considered to exist on the basis of
median values. This is not surprising with the small sample and already
established weak effect in relation to task performance. Even the few signif¬
icant results obtained (when viewed in the light of the number of compar¬
isons carried out and the likelihood of family-wise error) should be treated
with caution.
Although there are similar tendencies in scoring patterns between this
final study and the two previous studies it is obvious that the effect is weak¬
ened here. Once more, the non selected participants did represent the high¬
er end of the dimension of paranormal experience that took part in the first
study. This weakened the effect. In addition, although auditory noise was
added as it was hypothesised that an arouser such as this would increase
the size of the effect, it also inevitably meant that the increased complexity
of design would reduce the number of participants in each comparison con¬
dition. In the final instance this makes analysis of this study rather difficult
and perhaps more useful information is to be gained by treating the results
descriptively.
Summary
These three studies do not provide strong or consistent findings.
However, it is noticeable that there are some small but replicable effects.
The participants characterised by higher levels of paranormal experiences
tend to produce more guesses (both correct and incorrect) suggesting a facil¬
ity for generating reponses in the face of ambiguous stimuli. The high PE
participants tend to begin guessing earlier and reach a judgement earlier
than do the low or no PE participants (although study 2 deviates slightly
from this, producing less clearcut results). And in study 3 it was obvious
that the high paranormal experients were taking more time but fewer pre¬
sentations to make a decision. This suggests that high paranromal experi-
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ents prefer their own contribution to a decision rather than actively check¬
ing to verify by quickly reaching the clearer presentations.
In study 1 a clear difference was identified between experients and
non-experients on the basis of the relative reporting of complex visual sen¬
sations. Experients reported many more such sensations than non-experi-
ents; this appeared as a similar effect in study 2 but was not observed at all
in study 3. The reporting of complex visual sensations appeared to be relat¬
ed to the production of guesses in study 1 and 2. It may be that the small
numbers included in the analysis of the final study made this effect less
detectable. It is also feasible that the introduction of the noise variable may
have had some influence.
These studies do not show any dramatic effects, but they do provide
some tentative indications of certain tendencies of paranormal experients
which are less pronounced in non-experients or experients reporting fewer
experiences. Experients are more active in generating guesses, which turn
out to be both correct and incorrect. This suggests that they may be able to
produce more identifications, or construe more in response to an ambiguous
environment. The measures of imaginative ability showed a much stronger
relationship with these performance measures than did ambiguity intoler¬
ance, suggesting that this slight tendency to produce more guesses is related
to absorption states. The high paranormal experients take longer to identify
pictres but with fewer presentations. This suggests that they prefer to con¬
tribute to the final judgement themselves rather than determine the identity
by moving quickly to the clearer pictures.
In the next section a different tack is taken with an examination of the
phenomenology of unusual and paranormal experiences. These experiences
provide real life examples of changes towards imaginative attention states
which may have been responsible for the consistent if small effects seen in
these three experimental studies.
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Chapter 5
A phenomenology of paranormal experience
Chapters 3 and 4 reported both correlational and experimental studies
which provided suggestive evidence for an imaginative or experiential style
of cognition characterised by prominent and replicable relationships
between paranormal experience and absorption, magical ideation, perceptu¬
al aberration but not between the bias variables such as ambiguity intoler¬
ance and impulsivity. These findings are followed up further in an explo¬
ration of phenomenology of paranormal experience. This leads the investi¬
gation from a predominantly empirical mode to an intepretative one. Here
participants provide accounts of unusual, anomalous experiences but not all
of these are interpreted by the participant as paranormal. These permit the
addition of personal interpretations and indications of processes, contexts
and attributions to the findings in the empirical chapters.
This chapter focuses on the phenomenological aspects of paranormal
experience. A number of aspects of experience are considered here through
an examination and interpretation of a small number of narratives recount¬
ing personal experiences. These narratives of experience are important in a
number of ways:
1) They provide good first hand accounts of anomalous experiences of
various kinds, from small personal coincidences to more impressive consen¬
sual visual phenomena. As with any experiential accounts they may inform
experimental and other empirical testing procedures.
2) They provide insights into current lay theories and models related
to unusual experiences.
3) They indicate phenomenological accounts of corresponding cogni¬
tive states and permit comparisons with the findings of experimental and
correlational studies.
4) In line with the ideas which are presented in chapter 7 they may be
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suggestive of the imaginative structures, schemas and metaphors underly¬
ing and organising these experiences.
The accounts were provided by participants who had taken part in the
decision/imagery task studies 2 and 3. Following the experiments (or in
some cases at a later date) the participants were interviewed briefly about
any experiences that they had had which they considered might be paranor¬
mal. They ranged in age from 18 to 32 years of age. They were predomi¬
nantly undergraduate social science students studying at Napier University
Edinburgh or psychology students at the University of Edinburgh. Each of
these participants had been privately interviewed at a convenient time in
the psychology department at the University of Edinburgh.
These interviews differed considerably in length from a matter of 5
minutes to an hour depending entirely upon the wishes of the participant.
They took place in the privacy of experimental cubicles at a time which was
convenient for the respondent. These interviews arose as a preparatory dis¬
cussion prior to asking three questions which were the basis for the investi¬
gation reported in chapter 8.
The accounts are unedited except where small sections of irrelevant
material have been removed. This complete account provides as far as pos¬
sible a full description of the phenomenological aspects of the experience.
Events such as gestures or sounds are communicated in normal parentheses;
edited comments in square brackets; empty normal parentheses indicate a
word which could not be transcribed due to lack of clarity.
These accounts have been organised into broad and sometimes over¬
lapping categories which address kinds of experience as well as the phe¬
nomenology of that experience.
Unusual experiences in relaxed and absorbed states
Relaxation and passive attentional states have been indicated as associ¬
ated with paranormal experiences. Irwin (1989) for example, reports that
over 90% of respondents in a survey reported being engaged in minimal
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activities such as sleeping, sitting or standing when they had experiences.
The next few accounts suggest that relaxed and absorbed attentional states
do seem to precede paranormal experiences. In the first account the respon¬
dent indicates that she experienced a mental image of her friend's name
whom she felt was contacting her. She found later that this seemed to corre¬
spond with a time at which her friend had indeed been thinking about her.
R4: a friend of mine we used to we used to be quite good friends.
And errm I used to sometimes, cos we had certain restraints on the
phone at home so I used to sometimes try get him to phone me right,
and it would usually work (clears throat) and I told him about this
and he was very very skeptical about it and he was going 'yeh right
I don't believe you at all' and errm and his proof of this was that one
Sunday night he tried to it the other way round and I hadn't phoned
him what he didn't know about when he told me that was that
Sunday evening I'd been errm y'know cos my dad's a vicar and we
went to this church, sort of visiting a church that evening and it was
a point where there was sort of a prayer section in the service and
errm we just sort of we were just everyone was silent and at almost
exactly the same time that he said that he thought that I had a very
very strong sort of it sounds a but funny but sort of (coughs) I had
a visual image of his name on a white sheet
Her reaction to this experience indicates that she recognised at the time
that this was a significant event. In addition she clearly recognises that her
'mind wandering' may have contributed to the experience.
...I wondered where it errm where it had materialised from if you
see what I mean because although I was quite a a relaxed state of
mind and my mind was probably wandering quite a lot it (cough) it
was quite er ifs not the kind of thing 1 would usually imagine if you
see what I mean.
In elaborating further she also indicates that this image was unusual
and not the kind of thing she would normally imagine but that she does
actively create imagery in response to music. In comparison to this kind of
experience her ostensible paranormal experience was involuntary. It has
been noted earlier that this is one of the sources of feedback that is probably
used to denote external sources of influence.
I mean there's been things with with errm vision but it's more I
think that's created more than just listening to music and imagining
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shapes sort of thing but I think that's more consciously trying to
imagine the shapes rather than it just being there sort of thing.
Another account describes another meaningful coincidence which
occurred in a state of reverie although the experient is not entirely sure what
state.
R7: it was a dream like well it wasn't really a dream it was just a
feeling that I'd, it wasn't, it was kind of deja vu like but not neces¬
sarily. It was the day before I bought my guitar 2 Christmases before.
I could visualise what guitar I was going to get and there was no
way I could have known because I bought it in Glasgow ... it's diffi¬
cult to say cos I never really thought until afterwards and I don't
know whether I did imagine it when I was awake or asleep.
This respondent seems to link this failure to identify the state with dis¬
sociation and goes on to indicate that he frequently experiences minor disso¬
ciative states.
just sometimes when I'm walking along I feel as though I'm dis¬
tanced from my body just thinking and then you realise that you are
at the end of the road and you've not even realised that you've
walked so far...or just lying in my bed thinking and just feel dis¬
tanced from my body and that.
The next experient reports a vivid experience which at first he
describes as a dream and later reports that it occurred in a state of relaxation
during meditation:
R20: Yeh er. Well there was a er (laughs) this sounds quite stupid
but anyway. I kind of er saw the er (....). You remember that huge
fire in Sydney in 1994. I had er I would describe it as a er a vivid
dream about something like that beforehand and it was the day
before.
Again this is a loose definition of a dream but not necessarily a dream
associated with sleep. Instead, it was more associated with a meditative
state.
no it wasn't it was in a errm in a. I kind of like do sometimes do a
bit of meditating something like that. And it was in a when I was
when I was trying to relax myself and get myself. You know the err
the relaxation thing when you errm make your body go to stone
and then transfer it to sand and then make the sand blow away. It
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was a relaxation thing and it was a a period of time in my life when
I wasn't particularly happy with myself personally and 1 kind of
envisaged fire and it got very intense. It was out of control for a
while and then the next day I saw fire. I immediately connected the
two but then again it's very subjective how you feel about how you
feel whether that was a precognition or not. But other times it's quite
un- unsettling.
The final line of this description suggests a premonition and there is a
sense of a magical interpretation, with the visualisation of fire preceding the
actual fire the next day.
Ross and Joshi (1992) found that dissociation is strongly related to
paranormal experience, this seems to be supported by the mild dissociative
cases reported above. More pronounced dissociative states associated with
paranormal experience are described later in this section.
Seeing things
The following cases report on instances of seeing or sensing entities.
Even in this brief summary of accounts there are a variety of experiences,
some which are similar to descriptions of traditional apparitions and others
which are more unusual in form and which are more difficult to relate to
particular cognitive and state characteristics.
The first, related by a young woman, gives an account of an entity in
the form of a black shadow. This account arises in the context of a state of
reverie and relaxation as the respondent was absorbed in a TV program and
it was a short while before the she noticed the oddity of her experience.
R5: we just thought it was haunted cos I mean I saw somebody
walk past and there was nobody else in the flat saw like a black
shadow and then somebody else saw something when I was there
with them... I saw someone walk into the bathroom out of the corner
of my eye and then about 2 minutes later I realised that 1 was the
only person in the flat
At a later time her flat mate observed something similar. Again her
description seems to imply some form of detached (staring) state (which she
interprets as possibly being asthmatic).
I didn't see it she was just sort of staring like this and I was like "are
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you alright?" cos she's asthmatic and I thought she had one coming
on and after it had gone she said "oh my god you're right"
Another account of a brief appearance of an entity provides a feeling
of tension. In the account the experient (a woman in her early thirties)
describes a curious event for her, one which seemed to have quite a power¬
ful influence on her and one which indirectly contributed to changes in her
life.
R12: I saw something once which I couldn't really explain it was 1
was going to move into a house —I'll cut this very short— I was
going to move into a house with a boy when I was about 22 some¬
thing like that and we were all out there working on the house get¬
ting it ready for me to move in and we're standing beside a grassy
area and I was in the boot of my dad's car getting some stuff out and
my boyfriend was there at the same time and I heard somebody
behind me at the same time. This was an area where he lived he had
lived ten years before I had never been there it was a small village
in Fife and there was a big grassy area and there was nobody around
at all there was just two houses where we were and we were in the
boot of the car and I heard something behind me and I turned round
and I saw a man standing and I presumed he was watching us and 1
presumed that Barry would knew who it was because he'd come
from this tiny wee village thing so I looked behind me looked at
Barry he was looking in the same direction I looked back and the per¬
son was gone and it was I was quite upset though. 1 didn't actually
move into the house for whatever reasons and I was quite unhappy
and sort of at the time.
She describes that she was somewhat unhappy before this experience
and the experience compounded this unhappiness.
I was unhappy to the experience with the experience 1 was exception¬
ally unhappy and it didn't really help because we could of sort of
said y'know what I mean "God did you see that" and he's like
"yeh" and the guy had a wee black jacket thing on and black
trousers.
The experience was not subjective in that she ascertained that her
boyfriend had also observed the figure but that he did not want to discuss
it.
The appearance and disappearance of the figure took place very quick¬
ly. This together with the vividness and consensuality of the experience
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convinced the experient that this was a real experience.
yeh but but it wasn't that it was so fast I mean I literally had my
head in the boot and we're only talking between here and where the
wall is outside (approximately 2-3 m) and I went like that (turns head
around relatively quickly) I mean it was just a matter of perhaps
one and a half seconds.
She attempted to check her perceptions by asking her boyfriend if he
had seen the figure, and determining exactly what he saw.
yes well probably a part of the problem was that he wasn't a very
reliable or trustworthy person and I asked him at the time, I mean I
thought well y'know it's probably just my imagination I've probably
just made it up to myself and I asked him whether whether what if
he had seen something and he said yes and I said well what do you
think they were wearing because I thought it was in my head, I
thought it was just a err flick of the light or a change of light or what¬
ever and he sort of described a sort of similar similar kind of idea but
we never really spoke about it I really wasn't that keen I didn't think
it was a very nice nice thing.
She goes on to explain that she finds apparitional experiences like this
somewhat distasteful, she had worked previously as a nurse and having
had contact with the dead she did not relish the idea of such visitations.
I don't like I've never really liked the thought of anything any
ghosty things and I don't actually believe in it which makes it
makes it harder for reason- I've always found it interesting but I
don't really like it and I don't like the thought of of sort of dead peo¬
ple coming back to visit me and things like that — oh no it's horrible
I've seen lots of dead people and that doesn't help.
This particular account is interesting in that it again possibly describes
a relatively involved and absorbed state of mind (and in this case one which
was somewhat stressed and negative) at the time of the event. The consen¬
sual nature of the apparition and subsequent minimal discussion of the
event by the woman and her boyfriend are unusual. The event seemed to
symbolise the poor state of relationship for her "he wasn't a very reliable or
trustworthy person".
Two experiences reported by a man in his early thirties are more curi¬
ous in their content. The first seems to be a veridical experience in that he
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reports that his travel companion observed the same event.
R26: Yeh we were driving along a road in the middle of erm middle
of the night in Fife some years ago me and another fella. And errm
this thing crossed the road in front of us and it was err the effect
was exactly as if a very large er panther - like animal was crossing
road casting a shadow without the animal just the shadow. And the
car closed on this shadow and it was in motion as it went
across the road.
... the car was just going at about it was er an open er dual carriage
way I think so going pretty fast maybe 50 mph. And it was quite
dark and just the headlights and suddenly saw this thing going
across the road in front of it. And we were closing in on it so it and
there so we had plenty of time to see if there was a cat of some kind
between us and this thing and there wasn't. We just closed up on
this thing and it err sort of turned it's head and looked exactly as if a
shadow was being cast by an invisible panther. In fact 1 looked up in
a cat book later on the silhouette was perfect errm perfect erm puma
I think it was. And errm. I saw this thing and he put the brakes on
because he thought he was going to drive over it.
It was just because we were going quite fast and it all took a few sec¬
onds it was very clear. I mean I saw it for er oh about 60 yards or
something. Pete put the brakes on as soon as we reacted to this thing
and we sort of looked at each other and said "did you see it?" "yeh"
and we sort of thought about it and got out the car and errm we're
thinking we must have run over a cat in some complicated manner
and we're looking for the cat and there's obviously nothing and
we're standing there feeling non-plussed and we suddenly looked at
each other and we were both thinking er we're standing on a lonely
road in the middle of the night and there's nobody here but us and
whatever that was and we got back in the car and left at about 90
miles an hour.
What is curious about this is the observation that it was not simply a
puma (an admission which is somewhat contentious itself) but that it
seemed to be a shadow of an invisible puma. As they were travelling at
night there would, no doubt, have been ample opportunities for mispercep-
tion. However the respondent mentions that his view was clear, also both
experients checked each other's view of what they had seen and reached an
agreement on their experience. The next report by the same respondent is
somewhat more difficult to explain.
The other one was just me so I could have conceivably of errm hal¬
lucinated that one. But it was along vaguely similar lines I was up
on Arthur's seat in fact. I was going for a late night walk and errm I
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saw this dark thing moving about in the distance and it being pretty
dark I erm I thought because it was dark and upright and going a
reasonable rate and about the size of a vertical human being I could
hardly see I thought "oh it'll be somebody on a bicycle" and erm I
knew there was a path there. And then it began to move across
some rough ground towards me and errm it was still going about
the same speed and I thought I was still trying to interpret this as
something you would meet at night.
Yeh about that sort of speed (the speed of someone running). The
speed you might expect from someone going reasonably fast on a
bicycle. And it started moving across and I thought errm "that's not
a bicycle because there's a marsh there which I know about I can see
that in the daylight. It must be a oh God it must be huge dog or
something." Because that would be about the right size I was still
trying to figure out what it would be so 1 thought "I'll just stay still
and be casual there's a large unattended dog coming to have a look
at me hooray. And as this thing got closer I was thinking it's not a
bicycle and it's not a dog because it's going at the right speed and its
the right size but it's vertical what the hell is that? And it eventually
got within about within about 20 feet of me and it was just a 5 foot
spindle shaped ovoid with no distinguishing features at all. And it
just kind of stopped and had a look at me and I had a look at it and
thought "Shit!" And so we just stood like that for about 10 or 15 sec¬
onds and then it erm zoomed off at extremely high speed and van¬
ished somewhere.
There is no indication in the respondent's account of a relaxed frame of
mind although it may be speculated that this was likely. In the second case,
the respondent was actually very active, cognitively attempting to describe
and understand the experience. It seems that these two experiences are
more difficult to explain as hallucinatory experiences.
These few accounts give some indication of the kinds of apparitional
experience. In a few cases it seems that absorbed and mildly dissociated
states are a common feature. Some of these experiences are more difficult to
explain in these terms and alternative explanations would have to be
sought.
Sensing and feeling experiences
Many experiences seem to take place at a much less visual or concep¬
tual level. The terms 'sense' or 'feel' are often used and these seem to relate
to experiences which are more somatic or emotional in form than intellectu¬
al or perceptual. Irwin (1994), categorises paranormal experiences similar to
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these kinds of experience; he calls them intuitive impressions which are usu¬
ally devoid of imagery and conscious thought processes leading to the
impression. The information leading to the event is minimised or absent
and with a strong unexpected underlying emotion. Irwin goes on to note
that it is this feeling of conviction that often gives emphasis to an experience
being meaningful or compelling. In this first example, the respondent a
man in his mid-twenties reports a sense of presence which he had been
experiencing.
R32: Yeh just like I just see something that wouldn't be y'know
thaf s not there don't know it's just been a few times when especial¬
ly if I'm driving 1 think I've seen something at the side of the road
but there won't actually be y'know when I double take it's not
there
just figures sort of running or just y'know it could just be a shadow
or something that I that just catches my eye in the corner of my
eye especially when I'm driving errm nothing's actually ever
come up and appeared in front of me or anything like that it's just
it's always out of the comer of my eye or whatever and when I'm
on my own somewhere as well y'know I'll make myself think that
there's somebody there or something there you just get the jitters or
whatever and as soon as the light is on everything's ok but it's just
I always feel that there is something here (twists and gestures
behind) well just sort of ... not directly behind me just to the sides ...
just sort of behind my ears if I'm somewhere where I don't know
where I am that's where 1 always look 1 don't ever look behind me.
The account becomes more understandable when the respondent
begins to realise that the sense seems to be functional and is protective of his
shoulder which he injured some time ago playing rugby.
it's a sort of insecurity that someone's coming up the side of your
shoulders I'm not I mean I'm not bothered if anything is beside me
I mean if someone is walking up to me and I can hear footsteps I
won't be bothered but if s from the sides I don't know what that is
it might stem from rugby or something I haven't got a clue ... well I
did my shoulder in it's only been recently that I've ever thought
about it really someone hit me from the side and dislocated my
shoulder and it may be from that but I can't see that's just a
thought as I've been sitting here what it was.
This suggests a sense of presence may arise out of a preconceptual
sense or concern, in this particular case an injury to the shoulder.
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Another example, this time a woman in her early twenties, concerns a
similar sense of presence which seems to be attached to certain locations
and which the experient attributes to the death of her pet dog and possibly
to the death of her grandfather.
R35: and I sometimes feel that there are (laughs) things there that
shouldn't be there it's like if I'm in a room it's probably me just
being completely paranoid but errm I sometimes feel that there are
just things that I don't know what but there are things maybe people
that are there that just shouldn't be there but I don't know who they
are I don't know what they are they don't frighten me unduly
it tends to be actually in my hall I detest being in the hall errm night
or day you go in our front door and you've got the rooms coming off
it and I just I don't like being in the hall I do not know why I have
no idea why.
sometimes if I'm on my own at night usually errm but if s mainly I
don't like being in the hall for some unknown reason I don't even
like passing through it... probably errm it's probably something to
do with the fact that I used to have a dog and we had to get the dog
put down he had cancer and he always lay in the hall ifs probably
connected with that but in the old house we used to live in I didn't
like it was my bedroom I didn't like being in and I don't know why
that was errm but I was really small and I can't remember much
about that but I just felt very uncomfortable with it.
I usually feel ifs ifs not an intimidating thing but I get a very
strong sense that there's somebody there with me and occasionally
and I'll turn around and think ifs my mum walked in and I'll turn
round and I'll speak to somebody and go ok there's nobody here
(laughs) errm it doesn't frighten me except the hall that that fright¬
ens me a bit but if it happens ifs usually in my house somewhere in
my house either my bedroom or the living room
if I had to say that I would probably think it was my grandad who 1
don't know why because I never met him errm but it doesn't fright¬
en me it doesn't intimidate me if there is something there I know ifs
not going to hurt me ifs like a kinda he's protecting me kind of
thing so I would say if 1 had to say it was anybody it would proba¬
bly be him for some reason.
Persinger and Makerec (1987) have reported on a wide range of neuro¬
logical characteristics of paranormal believers; they have suggested that a
sense of presence is common amongst these and may be related to temporal
lobe epileptic-like signs.
It is interesting how this general sense of presence at first seemed to be
limited to a single place and entity but then becomes associated with other
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locations and entities.
Sometimes these 'feelings' have a definite locus and focus on a certain
person and event, it is however always possible to assume that the feeling
was rather general and became associated with a person only after the fact.
It is noticeable that often the respondents are open to alternative explanatins
such as coincidence.
R17: Just things erh that you have bad feeling about things or good
feelings about things and then something really good or bad hap¬
pens. Where you errm like err I don't know I knew I knew that
my boyfriend had been in a road accident and he had. And nobody
would believe me I was running around the house going "Dad!
Dad! Something's happened to Andrew" and he was saying "don't
be stupid" and half an hour later he phones up y'know had a car
crash. Err things like that and I mean a lot of them could be coinci¬
dence you don't know I mean like you'd walking down the road
and you could suddenly think of somebody and they'll walk around
the corner. That kind of thing.
Sometimes these experiences are are more explicitly connected with
family or places (this metaphor of connection is dealt with more fully in
chapter 8).
R20: And the link between my mother and I is very strong. Errm
I've had other experiences more premonition-wise.
R15: I think the most strange one was errm my dad went down to
London on business when I was about 9 or 10 like he'd gone before
heaps of times and it didn't really bother me much but then the day
he went I woke up and he'd already gone but I was in right state all
day I mean I was like actually throwing up I was so worried about
him I just had a really bad feeling that something horrible was going
to happen and I kept crying and my mum's going "look it's going to
be fine it's going to be fine he'll be back about 8 o'clock" and I was
just like I was thinking about plane crashes or taxi's bumping into
each other and stuff like that it was quite vague when he got home
and I sure was relieved to see him and 1 started crying and he said
"whafs all the fuss about?" and then when he put on the telly at 9
o'clock it had been the day of the Hungerford murders you know
that guy had gone nuts in London and my dad had actually passed
through Hungerford about a block away and he'd actually seen the
fire in the car mirror and he'd thought "oh there must be a hell of fire
over there" and not thought anything of it (laughs) and I said I'd
been in a state all day and that had happened and my parents were
going "that's a bit strange isn't it" it's quite because I'd felt uneasy
all day y'know it wasn't like just the moment that it was taken place
it had been all day so I don't know but that was about.
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The respondent indicates that the feelings did not suggest specific
details.
yeh but I was way off the ball I didn't think of anybody with a gun
or anything I just thought of him dying basically which was pretty
horrible but my mum had said something at the time that y'know
"Gillian quite often gets feelings like that" but I can't remember any¬
thing before that.
The next respondent provides a good account of how the recognition
aspect at the root of these feelings becomes more sensitive to events in an
'additive' way.
R20: I mean nothing I could definitely define. As that. I mean I've
just had it's one of those ones where like err it goes out of your
head completely and then something will happen and then sudden¬
ly you remember oh it's happened before and you build on images
and stuff. I mean I personally believe that er it's a kind of er addi¬
tive thing where you think something and then something else hap¬
pens and then you just make a connection more quicker and some
things are quite some things you make connections with and asso¬
ciate with being paranormal are completely irrelevant and wrong.
It's just that you're hoping that it may be true and then (drawing)
things become unsure about it. So I really wouldn't know about
other things. I've had there was I mean there was one other one
that was occurred but I wasn't sure about that either and that was
just last summer. And that was to do with err I just got a bit
depressed and lost it for a while. But I had a really bad gut feeling
about something and yeh 1 got the same one before er 1992 I think
and it was a recurring gut feeling that I got and I didn't like it at all.
So I thought some thing bad was going to happen so I didn't tell any¬
one about it because I thought I'd sound like an idiot (laughs).
Errm I can't remember in the first one I got a really bad I mean it
kind of like sets in when you get depressed. And I got depressed
and it was er suddenly got this this gut feeling that something was
going to happen and this was before the war in the gulf and then err.
But I mean it wasn't something I didn't perceive a war in it foretell
a war or anything like that. I felt bad about something and felt some¬
thing really bad was going to happen just as I feel that everything is
winding up to a close now in our real time and feeling feeling that
some, that some things hold more truth than others. Something like
that I get gut feelings about other things that's generally it I mean
thafs the scope of it I don't have anything more defined than that.
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The sense of feeling is often considered to have a bodily basis.
Everyday idioms refer to feeling the onset of an event in bones, guts and
even the body's water!
I feel it in my bones
I have a gut feeling
I feel it in my water
Something of this schema of paranormal knowing is communicated
here. There are also similarities to be drawn between this feeling experience
and the numinous feelings often ascribed to paranoid psychotic experiences.
Sass (1992) cites Conrad's use of the German term 'das trema' — 'stage-
fright' to describe a generalised feeling of anticipation.
Fantasy versus reality
The next description shows the difficulties involved in trying to sepa¬
rate fantasy from hallucinations which seemed to have a veridical basis.
The respondent here, a female in her early twenties, had a range of experi¬
ences and this was partly explained by her in terms of psychic abilities that
she may have inherited from her grandmother. In the first instance she
describes an apparition of her grandfather accompanied by another person
who was identified as a friend of the grandfather.
well I don't he was just at the bottom of my bed (laughs) and and
that particular situation he was with he was dressed as though he
would go to the football which in theory I could know what that
was like but I was only 7 when he - no 9 when he died but this was
about 2 years later and then but I hadn't seen him for 2 years and
errm but I hadn't seen him for two years so I hadn't really seen him
since I was 7 I could have possibly have seen him but anyway he
was with this bloke who I don't necessarily remember and I
described him and I described him in vivid detail to my mum
when I was 20 I might add not when we were talking about such
things I said "oh I thought I saw y'now grandad" sort of thing and
she said "ooh yeh who was he with and what was he doing?" and 1
said "he just came over and sat down and was chatting away to me"
and but he was with this this guy and she said "oh who was he?"
and I said I don't know who it was" and she said "well describe
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him" and they were dressed exactly the same and one was taller than
the other one was sort of thing and it turned out ermm he always
used to go to the football with this particular friend who had died
before.
Her claim that she had never met this friend of her grandfather's adds
weight to the likelihood of this experience being veridical. It seemed that
from the account that the encounter was likely to lead to communication but
at that point the respondent hid under the covers.
no I think he was just he was coming over and he was in the room
and I was just sort of like watching as if to say "this isn't really hap¬
pening" and then he sat on the bed and then he just sort of tried to
talk to me to tell me that it was ok and everything but he was there
but at that point I went under the covers (laughs)... and then I stayed
under there for a while and then I came out and he'd gone so but
errm I mean now I wouldn't do that so.
The respondent remarks that this seemed to her to be a real event
although there was some debate in the family since she had often reported
reasonably vivid experiences which her family thought might be dreams but
which she contested actually happened:
it was I mean at the time I thought it was definitely real it wasn't a
dream because I mean I've been dreaming vividly for years ever
since I was sort of my mum used to tel- talk about the dreams I had
but this wasn't a dream as far as I was concerned erm but it wasn't
something I could tell my mum or dad about in je-1 would tell
them that I'd seen pink elephants walking around the room and
things like that.
The small experiences
The majority of experiences reported as being paranormal are relative¬
ly unimportant and have less impact, they seem to be reported by the expe-
rients more as curiosities and often they consist of relatively unimportant
small coincidences. It is likely that these relatively unimportant experiences
are remembered and reconstructed in such as way as to inflate their signifi¬
cance. These experiences may take a number of forms: visual images, feel¬
ings and relaxed or dream state images. Also included are the relatively fre-
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quently reported phone call scenarios where one close friend seems to pre¬
dict an incoming phone call from another.
R8: But I've had a lot of dreams which just wee things nothing like
predicting winners of the national or something like that. It's just
been things like the way someone else has made a cup of coffee the
next day or something like that the next couple of days.
Two cases report unusual coincidences regarding relatively unimpor¬
tant issues which seemed to have been predicted in dreams. These provide
a good example of occasional coincidences which are relatively striking and
which suggest a level of connectedness and sense of significance — the hall¬
mark of magical thinking.
just things like dreams the stupid thing is 1 had a dream about er a
bird the other night and when I woke up I had this dream about a
bird in the garden y'know and then that day I was out and I found
an injured pigeon in the middle of the road and took him home
(laughs) looked after him and got the RSPB but this is stupid proba¬
bly coincidence and trying to think of others y'know if I've done
erm peoples cards before quite often I've been able to tell them more
specific things like erm I don't know like one couple I met who I
hadn't known at all y'know I could see that they were going to have
a divorce and have to sell their house and things and that happened
and things like that I mean that's one example.
R16: it wasn't that long ago errm they had my mum's a teacher at
the local high school and we got some gerbils back from the school
and then at night I dreamt that they'd had babies because it was a
male and female couple y'know two gerbils and errm I woke up in
the morning and just went through and there was a just a litter that
had just been born in the morning she was just giving birth to them
then.
R14: errm well you'll think I'm a complete looney now well errm
(laughs) there's a few things I mean I do tarot cards and things any¬
way and so I do believe in a lot of the sixth sense and errm and
things like that errm there's things like ermm I don't know if this
is relevant but things like sometimes I think I do affect things
around me like in our house errm light bulbs constantly go and
we've had electricians in and there's no reason for it y'know and er
quite often if I'm really strung up or in a mood y'know a light bulb
will go next to me (laughs) probably crackers.
R27: sometimes 1 well my only thing that 1 would have is probably
dreams I dream a lot and sometimes they could be interpreted that
way I suppose but erm probably the latest one was that we were
going off on we went on holiday in May we were going to off to
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we were going down the Grand Canyon which is really hot and
sunny and it was like desert basically and for some reason out of
the blue I dreamt that we weren't allowed to go on the raft because
of this huge thunder and lightening storm and rain and I mean just
something you wouldn't have got and the rain for the first year in
20 years was the worst ever and there was a thunder and lightening
storm which makes you sort of think "oh my God!" which but
y'know things like that occasionally but nothing I mean I wouldn't
necessarily say (laughs) and maybe that can be interpreted in other
ways.
The prescience of phone contact features a good deal in accounts of
small paranormal experiences. Typically these are phone calls or contact
between close friends or family members.
R27: y'know two people communicating from the other side of the
country knowing that the other person is phoning oh I've had a few
of them I would say that that7s probably again it usually involves
dreaming I would actually dream y'know dream about someone
that you haven't seen for well it could be months years whatever
you're not expecting them to call or anything but then the very next
day you get a letter or a postcard or a phone call from them com¬
pletely out of the blue I mean that happens a lot and or y'know
you're sitting there thinking about I've got a really good friend in
Clacton and y'know we will invariably pick up the phone on exact¬
ly the same day and phone and y'know quite often I've left a mes¬
sage on her machine and she's left on mine but we've phoned from
different places so and we find out that we phoned at exactly the
same time and in fact the same friend was once in when we were
at school we were at school together and we dialled the same num¬
ber at exactly the same time so I picked up the phone and dialled and
she was on the other end of the phone never rang cos she'd done
exactly the same at exactly the same time it hadn't even y'know we
thought that was pretty spooky at the time.
These connections seem to remain even when people do not live in the
same abode.
R32: my mum I can if my mum's upset I know to phone her
straight away and she's the same with me ... I haven't lived with my
mother for 8 no yeh 8 or 9 years but I can if she's upset or something
has happened I get a feeling as well but that's I wouldn't say that
was paranormal or anything like that it's just not telepathic but I
mean I can get a gut feeling and when I've broken my arm or done
my shoulder or something she feels something is wrong or whatever
even though she doesn't know it's happened.
The respondent below is quite aware that there are a number of rea-
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sons why people may make seemingly coincidental and significant phone
calls.
There's been a lot of things with phone calls but I don't know
whether they're errm I tend to use the phone to talk a lot to a lot of
my friends and errm often I mean a lot of people would probably
say this when I've been about to phone them they've been about to
phone me but that could just be because there's been a normal elapse
of time before we'd get in touch with each other.
R9: When I was very good friends with ( name of person ) very fre¬
quently like 4 out of every 5 times if one of us phoned the other one.
The other person would almost be next to the phone as the phone
rang y'know they'd just pick it up and go "hello there". And that
would happen a lot of the time. Errm. With my friend (name of per¬
son) (we actually carried out experiments things like that) it came to
the point where we couldn't just pick up the colour of the aura sort
of the emotion that was trying to be sent to one or the other we
could actually pick up what the other person was thinking we could
hear what they were saying. Let's think about pain or something like
that. And then you would go errm yeh. Then you'd (feel them
thinking about breaking their leg) and then.
In the last passage it is fairly obvious that there is a general acceptance
of the everyday nature of such experiences. This account goes a littler fur¬
ther in stressing a level of confidence in these abilities and it may be consid¬
ered a good example of what might be considered everyday magical think¬
ing. This particular respondent was a 19 year old female who was undergo¬
ing chemotherapy for cancer — it could be argued that for this respondent
magical ideation provided a way of controlling events that were essentially
out of her control. This kind of experience was not uncommon for this
respondent and she reported a number of cases of dissociation (which are
included in the childhood experiences section below) which stretched back
to her childhood and particularly to a time when her mother and father
were involved in divorce proceedings.
R9: A lot of the time I'll have a dream about something a conversa¬
tion or an image something happens y'know just sort of y'know
I'll wake up and something will come up to my conscious. Y'know
in the first minute certain things will go wa wa wa wa wa. And
some of them seem to be giving me little messages and the other
ones happen. Like just now mention a ( ) being dropped from a
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blue cup and it'll happen. Y'know or somebody's face said some¬
thing things like that. And errm. Sometimes they just come to me
as I'm doing things y'know just like it's not so much that I'm think¬
ing I wonder if this would happen. It just goes blah de blah de blah
the whole time and I'm so used to it that I don't think about it... its
not like spoken words its just like a picture of the event or a
glimpse of a little bit of conversation. Just a little marker y'know
it's as if someone's just taking little snapshots of the next two days
just one or two.
I just seem to know things without people really to speaking to me
about things and just have a rough idea of what's going on. Or errm.
I don't know its just how can you describe it I rated that quite high¬
ly more on feeling that that was a yes rather than I could explain just
on situations. I can quite often use quite a great degree of mind
power in influencing what happens to me during the day. And it's
literally I'll just sit and think about it. And it'll become or happen
whatever things like that.
This respondent indicates that these experiences just happen to her. As
with an earlier respondent, they take the form of mental images. She
expresses a good deal of confidence in her experiences even to the extent
that she believes she can influence events.
Magical thinking
The same respondent provides an excellent example of what seems to
be magical thinking with corresponding validating behaviour from the
stranger who was involved. At 16 she noticed what seemed to be a stranger
following her on a number of occasions (she reports that this was corrobo¬
rated by a friend) and she describes how this stranger seemed to speak to
her in her head.
R9: yeh it was as if you were doing it you could tune into it (and
build up your head and your thoughts and feelings and pictures).
And errm that's happened a lot. I had an experience with a com¬
plete stranger where he was following me about for a long time.
Like literally following me about. It wasn't paranoia because I asked
a (friend) and even she said "look this guy is definitely following you
about". And before I realised that it was this guy. I was sitting on
the bus and I felt as if someone talking in my head. And then saying
"come with me" y'know "we've got this great group going, come
and join us, you've obviously got something". And I was like what?
y'know and I was sitting there on the bus and I noticed immediately
this guy halfway across the bus at the back just looking out the win-
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dow and it was just like (z/zjjjuuummmpppfff!!) you know what I
mean it was definitely him.
he was looking out the window and I think that was quite deliberate.
This guy followed me about y'know from one bus to another bus.
he would follow me from Morningside up to the West End and then
down near my school. He would always get on the bus without me
seeing him. Even though I made a point to watch and he would get
off the bus and I wouldn't notice even if I tried to notice. And errm
eventually it came to the point where he was walking behind me and
he was still going on at me "join this group" sort of thing.
No. Just Y'know 1 could hear it I was I mean I errm very strong¬
ly as much as I could built up in my head (If you're ...fuck off!)
Really really in my head so violently and I never ever saw that guy
again. Never and that is absolute truth no bullshit about it.
I must have been sixteen I was still at ( ) at the time. That was
freaky. Because he was really getting into my head y'know. But I
didn't see him again.
This is an account of a pronounced experience which almost seems to
be more psychotic than paranormal and precisely the kind of significant
coincidence which provides the basis and supporting evidence or delusional
patterns of thinking.
R9: yeh you can change the mood of a group very very quickly by
projecting an aura like me and Wendy have both tried various kind
of little gimmicks errm I like doing it on the bus cause nobody is
aware of it and if you get the bus and sit and you don't change
your facial expression at all you set your face you just look out the
window and if you project a very uncomfortable horrible feeling
people will shuffle more than they would normally would I think
it's got a lot to do with astrology I'm into astrology errm each per¬
son in astrology has a different ability for these things
The respondent readily draws on broader factors such as the stars and
astrology to explain her experience of influence. This is something of a deep
leap conceptually and shows a high degree of association and connected¬
ness. Another respondent also made a number of comments which seemed
to show a preference for magical over a scientific view of the world.
R8: I was out in the garden a wee while ago er a couple of weeks.
And I was just sitting there and looking at the moon the moon was
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out. And I was just thinking that like science can just put it down to
oh just chance. But I think that the chance is that the moon happens
to be If s like the orbits of the moon, the sun, and the err the earth
and the sizes should just be the right size that the moon is the
same size as the disc of the sun. So you can get perfect it's like
absolutely dead on total eclipses. I've never seen one but I'd love to
because that to me sums up just like everything that is wonderful
in the universe. Because I mean like it's just that they just happen to
be the right size I think that there is more than just chance working
there. It like introduces an element of design. And I don't know if
that like suggests a designer. I don't know about that but just sim¬
ply the fact that they fit it's like quite awe-inspiring.
The big experiences
These experiences have been termed 'big experiences' because they are
considered more significant and often seem to suggest to the experient
major changes in awareness. The first description here is of an ostensible
OBE experience which was quite significant to the respondent since he
seemed to obtain to a visual point of view that would have been impossible
unless he did indeed have an out of the body experience.
R8: But I did get about stretch myself to about 8 feet 8 foot long
and managed to raise myself about an inch but didn't totally clear
my body. Other times I was doing some meditation and I filled the
whole room and I was looking down and in fact the room was simi¬
lar to this and because of squatting on the floor 1 couldn't have seen
the er ground outside because it was first a floor window but er I
managed to see the cat running across the ground because I (was up
by) the ceiling.
Yeh it looked the same. It was just that. In that example everything
was as it should be except errm I saw our cat our pet cat running
along across the garden and she came up the steps and that put a
security light on. So that tied it in. So I saw the cat before I should
have been able to I couldn't normally have sensed the cat being
there until she'd put the light on but I saw her running across before
she put the light on.
I just rose up. It was a sort of cross between remaining the same size
and just like floating up so my head was like bouncing off the ceiling.
I could see. I can't remember whether my eyes were open or shut.
Because it was y'know it was in like usual surroundings errm
apart from the cat. ( ). But everything else was it always is.
It's like you're errm you're floating in this void and you're errm
yer you feel totally like tiny and insignificant. Like you feel like an
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atom in this void but at the same time you feel as if you totally fill
the void at one and the same time. And it's just different perspec¬
tives and it's like (flipping) back and forth. Ifs almost a strobe effect
that comes in then but like it's you feel like you're sensing both that
you're extremely large and extremely small. And that quite often
comes just as I'm falling off to sleep.
A young male respondent in his early twenties reports what seems to
be a reasonably strong hallucinatory experience. What is particularly inter¬
esting about this report is that the respondent had been practising medita¬
tion and had developed an interest in ceremonial magical literature around
the time that the experience happened.
R20: And then I had a very vivid experience after that which
involved being blown around the room quite severely and me not
wanting to do it which was quite fun.
Yeh it was errm I was er found myself being kind of like it was
weird. Cos it was like it was so vivid. I was holding onto my bed
like at the side of it and I just made the picture worse by thinking
that the sheets were flying everywhere as well. But 1 literally felt that
I was being sucked off the bed. Quite odd really. But that was at a
point of time when I was trying to er get myself to er detach and
stuff like that but it didn't work at all and I had that experience and
it kind of stopped me for a while.
The respondent uses the term 'detach' to indicate an attempt to initiate
an OBE. In response to my clarifying the point and asking if this happened
in his mind's eye he gave an interesting response:
Oh well it happened. It think that's the point I can never distinguish
between the two I don't think. Err. It couldn't have happened phys¬
ically of course because errm everything it stopped and everything
was normal again. But I still could feel like a presence or something
but I don't know if that was my mind working overtime or some¬
thing. And yeh I it stopped and I kind of looked around and stuff
and everything was normal but not normal. Quite bizarre really.
He presents a position which is accepting of the event as real even
though he knew it couldn't have been real and he also intimates that he
experiences some difficulty in distinguishing reality from fantasy. He elabo¬
rated further upon his reading and practices at the time:
R20: Well like erm I mean I'm I'm very interested in the paranor¬
mal. Specifically I was in it was about two years ago or something
and I had a lot of time on my hands to play about dabble and that
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kind of stuff. And er I had er I was just being introduced to er
Crowley and to Don Juan that kind of stuff Carlos Castanada and
stuff. So I was err experimenting and in like a different in certain
kinds of things to do. And I managed to obtain these old err ESP
books and how to develop it and stuff like that so I so I was getting
maybe because I'd always believed in something like that anyway
and felt that I'd had some kind of premonitions before. Cos I I rea¬
soned that not everyone should feel that way so if you feel like me
maybe that's the beginning and tried it out. And then er after that
big voice thing it kind of died out a bit and I got a bit scared and
decided not to do it anymore for a while and had a chat with my par-
my mum about it because she's very very psychic I believe anyway.
And it kind of died down because of university basically because I
just haven't got any time to do it. And it was also a point in time
when I was single so I had a lot of time to myself to wonder about
those things. And when you're not single and you're are like sleep¬
ing with someone then you really can't get on down with those
things because it takes a lot of dedication and concentration and if
you're lying in bed you don't want to be doing all your exercises and
stuff the other people are gonna be wondering what you're doing
because it's more something you do by yourself. So that's that gen¬
erally.
The same respondent indicated that he also had an auditory experi¬
ence which seems to bear considerable resemblance to the hearing voices
experiences discussed in the next chapter.
R20: Errm. I've heard I've had voices before but I don't know if I
ca- it's one of those things where you hear voices and you think
"well that could be just er er something completely and utterly bio¬
logical that could be something completely different". And it wasn't
su- a voice as in I've heard ghost voices it was more of a central
voice and it's more me speaking to myself and I've personified it out
of myself and heard it. And er even though it was quite interesting
to see what it was talking about it was more of a I don't know I
think it was quite a bizarre experience and it wasn't something
where it was like a y'know you have internal voices in your head
and you can say you've been to a noisy party and you can go to bed
and you can hear people chattering away and stuff. It was more of
it was definitely directed to me and it definitely sounded highly
ultra personal. It was directed straight to my ego. And it sounded
probably maybe like my ego because it addressed me with a name
that it addressed by my full name rather than what I usually go
round thinking of myself as. It was like a parent to son kind of thing.
It was errm to do with er it was nothing specific. It was er more
of a kind of it was a err my name was addressed and something
about leaving or something to go with them or something. But I
perceived it as a male voice which is quite important.
The experience was a single occurrence and it seems that the voice
170
may have been the result of a particular set of events related to 'magical' or
self development practices. Interestingly he felt that the voice was parental
or authoritative and specifically targeted at him. This shares characteristics
with the hearing voices experiences (see Romme and Escher, 1993;
Hamilton, 1985; and Jaynes, 1976)
that was was a one off I think. I mean I kind of know that I'll prob¬
ably hear it again but errm not until another point of time when it's
I don't know it's time for that voice I suppose. But it's quite I do I
do expect to hear it again. And I don't think I mean it's er I feel
that sometimes it's up to me whether I hear it or not I mean I could
think "right I could provoke that voice again by doing by going
through the same motions again". But errm takes a lot more because
I'm a bit tired these days you have to get quite passionate into it
and once you've got well into it after a couple of days it starts hap¬
pening.
Confusing categories
On occasions some of the respondents seemed to show some conceptu¬
al confusion over categories of experience. For instance in this first case
dowsing and PK are considered as related.
R4: A friend of mine had er y'know crystal dowsing and stuff I
don't know is that the same thing as PK? sort of moving an object by
well she did it with it on a piece of string on a table without actually
touching it and got it to swing and yes and no and things and I was
really quite sort of y'know unconvinced she also said that she'd
asked a question that right her friend had had the crystal downstairs
and she'd been up at the top of the house she'd asked it a question
and got the friend to get the answer from it and the friend said what
was the question and it was something her friend would have
expected the answer to be yes to but in fact the answer was no to
because it was an unusual set up or something and she did it a
couple of times with just her hand but I'm a bit - vibrations and stuff
is just a bit errm
This shows how such phenomena are categorised by lay people in a
similar kind of way and would provide an indication how two such phe¬
nomena could be strongly associated in correlation studies or factor analy¬
ses (this may rely on certain conceptual or imaginative schemas).
The next respondent is a young female who gives a good indication of
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a confusion between non-verbal communication and ESP.
R9: I think that erm sounds that people give off and visual is an
incredibly small percentage of what you pick up from someone errm
they do play a big part I would say that body language and visual
play a lot bigger part than actual verbal but 1 think there is another
massive chunk that people take for granted and have [not looked at]
looked at deeply enough
The communication schema is expanded upon and lends form to the
specific processes in lay theories of ESP. This is a very good example of a
metaphorical image whic is applied to radio transmissions and body lan¬
guage and possibly extrasensory communication.
to explain how it works errm 1 think that the same as with the
other forms of communication some people are more adept at it than
others erm I think everybody has their own aura and their own
either very strong or very weak depending the person kind of signals
that they give out errm either in I don't know you talk about people
being on the same wavelength I think it's not so much waves or any¬
thing like that its errm some form that hasn't really been researched
enough yet but it really does transmit for instance with very close
friends you have a far quicker ability to tune in to that what particu¬
lar level of that form they're on I've had a lot of experiences of I've
needed to get in touch with somebody so I've just sat and meditated
and thought out my message and they've got it no problem so I'm
pretty much y'know 95% I believe in that errm because there have
been so many times when coincidence couldn't have explained it.
She offers another explanation, this time of auras, in which there is a
clear indication of metaphorical cross-mappings between personality (extra-
version) and aura intensity.
R9: it's the idea of territory but in a kind of more a spiritual or aura
sense the places you go to like say your bedroom you would have a
stronger projection of yourself in the room than you would do in a
group of strangers where I think it would become inhibited depend¬
ing upon whether your extravert or introvert as well I think erm
extraverts I think are people who can give off this kind of glow
almost very strongly regardless whereas introverts are less good
take it in more.
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Early childhood experiences
A number of respondents reported quite intense dissociative experi¬
ences, some of which have been included above. Here are two further expe¬
riences which took place in childhood. The first is one by the young female
who was mentioned above who has been diagnosed as having cancer. This
set of experiences indicate a pronounced dissociative experience. The
respondent states that she no control over the experience. The first episode
may have occurred during sleep but the second occurred during a waking
state.
Errm. Coming up for my tenth birthday I think it must have been
around then. I really didn't know nobody ever managed to explain
to me why this happened. Three times when I was in some situation.
The first time I was in bed and it was quite late at night and I had
gone to bed early. My mum and her boyfriend of the time were ( )
next door. I was lying there. And I don't really know how asleep I
was. I was lying there and I felt that there was all these chains
around my arms and legs and I could not move. I was lying on a
kind of slope and there was this kind of there was sea yeh it was
definitely the sea right. ( ) But it was this really weird sort of mus¬
tard yellow colour and I just knew that it would harm me. I got a
pic- a sort of feeling in my head that it was hot oil. That didn't actu¬
ally burn me but would just harm me in some way and it kept com¬
ing up and coming up and I absolutely just screamed and everyone
came running and I just switched off but from the time it was hap¬
pening I had no control over it.
The second time I was in the brownies guides or something and we
had all gone down to the Kings Theatre. We were all waiting in a big
queue. Standing by the gate. And we're all standing there and my
pal wasn't there so I didn't really have anyone to talk to at the time 1
was quite new and I was just standing there. And it happened again
and I got this feeling that this time I was actually in it and I was
drowning. I couldn't get out and 1 couldn't get out 1 looked down
on the scene and could see myself and at the same time I was in
there and the waves just kept like coming and I just stood there and
just couldn't do anything couldn't move and then the next thing I
knew I had just come out of it again.
The third time I was at my dad's flat. [I was] The same age. I was
between it was within the space of maybe six months so I must
have been nine going on ten. I was in my dad's flat and I was sitting
there and it started again while I was in there. This time there was
an island there. Like a sort of paradise island with a palm tree on it.
And I was drowning in it and my dad was in the flat at the time.
And this time I could speak I was going "dad, dad" you know
what I mean. And I started crying because I was really upset and I
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think the time at the guides I almost started crying. I kept saying
y'know "dad" and he came over and he looked a bit upset. But I
couldn't see anything else. Just that. And I got the feeling that my
dad was up there he was in some sort of flying/helicopter or some¬
thing like that. And I kept trying to get him to help me to put down
some sort of line or something and it didn't happen. And then I just
became aware that I was looking at the marble fireplace again. Each
one lasted maybe 10 minutes I just had no control over it.
My dad was sitting next to me I was just sitting there balling/ just
crying. I've no idea whether I was staring or whether 1 was looking
about the place. All I could see wherever I turned was this image.
So he never actually said anything at the time. At the time my mum
and dad were arguing a lot and I don't know whether that had any
emotional influence on the situation. 1 think my dad just thought
"oh she's upset" and because when I came out of it I immediately
calmed down It's just strange the fact that my dad was actually sit¬
ting right next to me and I was trying to ask him for help but it did¬
n't work it was me that had to come out of it. It's never been
explained. It frightened the shit out of me. It's never been explained.
I think when I thought back to that and remembered it. When I
thought back to that I remembered a similar situation when I was
maybe about four or five. You know these mazes you get including
hoops. This one had a witch in the bottom a horrible witch and you
had to get the witch out of it. I was lying in bed and all I could see
was this witch in the maze. The maze and the witch kept going like
that (gesture) and separating and the witch would come closer and
the like that. And it was all going like peculiar and 1 couldn't snap
out of it and I was awake. And that time I was quite upset and that
lasted a while.
The respondent prefers to view these experiences as having an impor¬
tant message bearing function.
I think that errm. In all situations I've got into so far in my life
whether ifs good or bad. Since I've been born there's always been
certain things that have happened to me I've seen something or I've
dreamed about something something quite out of the ordinary. That
has given me what I would say is a definite message. And if I've
gone along with that message everything's been ok. If I have gone
against the message then things have gone like shit and if I'd just
not bothered (then they've just trundled along). But it is very much
like something will happen thafs been totally out of my control I'll
read into that something y'know me myself nothing to do with any¬
body else or any outside influence. I'll read into that and sort of just
(diinngggl-makes sound of bell ringing) this little message'll come up
and that seem to happen a lot of the time. 1 think the actual thing
about the waves and that. It was a feeling that I was totally out of
control. My parents were about to get divorced so it was very highly
emotionally charged time of your life.
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Perhaps these experiences also communicated a need or desire to be
independent.
The last one with my dad being there being in the image and being
next to me but couldn't help me. I just at the age of ten I just got this
feeling you do have more control. Your mum and your dad cannot
help you out of this situation it's up to you. I got this very, very,
very big (feeling) it's up to you. I think it must have been a month
later sometime like that. I ended up screaming at my mum scream¬
ing at my dad calling them bastards everything 1 could possibly
think of saying to them go and speak to each other. Y'know "you're
fucking ruining my life here". And they did and it worked. And it
was like you know what I mean I was really really shocked. But
thaf s what I interpreted the message to be from that last one.
The images which compose the experience are strongly suggestive of
metaphors of being at sea, marooned, in hot water, or drowning. These are per¬
haps suggestive considering the events occurring at the time. In addition
the experiences provided the experient with a certain message that she had
to find her own way from now on.
The next account was provided by a male in his mid-twenties who was
reasonably skeptical of paranormal experiences but he admitted to a couple
of unusual early experiences — although he didn't label them as paranor¬
mal.
R25: I mean like that even I mean as a young child I thought I saw a
witch or something coming out of my er wardrobe once y'know but
that was just a 3 or 4 yr old or something like that yeh.
I thought I was awake yeh err but I could have just as easily been
dreaming it but I thought I was awake at the time and I as I say I was
only 3 or 4 at the time.
there was one time when I was on holiday oh I must have been about
12 or something like that and I was away on holiday with a friend
and his family just mucking around we didn't have like a ouija board
or anything like that we just sort of like y'know calling the spirits
just like that and was like "knock the plate off the wall" and the
plate did actually fall off the wall so whether or not that has got any¬
thing to do with it I don't know or a just a coincidence anyway we
ran out of the house quickly enough.
Another respondent reports an apparitional experience which seems
almost cartoon-like.
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R28: once when I was a kid yes well I was asleep with my brother in
my grandparents house and 1 was about 6 and I thought I saw a
ghost and it was almost a cartoon ghost it was just a white blob and I
moved and it moved it looked like someone with a sheet on yeh I
thought it was errm I thought it was my brother initially I assumed
it was him so I was petrified I turned on the light and of course there
was nothing there I'm not really sure [I was] probably about 8
The following accounts represent a series of experiences by another
respondent who figured strongly in this section, she was mentioned earlier
as someone who had seen her grandfather and whose grandmother consid¬
ered herself to be psychic. She reports a number of different classes of expe¬
rience which happened when she was a child.
R37: errm I've had experiences and accidents would happen and I
wouldn't travel and I've found out later that the car has crashed or
there's something wrong with the plane and it can't take off or
something ... errm once when I was very young errm I refused to
get back on the plane and going back from holiday. I was 2 and a
half and er the plane did a nose dive on the runway (laughs) and
there was nobody was actually hurt but I refused to get on that par¬
ticular plane I had complete tantrums and mum said "right ok she
doesn't want to get on we're not getting on it".
I was just very very distressed and I said "I'm not getting on the
plane there's something wrong with the plane I don't want to get
on the plane we shouldn't get on the plane".
[on another occasion] a friend was travelling and errm 1 said "oh I
don't think you should travel now I don't think you should go now
wait until later on" errm they went anyway and the car crashed
[they were] slightly injured errm it's just a funny feeling that some¬
thing is going to happen.
it was the same time I was on holiday I was two and a half mum
had taken me into a museum and er we were looking in a sort of
horse drawn carriages when were inside the museum and I said to
my mum "look at the lady with the funny hat on in the carriage" and
she looked but there was nothing there and I can still remember
what the lady looked like (laughs) she was very clear errm very sort
of full hairstyle red hair.
Red and not red errm green and black stripy sort of'satiny'dress
and she was just looking at me and she was wearing a hat a big
floppy hat.
The respondent reported the apparition as looking very life-like but
her mother could not see it. According to the respondent her mother picked
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her up and ran out of the museum. Seeing apparitions seemed to be some¬
thing of speciality for this respondent, she reports upon seeing a crisis
apparition of her grandfather at the time her grandmother was phoning to
tell her mother that he had died.
Again when I was 2 my grandpa died and errm 1 was in the bed¬
room and the phone had rung and my mum had answered and it
was my granny to saying my grandpa had died and mum went
though to the lounge and started crying and 1 went through and I
said "Mum you've not to cry because grandpa said he's alright now"
and as far as I can remember I'd seen my grandpa in the bedroom
and he'd said "tell your mum not to worry because I'm alright"
She also reported seeing people who have recently died. She interpret¬
ed this as serving a message bearing purpose.
I've seen people (laughs) again when they've supposedly died.
when I was very young I don't know if there's any sort of explana¬
tion for it errm 1 guess people who have been close to me and
they've died and I'm to go and give a message to somebody about
them.
As a child, on one occasion, she involved herself in mediumistic activi¬
ty-
R37: right errm once I was being very silly at school [1 was] errm 16
I was sitting in my English class and I was very bored (laughs) and I
thought I wonder if there is anything about this spiritual nonsense
and err I started to sort of saying "well you know if there are any
spirits out there" just into myself y'know "please show me that you
exist" or whatever and err I felt like the room had suddenly it was¬
n't a room anymore it was tunnel and I was going backwards in the
tunnel away from the light but I was watching myself doing it it was
very weird and I immediately said to myself I don't like this I want
to come back (laughs) that's the only time I've ever done it and it
frightened me so much I wouldn't do it again (laughs).
they [her classmates] said I looked very unwell and they said I'd
started to shake and had gone very white but I wasn't aware of that
I felt very drained afterwards but I wasn't aware of.
This particular set of experiences are more impressive than most
reports and provide a picture of possibly veridical childhood paranormal
experience.
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These experiential reports provide an insight into the kinds of experi¬
ences which seem to be relatively common in the general population. These
are rich accounts which have more than hint of an acceptance of a magically
charged world and a connected view of life. They are also useful because
they offer insights into how personal theories are arrived at.
It was noticeable that the respondents did not simply relate their expe¬
riences but when given the opportunity they relate them in terms of tenta¬
tive lay theories and often with a hint of underlying metaphorical projec¬
tions and underlying schemas. It is with an eye for these instances and a
view to understanding them that valuable information may be gathered
about such unusual experiences. This will often require going beyond the
simple objective descriptions which are often considered so desirable in
spontaneous case research. In going beyond the blow by blow account in
favour of the personal reflection we may lose some of the objectivity but
gain a flavour of the constructive aspects of the experience itself. Since
these experiences are fundamentally meaningful events it is likely that this
recognition of meaning will offer a more comprehensive view of such expe¬
riences.
For instance, the accounts provided above are often accompanied by
the experient's own meaningful explanation: for example, ESP and appari¬
tions can be seen as message bearing.
Often important issues which are raised by these accounts include the
situations and psychological states in which these experiences may occur.
Relaxed and absorbed states seem to figure strongly as do childhood experi¬
ences. A number of cases showed overtones of magical thinking, all of these
have been considered as conducive to anomalous experience and character¬
istics of low focus experiential thought.
In the next chapter the role of these paranormal interpretations of
experiences are examined in relation to hearing voices experiences.
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Chapter 6
A possible role for parapsychological explanations in the
experience of hearing voices.
Direct reference and allusions to pathological disorders have been
made in a number of sections of this investigation. Paranormal experience
in a sense attains the same status as the symptoms of psychosis in our mod¬
ern culture. It is seen as deviant or abnormal and perhaps outside the juris¬
diction of everyday consciousness, obtaining tenuous claims to validity only
when liminal or altered states of consciousness are invoked as explanations.
In the previous empirical studies reported in chapters 3 and 4 there are
clear relationships between measures of positive symptoms in schizotypy
and paranormal experience and belief. Some of the experiences reported in
chapter 5 are reminiscent of hallucinatory and del usional experiences which
are often considered to underpin diagnoses of schizophrenia.
In this chapter a survey was carried out on a sample of voice hearers
from the national hearing voices network. This incorporated assessments of
the phenomenology of the experiences as well as measures of paranormal
belief and experience. The central motivation for this was to assess whether
or not pronounced experiences such as auditory hallucinations reported by
the members of the hearing voices network are alleviated in any way by a
belief structure based around paranormal explanations.
J B. Rhine, often considered the founder of modern parapsychology,
once noted that parapsychology is a historical derivative of psychiatry
(Rhine, 1949). The early psychiatrist Janet (1899), proposed that, 'The gift of
mediumship must depend upon a peculiar pathological condition, from
which hysteria and insanity could later develop." Similarities have often
been drawn between the unusual experiences considered as paranormal and
those experiences which have long been associated with psychopathology.
Other proposals have been made, for instance, that paranormal experience
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can lead to psychosis and vice versa, that psychosis can incur paranormal
experiences.
There have been a few parapsychologists who have also had interests
in psychiatry or abnormal psychology and who have attempted to examine
the similarities between the two domains of experience. They have specu¬
lated on the relationship between these two domains of experience drawing
on their experience of the therapeutic context. Ehrenwald (1948) for exam¬
ple, was of the opinion that paranormal experiences might underlie the
kinds of phenomena characteristic of psychopathology, most notably psy¬
chosis. Taking what might be considered an extreme view he argued that
psychotic experiences, especially paranoia, could be explained by the occur¬
rence of telepathy. He viewed psi as an archaic, regressive or primitive fac¬
ulty which overwhelms the psychotic when a hypothetical filter system
breaks down. He also argues that the need for isolation exhibited by some
psychotics is indicative of their being overwhelmed by heteropsychic input.
Ehrenwald has been criticised by a number of other researchers with an
interest in this area (West, 1948; Eisenbud, 1949; Ullman, 1948) mostly on the
grounds of the paucity of empirical evidence for these claims.
Ullman (1977) concurred with Ehrenwald that in the therapeutic con¬
text patients do seem to make intuitive leaps which look like instances of
ESP (these are those patients who are considered to be close enough to a
psychotic episode to be aware of its possible imminence). He also suggested
that psi effects are related to the vigilance needs of the organism. Psi mes¬
sages perhaps have more of an alerting character than a clearly information¬
al one (Ullman, 1977). Most of the examples that these 'parapsychologist-
psychiatrists' describe arise in therapeutic situations and suggest that occa¬
sionally a client can access information that is personally relevant and occa¬
sionally embarrassing to the therapist.
As these accounts of paranormal experience in psychopathology are
drawn from the therapeutic context they are usually considered to carry less
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weight than experimental evidence. Experimental studies have also been
undertaken to test the psi ability of psychotics. These were mostly forced
choice tests using traditional ESP cards. Various results have been reported;
some showing successful psi scoring at traditional levels of significance
(Price, 1938; Urban & Kock, 1949; Humphrey, 1953). Other studies have
failed to obtain such marked results (West, 1952; Zorab, 1957). It has been
suggested by Ullman (1977) and Rogo (1982) with some justification, that
these kinds of formal testing might be doomed to failure. Psychotic patients
characteristically have poor levels of concentration which does not accom¬
modate forced choice testing (this is likely to be exacerbated by the use of
anti-psychotic drugs). In addition, these methods offer little ecological
validity and they have little personal relevance to the participants them¬
selves. An attempt was made by Greyson (1977) to overcome this problem
by using a free-response ESP paradigm (one which permits open-ended
answers rather than the fixed responses identified with ESP card experi¬
ments, e.g. stars, circles, crosses, etc.) with schizophrenics. Greyson found
that anecdotal accounts of paranormal experiences and belief in psychic
ability were more common among schizophrenic than non-schizophrenic
patients. In spite of this, he found that their ESP performance did not
exceed chance expectations. Rogo (1982) contends that there is strong evi¬
dence for schizophrenics showing quite striking ESP ability in everyday life.
Certainly psychotics often report experiences which are psi-like and some¬
times interpret these as paranormal.
Other evidence for links between psi and psychopathology
More recent investigations addressing similar questions have shown
that paranormal belief and schizotypy seem to be related in correlational
studies. Thalbourne (1985) found that scores on the magical ideation scale
(Eckblad and Chapman, 1983) proposed to measure schizotypy — the pre¬
disposition to schizophrenia — correlated with those on a paranormal belief
scale. He found that believers in the paranormal (sheep) scored significant-
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ly higher on magical ideation than did non-believers (goats) — this would
seem to indicate that sheep are possibly more predisposed to schizophrenia
than goats. However, this result is not so surprising when we consider that
a number of the items on the Mgl scale seem to correspond quite closely to
the kinds of items used as indicators of paranormal belief and experience:
e.g., I think I could learn to read others' minds if I wanted to.
In order to reassess the relationship in the light of this, Thalbourne
reduced the Mgl scale to three subscales, one which contained the eight
items which seemed to measure paranormal occurrences, another which
measured overtly psychotic symptomatology, and finally, a scale which con¬
tained the items which could not be fitted in the two other categories. In
spite of this, Thalbourne found that there was a residual significant positive
correlation between the paranormal belief scores and the psychotic subscale
scores. People who have higher paranormal beliefs seem to be more predis¬
posed to schizophrenia.
Williams and Irwin (1991) also examined the relationship between
schizotypy and paranormal belief. They predicted that believers and schizo-
types would resemble each other in terms of overall belief in the paranormal
but differ with regard to specific facets of paranormal belief, and cognitive
style. It was found that believers in the paranormal (members of an
Australian parapsychological society) resembled schizotypes and schizo¬
phrenics in terms of overall level of paranormal belief but differed with
regard to notions of causality. Believers displayed a causal cognitive style
based on notions of personal responsibility and reincarnation, contrasted
with schizotypes and schizophrenics who were more likely to emphasise the
role of chance.
They propose that the belief in the paranormal expressed by the believ¬
ers was adaptive and involved a personally charged and magical notion of
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causality; they see this as a mature means to attain a metacognitive appreci¬
ation of the world. On the other hand, they argue that the endorsement of
beliefs by schizotypes is an expression of impaired psychological function¬
ing, involving cognitive, perceptual and affective distortions and emphasis¬
ing the role of chance. Schizotypes were also reported as likely to display
an overall information processing style characterised by an external frame of
reference and involving lower levels of self consciousness. This work sug¬
gests that the role of structured belief systems, personal responsibility and
control is important in dealing with unusual perceptual experiences. This
corresponds with Schumaker's theory which proposed that paranormal
belief might be beneficial to mental health (Schumaker, 1987).
Common ground?
In the ideas of both parapsychologists and psychiatrists there has been
a concern with the role of changes in states of awareness in the generation of
unusual perceptual and ideational experiences. This suggests a common
ground for these kind of experiences.
Altered states of awareness have been scrutinised by parapsychologists
and psychiatrists. Researchers in both fields have paid attention to reports
and displays of dissociation, trances, multiple personality and associated
phenomena. It can be argued that there are certain changes in the deploy¬
ment of attention which seem to be related to both paranormal and psy-
chopathological experience.
A strong facility for internal attention and imaginative involvement
might be thought to bring about unusual experiences, paranormal or abnor¬
mal. Ingram (1990) argues that self-focused attention (characterised by an
awareness of self-referent, internally generated information) or more strong¬
ly, 'self- absorption'; characterises a number of types of pathology such as
depression and schizophrenia. A number of studies in parapsychology (e.g.
hypnosis and dreaming experiments) have indicated that internal attention
states seem to play a role in successful psi functioning (Honorton, 1977).
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Absorption, a measure of increased imaginative and sensory involvement,
has also been shown to correlate positively with reports of paranormal expe¬
riences (Rhue & Lynn, 1987).
West (1962) proposed a seepage model of unusual experiences such as
hallucinations. He compared hallucinations to the reflection of flames from
a fire cast on a window. During the daylight, they are barely visible because
of the strength of the light, however as the day wears on they become more
and more apparent and the scene outside weakens until on looking through
the window all that can be seen are the flames. Presuming that precon-
scious and unconscious contents "seep" into consciousness in such a way,
they will take the forms of images which may be 'seen' or 'heard' "as if
real.
Frith (1979) suggested that hallucinations occur if there is a breakdown
in filtering out the preconscious hypotheses generated in the act of percep¬
tion. Frith and Done (1989) later rejected this theory in favour of one which
involves a monitoring function. The notion of reality monitoring in relation
to hallucinatory and delusionary experiences has been described by Slade
and Bentall (1988), and Johnson et al. (1993). In short, it is suggested that
internally generated events might occasionally be misattributed to external
sources through a failure in a reality monitoring process (see chapter 1 for
more details). It is possible that the ability to make decisions about the
internal or external origin of experience may become unreliable when met
by alterations in cognition such as these absorbed and altered states.
It would seem that characteristics such as a high need for absorption
are indicators of people who have a tendency towards greater access to pre¬
conscious material, dissociation and marked idiosyncratic restructuring of
perceptions. A group of people which seems to confirm this notion, are
those described (rather negatively) as 'fantasy prone personalities' (FPP).
These people have been reported as having a strong orientation toward
inner experience and are reported as having difficulties in discriminating
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between the objects of their imagination and the objects of the external
world (Rhue & Lynn, 1987). Often this has been assumed to have origins in
childhood adjustment to difficulties at home. Fantasy prone people tend to
report higher levels of paranormal belief and experience.
Thalbourne and Delin (1994), interpreting a factor analysis of a number
of variables consisting of manic depression, schizotypy, creativity, mystical
experience and paranormal belief, suggest that a single factor of "translimi-
nality", an "openness to crossing the threshold" is common to people scor¬
ing high on these variables. This might be interpreted as a cognitive style
which promotes imagination and internal experience over concrete and
external perception. A similar view is suggested by Parker (1993) who pro¬
poses that, 'schizophrenia is an enforced state of perceptual absorption in
inner conflicts leading to perceptual aberrations which by the nature of the
individual's defensiveness are interpreted as alien and become delusory'.
This description seems to fit well with 'voice-lore' where it is suggested that
it is the hearer's response to the voices that is important rather than the
voices themselves.
Mavromatis, in his book Hypnagogia (1987), provides detail on the
relaxed attention style which characterises this liminal state. He uncovers a
mode of cognition which seems similar to the experience of both psi and
schizophrenia. He recorded statements such as "I felt my body growing
bigger", "I felt heaviness, and then parts of my body dissolving", "half my
face disappeared" when interviewing mediums participating in develop¬
ment circles. These are not dissimilar to the comments made by schizo¬
phrenics.
Summarising these findings, the common ground seems to consist of
particular changes in attention towards an sustained internal focus.
Accompanying this change in attention are unusual and idiosyncratic ten¬
dencies to restructure cognition. Thought is more experiential than rational
in this context, more metaphorical than literal or logical; it may be dissocia-
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tive (and seem negative) or integrative and have a 'peak-experience-like'
(positive) quality. People who express this kind of imaginative involvement
as a personality trait tend to report more unusual perceptual and ideational
experiences. They may also be more successful in psi experiments. Often,
parapsychological experiments seek to employ techniques which will
enhance these attentional states, for example, the partial sensory deprivation
technique employed in the ganzfeld paradigm aims to do precisely this. It
seems that these kinds of conditions are also conducive to the experience of
hearing voices. Techniques advocated to avoid hearing voices have often
involved some form of structured distraction, or busy activity, i.e. avoiding
that tendency to focus on internal imaginative attention. It was interesting
that at least one of the respondents in the previous chapter indicated that
his experiences had declined since he had less free time to enter these states.
Testing and exploring parapsychological interpretations of hearing
voices experiences.
It would seem that there is a good deal of evidence which suggests
that pathological experiences, particularly hallucinations and delusions, and
ostensible paranormal experiences may derive from a common ground, an
experiential form of cognition which is seen most readily in alternate cogni¬
tive states. A characteristic of this common ground is the tendency to expe¬
rience an extended sense of connection and causality (even where events
seem unrelated) between the phenomenal self and the world. These experi¬
ences more often possess metaphorical as opposed to literal connotations.
Indeed, ESP is itself unlikely to be clear-cut, with exact feature for feature
correspondences between the experience and the target (this is the way it is
often shown in fictional accounts); rather, it is probably symbolic, metaphor¬
ical and in need of interpretation.
Two approaches are possible. One would focus on validating the real¬
ity of the experience and would involve looking for confirmatory or discon-
firmatory objective evidence which corresponds to the content of the experi-
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ence. Another approach, which has only recently being proposed in para¬
psychology is more concerned with the experience itself, the effects it has on
a person, its pattern and significance. This will be explored more fully here
and will be related to the psychological traits already identified as connect¬
ed to reports of paranormal experience. From this point of view, voices
which seem to demonstrate ESP might be considered as subjective paranor¬
mal experiences. Thus an individual assumes that their personal experience
seems paranormal but does not necessarily imply that any testing of the
experience need take place. Instead, with this kind of approach we are more
concerned with what the experience means to the individual and where it
fits into their life.
In this approach to paranormal experience we should be more interest¬
ed in a metaphorical rather than a literal version of accounts. This does not
detract from the reality of the experience; it just offers a context for explo¬
ration of meaning primarily within psychological space rather than exclu¬
sively in the setting of everyday objective reality. Subjective paranormal
experiences may be seen metaphorically as indicating patterns and contexts
of meaning. The symbol, the message, the signal of something is of more
importance in this approach than trying to ascertain the objective reality of
ESP.
As Thalbourne (1991) noted there are strong arguments for links
between mystical and psychotic experience. In both of these, the experient
may feel that the world is ending; this is conveyed in the form of a
metaphorical drama which may be taken literally and projected onto the
objective world rather than interpreted as being relevant to understanding
the self. Lukoff (1985) discusses a number of main themes which seem to
arise, for example: cosmic conflict, death, sense of mission, encounters with
spirits of the dead, paranormal powers, new identity, new society, divine
union. In terms of their metaphorical nature, these themes seem to convey
hope and resolution of the experience as well as doubts and fears about the
187
conflict and possible demise of the hearer. Interpreting ESP from this
metaphorical perspective may indicate unusual forms of connection with
reality, or perhaps it is an indication of a need for increased connection. If
the voices seem to be other people who exert an influence on the hearer this
may suggest a perception of lack of control by the hearer.
If the voices seem to have a paranormal nature then it may be fruitful
to use this framework in responding to these experiences. An example of
this is given in the book Accepting Voices (p.224), in which an individual
found relief from the attention of voices/energies by 'closing his/her aura'
(the energy field assumed to surround the human body). Imagining an
energy field keeping out unwanted influences might be a suitable response
in keeping with the paranormal metaphors representing the voice experi¬
ences (and one which communicates directly to the experiential level of
mind). For hearers who are comfortable with a paranormal perspective on
their voices, responses in line with this interpretation may be more effective
than one taken from another perspective such as the medical model. Those
who are more anxious or frightened about paranormal interpretations
would probably prefer to adopt alternative explanations and means of con¬
trol.
Encouraging unusual beliefs in relation to hearing voices experiences
may be considered dangerous. This is inevitable from a perspective which
views voices as a symptom of some form of psychopathology. An argument
against this view is provided by Romme et al. (1992) who suggest that forc¬
ing a reality (the medical viewpoint) on the voice hearer can itself be coun¬
terproductive.
In general, the aim of psychiatric treatment is to bring the patient
back into our reality with antipsychotic medication, social therapies,
and sometimes psychodynamic therapy. Acceptance of patients' real¬
ity is avoided, as this might confuse them even further and increase
their internal chaos. Thus, discussion of the subjective experiences of
hearing voices is not encouraged, even though these auditory experi¬
ences sometimes represent a large part of the patient's daily life.
(p-99)
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Romme & Escher (1993) suggest that much of what the voices say is
couched in metaphorical language. It would seem particularly useful to try
and emphasise the metaphorical nature of these experiences. This is not to
undermine their reality but to accept them and engage them on their own
level. The voices may occasionally actually demonstrate ESP mediated
information but it is more likely that they do not. As well as testing the
validity of these ostensible ESP experiences a complementary process would
involve becoming engaged in dealing with the voices, treating them on a
personally relevant level as signifiers of personal issues and social tensions.
There are, however, arguments for encouraging this engagement in the
use of paranormal metaphors. For instance, Schumaker (1987) proposed
that paranormal beliefs might be beneficial to health; the differences in cog¬
nitive style noted between the paranormal believers and schizophrenics in
Williams and Irwin's (1991) study would support this; this suggested that
paranormal believers were healthier because they held beliefs which corre¬
sponded to a sense of personal control over these unusual and perhaps dis¬
tressing experiences, as opposed to a sense of chance and lack of control in
the comparison (schizophrenia) group. Parapsychological explanations may
provide a valuable resource for understanding and living with these experi¬
ences. This is exactly what is currently being explored by the hearing voices
groups.
In summary, the hearing voices experience seems to be commonly
linked to paranormal phenomena and explanations. There are obvious but
untested similarities between hearing voices and the kinds of phenomena
seen in mediumship and spiritualism. It may be that voices experiences and
some ostensible subjective and objective paranormal experiences may derive
from a common ground which is characterised by an experiential mode of
cognition. Testing the reliability of paranormal experiences is always diffi¬
cult and no definite proof can be obtained even in strictly controlled para¬
psychological experiments. The relevance of hearing voices and paranormal
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explanations can be addressed in two complementary ways. One which
focuses on an objective assessment aiming for consensual agreement, and
another which necessitates interpreting the meaning of the voices. It is sug¬
gested that the most appropriate assessment and interpretation of any osten¬
sible experience will depend on the needs and concerns of the voice hearer.
The experience of hearing voices has been considered as one of the
most reliable indicators of psychopathology. It is considered to be a sign of
mental illness; it is particularly associated with schizophrenia although it is
also seen in other disorders. Characteristically, in schizophrenia it is seen as
a particularly tortuous experience of hearing insulting and derogatory com¬
ments; commentaries on one's actions and thoughts, as well as commands to
adhere to these can naturally become an obstacle to normal functioning.
Typically, hearing voices (along with other symptoms) are responsive
to anti-psychotic medication. However, in some cases voices do not
respond to pharmacotherapy. It has been argued that medical treatment
generally avoids discussion of these subjective experiences and that the
medical approach aims to "bring the patient back into our reality with
antipsychotic medication, social therapies, and sometimes psychodynamic
therapy. Acceptance of the patients reality is avoided, as this might confuse
them further and increase their internal chaos." (Romme et al. 1992).
During the past three decades research has gone a long way to normal¬
ising the hallucination concept, partly as a trend to investigate symptoms
rather than syndromes in terms of psychopathology and also because of
their intrinsic interest (Bentall, 1990). Instead of being considered simply as
an indication of pathology, hallucinations have been looked at as alterations
in normal processes such as mental imagery (Jakes and Hemsley, 1986;
Barrett, 1993); judgement (Heilbrun, 1980; Bentall & Slade, 1985); or speech
production (Hoffman, 1986).
In the past, large scale surveys of the general population have indicat¬
ed reasonably high levels of infrequent hallucinatory experiences (Sidgwick,
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1894; West, 1948). Many recent researchers have carried out studies employ¬
ing student participants and have illustrated that hallucination-like experi¬
ences occur in normal populations. In one case at least 25% of college stu¬
dents were found to report auditory hallucinations (Barrett and Etheridge,
1994). Other have demonstrated that both auditory and visual hallucina¬
tion-like experiences can be evoked in laboratory conditions in normal stu¬
dents (Feelgood and Rantzen, 1994). Of course, these experiences are differ¬
ent from clinical forms in that most of these normal participants will not
accept the experiences as real, they are not as frequent, and consequently
not likely to interfere with normal functioning.
Although there has been a good deal of research examining the
mechanics of hallucinatory experiences less attention has been focussed on
their possible meaning and implications. Not everyone who hears voices is
distressed by the experience, in fact some people positively welcome them
as friends, advisors and as company. Some of the main details about these
experiences were presented by Romme et al. (1992) in their survey of the
Netherlands group. They were able to explore differences between the
reports of copers and non-copers in terms of their perception of the experi¬
ence and also in terms of strategies adopted to deal with the voices. Four
main categories of coping strategy were reported: distraction, ignoring,
selective listening and setting limits.
Techniques advocated for coping with voices have commonly concen¬
trated on trying to ignore the experiences, often employing tools to facilitate
distraction such as headphones and personal cassette players. Haddock and
Bentall (1993) suggest that instead of ignoring these experiences greater ben¬
efits may be had from engaging the voices in order to explore the meaning
of the experiences. Chadwick and Birkwood (1994) discuss a cognitive
approach to auditory hallucinations proposing that the omnipotence of
these voices can be addressed by examining core beliefs about them.
The hearing voices movement has proved a fertile breeding ground for
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alternative explanations. The book Accepting Voices (Romme & Escher, 1993)
is a compendium of possible views on the phenomena which range from
traditional psychiatric positions to those which are much more unusual,
including mediumship and channelling. Although these alternative
explanatory frameworks are considered likely to compound possible psychi¬
atric problems such as delusions there may be reason to assume that they
have something to offer the individual voice hearer. There are a number of
reasons for this, and foremost among these might be the sense of control
and increased sense of status that might be experienced by hearers who
assume that the voices are the result of a special gift or ability.
From the perspective of most mental health professionals the belief
that voices are due to ESP or spiritual entities would generally be consid¬
ered delusionary. A fundamental difference in judgement of reality exists
between the mental health professional and the magical-thinking' voice
hearer. From the perspective of the former it is adaptive to orient towards
consensual reality, from the perspective of the latter adopting these alterna¬
tive theories may actually be adaptive as well. It has been proposed that
positive illusions can foster mental health (Taylor and Brown, 1988).
It is quite common for individuals hearing voices to develop hypothe¬
ses regarding a possible paranormal origin of these kinds of experiences.
This may be an example of an ongoing process of testing the anomaly. If the
voice does not seem to be generated by the individual herself or originate
from someone in the immediate vicinity then it must be being communicat¬
ed by more unusual (not to mention controversial) means such as ESP. It
may also be related to a reliance on experiential thinking where these kinds
of assumptions tend to form the body and fabric of thought.
This study focussed on the conditions under which voices are heard,




Sixty eight respondents returned completed questionnaires, of those
that identified their sex 31 were males and 35 females (mean age = 43.70,
SD = 14.14). The youngest respondent was 18 and the eldest 81 years old.
The survey measure
A questionnaire composed of items referring to the phenomenology of
hearing voices (drawn from a measure used to assess hallucinations in a
clinical situation — HALQ Bentall, 1990). These questions addressed the
complexity of auditory experiences and voices, their frequency, additional
questions regarding the voices and a paranormal belief scale (Thalbourne,
1984). See appendix for further details.
Procedure
The survey was carried out during August and September 1995. Two
hundred questionnaires were posted to individuals subscribing to the
Hearing Voices Newsletter. Sixty six (33%) completed questionnaires were
returned. A small number of questionnaires were returned blank due to
changes in address, because individuals were currently in hospital or
because the individual was on the mailing list but was not a voice hearer.
Although this was a relatively small return rate this is not surprising consid¬
ering the nature of the population.
The sample was split into two groups depending upon the amount of
control they reported over their voices. This issue of control permits a rea¬
sonable degree of assessment of the individual s ability to exert influence
over the experience, and their ability to cope with the experience. It is
recognised in the voices movement that those who cope with the experi¬
ences often have a stronger sense of their own role in determining their rela¬
tionship with the voices (Romme & Escher, 1994). In this sense control was
taken as a broad indication of ability to cope with the experiences, choosing
to communicate with the experiences and maintain a sense of functional
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superiority over the voices. It was hypothesised that a greater degree of
control may be related to the degree of paranormal belief held. A higher
level of paranormal belief may confer not only a relatively accepted cultural
context for interpreting the experiences but also perhaps in some cases an
increased sense of importance for the individual. A therapist (Koolbergen)
and client (in Romme & Escher, 1994, p.220-227) describe a response based
on paranormal interpretation of the voices where the client suggests that she
is in touch with supernatural energies and at times she has had to learn
(from a woman who was paranormally gifted) to close her aura or energy
body and that this has the effect of helping with the voices experience.
Results
Of the sample of voice hearers 10 reported no contact with medical
professionals about their experiences while all but 6 of the remaining 58
reported one or more diagnoses. These included schizophrenia 34 (58%),
schizoaffective disorders 7 (12%), depression 4 (7%), manic depression 3
(5%), multiple diagnoses 2 (3%), post-natal depression 1 (2%), post traumat¬
ic stress disorder 1 (2%).
The sample was split into two groups depending upon the amount of
control they reported over their voices. Thirty two respondents fell into the
low control group and 30 into the high control group. A summary of the
relative frequency of coping strategies employed by the two groups is dis¬
played in table 23. It is noticeable that the two groups differ in terms of the
degree to which they engage the voices (that is speak to the voices and limit
their conversation); 46% in the high control group compared to 9% in the
low control group.
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Table 23 The reported coping strategies employed by voice hearers who
report low and high levels of control over the experience.
Coping strategy Low control (N= 32) High control (N=30)
Ignoring voices 5 (16%) 3 (10%)
Distraction 6 (19%) 6 (20%)
Engaging the voices 3 (9%) 14 (46%)
Prayer 3 (9%) 0
Medication 3 (9%) 3 (10%)
Social support 1 (3%) 2 (7%)
Impossible to cope 5 (16%) 0
No need to cope 3 (9%) 1 (3%)
No answer 6 (19%) 5 (17%)
Others 4 (13%) 5 (16%)
Note: percentages add up to more than 100% because respondents may report more than one coping
strategy.
The two groups of hearers reporting high and low control were also
explored in terms of the explanations they offered for the voices (see table
24). It is interesting that relatively few hearers explain their experience as
an illness while a much larger proportion explain their experience as a para¬
normal or spiritual activity.
Table 24 Summary of relative frequency of hearers explanations for the
voices.
Explanation Low control (N= 32) High control (N=30)
Paranormal 4 (13%) 9 (30%)
Spiritual 7 (22%) 5 (17%)
Physiology 4(13%) 3 (10%)
Stress 1 (3%) 4 (13%)
Psychological 2 (6%) 3 (10%)
Illness 3 (9%) 1 (3%)
Technological 1 (3%) 2 (7%)
Punishment 2 (6%) 0
Others 9 (28%) 4 (13%)
None 6 (19%) 2 (7%)
Note: percentages add up to more than 100% because respondents may report more than one expla¬
nation.
Paranormal explanations were reported more by the high control
respondents (30%) compared to the low control respondents (13%). This
suggests that paranormal explanations may have something useful to offer
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the voice hearer in need of coping; perhaps once the hearer has evolved a
parnormal explanation he feels more in control.
The level of paranormal belief was slightly higher among males (12.17)
(11.04) than females.
Males and females did not differ on questions related to complexity of
auditory hallucinations, frequency of occurrence, number of voices, per¬
ceived unpleasantness or hostility of the voices, or to the degree of control
that they felt over the voices.
Spearman rank order correlation coefficients were calculated between
scores on items of the questionnaire concerning age and features of voice
experiences. The complexity of the voices (rs = .07, ns), the frequency of
accompanying experiences in other modalities (rs = -.04, ns) and frequency
of experiences (rg = .016, ns) did not seem to be related to age but the num¬
ber of voices heard seemed to be fewer for older than for younger respon¬
dents (rs = -.24, p < .05).
It also seemed that there was a general but non-significant trend
towards younger voice hearers reporting that the voices they heard were
more unpleasant (rs = -.18, ns), hostile (rs = -.21, ns), upsetting (rs = -.12, ns)
and more difficult to control (rs = -.25, ns).
Paranormal belief scores showed a small nonsignificant relationship to
the complexity of the experience (rs = .13, ns); and seemed unrelated to the
number of voices heard (rs = -.01, ns); or the frequency of experiences (rs = -
.01, ns); however the frequency of occurrence of accompanying experiences
in other modalities did exhibit a small almost significant relationship to
paranormal belief (rs=.26, p <.068). When males and females were assessed
separately it was apparent that this relationship was contributed by the
females (rs = .28, ns) whereas the males evidenced a smaller relationship (rs
= .18, ns).
The strongest relationships were evidenced between paranormal belief
scores and levels of discomfort with the experience. For instance, level of
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paranormal belief was negatively correlated with the degree to which the
voices were perceived as unpleasant (rs = -.37, p < .01); hostile (rs = -.39, p <
.008); upsetting (rs = -.39, p < .006) but interestingly not the degree to which
the hearers perceived having control (rg = -.009, ns). Upon separate exami¬
nation of males and female scores it is apparent that the males alone which
contribute most to this pattern of results. The female values of rs ranged
between -.02 and -.18, none of these values were significant. For the males
however the degree of perceived unpleasantness demonstrated a reason¬
ably robust negative relationship to paranormal belief (rs = -.58, p <.003);
this was also the case for perceived hostility of the voices (rs = -.64, p <
.002); and for the reported upsettingness of the voices (rs = -.52, p < .007).
The degree of reported control over the voices was negatively related to
paranormal belief (rs = -.27, p < .19); the relationship between paranormal
belief and reported control was much smaller for females (rs = .02, ns).
This pattern of results indicate that males who report higher levels of
belief in the paranormal also report fewer negative aspects of hearing voices
but lower levels of control; and yet females who report higher levels of
paranormal belief, like males report fewer negative aspects (not significant
but suggestive) but tend to report more control over the voices.
Correlations between individual items of the paranormal belief scale
and assessments of the negative aspects and control of the voices were cal¬
culated in order to isolate which components of paranormal belief show the
strongest relationships with the negative and control aspects of the voices
experience. Tables 25 and 26 display these relationships for males and
females respectively.
Generally for males there were only small differences between the
sizes of the relationships for most variables. The visions communicating
information showed the strongest level of relationship for three of the vari¬
ables (unpleasant rs = -.53; hostile rs = -.66; and control rs = -.35) among
male hearers.
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Table 25 Spearman correlations between items of paranormal belief and
negative aspects and control of voices (males)
Unpleasant Hostile Upsetting Control
ESP -.45 -.58 -.50 -.26
Personal -.45 -.39 -.44 -.14
Psychic -.48 -.52 -.52 -.16
Hunch -.30 -.46 -.15 -.32
Premonition -.47 -.41 -.20 -.20
Dream -.21 -.29 -.19 -.30
Vision -.53 -.66 -.43 -.35
Afterlife -.40 -.46 -.48 -.28
Spirits -.41 -.47 -.41 .06
Telepathy -.49 -.62 -.48 -.22
Total PB -.58 -.64 -.52 -.27
For female hearers, vision was related in a similar way to hostile (rs = -
.40) and the other largest relationships were between items relating to men¬
tal phenomena such as belief in being psychic and unpleasantness of the
voice experience (rs = -.31, p< .08) and personal experience of telepathy with
control over the voices (rs = .31, p< .08).
Table 26 Spearman correlations between items of paranormal belief and
negative aspects and control of voices (females)
Unpleasant Hostile Upsetting Control
ESP -.27 -.24 -.23 .19
Personal -.11 -.16 -.05 .15
Psychic -.31 -.29 -.11 .06
Hunch -.23 -.19 -.09 .06
Premonition -.22 -.18 -.19 .23
Dream -.07 -.05 -.09 -.05
Vision -.23 -.40 -.14 .07
Afterlife .02 .14 -.01 -.14
Spirits .01 .06 -.06 .05
Telepathy -.15 -.07 -.19 .31
Total PB -.18 -.13 -.08 .02
Overall these correlations suggest that most forms of paranormal belief
provide the male voice hearers with a reduction in the negative aspects of
the voices but slightly increased tendencies for this seem to occur in relation
to visions, personal belief and experience of psi. It is this personal experi¬
ence or belief in telepathy that also perhaps provides the females with an
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increased sense of control over the experiences.
Characteristics, content and identity of voices.
Opportunities for open ended answers as well as restricted responses
were included for most questions. The hearers reported a range of sounds,
from whispers originating in noises like the wind and traffic sounds to spe¬
cific voices of family members, famous people, demons and angels. When
the voices are identified with entities they commonly 'speak' negatively to
the hearer and are concerned with the hearer's actions and conduct. It is
noticeable that a few hearers report more positive comments and encourage¬
ment.
Bangs, music, doors slamming, bells; like people talking in another room; saying non¬
sense things; went through a few years of hearing my dead sister telling me to kill
myself.
Machine-like grating; whispering; strings of unconnected words; repetition of my own
thoughts.
Like a deafening sensation in right ear as though sound is shut off only momentarily like
now. I've got little tinkle of bells and lots of voices all at once like a gentle mass of peo¬
ple. Mother, friends, father, brothers, sister in law.
Voices from God, supposedly important people; dead relatives; people concerned with
the security of the state even the world.
Descriptions of what the voices say were generally insulting or comments on behaviour;
only a very small minority seemed more constructive and comforting.
[They] tell me I'm a coward and things about my family and that my doctor is talking rub¬
bish. They make me think the TV knows about me.
Short sentences only. Remarking on what I have done during the day, or am doing now.
Sometimes intelligible but nonsense.
Mostly nosey and are inquiring into my day to day living. Wanting to know what I am
doing.
We've fixed your car you are going to have an accident. Kill yourself and let me in and
we can live forever together.
Pejorative abusive things—sometimes the opposite about being lazy, scrounger, a pros¬
titute, dirty, hippy, ugly, not bad looking, looking good, looking awful.
They may tell me whether or not to do something. They may give me information.
One voice said "you are going to have to do this by yourself" the other said "you are
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going to have to be braver than you have ever been before".
Many of the voices were unidentifiable to the hearers but some were easi¬
ly recognisable.
Spirits, my dead family and help.
1. the devil—a carping voice and fault finding character forever putting me down. 2. A
female voice which attempts to placate me which I believe is my mother.
They do have identities but I do not know them personally.
They live in different parts of the world.
George Sanders & Tommy Steel.
The neighbours—friends, parents, people from school, people from college, from the
therapy centre. They change with the environment depending upon where I am at the
moment.
Those hearers scoring higher on the control item tended to report
responses to the voices which involved engaging the voices, see table 27.
They take time to respond to the voices and reason with them, although
they do use distraction techniques and ignore them from time to time.
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Table 27 Coping strategies employed by the highest ten scorers on the
control item.
By asking who they are. I never get an answer or explanation when I ask them who
they are. If I turn on some music I stop hearing them.
Talking to them. Asking their opinions and when I disagree with them, just ignoring
them.
I say aloud to the voice ' I rebuke you Satan in the name of Jesus Christ.' When I say
this the voices cry. If I think this in my mind, they weep.
As I control my speaking voice.
Try to keep mind on things and be with people. Yoga. Lithium.
I could stop the voices getting through by using what I call my computer brain. I simply
solved mathematics, either in my head or on paper.
I accept what they have to say, I listen, relate myself and the situation to what they are
expressing. Then I look logically at what they are expressing and acknowledge what is
relevant.
I have found that the voices have become more controllable as I have increased my
own self esteem, found an interesting job and that I have increased my social skills.
I talk to them as if I'd talk to you or any of my close friends or relatives just chat within
myself of course, could say in thought.
Hearers scoring lower on the control item tended to report that they
found it difficult to deal with the voices. The majority of responses here
involved ignoring the voices or using distraction strategies such as playing
loud music.
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Table 28 Coping strategies employed by the lowest ten scorers on control.
I have on rare occasions been able to shut them out altogether.
The effect seems to last several days.
Alcohol, positive thought, prayer, meditation, ignoring [them].





Since having Clopixel injections the voices haven't bothered
me.
Speak to them, tell them to go away. Noise to mask voices
(TV, radio music) accept voices as part of illness looking to
understand them.
Can ask them to be quiet if they are disturbing our sleep and
they do.
I tell them its not necessary to be so hostile but they come
back with some other reply.
In terms of explanations for the voices the lowest scorers on the control
item provided various answers involving physiological, spiritual and para¬
normal causes. These indicate an interpretation of the voices that has less
negative and alienating consequences. In one case the hearer sees the voices
as an indication of personal spiritual development.
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Table 29 Explanations for the voices employed by the highest ten scorers
on control.
It says in the bible, 'it's better to rebuke than (unknown word)'.
Imagination.
I think when I get too stressed out my mind cuts off into day
dreams & loses reality as it is known.
Spiritualist.
Accepting it as an illness [and] not my fault.
Alteration of the brain, due to a brain haemorrhage I suffered
30 years ago.
I now believe in life after death & heaven & hell. My experi¬
ence lasted only one month ten years ago. The first 2 weeks
were hell & the last 2 weeks heaven. At the time I heard voic¬
es 4 of my neighbours told me their houses were haunted.
Spiritual, in the sense we all have an inner spirit which commu¬
nicates through emotions.
The voices are to me a process of reaching that level of
awareness.
I think that I must be either telepathic or extremely sensitive. I
believe that because I was so ill the 'vibes' I was picking up
were only very negative or maybe it was because of my own
feelings about myself.
Well I have had rather a lot of anxiety and stress through my
life, accidents and illness.
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These explanations were offered by hearers who reported low levels of
control of the experiences. They also provide a range of explanations and in
at least one case although the hearer reports low levels of control they con¬
sider the experience as positive.
Table 30 Explanations for the voices employed by the lowest ten scorers
on control.
I personally believe in ESP I have it sometimes.
My voices could be a reaction of loss of hearing. I believe
some hearing impaired people became mildly psychotic
because of the stress of their (unknown word) problems.
Through prayer and meditation it, has come to help me. I was
a 'disturbed' person for 42yrs before I got voices. I have
become a much better person since having them.
Result of being told that I am possessed by evil spirits and
three failed deliverance attempts.
Like a transmitting and receiving radio.
Chemical imbalance in brain functioning.
I was told it was a voice, I was hearing at a voice hearing
meeting.
Sometimes to do with ear/brain in terms of physiology. There
may be a spiritual component ie good and/or evil angels may
involved.
A reaction to an overload of stress and past abuse. Like post
traumatic stress syndrome — a way of coping without being
completely destroyed. Negative input and emotional abuse as
well as other kinds has created the voices.
I haven't any explanation.
It is noticeable that a range of explanations were offered both in terms
of illness and more spiritual explanations and in some cases a combination
of the two. Also noticeable were a few comments regarding how the voices




A distinct difference was apparent in that those reporting more control
over the experiences reported using more interactive control techniques
such as engaging the voices. This is after all, a strategy which is actively
promoted in the publications and meetings of the hearing voices network
and it would be expected that voice hearers would be using this and finding
it helpful. A clear distinction was noticeable between the high and low con¬
trols. The low control group failed to make as much use of engagement and
relied more on blocking the experiences with distracting media or activities.
A large number of alternative explanations for the voices were offered.
This again is something which is encouraged by the hearing voices network
and which possibly offers valuable opportunities for gaining control of the
experiences. A clear difference was apparent between high and low control
groups with over twice as many high compared to low control voice hearers
reporting paranormal explanations, although the low control voice hearers
did report more spiritual explanations than the high control voice hearers.
The low control voice hearers reported more idiosyncratic explanations
for the voices than the high control hearers. They were also more likely to
report the voices as arising from illness.
There was a combination of physiologically based explanations and
spiritual or paranormal explanations and in at least one case a combination
of the two. This indicates how these two disparate hypotheses can be be
held simultaneously. This seems to suggest a good deal of flexibility as well
as more than a hint of the unusual and metaphorical thinking indicative of
an experiential mode of cognition. This was particularly noticeable in rela¬
tionships to the technological explanations 'like a transmitting and receiving
radio' this also suggests a certain passivity in 'picking up' the voices which
is akin to metaphorical mapping of machine characteristics (see Sass, 1992).
The relationships between paranormal belief and levels of reported
discomfort in relation to the voices seem to suggest a beneficial aspect of
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paranormal belief or it could alternatively mean that those hearers who
experience less discomfort can afford the luxury of these beliefs. The ASGS
as a sheep goat scale rather than simply a belief measure also addresses
experiences and this suggests that these may provide a useful explanatory
framework for voices experiences. Using this framework the hearer can
begin perhaps to take responsibility for his actions and experiences — view¬
ing them as connected to some kind of paranormal facility or skill. It was
noticeable that more spiritual explanations of the voices were offered by the
low control experients, perhaps corresponding to an external frame of refer¬
ence to which they are subjugated.
Paranormal belief was variously related to reported control of the voic¬
es. In the males it was negatively related, suggesting higher levels of belief
were associated with lower levels of control while the opposite was true of
the females. In spite of this difference both males and female recorded high¬
er levels of belief in association with lower levels of discomfort.
This may be supportive of Taylor & Brown's (1988) and Schumaker's
(1990) contention that such beliefs can be healthy. This is something which is
completely at odds with much psychiatric practice, which aims to disengage
the psychiatric patient from beliefs such as these as soon as possible. It
might suggest that instead of obtaining a grounding in orthodox 'scientific
and objective truth' he or she may find it more beneficial to adopt a more
'magical' perspective. Romme has discussed this tendency to impose 'objec¬
tive truth' upon the voice hearer. While this might seem counterproductive
from our own Western perspective we should remember that in more tradi¬
tional cultures some people who hear voices are marked out for roles as
shamans and benefit greatly from the social acceptance of their unusual abil¬
ity.
What is perhaps useful about the Hearing Voices Network's approach
to these experiences is the encouragement of a diversity of explanations.
The small sample reviewed here offer a good range of explanations which
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reach from reasonably orthodox accepted explanations involving psychiatric
diagnoses to the much more controversial spiritual or paranormal ones.
Each of these explanations are movements towards a personal construction




Following the overall pattern of an experiential or imaginative cogni¬
tive style in the empirical and intepretative chapters an attempt is made in
this chapter to relate the various components of such a style to create a theo¬
retical picture of this style of thinking. It incorporates a wide range of expe¬
riential phenomena including hypnagogia, synesthesia and metaphor and
analogy. This experiential style is actually the everyday consciousness that
we all experience, it underlies the more analytic thinking style which is con¬
sidered as 'reason' and rational'.
In evolutionary terms experiential thought is much older than its ratio¬
nal and analytic counterpart. It is characteristic of thought in antiquity and
children's thought (Gelernter, 1994). It is likely that we miss much of the
features of this thought such as its metaphorical and symbolic nature
because of it is so implicit. By examining these metaphors we have an
opportunity to highlight the previously hidden and realise that certain
images such as those represented in the experiences reported in this work
are relatively commonplace yet perhaps they relate to the more twilight
periods of awareness, characterised as low focus thinking by Gelernter
(1994) and seen near sleep and in extreme changes in arousal. Perhaps
schizophrenics and paranormal experients inhabit these regions by virtue of
traits that have been discussed in the earlier chapters and are therefore more
familiar with this territory.
Experiential cognition and imagination
Evidence was found in the psychometric studies for an imaginative
and magical mode of cognition being related to reports of paranormal expe¬
riences. A similar conclusion can be drawn from the studies regarding cer¬
tain aspects of psychopathology. In this section a tentative attempt will be
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undertaken to try and integrate these different factors and influences further
under a single dimension which might be conveniently described as one of
experiential versus analytic cognition (Epstein, 1994). According to Epstein:
There are two interactive processing systems, experiential and ratio¬
nal; the experiential system is intimately associated with the experi¬
ence of affect. The experiential system is an associationistic system.
Processing in the mode of the experiential system and its influence
on rational thinking can lead people to judge events that are only
arbitrarily related as causally related, (p. 717)
The tendency to favour one form of thinking (mentioned earlier) in
some cases inclines to a neglect (if not a complete denial) of another major
form of thinking. Here I will use the terms employed by Epstein (1994) the
experiential and the rational-analytic to distinguish these two forms of cogni¬
tion. In general, rational analytic thinking has been promoted above imagi¬
nation and imagination has largely been viewed as a weak, inferior, regres¬
sive or sick mind. It is only recently that philosophers and scientists have
advocated that research examine the role of imagination.
These kinds of complementary thinking have largely been ignored in
psychology, although they have received attention from some quarters, e.g.
Freud in his classic distinction between primary and secondary processes
(although he perhaps sees indulgence in primary processes as largely patho¬
logical). Epstein (1994), in his model of the cognitive-experiential self pro¬
vides a rich framework for understanding two modes of cognition. Another
early discussion of this topic is offered by McKellar (1957) in his discussion
of A (autistic) and R (reality) types of thought. The cognitive heuristics of
Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky (1981) and the central and peripheral routes
to understanding and attitude formation outlined in social psychology
(Petty & Cacioppo, 1981) are also examples of this distinction between these
two different types of thinking.
Freud's distinction between primary and secondary processes empha¬
sised these two modes of thinking, stressing the important role of imagina¬
tive and experiential cognition, albeit largely in the development of psy-
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chopathology. He described the role of imagination in structuring experi¬
ence but maintained the Western bias towards rational rather than experien¬
tial thought. There were of course some domains in which imaginative and
experiential thinking had precedence, particularly in the creative process. It
is through experiential cognition that unusual juxtapositions of concepts can
be made. Even though valuable from the position of its creative contribu¬
tion, the experiential mode of thought sustained a pathological flavour and
debates continue on the relationship between pathology and creativity (see
Eysenck 1993).
Experiential thought is laden with affect and association (characterised
by low focus thought and communicated through metaphor); two good
examples of this kind of thought, both of which seem to be linked with
paranormal experience and psychopathology are synesthesia and hypna-
gogia.
Hypnagogia & synesthesia
Mavromatis (1987) in his discussion of hypnagogic experiences propos¬
es that mental images may on occasions be treated as real perceptual objects
by the sensory and processing systems in the brain. So mental images can
be functionally equivalent to physical objects and events at many levels of
the visual system (Finke, 1980). In isolating areas or structures of the brain
which might be considered focal points for hypnagogic activity, Mavromatis
points to subcortical structures (Cytowick, 1994, has suggested that synes¬
thesia is also subcortical in origin). There has been a steady accumulation of
evidence that the destruction of the visual cortex does not result in total loss
of vision, leading to the notion that vision may be partly directed from sub¬
cortical regions of the brain.
Specifically, Mavromatis identifies hypnagogic activities with cortico-
subcortical perturbations and with 4-7 cps theta rhythms recorded from the
parieotemporal regions. The stimulation of the deep structures in the limbic
system of epileptic patients seems to trigger experiences remarkably similar
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to hypnagogic experiences. For example they show verbal communications
which are similar to aphasia, sleep-talking and hypnagogia. From another
line of evidence — the link between schizophrenia and hypnagogia —
Mavromatis rallies support for his identification of lower brain sites for hyp¬
nagogic experiences. A number of investigators have identified distur¬
bances in the recticular system, thalamic structure, misencephalon, dien-
cephalon and brainstem of patients.
Glicksohn (1990) noted that most cases of subjective paranormal expe¬
rience occur during states proximal to hypnagogia. The case for relaxed
states is already well stated in experimental parapsychology and the rela¬
tionship between spontaneous experiences and similar states has been noted
already (Irwin, 1989).
There have been intimations that older areas of the brain may be
engaged in psi experience. For instance Warcollier (1948) remarks that
telepathy in its most primitive form may produce coenesthetic disturbances
i.e., sensation arising in the vital organs. Furthermore, these can be charac¬
terised by "sensations of a depressing type;... [and] give rise to fits of weep¬
ing, vague presentiments or premonitions, confusions or disorientations."
(quoted in Mavromatis, p. 61)
Myers (1903) viewed synesthesia as being related to more primitive
forms of perception and proposed that synesthesia "... may connect in
unlooked-for ways man's responses to his physical and to his transcenden¬
tal environments (quoted by Alvarado, 1994).
McLean (1960), as cited by Mavromatis, notes that the old brain can
confuse the inside and outside worlds. His impression is that "[these
patients] show an exaggerated tendency to regard the external world as
though it were part of themselves. In other words, internal feelings are
blended with what is seen, heard or otherwise sensed in such a way that the
outside world is experienced as though it were inside. In this respect there
is a resemblance to children and primitive peoples." (p. 252)
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Synesthesia has been considered as an older form of thinking about
and experiencing the world which is linked with older structures of the
brain. Synesthetic experiences involve a cross-domain processing of percep¬
tual experience or a fusion of perceptual qualities sometimes described as
syncretic (Werner, 1948). So certain aspects of visual experiences can be
equated with certain aspects of auditory experiences, for instance bright =
loud and dull = quiet (there is even an indication of this in the everyday
idiom "she wore loud clothes" which relates to brightly coloured clothing).
As an evolutionally older form of registering and experiencing the world
syncretic thought is, according to Mavromatis, present in lower animals. He
reports upon an experiment by Schiller (1935) in which fish which had
learnt to discriminate between light and dark seemed to demonstrate a
'transfer of training between the senses' in that they responded to certain
odours as 'bright' and 'dark'.
One might imagine, for example, that although the visceral brain
could never aspire to conceive of the colour red in terms of a three-
letter word or as a specific wave-length of light, it could associate the
colour symbolically with such diverse things as blood, fainting, fight¬
ing, flowers etc., — correlations leading to phobias, obsessive-com¬
pulsive behaviour, etc. Lacking the help and control of the neocortex,
its impressions would be discharged without modification into the
hypothalamus and lower centres of affective behaviour. Considered
in the light of Freudian psychology, the old brain would have many
attributes of the unconscious id. One might argue, however, that the
visceral brain is not at all unconscious (possibly not even in certain
stages of sleep), but rather eludes the grasp of the intellect because
its animalistic and primitive structure makes it impossible to commu¬
nicate in verbal terms. (McLean, quoted by Mavromatis, 1991)
Hunt (1984) provides an account of mystical and altered states experi¬
ences which are a full exteriorisation and completion of synesthetic experi¬
ence. He argues that this is the creative imaginal core of thought and lan¬
guage come to the front of experience. Alvarado (1994) examined the rela¬
tionship of synesthesia to paranormal belief. He notes the speculations of
Duplessis (1966,1968) where she discusses synesthesia as a "mode of emis¬
sion of an agent's image" (Alvarado, 1994, p.12). This is interpreted by
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Alvarado as meaning:
that a synesthetic transformation of a telepathic signal is a usual
expression of ESP-acquired information. She has reported qualitative
ESP tests in which ESP reception was facilitated by the use of sensory
modalities different from those of the percipient's responses.
Duplessis (1966) also lists several similarities between synesthesia
and ESP. In her view both phenomena are: spontaneous, maybe
hereditary, happen more frequently when the individual is relaxed,
more intense regarding emotional content, predominantly visual,
related to creativity, and to memory processes, (p. 12)
Alvarado went on to test this by assessing a small sample on both
paranormal experiences and synesthesia. Respondents were assessed on the
basis of their synesthesia scores (Tellegen's synesthesia subscale of the
absorption scale was employed). He found higher frequencies of reported
paranormal experiences in the respondents who were high on the synesthe¬
sia measure than those scoring lower on it.
Both hypnagogia and synesthesia are briefly presented here as exam¬
ples of an experiential mode of responding. The proposal presented here is
that this experiential mode of cognition is a primary process underlying all
human experience. This is likely to be the dominant mode functioning even
though rational analytic modes are often accessed. These experiential
modes are more commonly experienced in passive, low focused attentional
states, for instance near sleep, and perhaps in more aroused states such as a
'jamming of the circuits'(West, 1962).
It is also more likely that children adopt these stances more readily
than adults and perhaps our ancient forbears accessed these states more
readily than their modern counterparts (Gelernter, 1994). None of this is
very controversial, what is perhaps more testing is the likelihood that these
states of diffused consciousness can report accurately on the world and pos¬
sess meaning.
To a degree, the meaning derived from these experiences is dependent
upon a change in perspective. Objectivity itself (objectivism) is at odds with
this view as it naturally denies any significant role to subjective states and
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imaginative activity. A very good argument exists that objectivism itself is
based upon particular imaginative structures, schemas and metaphors
(Lakoff, 1987) and cannot therefore profess exclusive rights to the truth. It is
made blatantly apparent by the contemporary metaphor theorists that a
God's eye view of world is untenable — truth and objectivity are only satis¬
factory concepts insofar as they incorporate the social and common experi¬
ential frameworks of any given culture.
Mapping out the role of imagination and metaphor
The main characteristic of schizophrenic cosmology is its fantastic
and magic character.... The schizophrenic world is filled with secret
energies, rays, good and evil forces or waves which penetrate human
thoughts and direct human behaviour.... Even though the cultural
changes throughout history have influenced the thematic content of
the schizophrenic world, there are, nevertheless, certain motifs which
repeat themselves: a struggle of contradictory forces, the possibility
of action per distance, and the pretended character of the perceived
world. The world is a place of struggle between forces with a moral
connotation: good and evil, beauty and ugliness, wisdom and stupid¬
ity.... It seems as if the patient discovers the essence of reality—
Kant's "Ding an sich" (noumenon). According to the patient, other
people are ignorant and only aware of the Kantian phenomenon
(appearance). The world becomes a caricature of causal connections:
there are no independent events—one event is always dependent on
another and interacts with the other. (Kepinski 1974, pp. 118-119.
quoted in Bovet and Parnas, 1993)
The experiential side of thinking delivers an emotionally charged mag¬
ical world view as can be seen in the quote above. This is the kind of think¬
ing seen in its most pure state during dreams and psychosis but it is also
arguably inseparable from all thought. This dream-like thought seems to
occur in the background even during waking activities. In a study by
Klinger and Cox (1988) subjects were beeped throughout the day and asked
to record their daytime thoughts at those moments; 25% showed signs of
dream-like mentation. Also the predominant process in experiential
thought — metaphor — plays an primary role in structuring the world
(Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Wheeler, 1987).
In order to fully appreciate the nature of experiential thought we have
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to offload some of the clarity and logic of rational-analytic stance and wel¬
come the incongruous, conceptual overlapping, and logically blurred.
Experiential thought is likely to involve what seems to be vague and bizarre
content which has more to do with implicit patterns such as image schemas
(Johnson, 1987). In a case study mentioned by Hurlburt (1993), a young
woman called Michelle used the term 'balloon' to communicate her dys¬
phoric experiences. She could understand perception, metaphor and con¬
ception in relation to everything except her own personal inner experience.
This suggests that 'balloon' was a description which unfolded from bodily
and emotional valences — it is a preconceptual description of personal
experience; this is close to how Johnson describes image schemas. The bal¬
loon for Michelle was a subspace of her head in/ or against which certain
experiences, thoughts, images or words would appear. This seems to sug¬
gest something very like an enactive bodily/emotional image schematic rep¬
resentation of the cognitive registering process.
These bizarre symbols when communicated to clinicians are often
taken to be hints of pathology. Within the current cognitive approach to
psychology there is no place for such artful elaborations. According to Sass
(1992):
Apart from a few perfunctory speculations about the confusion and
anxiety likely to result from the malfunction in question, the cogni-
tivist theories have not had a great deal to say about the lived-world
or existential condition that may underlie and motivate these anom¬
alies of expression. And, since these cognitivist theories generally
understand schizophrenic abnormalities of speech and understand¬
ing as a causal by-product of a malfunctioning brain or cognitive
mechanism, they tend to downplay or even to deny the intentional
and meaningful aspects of such language, (p.182)
It is not surprising that these kinds of thoughts and experiences are
seen as regressive and unreal when viewed from the sharpened intellect of
the rational analytic position. Gelernter (1994) describes the elevation of the
rational over the experiential and laments the loss of the magical.
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The human cognitive faculty becomes, in this view, a tent defined by
a single round of cloth. As the individual or the civilisation devel¬
ops, the cloth doesn't get bigger—the tent pole merely rises higher.
Knowledge ascends to encompass new realms, and at the same time
the perimeter is dragged inwards, and experiences that were once
inside no longer are.
Human knowledge deepens and narrows, continuously and
inevitably, and on this view the pronouncements that attack "the
'magic' of earlier visions" are profoundly wrong. They deepen our
understanding not because they are good diagnoses but because they
are interesting symptoms. Outfitted as they are with modern minds
and habits of thought, our own thinkers and philosophers are simply
unable to see what ancient man saw. (p. 112)
Conceptual metaphor plays a fundamental role in our experience. Not
only are our everyday actions are enfolded by these imaginative structures,
so is science, economics and every area of human endeavour and experi¬
ence.
According to Lakoff and Johnson (1980):
Our ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which we both think
and act, is fundamentally metaphorical in nature, (p.3)
When concepts become culturally and socially acceptable their origins
in metaphor become forgotten and they are taken to be literal. Perhaps in
the case of paranormal experience and psychopathological/ schizotypal
experience these are a set of metaphors not convincingly accepted by the
culture as a whole. In some cases, perhaps particularly with the more pro¬
found experiences such as psychosis, we have examples of personal con¬
struction and metaphors. Metaphors offer the opportunity to develop new
views and perspectives, as Bohm and Peat (1987) indicate:
The essential point... is that metaphors can sometimes have an extra¬
ordinary power, not only to extend the thought processes of science,
but also to penetrate into as yet unknown domains of reality, which
are in some sense implicit in the metaphor... (p.41)
The contemporary view of metaphor owes much to the groundbreak¬
ing work of George Lakoff and Mark Johnson (1980). Their book Metaphors
We Live By provides a radical view of metaphor and its meaning. No longer
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seen as simply an attractive but vague linguistic device, metaphor instead is
accorded a role central to cognition itself. In this and other works Qohnson,
1987; Lakoff, 1987); Lakoff and Johnson provide an extensive analysis of the
role of metaphor in thought and language. They show that metaphor is a
form of cross-domain conceptual mapping, that highlights structural simi¬
larities between the experience of the target and source domains in a coher¬
ent and systematic way. To give an example, we often talk about love as if it
constituted a journey, as in "We've hit a dead end street." "We can't turn
back now." "Their marriage is on the rocks." "The relationship is not going
anywhere." "The relationship is at a crossroads."
These examples of everyday views of love and relationships convey
the metaphorical sense of a journey. As often happens the metaphorical rep¬
resentation (in this case a journey) is used to structure the more abstract
experience (in this case love). Love is mapped out in terms of a journey
because there are inherent commonalities between the two domains of expe¬
rience—the end of a relationship is the end of a journey; a relationship can
be rough and stormy or smooth and uneventful, just like a sea crossing.
Lakoff (1987) and Johnson (1987) present a strong case for a new
understanding of the generation of meaning through metaphor, basic-level
categories, and preconceptual systems such as image schemas. Basic-level
categories constitute prototypical exemplars of any category; for example
imagine a bird and it is likely to be sparrow-like rather than emu-like; image
schemas are regularities and patterns in the ordering activities of cognition.
An example of one of the most basic image schemas is that of the container.
For instance, the mind is a container as in "Get those ideas out of your
head." "I'll keep that in mind." "He's out of his mind."
Lakoff and Johnson stress an enactive view of cognition and advocate
that imagination and embodiment be accorded higher status in accounts of
cognition and the categorisation of experience. I will use the term metaphor
in the spirit of the contemporary view, although at times the terms analogy
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or symbol might be easily exchangeable with it. In some cases, the
metaphors may be obvious in their usage and relationship to the experi¬
ences they help to structure. In other cases it will be necessary to be more
sensitive to the context in which a term is employed in order to perceive any
relationships. This broad approach to metaphor departs from the strict defi¬
nition of metaphor as a linguistic device and promotes a view of metaphor
as an activity of cognition.
Studies of metaphors provide important insights into the construction
of a discipline. Metaphors serve both to focus and constrain thought and
investigation within certain boundaries. In the history of psychology, the
mind has been seen as a wax tablet, a ghost (in the machine), a telephone
exchange, a hydraulic system, and most recently and possibly most influen-
tially, a computer. Texts such as that by Soyland (1994) and Leary (1990)
provide excellent accounts of the changing metaphors used in psychological
modelling, rhetoric, and discourse.
Generally, we fail to realise how much our language is dependent
upon and constructed from metaphors, both living and dead. Many
metaphors eventually die and become part of literal discourse; for instance,
the term mental illness is currently used in the literal sense but was original¬
ly intended as a metaphor; in this sense, the literal is a subclass of the
metaphorical (Soyland, 1994). Adopting a strong view of metaphor, we may
even argue that everything is metaphor (Wheeler, 1987), even those funda¬
mental aspects of reality such as our cardinal concepts of time, space, and
measure (Jones, 1983).
Not only has the contribution of the imagination to cognition been
largely overlooked but the relationship of the imagination to the body and
the role of the body in the act of perception and experience has also been
missed. As always there are some exceptions to this and as in the case of
imagination we can look to the continent and the work of the phenomenolo-
gists like Husserl, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty. More recently, as part of
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the increasing interest in metaphor, authors such as Mark Johnson have dis¬
cussed the 'body in the mind', the way in which a good deal of our imagina¬
tive structures rely on forms derived from the experience of embodiment.
The sense of embodiment is fundamental in structuring imagination; the
role of image schemas (recurrent patterns of experience which are are pre-
conceptual in form) is primary in structuring even the most common-place
experiences.
One good example offered by Lakoff (1987) relates to anger. Anger is
schematically represented as a substance under pressure. So when a person
says that they 'exploded', 'hit the roof', or 'blew a gasket' they are drawing
on an imaginative schematic structure in which physiological experience,
tension and arousal are metaphorically allied with substances which are
heated or under pressure and which as a consequence explode.
There are possible parallels here in the visual iconographic representa¬
tions of upper palaeolithic art (Lewis-Williams & Dowson, 1988). In these
works it has been hypothesised that the shaman's experiences of altered
states of consciousness are reported in the simple patterns of the paintings
of the period. The zig zags or spirals for instance may be representations of
the trembling and boiling sensations in the stomach and spine. Interestingly
Lewis-Williams and Dowson note similarities between some of these trans¬
formations of physical states into visual representations and synesthetic
transformations.
Assumptions about our basic terminology being literal seem upon fur¬
ther examination open to question. Even the verb 'to be' which would be
seen as the most literal of verbs is metaphorical when you look at its origins.
It comes from the Sanskrit bhu, to "grow, or to make grow" while the
English forms 'am' and 'is' have evolved from the same root as the Sanskrit
asmi, "to breathe".
Emphasising the role of imagination in cognition permits an under¬
standing of the ways in which metaphorical, analogical, and associative rea-
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soning may help to structure unusual and rare experiences such as those
attributed to paranormal causes. Perhaps even more important than this is
that as these imaginative schemas and frameworks derive from experience
(predominantly physical experience) they provide a bridge between matter
and mind — the Cartesian gap.
Conceptual metaphors are central both to developing personal beliefs
and formal theories. Analogistic reasoning is likely to be responsible for
much of the belief systems of traditional societies. Rulers such as kings are
likened to the sun (this is especially the case in Ancient Egypt); sun = gold;
and as such the king wears gold. Much of this kind of reasoning is implicit
and unconscious and we are as likely to submit to its charms as much today
as yesterday; there are many good examples in terms of modern media
advertising. Science itself progresses in large part thanks to the available
metaphors, for example "an atom is a solar system" (Ortony, 1993).
It is likely that metaphorical thinking is strongly linked to magical
thinking. For instance, a common element in witchcraft is the use of a "wit¬
ness" or object which represents the individual to be focussed upon, is influ¬
enced in some way and that influence transferred to the person it repre¬
sents; "the person is the object", they are linked together in an imaginative,
magical and fundamentally metaphorical relationship. ESP is understood
largely in terms of metaphors focussed around the notion of a "power" or
"energy" which can be "transmitted" and "received". The construction of
ESP relies largely on metaphorically mapping one set of concepts in an
unknown domain (the domain of ESP) onto another known domain (for
example the domain of communications theory and radio transmissions —
this and other proposed core metaphors are set out in more detail below).
Discussions of this matter have appeared in contributions to the literature
by researchers examining anomalistic psychology (Zusne & Jones, 1987) and
experimental parapsychologists (Jahn & Dunne, 1987) who are prepared to
say that:
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consciousness is an operation rather than a thing, a repository, or a
function. It operates by way of analogy, by way of constructing an
analog space with an analog T that can observe that space, and move
metaphorically in it. It operates on any reactivity, excerpts relevant
aspects, narratizes and conciliates them together jn a metaphorical
space where such meanings can be manipulated like things in space.
Conscious mind is a spatial analog of the world and mental acts are
analogs of bodily acts. (p. 65-66)
In a sense we never escape the images of the world we construct
through metaphors and it is these that form the basis for our understanding
of the world. The contemporary metaphor theorists do not accept that this
is an inherently subjective position but one which represents a middle posi¬
tion between objectivity and subjectivity which they call 'experientialism'.
This would seem to support my position in arguing for an appreciation
of the multilevelled role of metaphor in understanding thought and experi¬
ence.
Metaphor seems to provide a fundamental basis for thought. This
leads to a counter-intuitive position that the literal is a subset of the
metaphorical (Soyland, 1994) and that reality is constructed through a par¬
ticular choice of metaphors and images which fit the cultural perspective in
which that construction is occurring. The role cognition plays in construct¬
ing reality is undeniable. Wheeler (1987) contends that metaphor is the pri¬
mary reality, Jones (1983) describes how the basic building blocks of the
world are themselves reliant on metaphor and Jahn and Dunne (1987) make
a similar case.
In the previous section evidence was presented to support a case for
understanding paranormal experience as arising out of experiential cogni¬
tion. This will be further explored in the following pages particularly in
relation to a metaphor schematisation of a phenomenology of the mind in
paranormal experiences.
Metaphors and mind
The recent emphasis on metaphor has perhaps been sensed by para-
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psychologists Jahn & Dunne (1987). They apply this framework to under¬
standing psi in the light of metaphors drawn from theoretical physics.
...the common concepts of established physical theories, such as
mass, momentum, and energy; electric charge and magnetic field; fre¬
quency and wavelength; the quantum and the wave function; and
even distance and time, be regarded as no more than useful cate¬
gories that consciousness has developed for ordering the chaos of
stimuli bombarding it from its environment, or passing from it to its
environment. More precisely, they reflect the characteristics of con¬
sciousness as of the environment. It follows, then, that the concepts,
formalisms, and imagery of physical theory may provide useful
metaphors for the representation of nature and processes of con¬
sciousness itself or, again more precisely, of consciousness examining
itself. Conversely, the less tangible aspects of subjective and impres¬
sionistic experience my be requisite ingredients of any general theory
of reality, including physical reality, (p. 205)
In their model of the role of consciousness jahn and Dunne challenge
the traditional Western view of a particulate nature of consciousness.
Although consciousness has predominantly been viewed as a discrete object
bounded in space and time, Jahn and Dunne propose that there is no reason
why the opposite view should not be entertained—that consciousness can
be spread-out, blurred and wave-like. Consciousness may itself (just like
material reality) be better and more fully described by adopting a wave-par¬
ticle duality perspective. Once the notion of a wave-like aspect to con¬
sciousness is introduced it is feasible that consciousness can be viewed as
operating an entirely new set of properties which are characteristic of waves
but not of particles.
At bottom, Jahn and Dunne are prepared to accept a fluid view of real¬
ity in which the world and it's observers are inextricably linked in a process
of experience, understanding and evaluation. A world which seems more
metaphorical than literal, temporary and fluxing rather than enduring and
fixed. With these values we return to a position held by the ancient Greeks
firmly between the choices of 'being' and 'becoming'. Parmenides (500 BC)
was a proponent of the concept of being and he argued that the world does
not change and it really is as it seems. Heraclitus (500 BC) — famous for
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never stepping in the same river twice —argued that contrary to the view of
Parmenides the world is constantly shifting and ever becoming something
new — it is more fire than earth. Being and becoming are perhaps examples
of an object / relationship dichotomy. Jahn and Dunne, drawing on theories
in modern physics reinstate this distinction and in true 'bootstrapping' style
they are even prepared to admit that quantum theory as it stands is essen¬
tially metaphorical.
Jahn and Dunne note that changes in perceptions of time are evident in
different cognitive states; when we are happy time flies, when we are bored
time drags. Also, in terms of mass, people can be heavy (heavy, burdened)
or light (levity, lighthearted). Lighter thoughts drift away and break free
from us while the heavier ones gravitate towards us. As in the theory of rel¬
ativity, massive experiences not only weigh on us but distort our conscious¬
ness perception grid (p. 235). Jahn and Dunne draw attention to some star¬
tling analogies between physical processes observed in physical systems
and the kinds of occurrences which we all experience in everyday life.
This mesh of analogies or web of metaphors is a subtle system of inter¬
relationship and interdependence. Many thinkers have noted that we
should take notice of the energy-matter continuum. Bohm explicitly places
these two concepts, as well as 'meaning', in a triangular relationship. This
relationship relates to a formulation of what Bohm calls soma-significance
which is another way of viewing the mind-matter connection. From Bohm's
perspective mind and matter are not separate at all as they are in the
Cartesian sense but aspects of one flowing whole.
Bohm notes how intelligent significant activity which we usually only
attribute to mental events occurs in physical systems as well. This being the
case, the physiological changes in response to a fear stimulus are somatic
signs of significance. This links remarkably well with the arguments for an
enactive view of mind where the embodiment of mind contributes much of
the imaginative structures used in cognition and experience (see Lakoff &
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Kovecses' case study of anger). It is likely that this level of thought is char¬
acteristic of the implicate (Bohm, 1980) or borderline (Chadwick, 1990) level
of understanding.
The metaphors and image schematic structures which seem to underlie
the fundamental construction and explanation of paranormal experiences
may be linked to some of the features of experience (vividness of certain
aspects of the experience). It may be that those with higher levels of self
focus will experience a greater awareness of the physical state of their body
and be more likely to permit this to structure their experiences and their
communication of these.
Not only is the body involved, it is also likely that mental representa¬
tion and affective states will colour perception and influence hallucinations.
For instance, imagine experiencing a sense of loss of self, of boundaries, of
individuality; this might lead to problems in defining where self ends and
begins, not just conceptually but physically (as it seems unlikely that these
operate separately from each other). This state of affairs could lead to the
assumption that your thoughts are leaking out or energies are being beamed
to you without any resistance normally provided by the body.
According to Smith (1993) the voices heard by schizophrenics are ethe¬
real, soft and mumbled, in the body, or vaguely in the air, arriving on
beams, rays or signals. Schizophrenic hallucinations often seem to originate
from affective or mental seeds. Arieti (1974) describes how a worthless feel¬
ing may be responsible for generating hallucinations and delusions of rot¬
ting (again a good example of a metaphorical transformation).
It is likely that once thought takes a lower focus personal reminis¬
cences and focal concerns contribute much of its content. The ESP claims of
psychotics may be derived from low focus thought brought on by such focal
concerns but may also have a correspondence with real events. The evi¬
dence supporting psychotic state telepathy comes mainly from early prodro¬
mal cases and therapeutic situations, while the experimental evidence is
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rather poor.
It is inevitable that certain schemas would arise in describing and
experiencing paranormal phenomena. We can see how the basic assump¬
tions about reality provide a context for the use of these schemas (they prob¬
ably developed themselves from sensed facts about reality). Objectivity is
the view that the world is as we see it, made up of hard objects such as
tables, chairs, rivers and mountains, which are 'out there'. Mind where it
exists is a characteristic of the brain bounded by the body. Experience is
individual and subjective but can be shared through communication.
Experience is also bounded by the time-space coordinates in which the body
moves (Howell, 1989). We have seen that there are possible alternatives to
this view arising from theoretical physics (Bohm, 1980). Howell describes
the phenomenological way of dealing with the objective-subjective split.
This is achieved through acknowledging the interactive nature of reality and
our expectations, although she admits that this view has had little impact
on "the plausibility limits of imposed on interpretations of praeternatural
experiences" (p. 81).
lahn and Dunne (1986) speculate that these kinds of constraints to cog¬
nition can be removed if a human can obtain to wave rather than particle
status. Through their analysis of metaphor and idiom, such as being "lost in
each other" and acknowledging that "this is bigger than the both of us" they
conjecture that anomalous events such as ESP occur where:
the wavelengths of the consciousness wave functions have the same
or larger scale than the dimensions of the environmental wells or
contexts in which they are immersed, and will revert to a normal pat¬
tern when the wavelengths are much smaller than those dimensions
... long wavelengths are postulated to represent more free-floating,
holistic, generalised, aesthetic consciousness strategies, (p. 263)
Some evidence is provided for this view, for instance, Nelson (1989)
has described the mystical experience as resulting from an 'ontic shift' or
'reality shift' in which — through changes in awareness — the world has
itself changed. Nelson also mentions that there are certain personality char-
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acteristics which enable this reality shift, for example, absorption. Howell
argues that all forms of psi experience (ESP, PK, precognition) compromise
body boundaries. This has to be taken seriously. It has perhaps been avoid¬
ed by the forced fit of parapsychology into current cognitivist frameworks.
Deikman (1982) discusses a state (the receptive mode) similar to the
one we have discussed as generative of metaphors and psi experiences.
... past and future drop away and sensual attributes dominate over
the perception of form and verbal meaning. Analytic thought tends
to cease; attention becomes diffuse and boundaries blur. The sepa¬
rate self dissolves, permitting the experience of connection or merg¬
ing into the environment.' (p. 71)
Jahn and Dunne (1987) use the wavelength metaphor in a similar way
to Gelernter's focus metaphor, both of these may indicate substantial alter¬
ations in cognition, which as a consequence yield unusual experiences.
According to Jahn and Dunne:
Consciousness may be characterised as a long or short wavelength.
The former is focussed, and purposeful the latter involves a more dif¬
fuse pattern of goals (free flowing and aesthetic attending less to
detail and more holistic patterns and sensations), p. 240
This relationship between mind and matter did not escape the atten¬
tion of Jung (1963) who also noted this exchange of energetic, spatial, and
mass characteristics between subjective and objective events.
It is obviously important to examine this 'mind space' because it is
likely that it is within this imaginative structure or schema of spatial extent
of experience, that the weightings, locations or parameters involved in the
decisions of subjective and objective, self and other are calculated.
Summary
In this chapter experiential thought was considered in relationship to
psychological states such as hypnagogia and synesthesia. These were
employed as examples of cognitive states which are related to unusual expe¬
rience of the kind reported in both paranormal and psychotic experience.
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A physical basis for this kind of thought was suggested with examples
of how experiential thought may be more primary and form the basis for lit¬
eral/ logical thought. It was also suggested that addressing the metaphori¬
cal representations of embodied/experiential thought provides a means to
address the mind body division.
Finally the speculative but powerful ideas drawn from metaphorical
analyses of quantum physics were examined as they may suggest ways of
understanding paranormal experiences.
In the next section specific attention is paid to metaphors used in the
parapsychological and psychical research literature with a view to develop¬




The metaphors of paranormal experience
In the last chapter it was proposed that metaphors are fundamental to
thought and particularly descriptive of experiential or low focused thought.
Metaphors can act as schematic images of personal experience and therefore
provide a framework in which to understand and contextualise such experi¬
ence. The metaphors of paranormal experience are described here firstly in
the context of a review of the parapsychological literature and subsequently
as windows on experiences reported in the narratives of paranormal experi-
ents. The second part of the chapter adds an empirical dimension to the
first part permitting a test of the usage of the metaphors isolated in the
parapsychological literature.
This chapter focusses the overall investigation upon the particular
forms of paranormal experience, and how they are represented metaphori¬
cally. It is suggested that this provides a means of accessing and under¬
standing the experiential or imaginative style of cognition which has been
suggested as underlying the experience of the paranormal and some symp¬
toms of psychopathology.
The review of the parapsychological literature isolates three forms of
metaphor used to describe parapsychological phenomena: these are named
intrusions, transmissions and connections. These are recorded in the answers
of a sample of participants and assessed for their relative frequencies to
other explanations and metaphors.
Like any other area of research, the history of psychical and parapsy¬
chological research is replete with metaphors employed to conceptually iso¬
late the elusive quarry psi (Hyman, 1989). This very elusiveness suggests a
primary metaphor of quicksilver or mercury (White, 1985). As in other dis¬
ciplines, there are benefits to be gained from applying an analysis of
metaphor to parapsychology. This approach highlights how paranormal
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phenomena have been conceptualised by different parties, how the study of
the paranormal has developed, and provides insights into what these excep¬
tional experiences might mean to those people who have them. It also pro¬
vides us with ideas about how the subject of parapsychology is presented in
the professional and public arenas.
An examination such as this, taking into account the metaphors
employed in the field of parapsychology, is somewhat rare but not entirely
new. Hillman (1971) in examining the main images, and fantasies of para¬
psychology noted the use of metaphors such as the involvement of will in
relation to PK and intimacy in relation to apparitional experiences. These
particular metaphors indicate how these kinds of experiences are construct¬
ed as well as indicating broader considerations such as the general spiritual
orientation or anti-matter fantasy of many parapsychologists.
Hess (1988) takes a certain delight in immersing himself in the
metaphors and ideas of parapsychology. He explores the identity and sexu¬
ality of parapsychology arguing that there is a hierarchy expressed in the
field with experimental modes of research having an elevated status over
those that involve experiential investigations. In addition experimental
approaches tend to be described as being more masculine, they are consid¬
ered as harder and more objective than the feminine experiential approach.
Exploring the role of dreams in psi experiences, Ullman (1984) views
these communications as primarily metaphorical in nature. According to
Ullman, dreams are metaphors in motion, and psi that occurs during
dreams partakes of this metaphorical atmosphere. Ullman ultimately views
dreams and psi as phenomena which bind the individual to others and to
the whole, as with metaphors they emphasise connecting patterns and rela¬
tionships.
The metaphors in parapsychology and psychical research have been
forged, adapted, and abandoned as the times and society encouraged differ¬
ent perspectives on paranormal phenomena. For instance, we have seen the
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force involved in psychokinesis compared earlier to fluids and electricity
and later to fields and quantum processes. The few titles listed below
(which probably occupy space on many of our shelves) give an inkling of
the ways in which paranormal phenomena have been envisioned: Phantasms
of the Living, Mental Radio, Beyond Reality, Parapsychology: Science or Magic.
Historically, the study of psi has been viewed as existing far outside
the normal boundaries and concerns of 19th - and 20th - century science.
Whether proposing the possibility of contact with the dead or novel forms
of communication, books with titles such as Beyond the Reach of Sense
(Heywood, 1974) and Bei/ond Reality (Rogo, 1990) establish psi as an object of
scrutiny out of this world; and to many the study of psi and its existence are
seen as existing in the Margins of Reality (Jahn & Dunne, 1987). These titles
are naturally eye-catching and are no doubt strategies to reach a popular
audience; however, they also provide clues to how paranormal phenomena
are conceptualised. Some metaphors are used overtly; however, it may be
argued that some of the metaphors that will be examined are literal in their
meaning. Accepting that much is yet to be learned about the nature of psi,
it is reasonable to consider some of these "literal" forms of describing psi as
metaphorical (indeed, if we adopt the strong view of metaphor, the literal is
simply a subset of the metaphorical anyway). This helps to clarify the way
in which particular descriptions of paranormal experiences arise in certain
contexts and how they are seen as being related to other types of phenome¬
na.
Psi as the grail
If for popular writers and some researchers psi research remains
beyond the sensate world many skeptics would tend to agree. For some, it
belongs to the same world as religion, magic, alchemy and astrology.
Alcock (1985), in the Skeptics Handbook, illustrates the counteradvocate's
position that parapsychologists are looking for intangibles that may be spiri¬
tual or quasi-religious but that at the very least are not scientific. To Alcock,
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parapsychology is not the search to understand the anomalies that
puzzle normal science; it is much more the quest to demonstrate that
certain anomalies can be found that demand for their explanation the
existence of forces or concepts as yet not accepted as possible by sci¬
ence. (p. 542)
Alcock lists the sciences and discoveries that have dropped by the
wayside in the march of science towards truth: alchemy, phrenology, N-rays,
phlogiston. By association, psi and parapsychology can be seen as occupy¬
ing a similar position to these bygones. It is a fact that psychical research
and parapsychology have been seen as reactions to a growing materialism
in the sciences. With the advent of spiritualism, with mediumistic phenom¬
ena and a possible channel to another world, those espousing such a view
were offered the means by which to argue against materialists. If true, these
phenomena promised an afterlife and a mind free from the chains of matter.
If parapsychological research was concerned with these issues, then it was
guilty of religious and spiritual motivations. This is a sin according to the
skeptics, but it is a blessing according to some writing from the parapsycho¬
logical perspective: "Parapsychology, once the despised outcast of a materi¬
alistically-orientated orthodoxy, may now claim pride of place among the
spiritual sciences; for it was parapsychology which pioneered the explo¬
ration of the world beyond the senses" (Randall, 1975, p. 241).
james Randi (1975), in his book on Uri Geller, uses a religious
metaphor when he refers to the search for the holy "grail of ESP." By
describing ESP as a holy relic that is mythical, precious, and wholly unat¬
tainable, he provides the sense of a fruitless crusade. The association with
religion rather than science is reinforced, thus hammering home the idea
that parapsychology is far removed from scientific orthodoxy and owes its
origins more to metaphysics and faith than empiricism and reality.
Psi is Pathology
Counteradvocates and lay people have conceptually mapped out psi in
terms of other domains such as illness and medicine. Hyman (1989) consid-
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ered parapsychology a good candidate for the title pathological science. The
connotations are obvious: Parapsychology is an ailment in the body of sci¬
ence and the remedy is surgery, to cut it out! However, Hyman is more
lenient; he argues that instead of being hounded out of science deviant sci¬
entists should receive honest, constructive criticism to treat the pathology.
If "pathologies" do exist in the sense that some of our best scientists
defend bizarre positions, then like all sicknesses, they are a symptom
of something. Something is wrong and requires remedy. We cannot
discover what is wrong by bad diagnoses—by failing to acknowledge
the disease exists, by preventing others from learning about it, or by
isolating the disease from the main body of science. Good science
requires good and effective criticism. Bad and irrational criticism,
even when the object is bizarre or outrageous, benefits no one. (p.
250)
Perhaps the most popular form of the pathology metaphor is that of
mental illness, and it is directed at those who are likely to believe in excep¬
tional phenomena, who report having had such experiences, or having
investigated them. For instance, according to astronomer Peter Sturrock:
"Having talked to some 'experts' in the UFO field, 1 am convinced that 99.9
per cent of them are crackpots, psychopaths or otherwise unreliable charac¬
ters" (in Evans, 1982, p. 189).
Not only are UFO experts "mentally unreliable," so too are shamans
and mediums (Gauld, 1982) points out:
Just as Victorian anthropologists were apt to think shamans merely
crazy, so some psychiatrists and clergymen have dramatically or
unreflectingly asserted that many mediums are mentally disturbed
and probably certifiable. Such assertions are as mistaken in the latter
case as in the former, (p. 21)
John Maddox, the editor of Nature, in a debate that took place at the
University of Liverpool, argued that psychic impressions are more likely to
be hallucinations rather than true accounts of the world and that as such,
they are probably symptomatic of schizophrenia. Accordingly, he thinks
that to the extent that many of these phenomena are conceivably and
quite probably the reports of people suffering from real organic phys¬
ical diseases of that kind, it is really rather cruel that we should
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rhetoric is employed to distance the phenomena and the subject from both
science and common sense. It might also be argued that the opposite situa¬
tion may arise where a proponent may seek to use "scientific" terminology
and metaphors in order to solidify the position of certain parapsychological
claims. Either way, the use of metaphor is essential to this rhetoric. It will
be seen later that certain metaphors are probably employed precisely
because they resonate with the current models in scientific research. I
would like to extend this and suggest that an examination of the metaphors
implicit in descriptions of psychical phenomena can usefully illuminate the
ways in which these events have been conceptualised.
Three core metaphors of psi phenomena
Intrusions
In the heady days of spiritualism there was an invasion of another
world. The title of Hilary Evans' book Intrusions seems a useful categoris¬
ing metaphor for these experiences. For example, take a look at Daniel
Defoe's discussion of the matter:
By apparitions of Spirits, i mean when the invisible inhabitants of the
unknown world, be they who they will, assume human shapes, or
other shapes, and show themselves visibly to us, so as that we can
see them, speak to them, hear them speak, and the like. . .
The question therefore is not so much whether there are any such
things; but WHO, and WHAT, and from WHENCE they are, what
business they come about, who sends them or directs them, and how
and in what manner we ought to think and act, and behave about
them, and to them, (in Evans, 1982, pp. 62-64)
There is no doubt that the oldest posited cause of paranormal phenom¬
ena are spirits or ghosts that penetrate our reality from another unseen
world. These entities are often said to be ancestors, deceased relatives, or
friends. The structure of this schema consists of an image of an another
world from which the occupants occasionally visit our reality. In most reli¬
gions and in mythology, there are numerous accounts of this other-world as
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an afterlife, spirit-world, limbo, and other terms. The intrusion metaphor is
also evident in anthropological studies of traditional societies, which often
employ spatial and entity schemas to make a demarcation between nature
and civilisation. Typically, the area outside the village (especially the forest)
is seen as occupied by spirits, and dangerous activities such as walking
alone in the bush are invitations to discarnate influence and possession; in
fact, it is viewed as flagrantly encouraging an intrusion into the self or the
home.
The intrusion metaphor assumes that poltergeists and apparitions are
the appearance of spirits that normally occupy a different space to our own.
Florence Cook manifesting Katy King and Mirabelli conjuring up the dead
are both viewed as creating a pathway from one world to the other. These
experiences were inevitably seen as alien visitations from another world that
intruded upon and jarred our increasingly material, objective, and mecha¬
nised reality.
There were good reasons for assuming that spirits were in attendance
at sittings. In so far as the proceedings included a measure of control for
fraud, movements of objects and rapping sounds all suggested contact with
a presence, an intelligence, even if it was generally hidden from the eyes of
the observers. In some cases, the presence was felt more corporeally and the
witnesses had good reason to assume that there were real entities intruding
into the space of the seance room. For instance, the impressive accounts of
sittings with the medium D. D. Flome feature reports of observers seeing
and holding disembodied hands. These hands ranged in size and flesh tone
and felt warm and solid, yet they also seemed to melt away from the firmest
grip (Braude, 1986). These insinuations of human form together with the
sitters' traditional religious beliefs in an afterlife provided a fitting construc¬
tion of these events. The notion of underlying communication or intention
seemed to be a factor in these mediumistic displays as well as in haunt-
ings—the spirit was often assumed to have something to communicate,
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hence their return to our world. This reaches its peak in crisis apparitions
where contact is made to inform someone that a death has taken place.
One of the main concerns of the early investigators was the issue of
survival. However, continued contact between the psychical researchers
and mediums eventually raised doubts over this issue and perhaps engen¬
dered a change in emphasis and metaphor. Increasingly, there was less con¬
cern with the ostensible deceased entities that sought to communicate with
the living and more interest in the psychic performances themselves and
with notions of a possible underlying energy or psychic force.
The intrusion metaphor has not lost its appeal in popular circles (or in
other cultures). Choose any film dealing with paranormal topics from
Ghostbusters to Poltergeist and you are treated to entities imposing them¬
selves upon otherwise normal citizens, their homes and their refrigerators.
We also have increasing reports of alien abductions, mostly in the U.S. but
to a lesser extent in Europe. These are intrusions with a modern technologi¬
cal and extraterrestrial flavour in which the other world is even further
removed from us. It is likely that there are similarities between these ideas
and older ones of possession. The term intrusion is used simply because it
conveys the notion of a visit from another place; it is not meant to be viewed
exclusively in a negative light.
The intrusion metaphor relies upon particular image schematic struc¬
tures: for example, that of the container schema. An intrusion is made into a
particular space, into consensual reality, albeit one which is often altered for
the benefit of the medium (i.e., carried out in the dark or in conditions of
reduced light). In the development of the metaphor of psychic force and in
the case of poltergeist phenomena, the medium or agent is the space from
which the intrusion is made into sensate reality. In the investigation of the
Miami poltergeist, researchers mapped the trajectories of objects, noting the
apparent influence of the individual at the centre of the phenomena (Roll,
Burdick, & Joines, 1973). Insofar as the activities of the intruding entities or
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psychic forces manipulate the environment, this can also be construed as a
purposive means of communication. Further study of this metaphor would
usefully incorporate mythical and anthropological accounts of intrusions to
extend and elaborate the content and context of this metaphor.
Transmissions and Forces
The focus of attention of psychical research eventually shifted from the
intrusion of entities to the ostensible demonstration of psychic energy or
force and also the anomalous transmission of information. The notion of
psychic force is an obvious forerunner of PK, which like ESP removes the
necessity for any intruding entities, providing instead a perspective which is
more in line with the modern scientific informational or physical context for
understanding these phenomena. E.W. Cox exemplifies this shift of concep¬
tual metaphors:
I have found no evidence, that the spirits of the dead are in any way
concerned; on the contrary, the evidence pointed entirely in the oppo¬
site direction. All the conditions under which the phenomena pre¬
sented themselves were entirely consistent with the exhibition of a
force emanating from some person or persons present and were
wholly inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of action by
those who have passed into another state of existence. What is the
nature of that force? if it be a product of nerve organisation, or a
purely Psychic Force, is a question of the highest scientific interest
that demands and, I hope, will soon receive the most patient and pro¬
found investigation, (in Evans, 1982, p. 122)
Crookes came to the same conclusion:
These experiments appear conclusively to establish the existence of a
new force, in some unknown manner connected with the human
organisation, which for convenience may be called the Psychic Force"
(in Evans 1982, p. 122).
Tyrrell (1947) dealt with the same issue arising from the study of pol¬
tergeists:
It looks much more as though a certain subconscious level of the per¬
sonality, of a sub-intelligent character, may be able to express itself by
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levels of mind:
Or is it some contact with a deeper level of mind, as bubbles on a
stream have contact with the water of the stream? (p. 5)
The metaphors that are used to structure abstract or unusual phenome¬
na do not arise arbitrarily; for instance, mental radio no doubt received a
boost from the discovery of "brain waves" or voltage fluctuations in the
brain. During the 1920s Italian neurologist Cazzamalli reported radio fre¬
quency radiations from subjects. However, as Rush (1986) notes:
The only known electrical oscillations in the brain are the brain-wave
potentials with frequencies of the order of ten per second. The electrical
power in these oscillations is minute, and the efficiency of radiation from
the brain at such frequencies is extremely low. The problem of selectivity, of
"tuning in" one individual pattern among a chaos of biological transmitters,
is obvious, (p. 286)
Radio is a real-world application with known physical principles that
provides a form for the less tangible processes of ESR As Lakoff and
Johnson (1980) argue, cognition naturally employs metaphor to relate
abstract, unknown domains to known experiential structures developed
from other domains, so anomalous communications such as psi are mapped
out in terms of known information transfer processes and technologies such
as radio. This supplies a rich context for analysing the nature of psi in a
way similar to that of normal processes of communication. A good example
of the range of possible metaphors drawn from scientific research in general
is described by Stokes (1987) in his review of theoretical parapsychology.
From the current perspective these are metaphors; their originators no
doubt would consider them as literal possibilities.
As in other forms of information transfer, the signal will occasionally
be interfered with or degraded by other forms of noise. Some of the most
recent developments in parapsychology have attempted to control this sig-
nal-to-noise ratio. Techniques to reduce noise have been the basis of the
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and Honorton employ the information transmission metaphor, perhaps
because it provides the only currently acceptable image of the way in which
psi might operate (contemporary psychology as a discipline is predominant¬
ly characterised by reductionistic and mechanistic metaphors). The
Ganzfeld might increase the probability of psi occurring in a number of
ways; an obvious alternative to the noise reduction theory is that it encour¬
ages the development of receptivity to a more collective level of personality
(this possibility is suggested in Sinclair's second metaphor, in Tyrrell's work,
and in Swann, 1987).
Explicit reference to an information transfer metaphor is made in the
recent work of May, Spottiswoode, and James (1994). They purposefully
construct and examine the metaphor in an attempt to provide an under¬
standing of the influence of target characteristics in anomalous cognition
experiments. May et al. were concerned with the relationship of Shannon
entropy—which they define as "a measure of our uncertainty, or lack, of
information, about a system" (p. 263) and how this relates to target images
used in experiments. They propose that a reductionist approach following
information theory and using the explicit information transfer metaphor
provides circumstantial evidence for possible receptors of psi or anomalous
cognition. It would seem that Isaacs' contention that the information trans¬
fer model is outdated was premature. The fact that May et al. note that they
are working with a metaphor should be applauded, and their work indi¬
cates how different metaphors can be usefully explored without resorting to
notions of one correct view. Any metaphor operates within a limited con¬
text, revealing some aspects (and hiding others) of the phenomenon being
explored.
Researchers such as Tyrrell (1947) considered that telepathy was less
about the transmission of thought and more about cues from a subliminal
level of the personality. Adopting a depth-psychological account of self,
people can be seen as volcanic islands projecting above the sea; underneath
241
they slope to a common ground from which they came and in which they
are all connected. Swann (1987) presents the case against the transfer
metaphor in his book Natural ESP; again, like Tyrrell, he develops a depth
metaphor for psi (these depth metaphors will be encountered again in the
next section with respect to Jung's notion of synchronicity). Swann makes
the important objection that the some metaphors of ESP can hinder perfor¬
mance and lead one to have the wrong expectations of psi.
I was able to conclude (correctly so) that ESP must work and function
on its own by mechanisms not recognisable to my brain learning,
even though I possessed lots of labels that served me intellectually.
There was no direct connection between these labels and real ESP
mechanisms. To put this another way, my labels served as filters or
barriers to true real ESP experience! The labels were acting as mental
preconceptions about what should be experienced intellectually.... It
was only after I learned to detach myself from the power of these
labels that some of ESP's mechanisms revealed themselves, (p. 2)
The image schema underlying the metaphor of information transfer is
exemplified in all communication systems. We continually assume that any
form of communication involves the transference of some form of informa¬
tion package from a sender to a receiver; see Reddy's analysis of the conduit
metaphor in language for an example (Reddy, 1993). Radio transmission
provides another example of a concrete communication process. Images of
transferring units of information or the influence of some kind of force are
projected onto those experiences, which are classified as paranormal. Our
common sense notions of communication and causation dictate the forms
we apply to anomalous experiences. Telepathy is seen as mentally seeing or
hearing and psychokinesis is the mental creation of physical movement or
action. The term extrasensory perception (ESP) confirms this metaphor and
implies that we can consider these phenomena as extensions of our normal
perceptual and motor skills. There have been attempts to avoid the percep¬
tual and motor connotations of this kind of terminology, for instance the
suggestion of the "theory-free' terms psi gamma and psi kappa to replace
ESP and PK (Thouless & Weisner, 1947). Zusne and Jones (1989) present a
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similar view, noting how elements of "magical thinking" follow similar
structural patterns to known and understood physical world processes.
Zusne and Jones see this metaphorical comparison of psi and known
processes of communication as indicative of 'magical thinking'; however, if
it were simply that, then we would have to consider many terms in science
as deriving from similar threads of fantasy. It should be stressed that what
is important about this relationship is how the image schemas and
metaphorical projections that we derive from our previous experience (pre¬
dominantly bodily experience and our contact with our particular culture),
structure and define more abstract, emotional, or exceptional experiences
and events.
Connections
The most recent development in metaphors of psi is probably a holistic
vision of reality—one of intricate and intimate connections. This develop¬
ment owes its inspiration largely to the developments in quantum physics
earlier this century, which have been popularised by books on the new
physics. From this perspective reality is fundamentally interconnected; it
removes many of the difficulties inherent in parapsychological phenomena
by permitting non-local interactions and connections. A good definition of
the holistic or systems paradigm is provided by Battista (1982).
According to the holistic paradigm the entire universe is intercon¬
nected and hierarchically organised. Matter and energy, living and
nonliving, mind, body and spirit all refer to different levels of the
same unified system. We know about this universal system because
of our interaction with it. Uncertainty is an inherent part of our rela¬
tionship to the system because the system is a process and we are a
part of the process we are attempting to know. To the extent that we
can reduce this uncertainty we generate information about the world
process. Knowledge thus exists in relationship rather than in an
"objective" world or in "subjective" experience. The world is not
classically determined in a simple, linear billiard ball manner; rather,
each level of the universal system operates on every other. Events
are thus partially determined from above (more complex and encom¬
passing levels) and from below (less complex and encompassing lev¬
els) as well as from the same level of complexity. Thus, we can never
know the absolute cause of anything, or whether an event is totally
determined, (p. 145)
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There are reasons to assume that this interconnected reality is the one
experienced by mystics and psychics (LeShan, 1974). Eileen Garrett
describes clairvoyance as:
an intensely acute sensing of some aspects of life in operation, and
since at clairvoyant levels time is undivided and whole, one often
perceives the object or event in its past, present and/ or future phases
in abruptly swift successions, (in Talbot, 1991, p. 208)
The connections metaphor resonates strongly with the theory of syn-
chronicity introduced by Carl Jung (1960). He suggested that in addition to
causal relationships, there exist acausal connections that are recognised
because of their meaningfulness. For Jung, psi processes begin where the
conscious processes end, at the boundaries of the phenomenal "I."
According to Richard Noll (1989), J. B. Rhine and Jung had met only once
but were deeply interested in each other's work. Noll asserts that Rhine:
had to "repress" these transpersonal and causally-independent
assumptions that can be found in Jung's model because they clashed
with causal and reductive assumptions that place the "source" of psi
within the individual and necessitates the belief that a causal mecha¬
nism can be found to unlock the secrets of psi. (p. 73)
This metaphor implies that psi is an outcome of fundamental intercon¬
nectedness and relationship to the whole. ESP is not a matter of transfer¬
ence of thought, image, or feeling, because these are simultaneously every¬
where and are not dependent upon transmission in time and space. Work
influenced by this metaphor is being considered in parapsychology, but the
dominant mode of exploration relies on the transmission metaphor. This is
not surprising, given the difficulty of framing empirical investigations in
terms of the connections of a holistic metaphor. Jaffe (1962) emphasises the
holistic nature of psychic reality in synchronistic phenomena:
Basically, both "sender" and "recipient" are mere instruments of the
autonomous archetype and its "ordering" effect on space and time;
or, they may be fellow actors in the drama of an archetypal situation.
Man and his conscious mind and will power are pushed into the
background by the Objective-Psychical, the Archetype. It is possible
that the impersonal, a-causal process of "ordering" (such as the dou-
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ing out and influencing other brains at a distance. Showers of particles, or
psitrons, have been postulated that appear unimpeded by distance or barri¬
ers. Psi fields have been proposed that are connected with organisms and
inanimate objects and can interact at times depending on attention, motiva¬
tion, and other psychological factors (see Rush 1986, for. further details).
In addition to these physical metaphors, there have been attempts to
structure psi employing concepts of four-dimensional space-time developed
from relativity theory. In effect, this would permit a shortcut between two
events and a possible psi connection in higher dimensions. One account of
telepathy and precognition has employed the term resonance to describe how
ESP may occur (Marshall, 1960). It is conjectured that two complex systems,
such as human brains, might synchronise and a thought pattern in one be
reproduced in the other. These physical and quasi-physical theories all
draw on theories and models circulating in physics and inevitably rely on
metaphors as these processes are often beyond common sense cognition. In
the words of Hardison (1989), science has gone beyond the normal limits of
direct human cognition.
We no longer face a world viewed from the middle distance where
Newtonian objects are "Solid, massy, hard, impenetrable..."
[instead],..nature has slipped, perhaps finally, beyond our field of
vision. We can imitate it in mathematics—we can even produce con¬
vincing images of it—but we can never know it. We can know only
our own creations, (p. 1)
A recent holistic metaphor that attempts to illustrate the nature of
wholeness through concrete example is that of the hologram. Working inde¬
pendently, physicist David Bohm (1980) and neurobiologist Karl Pribram
(1971) proposed that the hologram might be a good analogy to the universe
and also to the brain. So that, in effect, you have a holographic brain inter¬
preting a holographic universe. Initially, this metaphor was received enthu¬
siastically, used widely, and some would say too loosely (Blackmore, 1992).
In the years since its introduction, its popularity has weakened a little (see
Soyland, 1994 for a discussion of the holographic memory model in cogni-
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tive psychology). The holographic metaphor emphasises the interconnect-
edness of nature, each part being related to every other part just as in the
hologram itself every part is encoded throughout the interference pattern on
the photographic plate. By illuminating a particular region of the holo¬
graphic plate we still see the whole image but with less detail and from a
decreased range of possible points of view.
Holistic metaphors almost seem ready made for the elusive nature of
psi. Some have commented that ESP and PK are inevitable in a holographic
universe because of fundamental connectedness. As Krippner (1982) notes:
"ESP and PK are necessary components of that [holographic] universe.
Indeed, holographic theorists would have to hypothesise the existence of
ESP and PK had not parapsychologists carefully documented their existence
over the years" (p. 124).
Synchronicity and holograms aside, most of the momentum for this
view of interconnectedness and wholeness has been provided by the grow¬
ing popularity and mystery of quantum physics. It should be noted that
quantum physics is heavily tinged with metaphor itself (not surprising, as it
deals with a truly abstract realm). The explanation of psi in terms of quan¬
tum mechanics draws a link between psi and quantum mechanical events.
Quantum events are probabilistic, independent of time and space, and con¬
stitute correlations of states rather than energy transmission. Some
researchers (e.g., Walker, 1975) have proposed accounts in which an organ¬
ism's intention might influence an indeterminate quantum situation.
Another interpretation is offered by observational theories, in which it
is proposed that the imagined process and the quantum process correlate.
The term observational theories has been used to describe accounts of psi
derived from explanations of quantum theory following the Copenhagen
interpretation. In short, they assume that the observer paradox in quantum
physics (illustrated by the famous example of Schrodinger's cat) indicates
that events are in a state of superposition prior to any measurement or
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observation being made (the cat is both dead and alive). Once this all-
important observation is made, the wave function collapses, the superposi¬
tion is ended, and an identifiable and located event takes place. The obser¬
vational theories present a view of ultimate interconnectedness, which com¬
plicates the task of devising appropriate empirical designs to test these theo¬
ries. They require extra precautions that transcend the normal levels of
security applied to sources of possible sensory leakage; for instance, they
even require the consideration of possible leakage from any future examina¬
tion of the results of such an experiment (Lucadou, 1994).
Jahn and Dunne (1987) explicitly describe psi in terms of quantum
mechanics. Their approach is remarkably similar to the work of Lakoff and
Johnson (1980). They note that idioms of the English language often employ
metaphorical structures based on spatial schemas, which are extended to
abstract emotional and cognitive experience. In particular that:
impressionistic verbal allusions to physical distance are commonly
used to describe all manner of cognitive or emotional situations. A
person is described as a "close" friend or "distant" relative, as "deep"
in thought or "high" as a kite; an idea may be "central," "remote," or
"far out"; and we allow our minds to "wander" over various concep¬
tual "grounds," before taking a "position" on an issue. Lucid as
these analogies may be, they are inherently qualitative; to quantify
such consciousness dimensions, some referential standard must be
established—some conceptually evident "stride," "meter," or "wave¬
length," as it were—in terms of which consciousness "distance" may
be specified in quantitative form. (p. 229)
Jahn and Dunne build on this and develop a metaphorical interpreta¬
tion of humans as quantum particles, mapping human characteristics of
subjective experience in terms of the processes of quantum events. They
construct the image of a human as a particle, or rather a "quantum wave-
mechanical model of the rudimentary consciousness atom," (p. 251) which is
capable of interacting with other humans and with the environment by all
those means available to the analogous physical wave systems, including
wave-mechanical collisions, interatomic radiation, evanescent wave tun¬
nelling, or escape to free wave status. Each of these actions is metaphorical-
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ly projected from the domain of observations of physical systems to those of
consciousness and different aspects of normal and anomalous communica¬
tion. Amorim (1994) develops Jahn and Dunne s proposal by drawing on
the work on analogy and metaphor in understanding scientific concepts
(e.g., Gentner, 1983). He proposes the importance of developing metaphori¬
cal models of psi phenomena; in particular he advocates examining the
observational theories and the possible isomorphy between the structure of
quantum and psi phenomena.
Jahn and Dunne's use of metaphor provides an important and valu¬
able means to describe and explore an abstract domain such as the experi¬
ence of psi. In their linkage of the sub-atomic world with experiments in
parapsychology, they knit together two domains that are difficult to concep¬
tualise; but more than that, they accomplish this through the use of a coher¬
ent and systematic account, drawn from real-life cognition, which is
metaphorical in nature. Beyond this, as Amorim (1994) proposes, Jahn and
Dunne's quantum metaphor is also important in that it leads to testable
hypotheses.
There are enormous difficulties in dealing with a world or a concep¬
tion of a world which is ultimately thoroughly interconnected. For instance,
any reductionist isolation of elements is temporary and may actually detract
from the phenomenon it seeks to describe as much as it promises to clarify
its nature. When these elements are taken in their natural state, as active
relationships, they present a "truer" yet fuzzier picture of the underlying
reality than they do when taken out of context and out of relationship. This
is becoming an accepted consequence in terms of fuzzy logic accounts of
reality (Kosko, 1994), wherein black and white solutions seem to deliver
clarity yet are inaccurate in nature and grey accounts lead to fuzziness but
describe a process better. In structuring this reality, it is important to use a
instrument suitable for the job—metaphor is eminently qualified for this.
Metaphor is a means of qualifying and depicting relationships. It is natural-
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ly incomplete and limited, but it provides as accurate a view as possible
when you reach into a reality which is not about isolated parts but about
wholeness. Battista (1982) proposes that the appropriate methodology for a
holistic paradigm is one that uses analogy (and presumably metaphor). The
schema on which the holistic metaphor relies is one of relationship and con¬
nection (human and conceptual), notions of inclusivity and belonging, the
recognition of gestalt, and the emergence of higher orders (the whole is
greater than the sum of the parts); these ideas all perhaps contribute to the
formulation of the connections metaphor.
Conclusions
It seems that the history and interpretation of psi (like any domain of
experience) has relied heavily on metaphor, and reinforces the idea that
humans (scientists included) are an inexhaustible source of analogies of the
universe (Bohm & Peat, 1987). It may also support the contention of Lakoff
and Johnson (1980) that cognition is fundamentally metaphorical in nature.
It offers a way of understanding different constructions of paranormal expe¬
rience (see Table 31)
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Table 31 Different explanations derived from the different metaphors
used to describe various phenomena

















of force by an agent
Observer collapse of
the wavefunction
Apparitions Intrusion of spirit Constructed image in
response to information
communicated from
one domain to another
Synchronicity/non-local
correlation
In the next section the metaphors employed in lay theories of paranor¬
mal experience are explored. It seems likely that lay theories related to
paranormal experience may draw on the same metaphors as those present¬
ed above but may differ in the extent to which they are formally expressed.
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Metaphors and lay theories of psi experiences
It seems that formal explanations of paranormal experience have built
upon culturally available conceptual metaphors and schemas. In order to
further clarify these figurative schemas in general usage an examination of
lay explanations and theories of different paranormal experiences was
undertaken.
It is likely that individuals who report having unusual experiences
which they attribute to paranormal sources are likely to narrate them
employing metaphors and schemas which relate directly to their experience
as well as to culturally available theories and models. Metaphors are
employed much more frequently in ordinary discourse than we might
expect. Gibbs (1994) notes that between 5 and 6 metaphors are introduced
per minute of discourse. Analyses of the use of metaphors in television
debates and news commentary programs showed that speakers use one
unique metaphor for every 25 words (Graesser, Mio, & Millis, 1989). In
addition, novel metaphors were employed about every 2-3 minutes of dis¬
course by U.S. senators during the debate in January 1991 on the use of mili¬
tary force in the Persian Gulf (Voss, Kennet, Wiley, & Engstler-Schooler,
1992).
Metaphor has been the subject of a growing number of empirical
investigations. McConnell et al. (1993) were successful in measuring per¬
sonality attributes such as optimism, pessimism, locus of control and sensa¬
tion seeking through studying the metaphors which people generated.
Another study which looked at metaphor usage by participants who were
trained in psychology or who had little or no formal training revealed that
the experienced participants tended to generate more metaphors, particular¬
ly with respect to abstract areas of discussion where literal explanations
were not available (Cooke and Bartha,1992).
Quinn (1987) examined the usage of metaphor in general discourse of
Americans about marriage. She found that only eight classes of metaphors
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occurred when people discussed marriage. Amongst these were metaphors
of sharedness (I felt that marriage was just a partnership); metaphors of
mutual benefit (That was really something we got out of marriage);
metaphors of effort (she works harder at our marriage than I do); metaphors
of risk (there are so many odds against marriage). In all, eight classes of
metaphor seem to reflect the conceptual elements which characterise the
model of marriage held by most Americans. This analysis reveals the way
in which metaphors are used to construct and understand the abstract realm
of marriage.
In the field of parapsychology there has been relatively little attention
paid to the metaphors used to describe paranormal phenomena. Hillman
(1971) identified a number of fantasies involved in the study of parapsychol¬
ogy, these included; the notion of will, intimacy and a general spiritual or
anti-matter fantasy. Hess (1988) undertaking a similar approach which
focussed on the discourse of parapsychology, found a hierarchical structure
built upon foundations of hard and soft approaches which equate with the
masculine and feminine approaches to science in general. Ullman (1984)
has indicated how psi seems to be woven into dreams which suggests that
like dreams psi has a metaphorical form. These approaches indicate two
levels of metaphorical analysis: 1) a higher level which focuses on the con¬
struction of a subject and the ways in which discourse and narratives repre¬
sent the paranormal and psi; and 2) a deeper level which concentrates on
the form of the phenomena and suggests that psi itself may derive from a
metaphorical state of mind. This is a state which involves low focus
thought (see Gelernter, 1994) which is more experiential and imaginative
than rational and analytic (Epstein, 1994) and more related to the diffuse
and unfocused mental states seen more in creativity than problem solving.
Jahn and Dunne (1987) explored this second level of metaphorical
analysis by examining metaphorical projections from the quantum to the
human realm (popular sources such as Zohar's (1990) Quantum Self have
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also explored this metaphor). They offer a fascinating in-depth coverage of
the quantum consciousness metaphor. They explored the metaphor of the
human particle/ wave, mapping the qualities and characteristics of wave
particles onto human cognition and experience in an effort to understand
and speculate upon the generation of psi. They adopt a method similar to
that used by Lakoff & Johnson (1980) where they pay particular attention to
the clues offered in everyday speech regarding changes in orientation and
movement in mental space. For instance:
We speak of "spheres of influence," of "far-ranging" minds or
thoughts of "penetrating" insight; we acknowledge the advantages of
"positive attitude" or the detriments of "negativity"; and we ask
"what's his angle?" or "what's the point?" to ascertain someone's per¬
spective or orientation on a matter, (p. 247)
According to a traditional objectivist position this is simply a matter of
figurative speech embedded in subjectivity, however from the perspective of
the contemporary metaphor theorist this is resonant of actual deep experien¬
tial gestalts, which are structured and communicated metaphorically by
relating them to the experience of movement and orientation in space.
Amorim (1994) extended Jahn and Dunne's work more formally by showing
how cross-mapping attributes of quantum systems permits predictions
about psi. Fie does this by assuming an isomorphy between quantum and
psi phenomena, drawing on the observational theories to penetrate the
intentional states of the psi experient or operator. Building these analogies
permits certain testable hypotheses to be generated, in a sense this kind of
approach makes explicit what has been largely implicit and unrecognised in
any kind of creative scientific theory formation.
Adopting the first level of metaphor analysis, we have reviewed the
apparent use of three different metaphors in the parapsychological litera¬
ture. Although these might be taken for literal entities, it is worthwhile
postponing judgement and treating each as a way of relating to the experi¬
ence of psi. Different metaphors reveal and conceal particular aspects of the
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reality they are directed at; it is therefore important to realise that there are
no justified reasons for choosing one metaphor over another in an effort to
find the 'truth' (although one metaphor may be more appropriate or harmo¬
nious within a particular cultural or temporal environment than another).
Metaphors are the appropriate tools for describing a world which is not
'static but that is inherently a multifacetted being which influences and
reflects the activities of its explorers' (Feyerabend, 1988, p.270).
As indicated in the previous chapter, three broad categories of
metaphor seem to exist in the literature of parapsychology and psychical
research. Firstly, a metaphor that describes psi as occurring through the
intervention of entities (usually the spirits of the deceased); secondly, an
information transfer metaphor which describes psi as a communication
process (like a radio signal) and PK as force or energy-, and finally, a more
holistic metaphor (which relies on notions of interconnected nature evi¬
denced in Jung's notion of synchronicity and the abstruse realm of quantum
mechanics but also in lay conceptions of family bonds). These metaphors
might be briefly referred to as intrusions, transmissions and connections.
It is important that we attempt to understand the folk models and
metaphors that people generate and employ to describe ostensible paranor¬
mal experiences. It will help to describe the kinds of models and expecta¬
tions that people have of these experiences and how these are used to con¬
strue possible instances of psi. It may also provide clues about the situa¬
tions in which certain experiences may arise; for example, one of the signs
of having an ESP experience might be the sense of foreignness of the infor¬
mation, that it does not seem to belong to the individual and that they have
no recognition of having generated it themselves. It seems reasonable to
assume that it came in or was transmitted in from the outside. Most impor¬
tantly, it is valuable to examine people's metaphorical accounts of experi¬
ence and explanation because it offers ways in which to picture psi; this is
of course something we are still far from being sure about (Morris, 1974).
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In this study, semi-structured informal interviews were carried out in
order to assess the use of these three core and other metaphors and explana¬
tions of paranormal experience in people's everyday discourse.
Participants and procedure
Thirty eight participants, mostly undergraduate students from the
University of Edinburgh and Napier University, Edinburgh, took part in the
study. The few remaining participants were gathered from a participant
pool held at the Koestler Parapsychology Unit. The participants possessed a
range of opinions and beliefs on acceptance of the paranormal.
In most cases, each participant had taken part in an experimental task
and was briefly interviewed following the task. In some cases, participants
were interviewed after a longer period of time had elapsed since they
undertook the task. Each participant was initially asked to relate any para¬
normal experiences that they might have had (some of these were presented
in chapter 5). Upon completing their account of these experiences they were
asked three questions regarding paranormal phenomena, always presented
in the same order (shown below).
1) How might you explain what is involved when someone says that
they have an experience of ESP (e.g., telepathy)?
2) How might you explain what is involved when someone says that
they have seen a ghost?
3) How might you explain what is involved when someone says that
they have an experience of PK (e.g., a mental influence on matter)?
Each participant was encouraged to answer the question as fully as
possible. They were not interrupted but were encouraged to continue if it
seemed that they had more to say. In the early part of the study the PK
question was not included, as a result nine participants did not provide
answers for this. All interviews took place in the privacy of an experimen¬
tal cubicle and lasted between 5 and 60 minutes depending entirely upon
the wishes of the participant.
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Analysis procedure
Each of the participants taking part in this study were classified in
terms of whether they reported at least one experience which could be con¬
sidered as 'paranormal' in theme. This meant that even a minor experience
which may be considered as a 'case of coincidence' would assign them to
the experience group. In some cases a participant had experiences which
they related but which they had not defined as 'paranormal' yet they could
clearly have been categorised as such and so these were included in the
experient group. Each of the participants prior to being asked the three
questions regarding different explanations of paranormal experience were
asked to relate any experiences which they might consider as possibly being
paranormal in nature. If they had at least one such experience to relate then
they were considered as having had an experience which might be labelled
as 'paranormal'. In reality none of these experiences could be verified and
so each stands as an ostensible paranormal experience or better as an anom¬
alous experience for which the individual has not found a conventional
explanation.
Interviews were fully transcribed for the 38 participants. The inter¬
views were divided into idea units', these were oriented around a single
theme, metaphor or explanation, units varied from sentences to parts of a
sentence or occasionally a number of sentences. An example response
divided into idea units is represented below,
e.g. Response 9b:
(unit 13) I'm not so sure about this idea of them having a reason I think that's
maybe a human thing that's been imprinted on it
(unit 14) I think they exist everywhere in a sense
(unit 15) it's just that we don't pick up on it much something like that.
Each separate idea unit was assessed independently for the occurrence
of metaphors by the two raters using a content analytic technique. The
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number of occurrences of the three core conceptual metaphors (intrusions,
transmissions and connections), as well as novel metaphors and explana¬
tions were recorded. All metaphors and explanations were recorded irre¬
spective of whether the individual actually subscribed to that view or sim¬
ply raised it as an explanation others might adopt. This means that some¬
one who reports no such personal experience may use a metaphor or expla¬
nation of paranormal experience. Essentially, the metaphors and explana¬
tions recorded offer a glimpse of the ideas about paranormal experience
which are in current circulation.
The criteria for recording an instance of metaphor were that the
respondent either directly employed a metaphor or that they answered in
such a way as to suggest an underlying metaphor. For example, if a nonhu-
man entity such as a ghost, spirit, or supernatural being was mentioned in
relation to an experience this was recorded as an intrusion metaphor.
Mention of the notion of some kind of transfer of information between two
people (picking up, receiving or the sending of information) or the transfer of
energy between a human and environment (a mental force or energy) was
considered as an instance of transmissions. An instance of connections was
recorded if any mention was made of some form of bond, empathy or connec -
tion between individuals or if the explanation involved some form of inter-
connectedness (e.g., nonlocality in quantum physics). Novel metaphors
were recorded if the explanation involved what was judged to be a
metaphorical concept other than the three core metaphors. Explanations
which were judged to be more literal than metaphorical (this usually meant
they were acceptable as current explanations) were recorded as literal expla¬
nations.
Results
Inter-rater reliabilities (based on the proportion of agreed identifica¬
tions relative to the proportion of total identifications) between the two
raters indicated that there was 87% agreement on identification of the intru-
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sion metaphors, 93% agreement on transmissions; and 93% on connections.
Disagreements on identification of a particular metaphor resulted primarily
from the tendency for a degree of overlap to exist between novel metaphors
and core metaphors. The overall pattern of usage of metaphors is shown in
Table 32.
It can be seen from Table 32 that transmissions and connections were
preferable in explaining ESP and intrusions in explaining ghosts. In answer¬
ing the PK question participants seemed to rely on a variant of the transmis¬
sions metaphor which involved notions of force or energy.
Table 32 Number and type of responses employed in answering the three
questions (bold figures indicate most frequent answer).
Q. 1 . ESP Q. 2. Ghost Q. 3. PK Total
Intrusions 4 61 3 68
Transmissions 41 14 11 66
Connections 12 3 0 15
Novel 17 22 19 58
Explanations 37 41 12 90
In addition to the three core metaphors, novel metaphors were also
noted. Table 33 shows the kinds of novel metaphors used and their frequen¬
cy. These novel metaphors might usefully be thought of as comprising two
categories: one with the individual or personality as its locus, focused on
internal factors and the other focused on external factors. The most frequent
metaphor in the internal factors category was that of some kind of power: a
powerful mind. This would appear to bear a strong resemblance to the
usage of the psychic force metaphor which is involved in the transmissions
metaphor. The other metaphors in the internal category related to certain
skills, gifts or personality traits which might characterise a person with psi
abilities. The most frequently used metaphor in the external category con-
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sisted of stone tape recordings which were mentioned as possible metaphor¬
ical explanations of ghosts and these were related to the idea of some form
of psychic impression or atmosphere occurring in an environment. These
effects seem to be related conceptually to the past occurrence of a traumatic
event resulting in residual affect in the form of an atmosphere. In one
instance, the respondent noted that seeing a ghost was probably "just a more
intense form" of an atmosphere.
Table 33 Examples of novel metaphors used to explain ESP, ghosts and
PK.
Internal External
Powerful mind Stone tape recordings
Particular personality Atmosphere
Sixth sense Psychic impression
Intuition Psychic planes
Willpower Power
As well as noting the frequency of novel metaphors, any explanations
which seemed to be used in an overtly literal manner were noted. In an
extended definition of metaphor some of these might arguably be included
as metaphors. Again these explanations seemed to be usefully categorised
under internal or external headings. The most frequent explanations in the
internal category were those explanations which revolved around perceptu¬
al and cognitive mistakes which occur in states such as hallucinations, imag¬
ination and dreams. The next frequent explanation was desire, charac¬
terised by a desire to see a deceased relative again. A number of respon¬
dents considered non-verbal communication a viable means of explaining
ESP. The next two most frequent explanations related to a tendency to have
similar thoughts, for example in twins or close friends, and also that recol¬
lection characterised by conscience or memory can sometimes be misinter¬
preted as ESP. In the external category similar kinds of skeptical explana¬
tions were employed; tricks of the light were the most frequent along with
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coincidence. Less frequent contributions included the notion of some kind
of illusion, the influence of a life event or luck.
Table 34 Examples of explanations used to explain ESP, ghosts and PK.
These results support the idea that paranormal experiences are pre¬
dominantly structured in terms of three core metaphors of intrusions, trans¬
missions and connections, with intrusions and transmissions enjoying the
greatest circulation. These metaphors overlap to some degree with the
novel metaphors; for instance the powerful mind metaphor is readily associ¬
ated with the notion of some kind of transmitting energy involved in PK or
ESP (focussing on the transmitter rather than the transmitted). Examples of
answers to these questions are displayed in Table 35. In addition it is worth
noting that each of the core metaphors are not singular descriptions of one
phenomena although they may predominate in one kind of experience, as
transmissions do in the case of ESP, but transmissions are also used to
explain ghost or apparational experiences. Also they may be used as com¬




Desire (to see someone who has died)
Non-verbal communication
Similarity of thought (eg in twins)
Conscience & memory






Table 35 Examples of discourse involving the three core metaphors.
Intrusions
13-b
in your mind that you've brought back this person's spirit
they've gone on somewhere else errm either they're in heaven or hell or whatever
37-a
I believe there's a place which isn't heaven and it isn't hell that the spirits sort of hang
around (laughs) for a while and they can communicate with people who are very receptive
to them and because these spirits exist in infinity which is timeless they know what is going
to happen in our future
Transmissions
15-a
I always thought of it as tuning in to somebody else's thoughts and actually like language
almost having a conversation with somebody except mentally you can just see what their
thoughts are like
23-a
I would think telepathy would be where errm you pick up ideas out of someone's mind I
suppose it might be like the radio where that picks up y'know that's always fascinated




Just a strong bond between two people and that enables them like twins or something
like that
28-a
ideas about nonlocality and quantum physics appeal to me er but naturally everyone imme¬
diately says this means we can have telepathy and that's er a presumption that's hard to
make since I find the actual physics pretty hard to believe and you have to take that all on
trust anyway
Finally, to further explore the data, the proportion of metaphors to the
total number of idea units used in all answers was assessed and explored
for possible relationships with paranormal belief and experience. Self-
response scores for paranormal belief and paranormal experience were cor¬
related with the proportion of metaphors used by respondents. Belief scores
(as measured by the Australian Sheep Goat Scale, Thalbourne & Haraldsson,
1980) were only available for 23 respondents, all correlations were based on
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this sample.
Pearson correlation coefficients were calculated between paranormal
belief and proportion of metaphors to idea units used in answering the
question. Paranormal belief was significantly positively correlated with the
proportions of metaphors to words used in the explanations of paranormal
experiences (r = .50, p<.02). Interestingly, a negative correlation was
obtained between the proportion of explanations to idea units and paranor¬
mal belief (r= -.26, ns). It is most likely that these results reflect the different
degrees to which explanatory schemas are available for paranormal phe¬
nomena and experiences. Those with more experiences have not only used
terms appropriate for talking about those experiences but have developed a
conceptual framework characterised by the core and novel metaphors pre¬
sented here. Those individuals reporting fewer experiences were more like¬
ly to use literal explanations and avoid using the metaphors of paranormal
experience. This probably derives from their lower levels of belief and
reluctance to employ such explanatory systems, although they may indeed
have access to them in the sense that they are culturally shared. There is
also the possibility that personal experience provides a certain impetus for
the use of and acquaintance with these terms which is less available to non-
experients.
Table 36 Spearman correlations between number of metaphors and expla¬
nations generated in explanation of accounts of paranormal experiences
and personality variables.
TAS AT PAB MGI VVIQ PB
Metaphors .19 .15 .18 .35 .01 .50
Explanations -.39 -.09 -.25 -.30 -.04 -.26
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Discussion
This study provides support for the notion of common core metaphors
which are not necessarily mutually exclusive, but which may be used in
combination or in isolation for structuring and communicating paranormal
experiences. These metaphors have largely gone unnoticed in the work of
parapsychologists. In a sense this is not surprising, we tend to miss the
metaphorical nature of most of our everyday discourse. This very fact has
necessitated a reconsideration of the relationship of discourse and cognition
of the kind exemplified by contemporary theorists such as Lakoff and
Johnson (1980) in order to highlight this. The work on metaphor in the last
couple of decades has initiated a surge in a number of disciplines (literary
criticism, Turner, 1987; philosophy, Johnson, 1987; psychology, Leary, 1990;
Gibbs, 1994; and cognitive science, Lakoff, 1987) taking stock of how our
understanding of human cognition and experience is constructed. For para¬
psychologists, an examination of metaphor permits valuable insights into
the domain in which experiences and accounts of the paranormal are fos¬
tered and communicated, and also identifies the varieties and forms of para¬
normal experience which are in circulation. This is extremely important in
undertaking any validation of such experiences and understanding an indi¬
vidual's comprehension of and attitude to different kinds of phenomena.
The three metaphors (intrusions, transmissions and connections) which
seemed to characterise much of the writing in parapsychology were reason¬
ably strongly represented in the discourse of the respondents in this study.
References to these three metaphors were more frequent than any other sin¬
gle metaphor, supporting the notion that these are the three main metaphors
employed in experiencing and constructing paranormal experiences. Both
the transmissions and connections metaphors characterised ESP explana¬
tions and intrusions was most frequently used in relation to explaining
ghosts or hauntings. Explanations of PK also relied heavily on transmis¬
sions metaphors. These were mainly descriptions of mental force or energy
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and are viewed as physical extensions of the transmissions metaphor. PK
was also seen as an outcome of novel metaphors such as a powerful mind
or imagination which through visualisation can influence the outcome of
some physical event.
A deeper examination of these metaphors suggest that in the case of
transmissions the signal is conceived as some form of electrical energy, with
wavelengths, and exhibited by brainwaves. This energy is sent, projected or
focussed, and other people can tune in, receive, read or pick up on it.
Interestingly, it was also noted by one respondent that a telepathic transmis¬
sion would probably require more energy and focus to extend its reach to a
number of people:
38-a if you wanted to contact a group of people I think that could
happen too I don't think if you're telepathic you have to put in so
much concentration to the one person I think you could transmit to
a few people maybe not a large group but a few people at one time if
you wanted to pass on the same message.
Another important facet of the discussion of ESP was the proposition
that it was easier to communicate with people who are closer to the individ¬
ual such as family or friends because they have a greater ability to Tune in,
or because they are on the same wavelength, or because they have some
form of mental connection by which they can link minds (especially where
relatives are involved). This is considered to be a relatively robust finding
in the parapsychological literature (e.g. Rhine, 1956; Green, 1960, Irwin,
1989).
The form of these communications was considered to vary between
vague feelings, visual images and language. The content was often an
intention to inform of some event ranging from relatively unimportant
events to much more important events such as accidents. These communi¬
cation abilities were considered more often than not to be properties of the
individual, they were due to a type of person, people having certain charac¬
teristics such as a powerful imagination or mind or having some form of
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innate aspect such as a gift or development such as a skill.
In answering the question about ghosts the respondents seemed to be
less confident about the reality of the phenomenon. Those who had experi¬
enced an apparition of some kind tended to err on the side of caution:
5-b what I saw was a shape it was nothing really discernable it just
moved in a manner which if I'd seen it from a distance 1 would
think it was human I don't know if I believe in them or not but I
don't know how I'd explain it.
12-b I'm not sure that I definitely saw a ghost I'd have to say I don't
think it definitely was I don't really know what it was.
Some assumed that a person's spirit is brought back only in the sense
of it being in the mind of the individual who experiences it. Another
respondent considered that there was a link between people who were close
(in the sense of a relationship) which enabled a connection to be made
between the two worlds in which these people lived. Yet another consid¬
ered it possible for a deceased person to come back from the other world
during the transitory period between death and reincarnation. Other
respondents preferred to see an individual as responsible for the experience
themselves, perhaps through imagination driven by a desire to see relatives
who had passed on and by generating the experience themselves in their
imagination. Alternatively, the characteristics of the environment may cre¬
ate the experience of seeing a ghost; this was considered to take place in two
main ways. It might result from some form of impact on the environment
from stressful emotions or a situation which creates a psychic impression,
atmosphere, vibrations or mood, which may like a tape recording be played back
occasionally to observers. It may also result from a continued presence or
mind of a deceased individual which persists in the locale and can be
detected by some sensitive people. More skeptical evaluations invoked
explanations oriented around tricks of the light and illusions.
The PK question seemed to meet with a good deal more blank stares
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and skepticism than the other questions. Ready comparisons with Uri
Geller were offered by respondents.
31-c I would investigate strings and magnetic fields perhaps but I
don't think I could explain it there is no basis in my understanding at
the moment for that to happen.
Generally, respondents stressed that they would want to see PK before
they would believe it and considered it to be more likely to be the result of
an illusion or deception rather than reality. Where respondents did consider
it possible they offered explanations based around unknown power of the
mind metaphors and special characteristics, skills or gifts of some people
such as Geller. The reliance on powerful mind and force/energy metaphors
links PK explanations with the transmissions metaphor as it is employed in
discussing ESP. Instead of information being focussed it is seen as some
form of concentrated influence (possibly involving a vivid visualisation of
the proposed outcome) which is directed upon some physical object. The
force or energy involved was considered by one respondent to involve a
spiritual force, possibly manifesting as heat, which bends metals but the
respondent was puzzled as to how this would actually bend or move non-
metallic objects. Another respondent considered it to be an electrical or
chemical thing, or an energy that can be influenced. One rare explanation of
PK involved the intrusion of a poltergeist. There was also some confusion
between PK and the movement of the glass in ouija sessions which also per¬
mitted the notion of entities being involved in the generation of PK.
It is interesting, if not surprising, that both novel metaphors and literal
explanations seemed to be organised into two main categories of internal
and external causes. Novel metaphors were predominantly concerned with
the metaphor of power in both internal and external categories, a powerful
mind, and a sense of atmosphere or power. The powerful mind metaphor
clearly relates back to the transmissions metaphor, this may also be the case
for the use of the term power. All of these metaphors rely on the vague
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notion of energy or power existent in the personality or environment. This
is not surprising when we consider that energy is itself a core metaphor
which we use to describe our cognitive, emotional and physical states. It
also seems to have a great deal of currency in new age discourse as a means
of discussing invisibles; in this case it possibly offers a sense of validity
since it hints of a more formal use in physics.
Literal explanations revolved around skeptical themes of distressed
mental and emotional states in which we may deceive ourselves. The
respondents noted that this can occur in hallucinations, dreams and in bouts
of imaginative activity. The environment also has a role to play, leading to
misperception or tricks of the light and illusions. Other frequent explana¬
tions involved the experients desiring these experiences or of them simply
encountering coincidences (albeit startling ones). A number of respondents
allied themselves with non-verbal communication explanations in the case
of ostensible ESP.
It is also interesting to note the extent to which most respondents were
cautious in their attributions of paranormal causality. They often indicated
that they would attempt some form of testing of the experience and
assessed other possible explanations prior to committing themselves to a
paranormal explanation. As one respondent explained:
26-b [a friend thought that a] poltergeist was stealing the biros and
putting them under the er armchair and er the cat actually did it
while I was there I pointed this out that it's the cat [and he said]
"Oh yeh right well there's other stuff happening as well".
Another respondent expressed some concern over the reliability of wit¬
nesses.
20-b If they said "oh I saw a ghost last night?" errm first of all it
would depend what medium it was in as in someone was writing in
a newspaper "I saw a ghost last night" y'know why would some¬
one want to tell anyone that in the first place unless you wanted to
draw attention to yourself?
Overall there was relatively good agreement on metaphors used to
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describe the processes underlying ESP and ghosts and rather less so for the
processes behind PK. This suggests that there is a reasonably robust collec¬
tive representation, lay theory or folk concept of ESP which is structured
around the notion of some form of transmission of information and involves
focusing strongly on another individual or receiving unexpected informa¬
tion. For ghosts the main metaphor involved the notion of an intruding
entity. For PK, there is less agreement, indicating not only the decreased
social tangibility of these phenomena but also a decreased belief in their
validity. It is easier to believe in ESP than it is to believe in ghosts or PK
partly because the criteria for these experiences are fuzzier (and more easily
met).
Useful extensions of this work could include an examination of similar
accounts of experiences in other non-Western cultures. The energy/trans¬
mission metaphors which seem to dominate the ESP and PK explanations
are likely to be universal; some examples of common metaphors of human
energy employed paranormally include: chi (Chinese), ki (Japanese), kun-
dalini (Indian), baraka (Sufi), mana (Kahuna).
Metaphors are threads in a net woven by humans to surround and
account for experience in general and they are primary modes of describing
the case of unusual or exceptional experiences where literal (objective)
descriptions do not exist. By examining the metaphors used in relation to
any domain of experience a good measure of the reality of that phenomena
becomes apparent. Although for most people the case for the existence of
paranormal phenomena remains largely unproven by parapsychologists, a
conceptual framework and language already exists for these phenomena
from a lay theory perspective. By directing our attention towards the
metaphors surrounding these exceptional experiences we may begin to clar¬
ify their nature and divest ourselves of the perception that these experiences
are definitive objects. (Fiere we would argue that none of our experiences
are definitive objects, instead, all of them result from the metaphorical inter-
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play of the domains in which we construct them). We should also be able
to move easily between the relationships generated by metaphor and the
objects and literal terms which are created as the metaphor crystallises and
it becomes socially and culturally accepted. The approach we need is not
unlike the complementarity of quantum physicists who must acknowledge
that matter is both particle (literal-object) and wave-like (metaphor-relation¬
ship). It is in the fluxing, undifferentiated ground of experiential mind that
metaphor flourishes and where we may occasionally note the strong roots of
psi experience.
Summary
This chapter explored the natural discourse of a group of student par¬
ticipants in response to three questions regarding the causes of different
paranormal experiences. It was found that a similar pattern of metaphors
and constructs to those used in the parapsychological literature were used
by these participants. Common core metaphors seem to be culturally avail¬
able to describe unusual experiences. These experiences may derive from
particular configurations of emotional, physical and cognitive states which
correspond to certain coherent metaphorical projections of schemas.
Some tentative evidence was found to suggest that paranormal experi¬
ence metaphor production is related to experiential variables such as
absorption and magical ideation. However, it is likely that these explana¬
tions and metaphors are culturally available and their use is not necessarily
an indication of the user having had the relevant associated experience.
In the next chapter the most common form of metaphor is explained




The concept of "energy" — a core conceptual metaphor in
constructing paranormal experiences
The role of imaginative schemas like metaphors is also considered in
this chapter, where a single core conceptual metaphor energy' is explored in
the narrative of a practising medium. The use of the metaphor is character¬
istic of low focus thinking and the blurring of conceptual categories. This
results in patterns of interpretation which constitute the medium's spiritual¬
istic world view. The core metaphor of energy is used to link together vari¬
ous forms of evidential phenomena for this spiritualistic world view. If this
view were to be presented in a clinical context along with other symptoms it
would no doubt be considered as pathological however here it is viewed as
an alternative intepretation founded on frequent instances of low focused
thinking and consequent exposure to anomalous experiences.
It has long been held that cognition is relatively independent of lan¬
guage. In the past it was largely accepted that metaphor was an unusual
construction following literal interpretation. The role of metaphor has large¬
ly been downplayed and there has been a tendency to steer clear of
metaphor in both philosophy and science (even though this didn't necessari¬
ly stop it being used tacitly). According to Lakoff (1987) and discussed in
Gibbs (1994) there are two main philosophical objections to the metaphor
approach; 1) the objectivist commitment which assumes that "reality is made
objectively of determinate entities with properties and relations holding
among those entities at each instant. This is a commitment to a view that
reality comes with a preferred description, and it is a commitment to what
reality is like". 2) The second is the Fregean commitment which is "a com¬
mitment to understand meaning in terms of reference and truth, given the
objectivist commitment. Semantics consist of the relationship between sym¬
bols and the objective world independent of the minds of any beings".
271
These positions perpetuate the view of metaphor and imagination as
decoration on the cake rather than an essential ingredient. Over the past
few decades evidence has been accumulating which seems to make the
objectivist position less tenable. Rather than adopting the opposite corner to
objectivists by assuming a subjective position, the contemporary theorists
advocate a middle way — experientialism (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980). In
fact this position permits a more sensible interpretation of objectivity than
possible in the traditional view. One of the main arguments against objec¬
tivism is it's reliance on a God's eye view of truth which assumes that it is
independent of cognition.
Metaphor in the contemporary view plays a central role in cognition.
Thought is predominantly figurative in nature and metaphor is the master
trope but other figurative forms such as metonymy and irony are also relat¬
ed to this position. These are used to structure and communicate experience
in a bootstrapping process not unlike that considered by some as central to
modern physics. 'Metaphor' is perhaps an unfortunate term to adopt in dis¬
cussing this general imaginative pattern of cognition because it tends to con¬
tinuously return us to language, while as Lakoff and Johnson (1980) empha¬
sise, every time they use the term 'metaphor' it should be read as metaphor¬
ical cognition or as conceptual metaphor.
From this position, figurative language is a means of tuning into the
underlying cognitive constructions. It is likely that this correspondence
between metaphorical language and thought is not a superficial relation¬
ship; it may well be fundamental to the biology of thought. Recent exposi¬
tions of brain structure tend to suggest that such imaginative relationships
as metaphor are underpinned by biological structure (Edelman, 1994).
Metaphor as a cross domain mapping process is comparable with other syn¬
cretic activities such as synesthesia. In fact metaphor may be usefully
thought of as a specific linguistic instance of syncretic processes.
It was with this mind that a consideration of specific metaphor usage
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was examined, in a particular case study of two mediums who discuss the
role of energy in psychic reading and in a spiritual interpretation of reality
in general.
Introduction
In order to examine the metaphors underlying ostensible paranormal
experience in detail a cognitive semantic analysis was undertaken of the dis¬
course of two mediums. Wendy is a professional medium living in
Skelmersdale, Lancashire — she had contacted the Society for Psychical
Research to request that she be tested for psychic ability. I undertook to
devise a set of tests and as part of the preliminary discussion of the nature
of these tests interviewed the medium and her partner Gill (who is also
training to be a medium) for three hours regarding possible testing proce¬
dures as well as her experiences as a medium. The first one and half hours,
which contained most of the information about her experience of psychic
reading, were transcribed fully and sections of this transcript are presented
below.
The interview was primarily aimed at gathering information regarding
preferences of possible testing procedures. The interview was partially
structured in terms of the specific issues needing to be covered regarding
possible testing paradigms but open ended enough to allow Wendy and Gill
to spontaneously elaborate upon their experiences and voice their ideas
upon the kinds of processes involved in psychic reading, mediumship and
channelling. Wendy contributes most in this discussion but Gill also con¬
tributes and sometimes there is some cross conversation between the two.
A number of themes developed in the course of the interview. The
dimension of true versus false mediumship was presented as well as an idea
of pathological aspects of mediumship. The main area which is dealt with
here revolves around the concept of energy: how it relates to accuracy in
psychic reading and how it also relates to the nature of 'spirit' ( a term used
to designate a spiritual dimension). The concept of energy as presented in
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the text is very close to the notion of transmissions — one of the core
metaphors presented in chapter 8.
Brief outline of case
Wendy was born and grew up in Manchester. Her acquaintance with
mediumship began in the spiritualist churches where she eventually
'learned' how to heal through the laying on of hands'. She became a friend
of a male medium who said that she had 'something special about her'. He
taught her how to meditate. She moved to Southport following some criti¬
cism by locals who called her a 'white witch'. Here she met up with another
friend and started attending spiritual churches and eventually she founded
a business with this friend, carrying out psychic readings. She carried out
this work at a variety of settings including a fairground, where she gave fast
readings of 3-4 minutes to 'coachloads' of tourists. This business was gener¬
ally successful and functioned as her only form of employment. At one
point Wendy visited London and was told at a spiritualist organisation that
she was 'very psychic' and that her name would go up in lights. This
amounted to the proof that Wendy needed to be 100% sure about her abili¬
ties and safeguard against 'leading people on'. When she was told this it
put her mind at rest. Prior to the London visit she had started automatic
writing and through meditation she discovered that she was a trance medi¬
um. She also worked in development circles to help other people find this
gift. She found that this was completely 'draining her' and also she thought
that other mediums were abusing her gift and she felt that it was better to
"lock it away in a cupboard". The abuse of Wendy's gift by other mediums
was due them 'not taking on board what was said to them' according to
Wendy and Gill. This suggests some disagreement perhaps on philosophical
matters and also preferences for future predictions over and above the
teachings which Wendy was channelling. According to Gill these communi¬
cations were stopped by the entity or entities that guide Wendy.
Wendy continued giving readings around Merseyside and also took up
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a GCSE course in psychology because she likes to extend herself, and par¬
ticularly when this helps other people. She met a number of people through
her gift, including businessmen whom she helped to plan their futures on
various business deals. She peaked with a show at Southport Arts Centre.
As a result of this she was invited to lead a closed workshop at a local
development circle. She enjoyed this experience immensely and found
everybody there to be on the same level' as her.
The Ormskirk Advertiser ran a story which generated quite a lot of work
for Wendy. The Weekly Nervs also published a piece on Wendy following a
press release sent out by Wendy and Gill. Wendy has also received some
attention following the successful location of a missing local boy. She was
approached by a policewoman who had previously been to Wendy for a
reading. Wendy told the police that she felt that the boy was underground,
somewhere dark. As a result of this information the boy was later located in
a disused mine shaft of which there are a number in that particular locality.
Wendy and Gill currently run a fairly successful business based on
Wendy's abilities. Wendy has in the past undertaken both trance medi-
umship as well as more traditional stand up' psychic readings (although
she does not carry out trance readings for customers and is generally con¬
cerned about the kind of people who see her in trance). She enjoys working
with lots of people rather than one-to-one, single individual basis.
Her aspirations for her work are mainly focussed upon her becoming
more publicly known for her abilities. In mentioning this she also makes
comparison between herself and the medium Doris Stokes but in a very
modest way, noting that she doesn't want to present herself as a replace¬
ment for her. One of her reasons for wanting to be tested was in order to
provide some form of empirical evidence for the book that she and Gill are
writing. The book is predominantly about the psychic abilities that Wendy
possesses but also deals with information which is channelled directly in
trance from Wendy's guides. Wendy no longer had access to the test results
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as provided by the spiritualist organisation when she had been tested in
London. These test results, which would have been included in the book,
had been kept by Wendy's previous partner with whom she fell out. Wendy
has also recently been hypnotised and regressed to previous lives, this again
has provided material for inclusion in the book.
Both Wendy and Gill are middle-aged. Wendy presents herself as
somewhat nervous and tense and at an early stage in the first meeting
became slightly agitated and defensive over my switching on a cassette
recorder even though she had previously agreed to being recorded. Both
Wendy and Gill seemed somewhat wary at first and were obviously curious
as to what form this testing process would take. They seemed to adapt
themselves reasonably quickly to the situation and any sense of the initial
wariness they displayed seemed to have dissipated during the first hour of
the first meeting.
Two types of psychic reading
Wendy claims that she has been psychic from an early age although
these abilities were developed in the context of the traditional mediumship
sitting circles. Wendy can carry out readings in two modes: firstly in a tra¬
ditional stand-up' mediumship where she usually interacts with a small
audience in a house party or frequently on a one-to-one basis at her own
home. Less frequently she engages in channelling. This practice is always
private between Wendy and Gill, with Gill taking notes, and seems to occur
predominantly when Wendy and Gill themselves are looking for informa¬
tion which provides a meta-perspective on the process of mediumship. As
such, trance mediumship or channelling (terms which are exchangeable in
the accounts of Wendy and Gill) is a private and more pure mode of reading
compared to the normal mode.
No I don't do the trance in the readings I mean nobody knows about
the trance. I wouldn't do it publicly. I'm not I don't want to I
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couldn't do it in front of an audience and I couldn't do it in front of a
church because to me you couldn't really get people on the same
level.
The discourse which describes the two forms of reading covers much
the same ground. By far the most frequent metaphor used in discussing
psychic abilities is that of energy'. This energy metaphor seems to be used
for a number of reasons, perhaps primarily because it is a rather vague con¬
cept which is malleable enough to cover a wide range of phenomena. One
could also conjecture (perhaps somewhat critically) that another reliable
characteristic of this concept is its untestability.
It is likely that the energy metaphor is based on primary schemas relat¬
ed to force. All organisms are subject to various physical forces such as
gravity, radiation, and wind (air pressure), to name but a few natural
sources. This is in turn projected onto various domains of human activity
and the subjective experience of personal physical energy also helps to
describe this.
Beyond the actual demonstration of energy or force in terms of physi¬
cal movement and pressure, a metaphorical connotation (perhaps the largest
domain) exists. This can be seen for instance in discussion of gaze in which
the activity is described as a force. A gaze can be 'penetrating' or 'intrusive'
and it seems likely that older traditions of the evil eye have their origins in
the metaphorical projection of an energy or force emanating from the gaze
of an observer.
Zusne and Jones (1988) describe how these descriptions of energic
events are related to the patterns of causation in which energy is transferred
or seen as causal in everyday and scientific phenomena. They assume that
the use of such terms in relation to anomalous phenomena is an example of
magical thinking. They give the example of natural energy events which
originate in the person being used to produce energy events in the environ¬
ment. For instance a normal account of energic events might include such
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examples as kicking a ball or warming another person's hands with one's
own. An anomalous account could include accounts of magical touch or
miraculous healing.
Many traditional societies employ energic concepts which play a simi¬
lar role to those used in discussion of psychic events. For instance the term
'rnana' is used among Hawaiian Kahunas to describe a potent magical ener¬
gy which can be transmitted and stored in objects. There are many other
examples available in a wide range of cultures.
The energy metaphor can also be seen as fundamental to early notions
of hypnotism as exemplified by Mesmerism and in the beginnings of the
spiritualism movement.
The energy concept is a fundamental concept and as such can be seen
as operating widely in psychopathological experience. Often energies play
a role in schizophrenic hallucinations and delusions, often focussed on
influencing machines and manipulating entities. Sass (1992) discusses
Tausk's (1919) paper On the origin of the influencing machine in schizophrenia in
which the patient Miss Natalija A., believed that she had been under the
influence of an electrical machine located 'elsewhere'. According to Tausk,
Natalija felt that her movements, sensations, and desires were all controlled
by a distant external force. Presumably this was mediated through some
form of energy transmission.
A psychic's account of energy'
Wendy describes how she prefers working with a number of clients
giving multiple readings rather than single readings in 'one to ones'. This is
because more people increase the 'energy'. This we shall see is related to
the concept of gathering 'evidence' or verifying aspects of the reading.
I enjoy working with more people than just the one to ones because
the energies are quicker. Y'know you're getting thoughts all the time
like I could come to this lady and then I give you a message and
then I'd go to someone else and it's quicker.
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The receptivity of the psychic to energy in these situations can be tir¬
ing:
Now when I go down [toj people's houses you feel exhausted
because you have to pick up that energy to make them understand
what you've got to say and you're draining yourself you're taking
you're building up their energy as well for them to communicate
back to you. So you take a lot out of yourself doing seven or six peo¬
ple. Then more or less in the pub if someone says no to me a few
times I say 'oh, I'm leaving you I'll come to someone else. Because
then the lady will probably say afterwards 'well Wendy I understand
what you say' but it's too late then because its gone. Y'know if they
keep on saying no to me and the messages that I'm getting from
my guides say 'well leave that one Wendy because you're wasting
your time'. And they'll move me on to someone else. A lot of the
ladies and the people that I dealt with in the pub they have 'oh I
should have said yes shouldn't I?' But when you finish, you just
want to finish really but they all sort of come over and say 'Wendy I
should have said yes'. But you can't go back to say an hour before
hand because ifs gone.
On occasions the energy can be so abundant that the reading flies by in
no time and instead of tiring Wendy, it boosts her own energy levels.
sometimes I'm watching for the time to go and sometimes the time
the readings just go so well that I can't remember do you under¬
stand what I mean. So it's er what I'm trying to say to you it must
be the certain energy. Like sometimes I can errm work in a pub or a
house and I could work there all night I could work there to 4 or 5
o'clock in the morning because the energy is there and I feel so
pleased and with the energy being high if s giving me a boost as
well.
A good illustration of the malleability of the energy concept as used by
the psychic is presented in the next extract. Often Wendy and Gill used the
term 'energy' in relation to entities. The entities included Wendy's guides as
well as spirits and people 'on the other side'. Gill provides an account of
energy in relation to a man who had reported that his bed often vibrated
when he lay on it, this was interpreted as the message of some spirit or
energy.
Well I said there is no problem coming out and removing a spirit
from the house it can be done no problem. It might take a couple of
days because obviously you've got to go in and find that energy in
the home and like y'know Wendy's guides will automatically
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remove it if it's there and if it's not there and it comes back later that
night when you've left or it comes back the next day. They would
know anyway and they would still remove the energy from the
house y'know the entity from the house.
It is noticeable that one of the main functions of the guides is to pro¬
vide a conduit for energies. The psychic reading can be exhausting but the
guides can replace lost energies.
so in the end I got frustrated with myself 1 didn't get frustrated with
my guides because they are very good because they I mean if I feel
absolutely shattered when I get to that house they can lift me up.
Gill explains this a little more vividly:
They connect their energy to yours it's like having an electrical
charge they boost your energy back up again.
Wendy often communicated during the interview a desire to help peo¬
ple and also to make them feel as comfortable as possible during the read¬
ing process. She speculates that some people might interpret her holding
someone's hand during a reading as 'taking their energies'.
I like to be intimate with them I'm not a stand-offish person with
them like I might touch them or get hold of a hand. Well people
might say you're doing that to get their energies well I'm not doing
that to get their energies it's just to comfort them.
Energy is related to the validation process (as mentioned above), some¬
times Wendy refers to this as finding a link (a concept relate to the connec¬
tions metaphor).
Now like if I say to a person "who's a Pisces?" and she says "me"
then I've got that link. And then I'll get something else. But if I say
to her "who's Gemmi"? I have to find something else to open up that
link you see do you understand what I mean? You've got to open up
an energy. And if someone keeps on saying "no" to me and "no" to
me which I don't like because I know what I'm getting you know
they might say might walk away and say well Wendy I didn't under¬
stand that then they'll ring me up a few months later and say yeah
because it's on tape you see.
The energy and links are for Wendy partly mediated through mental
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images:
Anyway when I'm going into houses and that I can feel by just
going into a house whether it's going to be a good house or a bad
house y'know what the energies are going to be like errm I also can
see now a lot of mediums psychic mediums I get like pictures say
for instance that your picture had passed away I get a picture of your
father in my head.
Gill explains that this can also be mediated through physical represen¬
tations or sensations; interestingly both Wendy and Gill showed a certain
antipathy to this kind of mediumship and they considered it of lower value
than mental mediumship.
You can say to somebody like you can get a pain in your leg or knee
and you can say to that person "did your mother suffer with her
legs" because you've automatically picked up on that pain (claps) but
as soon as they've said "yeah" that pain's left you cos that's the way
you're trained you don't walk away with that negative negativity
you're not limping out the house it automatically leaves you as soon
as they say "yes".
Gill extends the energy metaphor to include 'vibration'. This term is
used in as a comprehensive a way as 'energy' and is related to the reading
process and the verification of the reading. These vibrations are related to
responses such as verbal affirmations from a client as well as feedback from
inanimate objects.
It's all done with vibration it's the vibration in your voice it's the
vibration on a piece of jewellery it's that person's vibration. You've
held something and then pass it on to Wendy your vibrations are on
it so everything you work with is done with vibration. So if some¬
body is going (gestures — indicating a non-responsive person) you
can't work with them.
Gill uses the energy metaphor to describe different types of entities in
the spirit world. It is noticeable that in addition she also uses a vertical
schema with different levels. Those entities on lower levels have lower
energy levels or negative energy while those on the higher levels are associ¬
ated with higher and more positive energy.
The spirits are on different levels as well. I mean it's if a spirit does-
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n't want to move on it wants to stay around the family unit it is
classed as a low level spirit cause it hasn't got as much energy. Once
they start using their energy for better things like to visualise what
they want in the spirit world they move up in levels now if you've
ever read books it'll say the seven planes that spirit move to move
up to well they move up with energy so if they want to stay in the
pub that they used to drink in they will do if they want to stay in the
home they lived in they will do y'know. And that's what I'm saying
we've got to be so protected that is a low level energy and that will
feed off your positive energy y'know. So when we go to houses
there's like me and Wendy and Wendy's guides and of course they
it's a four way communication you're the spirit you're passing your
message on to the guide the guide's passing the message on to me
the medium and I'm passing it on to you. And that's the way it
works.
The underlying schema is widely used in relation to normal phenome¬
na where good is seen as up, and more is up (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). The
account of energies also draws on Indian philosophical and yogic traditions
where subtle energies are mediated by certain centres in the body (chakras).
this happened to me when 1 started doing the errm the automatic
writing some of the things that the other partner had then and some
of the things she was told were so unbelievable I mean we were told
that something was going to happen on the night we went out and it
happened y'know it was so incredible and because people were get¬
ting that information so quickly the evidence was happening you
know the future was happening so quickly it was like fascinating at
first y'know what I'm saying very fascinating. And errm it's like
how can I say when I used to do the circles in Southport they told
me that they could see the energy going through my hands y'know
like you've got five energy points they could see the energy coming
out of your stomach area and it was a shame with that because my
other partner then she used to write all this down and because we
fell out now I don't know what she's done with that information for
now you see for this book that we are doing but in the end she was
using my trance for her own future of her own gains really and real¬
ly she abused it in the end so we did part friendships because some
of the evidence then when I first started going into trance was more
incredible I mean I mean some of the things that Gill's to write
down in the book y'know it's very hard to believe but because I've
done psychology and energies and this that and the other I can
understand it a lot more than probably than the average person who
is walking in the street.
Gil] provides further information on the nature of energy. She likens
the energy to electricity and spontaneous emissions of this spiritual or psy¬
chic energy can be found in the operation of domestic appliances as well as
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in static electricity.
You see when Wendy's been in trance also I mean when Wendy is in
trance the heat from Wendy's body and she can be sitting there freez¬
ing but as soon as he starts to channel through her the heat is phe¬
nomenal in her hand (claps) and you can touch her it's like touching
a hot water bottle that is his energy (the guide) transmitting through
Wendy. And also like if I was to touch Wendy not every time but
sometimes because my energy is so high you know when you take
your clothes off and you've got static y'know click click click well
thaf s what me and her are like cos the energy is there and if you
went into the kitchen and went owvv! because you've got so much
energy in your body and 1 don't know whether you have it in your
own home y'know most people say to us "the television keeps click¬
ing and it hasn't been on" that is spirit that is energy because spirit711
come because they work on a much higher level of energy spirifll
come into your home and they'll connect to your electricity point
which is a higher level energy than what you are bodily-wise so
y'know the television will click whether it's off or it's on it's still an
energy the lights switches that's why you'll get a lot of people will
say we've got a poltergeist in the house the lights are flickering the
bulbs are conking. The spirits are connecting to that energy electrici¬
ty because we all know that we are made up of so much water and
so much electricity spirit are no different. But that's what if s like for
us it's just like static 1 mean 1 was out with my sister one day and in
the end she said to me I can't come near you because every time I
touch I get an electric shock off you. But that's another thing that
happens when she's in a trance is the heat which is the energy from
him [the guide].
Wendy describes how this energy was also in evidence when she was a
child. She mentions her unusual behaviour, as a small child, of rocking
although she does not make the explicit connection between this behaviour
and her channel of psychic energy it does seem to be implicit in her account.
when I was young I used to rock y'know rock myself in the chair or
in bed I used to rock myself. And my mum even took me to a hospi¬
tal because I was three months premature I was only like a bag of
sugar when I was born and I had to go and have check ups every so
often from the hospital check my reflexes and errm did little tests
like they do with little children y'know putting in little squares and
that because they didn't think I was developing properly at first.
And then she was saying to me and I've only just recently found this
out that she used to put me in a pram at one end of the street and by
the time she'd come out of the shop (I would be at the other end) I
used to rock in the pram. So when I was there I asked this errm this
person what is that caused by and they said well you had so much
energy then Wendy as a child you couldn't get rid of it so you were
rocking to get rid of the excess energy. It's like I always remember
when I used to go and stay with my grandma there was one room I
didn't like that I couldn't sleep in. Now they didn't give me any
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answers for that but they said that I've been psychic had the energy
since I was a child. I spoke to my mother the other day she said well
one of my great aunts was psychic well not psychic she used to read
tea leaves and someone else did so there's two people in my family
who've had this type of gift.
Occasionally, these energies can make themselves visible as lights. Gill
relates an account of one such occasion. It is worth taking note here of how
central the notion of communication is to these phenomena — flashing
lights communicating with each other through something like Morse code.
It's like people say to us y'know "what do you see and what do you
hear?" We go to bed like every night and in my bedroom above my
bed there is a light every night and it's not a reflection because
there's nothing to reflect and that light is there and that light is spirit
cos I've asked "I've said "what's that light?" and they said it's spirit
watching over you it's your guide watching over you. Also I mean
Wendy has woken on occasions to go to the loo in the middle of the
night and I've been wide awake and I've said to her she's said to me
"whafs that?'"and ifs like a pale blue light they all work with dif¬
ferent colours they all radiate different colours some might be darker
in colour and some might be lighter in shade different shapes
there's two lights on the ceiling and the flickering like off and on off
and on off and on like Morse code y'know like reflecting off the
wall like someone doing that with a torch (gestures flashing a torch)
"what7s that Gill" "it's spirits they're communicating with each
other" y'know and they communicate telepathy as we well know
you know telepathically (that's how they communicate) so they don't
use so much energy so that's them. Because she's been in trance and
I've asked them what is that light in my bedroom you know what
are those lights flicking on and off in my bedroom.
Wendy goes on to describe a recent experience where she woke up in
the middle of the night to see a female figure sitting across the room. The
figure was unknown to her and she was somewhat disturbed by this and
especially by the fact that the apparition was in colour.
I mean errm a few months ago I mean 1 did used to see spirit I did
used to see when I first opened up psychically I did see more than I
do see now. I was in bed and I just woke up and there was a woman
beside me on a stool and I kept on blinking and thought I was
dreaming y'know and she just sat there watching me y'know and 1
thought "oh God who's this" because I couldn't recognise her I
mean errm like I've never seen anyone I'd love to see someone in
my family like my grandma or grandfather y'know anyone related
to my family that's passed away but they don't come to me y'know
well when I woke up and I woke Gill up because I thought who is it I
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don't know who the person is. It's like you sat there but you're con¬
stantly staring at me. Now (3) I mean am a 100 99% honest I mean
a 100% honest really and 1 couldn't really understand who it was
y'know but like I say you can go in people's houses and this is very
strange this I was in a persons house and sometimes you can see the
spirit walk in (3) when you walk in you can see the spirit following
you if you walked in this room and say your it's your grandfather or
father walked in after you 1 could see it or I could see it in my head.
It depends on the house again you see this is what I'm saying there
is a lot to do with ley lines (.2) energies under the ground.
According to Gill this event was unusual because the figure was seen
in colour whereas energy is usually black or white.
I mean I asked Wendy's guide who that lady was because Wendy
actually saw that lady in colour she had a shocking pink blouse on
and a skirt now normally you don't see that y'know it would be like
(2) it would be like black and white or whatever because that's ener¬
gy (2) and he said to me because they're here they constantly protect
us so when we're sleeping at night when we've been working in
houses and we've come home they cleanse us while we're sleeping
and cleanse all your energies and take all the negative energies that
might have clung on to you from them people in the houses (2) and I
said to them who's the lady sitting in the corner y'know and they
said she's a lady from around this area and she'd not long passed
away she was just walking through the gardens she was crying she
was upset he said so I brought her in here and I said sit there a
minute while I get somebody to take you back to transport you and
he said thaf s why with being so psychic she's woke up and seen
that and I said it frightened her more so because she (1.5) i.e. she
couldn't recognise the lady she was sitting in the corner where the
stool was there and she wasn't actually sitting on the stool and that's
what upset it upset Wendy actually and she said to me was " what I
can't understand is she wasn't actually sitting on the stool cos the
stool wasn't there she was sitting in the corner. And in the corner of
the bedroom is like a dressing table and it goes round like that like a
V and she was sitting there like as though a she was on a stool but
there was no stool and it upset her and I thought well I've got find
out about this because she's so upset. So she went into trance and I
asked what was going on who was that? Now had she recognised
the spirit it wouldn't have upset her and also because she'd seen the
lady in colour she kept saying shocking you were really upset that
night weren't you she had this shocking pink blouse on y'know
which I found (1.5) really (2) strange for Wendy because she's seen
that many things and I said to her why is upsetting you for why are
you getting so worked up about that it's only a spirit and you've
seen that many of them and she said "yeah but I've never seen one in
colour before actually sitting in a vivid shocking pink blouse"
Two other points in the two passages above are worthy of brief men¬
tion. Wendy notes that these energies are associated with certain places and
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she concretises the notion of ley lines into something like electrical currents
running underground. In the second passage Gill refers to the role of the
guides in cleansing the psychic during sleep. This is necessary because the
psychic may be contaminated by the negative energies absorbed during
readings or contact with other energies or entities.
Gill relates how these energies also have identifying colours which are
linked to familial ties.
spirit can recognise you as belonging to them is because you all radi¬
ate a certain colour energy now your passed over relatives have got
that colour that's why I said to you before all spirit works in differ¬
ent colour they recognise your colour and they say "oh" it's like
recognising your aura "there's our Carl", "there's our Carl there"
even in a room of 500 people that's how they recognise you by your
colour. Your energy is you know when your born and you've got the
cord coming from you to your mother well it's the same thing with
spirit that's still there y'know you've read about books and they say
oh the silver cord what's the silver cord well that's just a terminolo¬
gy that they use for the same thing that is your energy that colour.
This discussion of energy provides a lay theory account of the kinds of
models associated with psychic experience from a mediums point of view.
Although this was a personal account, it is likely that there are broad
areas of overlap between this and other accounts. It is also interesting to
note that often there is more than a passing similarity between formal theo¬
ries and lay theories of a particular phenomena. In this particular example
the formulation of the psychic 'energy' concept relies on metaphorical pro¬
jections from both the embodied experience of energy as well as from tech¬
nical and scientific accounts of energy. Parapsychologists also employ simi¬
lar constructs (see chapter 8).
Summary
This chapter focussed on the lay theoretical explanations of 'energy', a
term used by a working psychic. This term provided a flexible means of
describing a range of phenomena. Energy was used in a similar way to the
transmissions metaphor and frequently showed overlaps with both the
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intrusions and connections metaphors. The psychic in the account present¬
ed above uses the energy concept as a primary way of conceptualising her
relationship with an otherwise invisible other world.
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Chapter 10
Conclusion and future directions
The research reported here attempts to describe an alternative to the
usual bias-ridden descriptions of unusual and exceptional experiences. This
has largely been afforded by developing an argument based on new views
of cognition as deriving from emotion, embodiment and experience as well
as being understood and communicated through imaginative structures
such preconceptual image schemas and metaphorical projections.
Evidence was gathered which indicated that experients of the paranor¬
mal relied on an experiential cognitive style, that is, a mode of thinking
which is focussed on holistic methods of understanding the world and
altered states of personal relationship to the phenomenal world. It was sug¬
gested that both ostensible psi and subjective paranormal experience may
have their origins in this form of cognition. This cognitive style also broadly
resembles in form and content psychotic experiences. Indeed reasonable
evidence of relationships between these two types of experiences were
found in earlier chapters.
The recent research on conceptual metaphor provides a basis for
understanding these experiential cognitions and perhaps describes how
paranormal and psychotic experiences may arise from changes in the expe¬
rience of the phenomenal self. Consciousness is often treated as an object
but in fact it is much better thought of as arising out of relationships
between the individual and the environment. Changes in consciousness
associated with discrete altered states such as sleep offer different
metaphors of the function of mind and following the lead of contemporary
metaphor these may suggest actual experiential descriptions of real changes
in the form of mind. Jahn and Dunne (1986) explore this idea somewhat in
their discussion of the everyday idioms of Tar reaching thought' and 'mind
wandering'. From an experiential perspective these may be real events in
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the sense that mind may under certain circumstances be able to, in Jahn and
Dunne's terms, escape to 'free wave status'.
These descriptions of changes in cognition offer a rich and meaningful
account of the 'movement of the mind' and provide a fundamental means of
understanding this through metaphors and images based on the enactive
and embodied phenomena themselves.
It is becoming more obvious that language and thought are not
abstract algorithmic systems, they are fundamentally grounded in experi¬
ence. The vehicle which clearly communicates this, the vehicle which links
reason, embodiment and imagination is the metaphor.
This spontaneous use of metaphor demonstrates not only that that
human beings are naturally aware of the structural resemblance unit¬
ing physical and non-physical objects and events; one must go fur¬
ther and assert that the perceptual qualities of shape and motion are
present in the very acts of thinking depicted by the gestures and are
in fact the medium in which the thinking itself is taking place.
(Arnheim, 1969 pll8)
It is in exploring these metaphors that we begin to understand how we
generate meaning.
For Bohm (1987), meaning arises out of the soma-significant tension
existent in the unfolding of reality. Meaning is not something inherent, it is
something achieved through subtle recognition of ever increasing levels of
complexity. Multiple meanings are available in the tensions created by con¬
ceptual metaphor and a deep change of meaning alters the physical nature
of the brain.
Bohm suggests that if we could:
... sustain a perception and realise this perception signifying that the
world is an unbroken whole with a multiplicity of meanings, some of
which are fitting and harmonious and some of which are not, a very
different state of affairs could unfold. For then there could be an
unending creative perception of new meanings that encompass the
older ones in broader and more harmonious wholes which would
unfold in a corresponding transformation of the overall reality that
was thus encompassed. p96
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This suggests that:
Therefore each perception of a new meaning by human beings actu¬
ally changes the over-all reality in which we live and have our exis¬
tence — sometimes in a far-reaching way. This implies that this reali¬
ty is never complete. In the older view, however, meaning and reali¬
ty were sharply separated. Reality was not supposed to be changed
directly by perception of a new meaning. Rather it was that to do
this was merely to obtain a better 'view' of reality that was indepen¬
dent of what it meant to us, and then to do something about it. But
once you actually see the new meaning and take hold of your inten¬
tion, reality has changed. No further act is needed. p94
In this account an attempt has been made to address the role of mean¬
ing in understanding unusual experiences. Metaphor has played a signifi¬
cant role in this endeavour. Although the metaphors described here may be
viewed simply as convenient figurative depictions of certain inherently sub¬
jective experiences which have little to do with reality, this can really only
be judged properly when it is apparent how much our Western conceptions
are formed through metaphorical projections and imaginative structures in
every sphere of life, including science!
If this was accomplished, scientific and lay thinking would embrace
Bohm's notion of meaning changing reality. It would also bring an end to
the endless turning over of viewpoints in favour of alternative equally limit¬
ed singular perspectives as Berman (1990) remarks:
Part of our goal, undoubtedly, is to learn what it means to live with¬
out paradigm, but I also sense a much more complex possibility, viz.,
developing a radical new code that is itself about coding, and is not
merely a shift in coding.
... only our need for truth is true, and the problem arises when any
one of these tools or codes, is mapped onto our entire ontology.
Reflexivity is about breaking away from this vertical, binary patholo¬
gy, for it does not (necessarily) say, "Have no codes," but only
requires a deliberate awareness of constructing and using a code, and
the having of that awareness as part of your code. p313
In a sense, quantum theorists have already faced this problem. Bohr's
notion of complementarity insists 'that a single consistent description will
never exhaust the meaning of what is happening at a quantum level',
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requiring instead 'a number of complementary, mutually contradictory
descriptions' (Peat, 1995, p.264). The view from Bohm's work on quantum
physics and from the contemporary metaphor theory is that reality is infi¬
nitely subtle in its representations by humans and is inexhaustible in terms
of the metaphors, images and constructions which we use to picture it.
Paranormal experiences provide a testing ground for originating
metaphors of reality. Chadwick (1992) called the psychotic paranoid state
the 'borderline', the point at which reality is hammered out; paranormal
experience is also a borderline, a liminal phenomenon which draws on our
imaginative efforts to derive meaning. As a consequence it informs on the
process of constructing reality. Paranormal phenomena such as ghosts high¬
light familial tensions and domestic politics, they are welcome messengers
and unwanted intruders. ESP is a sudden connection, link or evidence of a
strong bond, or it is a communication process where information or energy
is transmitted. These phenomena can be understood in a number of ways
through the metaphorical relations in which they inhere.
Metaphorical thought is very similar to magical thinking, both of these
conceptual frameworks demonstrate ideas of unusual connection and subtle
interactions. Both magical and metaphorical thinking show an extended
sense of relationship and participation. Where objectivist images of the
world do not share this vital connection we tend to insert it.
This metaphorical and magical perception of the world is likely to be
more prominent in some personalities and may arise in certain situations
which incur stress and force adjustments in the envelope of thought.
In the clinical literature there has been a good deal of focus on magical
thinking. This is defined as a tendency to engage in thoughts related to
forms of causation which are not recognised by science. This is an out¬
growth of an imaginative tendency which has been formally addressed in
terms of the concept of schizotypy. It is these unusual and often unaccept¬
able forms of causation which are debated in discussion of paranormal
291
experience. Where these unusual forms of causation have received valida¬
tion it has often been in terms of regressive, child-like fantasies of control.
In this respect they are often ways of trying to attain control over difficult to
control situations (Irwin, 1991). Schumaker (1991) sees them as nothing less
than conceptual devices promoting survival.
Magic, religion, and all forms of reality distortion are simply species-
specific responses unique to the human animal. These act in our ser¬
vice. Paranormal belief did a great deal for us: it did nothing less
than save us from extinction, (p..26)
Birth was given to the paranormal believer in a brilliant evolutionary
tactic that allowed intelligence to remain the mechanism for our sur¬
vival. It was to be a maneuver quite unlike the usual adaptations
observed in nature. It was necessary for us to use an amplified state
of consciousness to function within the realities of our situation.
Simultaneously, however, it was also essential that we avoid perceiv¬
ing reality for what it was — chaos followed by oblivion. That is as
difficult as asking someone to see and be blind at the same time. We
had to retain all the advantages of our new intelligence while being
usefully "ignorant" enough of the same reality of which we needed
to be aware. That sounds, and is, contradictory. But that is exactly
what was required — namely, a creature of contradictions, of oppo-
sites. We became the genius ignoramus, the wise fool, the truth-hat¬
ing seeker of truth, the chimera as we now exist, p. 26-27.
Of course the association with mental illness persists, Spiro (1965)
identified three areas of distortion that suggest that paranormal beliefs are
an "impairment of psychological functioning".
1. cognitive distortion in which logically unfounded beliefs are held
to be true
2. perceptual distortion in which stimuli are perceived as something
other than what they are
3. affective distortion and the hyper-affectivity (or hypo-affectivity)
that is often associated with paranormal belief and experience.
Interestingly Schumaker suggests that in order to become paranormal
believers we had to be suggestible and that in our normal waking state we
are not fully awake. According to Schumaker we have developed the ability
to believe and not believe at the same time:
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...on one level, we all weigh up available evidence about the world
around us and arrive at accurate conclusions. When the puffy, over¬
weight businessman who masquerades as a religious healer touches
and "heals" the sick, the faithful followers "know" that it is a sham.
They also believe that a miracle has taken place. Again, the trick is
how to know and not know, to see and not see, to believe and not
believe at the same time. p. 56.
There are a number of mental health advantages for the believer
according to Schumaker for instance, people with religious paranormal
beliefs are generally happier and more satisfied with their lives. He sug¬
gests that mental illness is more prevalent in non-believers than believers.
These positions all suggest a rather unfortunate consequence of believ¬
ing in the paranormal and of holding illogical (metaphorical) beliefs. This is
not always the case, this kind of belief and experience can be empowering.
Peat (1995) in his comparison of Western attitudes to unusual experiences
quotes a psychopathological utterance from the diagnostic manual of the
American Psychiatric Association (APA, 1980).
Parents are the people that raise you. Parents can be anything —
material, vegetable or mineral — that has taught you something. A
person can look at a rock and learn something from it, so a rock is a
parent, p. 287
Peat notes that this is a pathological account from the perspective of
modern psychiatry but it is precisely the kind of thinking a native American
or aboriginal Australian might believe, for them it is a reality — rocks may
be ancestors. Peat asks whetherit is our own society, with its rigid compul¬
sive grip upon a single (and perhaps literal) dimension of reality, that has
become abnormal.
Perhaps the fluidity of the metaphorical and experiential is a conse¬
quence of this rigidity and at the same time a release from it to a world
which is more connected and natural for us.
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Future directions
This multi-modal approach and a recognition of figurative thought in
both formal and lay expression of unusual experiences has provided a basis
for understanding the context in which these experiences occur and presents
a possible framework for developing an interpretative approach to such
anomalous experiences based on metaphor and conceptual schemas. This
approach would contain benefits for understanding unusual experiences in
both psychopathology and parapsychology.
The approach presented in this work is as yet rather crude and lacking
in sensitivity but further exploration and development of a rudimentary car¬
tography of this experiential realm is much needed. It may afford a valu¬
able window on anomalies and unusual experience which is currently lack¬




Adorno, T. W., Frenkel-Brunswik, E., Levinson, D.J., & Sanford, R. N. (1949).
The Authoritarian Personality. New York: Harpers.
Aggaernaes, A. (1972). The experienced reality of hallucinations and other
psychological phenomena: An experimental analysis. Acta Psychiatrica
Scandinavica, 48, 220-238.
American Psychiatric Association. (1980). Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders (3rd ed.) (DSM-III). New York: American Psychiatric
Association.
Arieti, S. (1974). Interpretation of Schizophrenia. New York: Basic Books.
Arnheim, R. (1969). Visual thinking. Berkeley LA: University of California
Press.
Alcock, J. E. (1981). Parapsychology: Science or Magic? A Psychological
Perspective. Elmsford, NY: Pergamon.
Alcock, J. E. (1985). Parapsychology as a "spiritual" science. In P. Kurtz
(Ed.), Skeptic's Handbook (pp. 537-565). Buffalo, NY: Prometheus.
Alcock, J. E. & Otis, L .P. (1980). Critical thinking and belif in the paranor¬
mal. Psychological Reports, 46, 479-482.
Al-Issa, I. (1978). Social and cultural aspects of hallucinations. Psychological
Bulletin, 84(3), 570-587.
Alvarado, C. S. (1993). Gifted subject s contributions to psychical research:
The case of Eusapia Palladino. Journal of the Society for Psychical Research, 59,
269-292.
Amorim, M. A. (1994). Do quantum mechanical concepts help to under¬
stand psi phenomena? Proceedings of Presented Papers: The 37th Annual
Convention of the Parapsychological Association, pp. 18-34.
Bainbridge, W. S. (1978). Chariots of the gullible. Skeptical Inquirer, 3(2), 33-
48.
295
Barrett, T. R. (1993). Verbal hallucinations in normals—II: self-reported
imagery vividness. Personality and Individual Differences, 15C1), 61-67.
Barrett, T. R. & Etheridge, J. B. (1994). Verbal hallucinations in normals—
III: Dysfunctional personality correlates. Personality and Individual
Differences, 16(1), 57-62.
Bartholomew, R. E., Basterfield, K. & Howard, G. S. (1991). UFO abductees
and contactees: Psychopathology or fantasy proneness? Professional
Psychology: Research and Practice, 22, 215-222.
Batcheldor, K. J. (1984). Contributions to the theory of PK induction from
sitter group work, journal of the American Society for Psychical Research, 78,
105-122.
Battista, J. R. (1982). The holographic model, holistic paradigm, informa¬
tion theory and consciousness. In K. Wilber (Ed.), The Holographic Paradigm
and Other Paradoxes: Exploring the Leading Edge of Science (pp. 143-150).
Boulder, CO: Shambhala.
Beloff, J. (1994). Lessons of history, journal of the American Society for
Psychical Research, 88, 7-22.
Bern, D. J., & Honorton, C. (1994). Does psi exist? Replicable evidence for
an anomalous process of information transfer. Psychological Bulletin, 115, 4-
18.
Bentall, R. P. (1990). The illusion of reality: A review and integration of psy¬
chological research on hallucinations. Psychological Bulletin, 107(1), 82-95.
Bentall, R. P. (1990). HALQ. Unpublished scale. University of Liverpool.
Bentall, R. P. (1995). Reconstructing Schizophrenia. London: Routledge.
Bentall, R. P., Baker, G. A., & Havers, S. (1991). Reality monitoring and psy¬
chotic hallucinations. British journal of Clinical Psychology, 30, 213-222.
Bentall, R. P., Claridge, G. S. & Slade, P. D. (1989). The multidimensional
nature of schizotypal traits: A factor analytic study with normal subjects.
296
British Journal fo Clinical Psychology, 28, 363-375.
Bentall, R. P., Kaney, S., & Dewey, M. E. (1991). Paranoia and social reason¬
ing: An attribution theory analysis. British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 24,
159-169.
Bentall, R. P. &. Slade, P. D. (1985). Reality testing and auditory hallucina¬
tions: A signal detection analysis. British Jourmil of Clinical Psychology, 24,
159-169.
Berman, M. (1989). Coming to Our Senses: Body and Spirit in the Hidden
History of the West. London: Unwin.
Black, M. (1954). Metaphor. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 55, 273-
294.
Black, M. (1977). More about metaphor. Dialectica, 31, 431-457.
Blackmore, S. J. (1984). A psychological theory of out-of-the-body experi¬
ences. Journal of Parapsychology, 48, 201-218.
Blackmore, S. J. (1992). The holographic fallacy. Journal of the Society for
Psychical Research, 58, 270-273.
Blackmore, S. & Moore, R. (1994). Seeing things: Visual recognition and
belief in the paranormal. European Journal of Parapsychology, 10, 91-103.
Blackmore, S. J. & Troscianko, T. (1985). Belief in the paranormal:
Probability judgements, illusory control, and the "chance baseline shift".
British Journal of Psychology, 76, 459-468.
Bohm, D. (1980). Wholeness and the Implicate Order. London: Routledge &
Kegan Paul.
Bohm, D. (1985). Unfolding Meaning: A weekend of dialogue with David Bohm.
Mickleton: Loundation House.
Bohm, D., & Peat, P. D. (1987). Science, Order and Creativitx/. New York:
Bantam.
297
Bovet, P. & Parnas, J. (1993). Schizophrenic delusions: A phenomneological
approach. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 19(3), 579- 597.
Braud, W. G. (1975). Psi-conducive states. Journal of Communication, 25,
142-152.
Broad, C. D. (1969). Religion, philosophy and psychical research. New York:
Humanities Press.
Braude, S. E. (1986). The Limits of Influence: Psychokinesis and the Philosophy
of Science. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Brugger, P., Regard, M., & Landis, T. (1991). Belief in extrasensory percep¬
tion and illusory control: A replication. Journal of Psychology, 125, 501-502.
Brunas-Wagstaff, J., Berquist, A., Morgan, K., & Wagstaff, G. F. (1995).
Impulsivity and interference on perceptual tasks and hypothesis testing.
Unpublished MS. Liverpool Hope University College.
Budner, S. (1962). Intolerance of ambiguity as a personality variable.
Journal of Personality, 30, 29-50.
Chadwick, P. (1988). A psychological study ofparanoia and delusional thinking.
PhD thesis. University of London.
Chadwick, P. (1992). Borderline: A Psychological Study of Paranoia & Delusional
Thinking. London: Routledge.
Chadwick, P. & Birchwood, M. (1994). The omnipotence of voices: A cogni¬
tive approach to auditory hallucinations. British Journal of Psychiatry, 164,
190-201.
Chapman, L. J., Chapman, J. P. & Raulin, M. L. (1978). Body-image aberra¬
tion in schizophrenia. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 87, 399-407. •
Chapman, L. J., Chapman, J. P., Kwapil, T. R., Eckblad, M., & Zinser, M. C.
(1994). Putatively psychosis prone subjects 10 years later. Journal of
Abnormal Psychology, 103(2), 171-183.
298
Chapman, L. J., Chapman, J. P., & Miller, E. N. (1982). Reliabilities and
intercorrelations of eight measures of proneness to psychosis. Journal of
Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 50, 182-195.
Chari, C. T. K. (1977). Some generalized theories and models of psi: A criti¬
cal evaluation. In B. B. Wolman (Ed.), Handbook of Parapsychology (pp. 803-
822). New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold.
Cytowik, R. E. (1993). The Man who Tasted Shapes. London: Abacus.
Darvill, T. J., Johnson, R. C., & Danko, G. P. (1992). Personality correlates of
public and private self consciousness. Personality and Individual Differences,
13(3), 383-384.
DeWolfe, A. S. (1974). Are there two kinds of thinking in process and reac¬
tive schizophrenics? Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 83(3), 285-290.
Dickman, S. J. (1990). Functional and dysfunctional impulsivity:
Personality and cognitive correlates. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 58(1), 95-102.
Draguns, J. G. (1963). Responses to Cognitive and Perceptual Ambiguity in
Chronic and Acute Schizophrenics. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology,
66(1), 24-30.
Duplessis, Y. (1966). Synesthesie et telepathie. Revue Metaphysique, (1), 45-
54.
Easterbrook, J. A. (1959). The effect of emotion on cue utilisatoin and the
organisation of behaviour. Psychological Review, 66, 183-201.
Eckblad, M. & Chapman, L.J. (1983). Magical ideation as an indicator of
schizotypy. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 51(2), 215-225.
Eckblad, M. & Chapman, L.J. (1986). Development and validation of a scale
for hypomanic personality. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 95(3), 214-222.
Edelman, G. (1992). Bright Air, Brilliant Fire: On the Matter of the Mind.
London: Penguinl.
299
Edge, H. L. (1994). A Constructive Postmodern Perspective on Selfand
Community: From Atomism to Holism. Lampeter: The Edwin Mellen Press.
Ehrenwald, J. (1948). Telepathy and Medical Psychology. New York: Norton.
Eisenbud, J. (1949). Psychiatric contributions to parapsychology: A review.
Journal of Parapsychology, 73, 247-262.
Eisenbud, J. (1989). To be or not to be human: A capsule backstairs history
of psychical research. In G. K. Zollschan, J. F. Schumaker, & G. F. Walsh,
(Eds.) Exploring the paranormal: Perspectives on beliefand experience. Bridport:
Prism.
Eliot, T. S. (1944). The four quartets. London: Faber.
Epstein, S. (1994). Integration of the conitive and the psychodynamic
uncosncious. American Psychologist, 49(8), 709-724.
Evans, H. (1982). Intrusions: Society and the Paranormal. London: Routledge
& Kegan Paul.
Eysenck, FT J. (1993). Creativity and personality: Suggestions for a theory.
Psychological Inquiry, 4(3), 147-178.
Eysenck, H. J. & Eysenck, S. B. G. (1975). Manual of the Eysenck Personality
Questionnaire. London: Hodder & Stoughton.
Eysenck, S. B. G. & Eysenck, H. J. (1978). Impulsiveness and venturesome-
ness: Their position in a dimensional system of personality descriptions.
Psychological Reports, 43, 1247-1253.
Eysenck, S. B. G., Eysenck, H. J., & Barrett, P. (1984). A revised version of
the psychoticism scale. Personalitxj and Individual Differences, 21-29.
Feelgood, S. R. & Rantzen, A. j. (1994). Auditory and visual hallucinations
in university students. Persomlity and Individual Differences, 17(2), 293-296.
Fenigstein, A., Scheier, M . F. & Buss, A. H. (1975). Public and private self
consciousness: Assessment and theory. Journal of Consulting and Clinical
300
Psychology, 43(4), 522-527.
Feyerabend, P. (1988). Against Method. London: Verso.
Finke, R. A. (1980). Levels of equivalence in imagery and perception.
Psychological Review, 87(2), 113-132.
Fischer, R. (1975). Cartography of inner space. In R. K. Siegel, & L. J. West,
(Eds). Hallucinations: Behavior, Experience and Theory. London: John Wiley and
Sons.
Flavell, J. H. (1979). Metacognition and cognitive monitoring. American
Psychologist, 34, 906-911.
Flavell, J. H. (1986). The development of chidren's knowledge about the
appearence reality distinction. American Psychologist, 4, 418-425.
Franzoi, S. L., Davis, M. H. & Markweise, B. (199). A motivational explana¬
tion for the existence of private self consciousness differences. Journal of
Personality, 58(4), 641-659.
Frenkel-Brunswik, E. (1949). Intolerance of ambiguity as an emotional and
perceptual personality variable. Journal of Personality, 18, 108-143.
Frith, C. D. (1979). Consciousness, information processing and schizophre¬
nia. British Journal of Psychiatry, 134, 225-235.
Frith, C. D. & Done, D. J. (1988). Towards a neuropsychology of schizo¬
phrenia. British Journal of Psychiatry, 153, 437-443.
Gauld, A. (1982). Mediumship and Survival: A Century of Investigations.
London: Paladin.
Gelernter, D. (1994). The Muse in the Machine: Computers and Creative
Thought. London: Fourth Estate.
Geller, G., Tambor, E. S., Chase, G. A. & Hotzman, N. A. (1993). Measuring
physicians tolerance for ambiguity and its relationship to their reported
practices regarding genetic testing. Medical Care, 31, 989-1000.
301
Gentner, D. (1983). Structure-mapping: A theoretical framework for analo¬
gy. Cognitive Science, 7(2), 155-170.
George, L. (1981). A survey of research into the relationships between
imagery and psi. Journal of Parapsychology, 45, 121-146.
Gergen, K. J. (1994). Exploring the postmodern: Perils or potentials?
American Psychologist, 49, 412-416.
Gissurarson, L. R. (1992). Reported auditory imagery and its relationship
with visual imagery, journal ofMental Imagery, 16(3 & 4), 117-122.
Glicksohn, J. (1990). Belief in the paranormal and subjective paranormal
experience. Personality and Individual Differences, 11(7), 675-683.
Greyson, B. (1977). Telepathy or mental illness: Deluge or delusion? Journal
of Nervous and Mental Disease, 165, 184-200.
Gurney, E., Myers, F. W. H., and Podmore, F. (1886). Phantasms of the Living.
London: Trubner's.
Haddock, G. & Bentall, R. P. (1993). Focusing. In M. Romme & S. Escher
(Eds.) Accepting Voices. London: MIND.
Hamilton, J. (1985). Auditory hallucinations in nonverbal quadriplegics.
Psychiatry, 48, 382-92.
Hardison, O. B. (1989). Disappearing Through the Skylight — Culture and
Technology in the Twentieth Century. London: Penguin.
Hartman, E. (1991). Boundaries in the Mind. New York: Basic Books.
Heilbrun, A. B. (1972). Tolerance for ambiguity in late adolescent males:
Implications for a developmental model of paranoid behaviour.
Developmental Psychology, 7(3), 288-294.
Heilbrun, A. B., Blum, N. & Haas, M. (1983). Cognitive vulnerability to audi¬
tory hallucination: Preferred mode of imagery and spatial location of
sounds. British Journal of Psychiatry, 143, 294-299.
302
Heilbrun, A. B. & Blum, N. (1984). Cognitive vulnerability to auditory hallu¬
cination: impaired perception of meaning. British Journal of Psychiatry, 144,
508-512.
Heise, D. R. (1988). Delusions and the construction of reality. In T. F.
Oltmanns & B. A. Maher (Eds.), Delusional Beliefs (pp. 259-272). New York:
Wiley.
Fless, D. J. (1988). Gender, hierarchy, and the psychic: An interpretation of
the culture of parapsychology. Proceedings of Presented Papers: The 31st
Annual Convention of the Parapsychologi/ Association, pp. 341-353.
Heywood, R. (1974). Beyond the Reach of Sense. London: Chatto & Windus.
Hilgard, J. R. (1979). Personality and hypnosis: a study of imaginative involve -
ment. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Hillman, J. (1971). On the psychology of parapsychology. In A. Angoff & B.
Shapin (Eds.), A Century of Psychical Research: The Continuing Doubts and
Affirmations (pp. 177-187). New York: Parapsychology Foundation.
Hoffman, R. E. (1986). Verbal hallucinations and language production
processes in schizophrenia. The Behavioural and Brain Sciences, 9, 503-548.
Honorton, C. (1977). Psi and internal attention states. In B. B. Wolman
(Ed.), Handbook of Parapsychologi/. (pp. 435-472). New York: Van Nostrand
Reinhold.
Honorton, C. (1985). Meta-analysis of psi ganzfeld research: A response to
Hyman. Journal of Parapsychology, 49, 51-91.
Honorton, C., & Ferrari, D. C. (1989). "Future telling": A meta-analysis of
forced choice precognition experiments, 1935-1987. Journal of Parapsychology,
53, 281-308.
Holt, R. R. (1964). Imagery: The return of the ostracised. American
Psychologist, 19, 254-264.
Horowitz, M. (1975). Hallucinations: a information processing approach.
303
In R. K. Siegel & L. ]. West (Eds.), Hallucinations: behaviour, experience and the -
ory (pp. 163-196). New York: Wiley.
Howell, J. D. (1989). The social sciences and mystical experience. In G. K.
Zollschan, J. F. Schumaker, & G. F. Walsh, (Eds.) Exploring the paranormal:
Perspectives on beliefand experience. Bridport: Prism.
Hurlburt, R. T. (1993). Sampling Inner Experience in Disturbed Affect.
London: Plenum Press.
Humphrey, B. (1953). ESP tests with mental patients before and after elec¬
tro-shock treatment. Journal of the Society for Psychical Research, 37, 259-266.
Hyman, R. (1989). The Elusive Quarry: A Scientific Appraisal of Psychical
Research. Buffalo, NY: Prometheus.
Ingram, R. E. (1990). Self-focused attention in clinical disorders: review and
a conceptual model. Psychological Bulletin, 107, 156-176.
Irwin, H. J. (1981). Some psychological dimensions of the out-of-the-body
experience. Parapsychology Review, 12(4), 1-6.
Irwin, H. J. (1985). Parapsychological phenomena and the absorption
domain. Journal of the American Society for Psychical Research, 79, 1-11.
Irwin, H. J. (1986). Perceptual perspective of visual imagery in OBEs,
dreams and reminiscence. Journal of the Society for Psychical Research, 54, 97-
118.
Irwin, H. J. (1989). Extrasensory experiences and the need for absorption.
Parapsychology Review, 20(6), 9-10.
Irwin, H. J. (1990). Fantasy proneness and paranormal beliefs. Psychological
Reports, 66, 655-658.
Irwin, H. J. (1991). The reasoning skills of paranormal believers. Journal of
Parapsychology, 55, 281-300.
Irwin, H. J. (1993). Belief in the paranormal: A review of the emipirical lit-
304
erature. Journal of the American Societi/ for Psychical Research, 87, 1-39.
Irwin, H. J. (1994). An introduction to parapsychology. London: McFarland.
Jaffe, A. (1962). Psychological aspects of spontaneous cases. International
Journal of Parapsychology, 4(2), 97-120.
Jakes, S. &. Hemsley, D. R. (1986). Individual differences in reaction to brief
exposure to unpatterned stimulation. Personalityj and Individual Differences, 7,
121-123.
Jahn, R. G., & Dunne, B. J. (1987). Margins of reality: The Role of
Consciousness in the Physical World. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
Janet, P. (1899). L'Automatisme psychologique. Paris: Alcan.
Jaynes, J. (1990). The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral
Mind. London: Penguin.
Johnson, M. (1987). The Body in the Mind: The Bodily Basis ofMeaning,
Imagination and Reason. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Johnson, M. K. (1988). Reality monitoring: An experimental phenomenologi-
cal approach. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 117(4), 390-394.
Johnson, M. K., Hashtroudi, S. & Lindsay, D. S. (1993). Source monitoring.
Psychological Bulletin, 114(1), 3-28.
Johnson, M. K., Kahan, T. L. & Raye, C. L. (1984). Dreams and reality moni¬
toring. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 113, 329-344.
Johnson, M. K. &. Raye, C. L. (1981). Reality monitoring. Psychological
Review, 88(1), 67-85.
Jones, R. (1983). Physics as Metaphor. London: Abacus.
Jung, C. G. (1933). Psychological Types. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
305
Jung, C. G. (1960). The Psychological Foundations of Beliefs in Spirits (pp. 301-
318). In The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche. (Collected Works of C. G.
Jung, Vol. 8). London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. (Original work published
1920)
Kahneman, D., Slovic, P. & Tversky, A. (1981). lodgement under uncertainty:
Heuristics and biases. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Keinan, G. (1994). Effects of stress and tolerance of ambiguity on magical
thinking. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67(1), 48-55.
Kepinski, A. (1974). Schizofrenia. Warsaw, Poland: Panstwowy Zaklad
Wydawnictw Lekarskich.
Kline, P. (1993). The Handbook of Psychological Testing. London. Routledge.
Klinger, E. & Cox, W. M. (1988). Dimensions of thought flow in everyday
life. Imagination, Cognition and Personality, 7(2), 105-124.
Koehler, D. (1991). Explanation, imagination and confidence in judgements.
Psychological Bulletin, 110(3), 499-519.
Kosko, B. (1994). Fuzzy Thinking. The New Science of Fuzzy Logic. London:
HarperCollins.
Krippner, S. (1982). Holonomy and Parapsychology. In K. Wilber (Ed.),
The Holographic Paradigm and Other Paradoxes: Exploring the Leading Edge of
Science (pp. 124-125). Boulder, CO: Shambhala.
Kruse, P. (1989). Some suggestions about suggestion and hypnosis: A radi¬
cal constructivist view. In V. Gheorghui (Ed.) Suggestion and suggestibility.
Berlin: Springer Verlag.
Lakoff, G. (1987). Women, Fire and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal
about the Mind. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. (1980). Metaphors We Live By. Chicago, IL:
University of Chicago Press.
306
Launay, G. & Slade, P. D. (1981). The measurement of hallucinatory predis¬
position in male and female prisoners. Personality and Individual Differences,
2,221-234.
Lavater, L. (1572). Of ghostes and Spirites Walking by Night (R. H. Trans.)
London: Watkins. (Original work published 1570).
Lawrence, T. R. (1994). How many factors of paranormal belief are there?
Proceedings of Presented Papers: The 37th Annual Convention of the
Parapsyetiological Association, pp. 231-241.
Leary, D. E. (1990). Metaphors in the History of Psychology. Cambridge,
England: Cambridge University Press.
LeShan, L. (1974). The Medium, the Mystic and the Physicist. London:
Turnstone.
Levitt, E. E. (1953). Studies in intolerance of ambiguity: 1. The decision-loca¬
tion test with grade school children. Child Development, 24(3-4), 263-268.
Lewis-Williams, j.D. & Dowson, T. A. (1988). The signs of all times:
Entoptic phenomena in upper palaeolithic art. Current Anthropology, 29(2),
201-245.
Longhurst, N. & Morgan, K. (1995). APEX. Unpublished MS. Liverpool
Hope University College.
Lucadou, W. v. (1994). The endo-exo-perspective—heaven and hell of para¬
psychology. Proceedings of Presented Papers: The 37th Annual Convention of the
Parapsychological Association, pp. 242-252.
McCrae, R. R. & John, O. P. (1992). An introduction to the five factor model
and its application. Journal of Personality, 60, 175-216.
McKellar, P. (1957). Imagination and Thinking: A Psychological Analysis.
London: Cohen & West.
MacDonald, A. P. (1970). A revised scale for ambiguity tolerance: Reliability
and validity. Psychological Reports, 25, 791-798.
307
Maddox, J. (1990). This house believes in ghosts. British & Irish Skeptic, 4,
18-22.
Malinowski, B. (1954). Magic, Science, and Religion. Garden City, New York:
Doubleday.
Markham, R. (1991). Development of reality monitoring for performed and
imaginaed actions. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 72, 1347-1354.
Marks, D. F. (1973). Visual imagery differences in the recall of pictures.
British Journal of Psychology, 64(1), 17-24.
Marshall, N. (1960). ESP and memory: A physical theory. British Jourml for
Philosophy of Science, 10, 265-286.
Maturana, H. R. & Varela, F. J. (1979). Autopoiesis and Cognition. Boston:
Reidel.
Mavromatis, A. (1987). Hypnagogia. London: Routledge.
May, E. C., Spottiswoode, S. J. P., & James, C. L. (1994). Shannon entropy as
an intrinsic target property: Toward a reductionist model of anomalous cog¬
nition. Proceedings of Presented Papers: The 37th Annual Convention of the
Parapsychological Association, pp. 261-272.
Mead, G. H. (1934). Mind, Selfand Society. Chicago: Chicago University
Press.
Mintz, S. &. Alpert, M. (1972). Imagery vividness, reality testing, and schizo¬
phrenic hallucinations. Journal ofAbnormal Psychology, 79(3), 310-316.
Morris, R. L. (1975). Tacit communication and experimental theology. In J.
D. Morris, W. G. Roll, & R. L. Morris (Eds.), Research in Parapsychology 1974
(pp. 179-198). Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow Press.
Myers, F. W. FT (1903). Human Personality and its Survival of Bodily Death.
London: Longmans, Green.
308
Myers, S. A., Austrin, H. R., Grisso, J. T., & Nickeson, R. C. (1983).
Personality characteristics as related to the out-of-body experience, journal
of Parapsychology, 47, 131-144.
Nanko, M. J. (1987). Critical thinking ability, dogmatism, ambiguity tolerance and
belief in the paranormal. Unpublished PhD, United States International
University.
Nelson, P. L. (1989). A survey of mystical, visionary and remote perception
experiences. In G. K. Zollschan, J. F. Schumaker, & G. F. Walsh, (Eds.)
Exploring the paranormal: Perspectives on beliefand experience. Bridport: Prism.
Neppe, V. E. (1983). Temporal lobe symptomatology in subjective paranor¬
mal experients. Journal of the American Societxj for Psychical Research, 77, 1-29.
Neppe, V. N. (1988). Psychopathology of psi. Parapsychology Review, 19 (5),
1-3.
Noll, R. (1989). C. G. Jung and J. B. Rhine: Two complementary approach¬
es to the phenomenology of the paranormal. In B. Shapin & L. Coly (Eds.),
Parapsychology and Human Nature (pp. 57-80). New York: Parapsychology
Foundation.
Norton, R. W. (1975). Measurement of ambiguity tolerance. Journal of
Personality Assessment, 39(6), 607-619.
Ortony, A. (1993). Metaphor and thought. (2nd Ed.) Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Osgood, C. E. (1980). The cognitive dynamics of synesthesia and metaphor.
In R. P Honeck, & R. R. Floffman, (Eds.). Cognition and Figurative Language.
Hillsdale, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Palmer, J. & van der Velden, I. (1983). ESP and "hypnotic imagination": A
group free response study. European Journal of Parapsychology, 4, 413-434.
Parker, A. (1994). The normality and abnormality of paranormal experi¬
ences: Predictions from clinical, cognitive and psi models. In Coly, L. &
McMahon, J. D. S. (Eds.) Psi and Clinical Practice: Proceedings ofan interna -
tional conference. New York: Parapsychology Foundation, Inc.
309
Peat, D. (1995). Blackfoot physics: A journey into the native American universe.
London: Fourth Estate.
Persinger, M. A. & Makerac, K. (1987). Temporal lobe epileptic signs and
correlative behaviours displayed by normal populations. Journal of General
Psychology, 114,179-195.
Petty, R. E. & Cacioppo, J. T. (1986). Communication and Persuasion: Central
and Peripheral Routes to Attitude Change. New York, Springer-Verlag.
Podmore, F. (c. 1909). Telepathic Hallucinations: The New View of Ghosts.
Halifax. Milners.
Pratt, J. G. & Woodruff, J. L. (1961). Refutation of of Hansel's allegation
concerning the Pratt-Woodruff series. Journal of Parapsychology/, 25, 114-129.
Pribram, K. (1971). Languages of the Brain. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice
Hall.
Price, M. (1938). Reported by Bates, K. E. & Newton, M. (1951). An experi¬
mental study of ESP capacity in mental patients. Journal of Parapsychology,
15, 271-277.
Randall, J.L. (1975). Parapsychology and the Nature of Life. London: Souvenir
Press.
Randi, J. (1975). The Magic of Uri Geller. New York: Ballantine.
Reddy, M. J. (1993). The conduit metaphor: A case of frame conflict in our
language about language. In A. Ortony (Ed.), Metaphor and Thought (2nd
ed., pp. 164-201). Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
Rhine, J. B. (1949). Parapsychology and psychiatry: editorial. Journal of
Parapsychology, 13, 143-150.
Rhine, L. E. (1956). The relationship of agent and percipient in spontaneous
telepathy. Journal of Parapsychology/, 18, 93-123.
310
Rhue, J. W. & Lynn, S. J. (1987). Fantasy proneness and psychopathology.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 53 (2), 327-336.
Rokeach, M. (160). The Open and Closed Mind. New York: Basic Books.
Roche, S. M. and McConkey, K. M. (1990). Absorption: Nature, assessment,
and correlates. Journal of Personality/ and Social Psychology/, 59, 91-101.
Rogo, D. S. (1982). ESP and Schizophrenia: An analysis from two perspec¬
tives. Journal of the Socieh/ for Psychical Research, 57, 329-342.
Rogo, D. S. (1990). Beyond Reality: The Role Unseen Dimensions Play in Our
Lives. Wellingborough, England: Aquarian.
Roll, W. G., Burdick, D. S., & joines, W. T. (1973). Radial and tangential
forces in the Miami poltergeist. Journal of the American Society for Psychical
Research, 67, 267-281.
Romme, M. & Escher, S. (eds.) (1993). Accepting Voices. London: MIND pub¬
lications.
Romme, M. A. J., Honig, A., Noorthoorn, E. O., & Escher, A. D. M. A. C.
(1992). Coping with voices: An emancipatory approach. British Journal of
Psychiatry, 161, 99-103.
Ross, C. A. & Joshi, S. (1992). Paranormal experiences in the general popu¬
lation. Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 180 (6), 357-361.
Rush, J. H. (1986). Physical and quasi-physical theories of psi. In H. L. Edge,
R. L. Morris, J. Palmer, & J. H. Rush, Foundations ofparapsychology (pp. 276-
292). London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Sass, L. A. (1992). Madness and Modernism: Insanity in the Light ofModern
Art, Literature, and Thought. New York: Basic Books.
Sarbin, T. R. (1967). The concept of hallucination. Journal of Personality, 35,
359-380.
311
Sarbin, T. R. (1990). Metaphors of unwanted conduct: A historical sketch. In
D. E. Leary (Ed.), Metaphors in the History of Psychology. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Schiller, P. (1935). Interrelation of different sense in perception, journal of
Psychology, 93, 312-318.
Schumaker, J. F. (1987). Mental health, belief deficit compensation and
paranormal beliefs. The journal of Psychology, 727 (5), 451-457.
Schumaker,}. F. (1990). Wings of IIIusin: The Origin, Nature, and Future of
Paranormal Belief. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Shapin, B., & Coly, L. (Eds.). (1989). Parapsychology and Human Nature. New
York: Parapsychology Foundation.
Shepard, R.N. (1984). Ecological constraints on internal representation:
Resonant kinematics of perceiving, imagining, thinking, and dreaming.
Psychological Review, 4, 417-447.
Sidgwick, H. A. (1894). Report of the census of hallucinations. Proceedings
of the Society for Psychical Research, 26, 259-394.
Silverman, J. (1964). The problem of attention in research and theory in
schizophrenia. Psychological Review, 71(5), 352-379.
Sinclair, U. (1962). Mental Radio, (rev. 2nd ed.) Springfield, IL: Charles C.
Thomas. (Original work published 1930).
Slade, P. D. & Bentall, R. P. (1988). Sensory Deception: Towards a scientific
analysis ofhallucinations. London: Croom Helm.
Slade, P. D. (1976). Towards a theory of auditory hallucinations: Outline of
an hypothetical four-factor model. British journal of Social and Clinical
Psychology, 15, 415-423.
Slusher, M. P. & Anderson, C. A. (1987). When reality monitoring fails: The
role of imagination in stereotype maintenance, journal of Peisonahty and
Social Psychology, 52, 653-662.
312
Smith, J. D. (1992). The auditory hallucinations of schizophrenia. In D.
Reisberg (Ed.) Auditory Imagery. London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Soyland, A. J. (1994). Psychology as Metaphor. London: Sage.
Stanford, R. G. & Angelini, R. F. (1984). Effects of noise and the trait of
absorption on ganzfeld ESP performance. Journal of Parapsychology, 48, 85-
99.
Stenner, P., & Eccleston, C. (1994). On the textuality of being: Towards an
invigorated social constructionism. Theory & Psx/chologi/, 4, 85-103.
Stokes, D. M. (1987).Theoretical parapsychology. In S. Krippner (Ed.),
Advances in Parapsychological Research #5 (pp. 77-189). Jefferson, NC:
McFarland.
Swann, I. (1987). Natural ESP. The ESP Core and Its Raw Characteristics.
New York: Bantam.
Tart, C. (1975). States of Consciousness. New York: Dutton.
Talbot, M. (1991). The Holographic Universe. London: Grafton.
Taylor, S. E. & Brown, j. D. (1988). lllusin and well-being: A social psycho¬
logical perspective on mental health. Psychological Bulletin, 103, 193-210.
Tellegen, A. (1981). Practicing the to disciplines for relaxation and enlight¬
enment: comment on "Role of the feedback signal in electromyograph
biofeedback: the relevance of attention" by Quails and Sheehan. Journal of
Experimental Psychology: General, 110, 217-226.
Tellegen, A. (1982). Brief manual for the multidimensional personality question -
mire. Unpublished manuscript, University of Minnesota.
Tellegen, A. (1992). Note on the structure and meaning of the MPQ Absorption
scale. Unpublished manuscript, University of Minnesota.
313
Thalbourne, M. A. (1981). Extraversion and the Sheep-Goat Variable: A
Conceptual Replication. The journal of the American Society for Psychical
Research, 75(2), 105-119.
Thalbourne, M. A. (1985). Are believers in psi more prone to schizophrenia?
In R. A. White & J. Solfvin (Eds.), Research in Parapsychology 1984, pp85-88.
Metuchen, NJ/ London: Scarecrow Press.
Thalbourne, M. (1991). The psychology of mystical experience. Exceptional
Human Experience. 9(1), 168-183.
Thalbourne, M. A. (1994). Belief in paranormal and its relationship to schiz¬
ophrenia-relevant measures: A confirmatory study. British Journal of Clinical
Psychology, 33, 78-80.
Thalbourne, M. A. & Delin, P. S. (1994). A common thread underlying
belief in the paranormal, creative personality, mystical experience and psy-
chopathology. Journal of Parapsychology, 58, 3-38.
Thalbourne, M. A., Dunbar, K. A. & Delin, P. S. (1995). An investigation
into correlates of belief in the paranormal. Journal of the American Society for
Psychical Research, 215-231.
Thouless, R. H., & Wiesner, B. P. (1947). The psi process in normal and
"paranormal" psychology. Proceeding of the Society for Psychical Research, 48,
177-196.
Tobacyk, J. J. (1988). A revised paranormal belief scale, unpublished MS.
Lousiana Technical University, Ruston LA.
Tobacyk, J. J. & Milford, G. (1983). Belief in paranormal phenomena:
Assessment instrument development and implications for personality func¬
tioning. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 44, 1029-1037.
Tobacyk, J. J., Miller, M. J., Murphy, P. & Mitchell, T. (1988). Comparisons of
paranormla beliefs of black and white university students from the southern
United States. Psychological Reports, 63, 492-494.
Tyrrell, G. N. M. (1946). The Personality ofMan: Neiv Facts and Their
Significance. London: Pelican.
314
Tyrrell, G. N. M. (1973). Apparitions. London: SPR.
Ullman, M. (1948). Review of Telepathy and Medical Psychology. Journal of
the American Society for Psychical Research, 42,12-11.
Ullman, M. (1977). Psychopathology and psi phenomena. In B. B. Wolman
(Ed.) Handbook of Parapsychology/. New York: Van Norstrand Reinhold.
Ullman, M. (1984). Dream, metaphor, and psi. In R. A. White & R. S.
Broughton (Eds.), Research in Parapsychology 1983 (pp. 138-152). Metuchen,
NJ: Scarecrow Press.
Urban, H. & Kock, F. (1949). Reported in "ESP tests with the mentally ill."
Parapsychology Bulletin, 14.
Vallee, J. (1988). Dimensions: A Casebook of Alien Contact. Toronto:
Ballantine.
van Gennep, A. (1960). Rites ofpassage. Chicago University of Chicago
Press.
van Kampen, D., Bierman, D. ]., & Wezelman, R. (1994). Personality and
psi: Unrravelling relations between extraversion, agreeableness and open¬
ness to experience with ganzfeld performance. In D. J. Bierman (Ed.)
Proceedings of Presented Papers: The 31th Annual Convention of the
Parapsychological Association, pp. 175-181.
Venables, P. H. & Bailes, K. (1994). The structure of schizotypyits relation to
subdiagnoses and to sex and age. British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 33,
277-294.
Walker, E. H. (1975). Foundations of paraphysical and parapsychological
phenomena. In L. Oteri (Ed.), Quantum physics and parapsychology (pp. 1-53).
New York: Parapsychology Foundation.
Warcollier, R. (1948). Mind to Mind. New York: Creative Age Press.
Werner, H. (1948). Comparative Psychology ofMental Development. New
York: International Universities Press.
315
West, D. J. (1948). A Mass Observation Questionnaire on Hallucinations.
Journal of the Society for Psychical Research, 34, 644-645,187-196.
West, D. J. (1948). Review of Telepathy and Medical Psychology. Journal of
the Society for Psychical Research, 34, 211-215.
West, D. J. (1952). ESP tests with psychotics. Journal of the Society for
Psychical Research, 36, 619-623.
West, L. J. (1962). A general theory of hallucinations and dreams. In L. J.
West (Eds.), Hallucinations (pp. 275-291). New York: Grune & Stratton.
Wheeler, C. J. (1987). The magic of metaphor: A perspective on reality con¬
struction. Metaphor and Symbolic Activity, 2, 223-237.
White, R. A. (1985). The spontaneous, the imaginal, and psi: Foundations
for a depth parapsychology. In R. A. White & J. Solfvin (Eds.), Research in
Parapsychology 1984 (pp. 166-190). Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow Press.
White, R. A. (1990). An experience-centred approach to parapsychology.
Exceptional Human Experiences, 8, 7-36.
White, R. A. (1993). Review essay 2: Acts of meaning by Jerome bruner: A
call to psychology and parapsychology. Exceptional Human Experiences, 11,
5-13.
White, R. A. (1994). Exceptional human experiences: The generic connec¬
tion. ASPR Newsletter, 18(3), 1-6.
Wierzibicki, M. (1985). Reasoning errors and belief in the paranormal.
Journal of Social Psychology, 125, 489-494.
Williams, L. M. & Irwin, H. J. (1991). A study of paranormal belief, magical
ideation as an index of schizotypy and cognitive style. Personality and
Individual Differences, 12, 1339-1348.
316
Wilson, S. C. & Barber, T. X. (1981). Vivid fantasy and hallucinatory abili¬
ties in the life histories of excellent hypnotic subjects ("Sonambules"):
Preliminary reports with female subjects. In Klinger (Ed.) Imagery Vol. 2.
Concepts, results, and applications (pp.133-149). New York: Plenum.
Wilson, S. C. & Barber, T. X. (1983). The fantasy prone personality:
Impklications for understanding imagery, hypnosis, and parapsychological
phenomena. In A. A. Sheikh (Ed.), Imagery: Current Theory, Research, and
Application. (pp340-387). New York: Wiley.
Windholz, G. &. D., L. (1974). Some personality traits of believers in extraor¬
dinary phenomena. Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society, 3(2), 125-126.
Wiseman, R. (1992). The Fielding report: A reconsideration, journal of the
Society for Psychical Research, 58, 129-152.
Zorab, G. (1957). ESP experiments with psychotics. Journal of the Society for
Psychical Research, 39, 162-164.
Zuckerman, M. & Cohen, N. (1964). Sources of visual and auditory sensa¬
tions in perceptual isolation experiments. Psychological Bulletin, 62(1), 1-20.
Zusne, L. (1985). Magical thinking and parapsychology. In P. Kurtz, (Ed.),
A Skeptics Handbook of Parapsychology/, (pp 685-700). Buffalo: Prometheus.
Zusne, L., & Jones, W. H. (1989). Anomalistic Psychology: A Study of
Magical Thinking. (2nd ed.) London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
317
Appendix
1. Sample pages from questionnaire for study 2
2. Hearing voices survey questionnaire
3. Sample picture series from the picture identification task
318
ID No.
Please Read These Instructions Carefully
This questionnaire is intended to measure personality characteristics related to particularly vivid mental
experiences. It seems likely that these experiences are more common than was originally thought and that
most people will experience such events at some time in their lives. These experiences may be related to
individual differences in decision-making, creativity, and imagination. We hope to gain a number of insights
about the relationship of these experiences and personality characteristics.
The questionnaire begins with a section on paranormal beliefs and experiences followed by a number of
questions related to oersonality characteristics.
Please remember that:
When you complete this questionnaire please answer the questions honestly and quickly (without too
much deliberation). There are no right or wrong answers, the answers received will be expected to
vary quite a lot from person to person. Answers will always involve ticking a relevant box although
the numbers of options will sometimes vary (instructions will be given at the beginning of each
section).
Please do not discuss your answers to any of these questions with anyone else (especially anyone
else completing the questionnaire). We suggest that you complete it in private and at a time when
you are likely to be uninterrupted.
We understand that the questionnaire is quite long, we estimate that it should take around 30-40 minutes to
complete. We need to include such a large number of questions in order to properly assess the relationships
between the personality characteristics being measured. The questions included in this questionnaire have
been used extensively in the past to assess personality and by completing this questionnaire you will be
adding important information to this body of knowledge.
Thank you very much for taking part in this research.
Please return to:




Answers = Scale 0-4
0= Extremely uncharacteristic
1= Generally uncharacteristic




20. I'm always trying to figure myself out. 0 1 2 3 4
21. I'm concerned about my style of doing things. 0 1 2 3 4
22. Generally, I'm very aware of myself. 0 1 2 3 4
23. It takes me time to overcome my shyness in new situations. 0 1 2 3 4
24. I reflect about myself a lot. 0 1 2 3 4
25. I'm concerned about the way I present myself. 0 1 2 3 4
26. I'm often the subject of my own fantasies. 0 1 2 3 4
27. I have trouble working when someone is watching me. 0 1 2 3 4
28. I constantly scrutinize myself. 0 1 2 3 4
29. I get embarrassed very easily. 0 1 2 3 4
30. I'm self-conscious about the way I look. 0 1 2 3 4
31. I find it hard to talk to strangers. 0 1 2 3 4
32. I'm generally attentive to my inner feelings. 0 1 2 3 4
33. I usually worry about making a good impression. 0 1 2 3 4
34. I'm constantly examining my motives. 0 1 2 3 4
35. I feel anxious when I speak in front of large group. 0 1 2 3 4
36. One of the last things I do before I leave the house is look in the mirror. 0 1 2 3 4
37. I sometimes have the feeling that I'm off somewhere watching myself. 0 1 2 3 4
38. I'm concerned about what other people think of me. 0 1 2 3 4
39. I'm alert to changes of my mood. 0 1 2 3 4
40. I'm usually aware of my appearance. 0 1 2 3 4
41. I'm aware of the way my mind works when I work through a problem. 0 1 2 3 4
42. Large groups make me nervous. 0 1 2 3 4
Answers = Scale 1-4
1= No sound/noise at all
2 = Vague sound/noise
3 = Moderately clear sound/noise
4 = Very clear sound/noise
(circle one)
Consider the following items. Rate them according to how well you can manage to imagine the sound/noise
43. Imagine the sound of car driving in the road in front of a house
44. Imagine a monotonous beep-like sound like in a telephone.
45. Imagine the sound of footsteps coming up a stair.
46. Imagine the sound of water dripping.
47. Imagine the sound of snapping twigs.
48. Imagine the noise of conversation as if there was a party taking place next
door.
49. Imagine your favourite piece of music.
to
1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4
Answers = Scale 1-5
1= No image at all
2 = Vague and dim
3 = Moderately clear and vivid
4 = Clear and reasonably vivid
5 = Perfectly clear
(circle one)
For items 1-4, think of some relative or friend whom you frequently see (but who is not with you at present)
and consider carefully the picture that comes before your mind's eye.
50. The exact contour of face, head, shoulders and body. 1 2 3 4 5
51. Characteristics poses of head, attitudes of body, etc. 1 2 3 4 5
52. The precise carriage, length of step, etc., in walking. 1 2 3 4 5
53. The different colours worn in some familiar clothes. 1 2 3 4 5
Visualize a rising sun. Consider carefully the picture that comes before your mind's eye.
54. The sun is rising above the horizon into a hazy sky. 1 2 3 4 5
55. The sky clears and surrounds the sun with blueness. 1 2 3 4 5
56. Clouds. A storm blows up, with flashes of lightening. 1 2 3 4 5
57. A rainbow appears. 1 2 3 4 5
Think of the front of a shop which you often go to. Consider the picture that comes before your mind's eye.
58. The overall appearance of the shop from the opposite side of the road. 1 2 3 4 5
59. A window display including colours, shapes and details of individual items
for sale. 1 2 3 4 5
60. You are near the entrance. The colour, shape and details of the door. 1 2 3 4 5
61. You enter the shop and go to the counter. The counter assistant serves
you. Money changes hands. 1 2 3 4 5
Finally, think of a country scene which involves trees, mountains and lake. Consider the picture that comes
before your mind's eye.
62. The contours of the landscape. 1 2 3 4 5
63. The colour and shape of the trees. 1 2 3 4 5
64. The colour and shape of the lake. 1 2 3 4 5
65. A strong wind blows on the trees and on the lake causing waves. 1 2 3 4 5
Answers = True or False
(circle one)
66. A problem has little attraction for me if I don't think it has a solution.
67. I am just a little uncomfortable with people unless I feel that I can understand
their behaviour.
68. The way to understand complex problems is to be concerned with their larger
aspects instead of breaking them into smaller pieces.
69. I get pretty anxious when I'm in a social situation over which I have no control.
70. Practically every problem has a solution.
71. I sometimes have had the feeling that some parts of my body are not attached to
the same person.
72. I have never had the passing feeling that my arms or legs had become longer than
usual.
73. It bothers me when I am unable to follow another person's train of thought.
74. I have always felt that there is a clear difference between right and wrong.
75. It bothers me when I don't know how other people react to me.
76. Nothing gets accomplished in this world unless you stick to some basic rules.
77. Occasionally I have felt as thought my body did not exist.
78. Sometimes people whom I know well begin to look like strangers.
79. There's a right way and a wrong way to do almost everything.
80. I would rather bet 1 to 6 on a long shot than 3 to 1 on a probable winner.
81. Often I have a day when indoor lights seem so bright that they bother my eyes.
82. I have felt as though my head or limbs were somehow not my own.
83. I have never felt that my arms or legs have momentarily grown in size.
84. At times I have wondered if my body was really my own.
85. I have felt that my body and another person's body were one and the same.
86. Before an examination, I feel much less anxious if I know how many questions
there will be.
87. The best part of working a jigsaw puzzle is putting in that last piece.
88. Sometimes I rather enjoy going against the rules and doing things I'm not supposed
to do.
89. Sometimes I have felt that I could not distinguish my body from other objects
around me.
90. Now and then when I look in the mirror, my face seems quite different than usual.
91. It has seemed at times as if my body was melting into my surroundings.
92. I don't like to work on a problem unless there is a possibility of coming out with
a clear-cut and unambiguous answer.
93. I like to fool around with new ideas, even if they turn out to be a total waste of
time.
94. Perfect balance is the essence of all good composition.
95. I have sometimes had the feeling that my body is decaying inside.
96. Sometimes when I look at things like tables and chairs, they seem strange.
97. I have had the momentary feeling that things I touch remain attached to my body.
98. I can remember when it seemed as though one of my limbs took on an unusual shap<
99. If I were a doctor, I would prefer the uncertainties of a psychiatrist to the clear
and definite work of someone like a surgeon or X-ray specialist.
100. If I were a scientist, it would bother me that my work would never be completed
(because science will always make new discoveries).
101. I have had the momentary feeling that my body has become misshapen.
102. Sometimes I have the feelings that I am united with an object near me.
103. Sometimes I feel like everything around me is tilting.
104. Sometimes I have had the passing thought that some part of my body was rotting
away.
105. I sometimes have had the feeling that my body is abnormal.
106. Vague and impressionistic pictures really have little appeal for me.
107. I have sometimes felt that some part of my body no longer belonged to me.
108. The boundaries of my body always seem clear.
109. Ordinary colours sometimes seem much too bright for me (without taking drugs).

















































111. For several days at a time I have had such a heightened awareness of sights and
sounds that I cannot shut them out. True False
112. Sometimes I have had the feeling that a part of my body is larger than it
usually is. True False
113. Occasionally it has seemed as if my body has taken on the appearance of another
person's body. True False
114. I sometimes have to touch myself to make sure I'm still there. True False
115. I have sometimes had the feeling that one of my arms or legs is disconnected
from the rest of my body. True False
116. My hearing is sometimes so sensitive that ordinary sounds become
uncomfortable. True False
117. Parts of my body occasionally seem dead or unreal. True False
118. Sometimes part of my body has seemed smaller than it usually is. True False
119. My hands or feet have never seemed far away. True False
120. I have sometimes felt confused as to whether my body was really my own. True False
121. I have heard the voice of the devil. True False
122. The people in my daydreams seem so true to life that I sometimes think
they are. True False
123. I have sometimes had the feeling of gaining or losing energy when certain people
look at me or touch me. Sometimes my thoughts seem as real as actual events
in my life. True False
124. I have sometimes felt that strangers were reading my mind. True False
125. Things sometimes seem to be in different places when I get home, even though no
one has been there. True False
126. I can be deeply moved by a sunset. True False
127. At times I have felt that a professor's lecture was meant especially for me. True False
128. I have occasionally had the silly feeling that a TV or radio broadcaster knew that
I was listening to him. True False
129. I have felt that there were messages for me in the way things were arranged,
like a store window. True False
130. My thoughts often don't occur as words but as visual images. True False
131. Textures — such as wool, sand, wood — sometimes remind me of colours and
music. True False
132. I think I could learn to read others' minds if I wanted to. True False
133. It is sometimes possible for me to be completely immersed in nature or in art and
to feel as if my whole state of consciousness has somehow been temporarily
altered. True False
134. Some people can make me aware of them just by thinking about me. True False
135. I have sometimes had the passing thought that strangers are in love with me. True False
136. Sometimes thoughts and images come to me without the slightest effort. True False
137. Good luck charms don't work. True False
138. Different colours have distinctive and special meanings for me. True False
139. I often hear a voice speaking my thoughts aloud. True False
140. I have worried that people on other planets may be influencing what happens on
earth. True False
141. Sometimes I feel as if my mind could envelop the whole world. True False
142. I like to watch cloud shapes change in the sky. True False
143. I can be greatly moved by eloquent or poetic language. True False
144. When introduced to strangers, I rarely wonder whether I have known them
before. True False
145. I have never had the feeling that certain thoughts of mine really belonged to
someone else. True False
146. I often know what someone is going to say before he or she says it. True False
147. People often behave so strangely that one wonders if they are part of an
experiment. True False
148. If reincarnation were true, It would explain some unusual experiences I have had. True False
149. Sometimes a passing thought-will seem so real that it frightens me. True False
150. I have had the momentary feeling that someone's place has been taken by a
look-alike. True False
151. I have never doubted that my dreams are the products of my own mind. True False
152. I have sometimes sensed an evil presence about me, although I could not see it. True False
153. I can sometimes recollect certain past experiences in my life with such clarity
and vividness that it is like living them again or almost so. True False
154. If I stare at a picture and then look away from it, I can sometimes "see" an
image of the picture almost as if I were still looking at it. True False
155. I have wondered whether the spirits of the dead can influence the living. True False
156. On occasions I have seen a person's face in front of me when no one was in
fact there. True False
157. I have felt that I might cause something to happen just by thinking too much
about it. True False
158. I often have "physical memories"; for example, after I have been swimming I
may still feel as if I am in the water. True False
159. The crackle and flames of a wood fire stimulate my imagination. True False
160. The government refuses to tell us the truth about flying saucers. True False
161. No matter how hard I concentrate, unrelated thoughts always creep into
my mind. True False
162. I think I really know what some people mean when they talk about mystical
experiences. True False
I have had the momentary feeling that I might not be human. True False
I have sometimes been fearful of stepping on sidewalk cracks. True False
At times I somehow feel the presence of someone who is not physically there. True False
Sometimes I can change noise into music by the way I listen to it. True False
When listening to organ music or other powerful music I sometimes feel as if I
am being lifted into the air. True False
Numbers like 13 or 7 have no special powers. True False
In the past I have had experiences of hearing a person's voice and then found
that no one was there. True False
Floroscopes are right too often for it to be a coincidence. True False
I have been troubled by voices in my head. True False
It is not possible to harm others merely by thinking about bad thoughts
about them. True False
When I listen to music I can get so caught up in it that I don't notice anything else. True False
I can often somehow sense the presence of another person before I actually see
or hear her/him. True False
Things that might seem meaningless to others often make sense to me. True False
The sound of a voice can be so fascinating to me that I can just go on listening
to it. True False
The hand motions that strangers make seem to influence me at times. True False
At times I perform certain little rituals to ward off negative influences. True False
If I wish I can imagine that my body is so heavy that I could not move it if I
wanted to. True False
Some of my most vivid memories are called up by scents and smells. True False
While watching a movie, a TV show, or a play, I may become so involved that I
may forget about myself and my surroundings and experience the movie as if
it were real and as if I were taking part in it. True False
I often take delight in small things (like the five-pointed star shape that appears
when you cut an apple across the core or the colours in soap bubbles). True False
I am able to wander off into my thoughts while doing a routine task and actually
forget that I am doing the task, and find a few minutes later that I have
completed it. True False
I almost never dream about things before they happen. True False
In the past I have heard the voice of God speaking to me. True False
In my daydreams I can hear the sound of tune almost as clearly as if I were
actually listening to it. True False
If I wish I can imagine (or daydream) some things so vividly that they hold
my attention as a good movie or story does. True False
Some music reminds me of pictures or changing colour patterns. True False
I find that different odours have different colours. True False
190. While acting in a play I think I could really feel the emotions of the character and
"become" her/him for the time being, forgetting both myself and
the audience. True False
191. I have noticed sounds on my records that are not there at other times. True False
192. The sounds I hear in my daydreams are usually clear and distinct. True False
193. Sometimes I feel and experience things as I did when I was a child. True False
194. I sometimes "step outside" my usual self and experience an entirely different
state of being. True False
195. Sometimes I experience things as if they were doubly real. True False
196. I don't like to make decisions quickly, even simple decisions, such as choosing
what to wear, or what to have for dinner. True False
197. I often get into trouble because I don't think before I act. True False
198. Many times the plans I make don't work out because I haven't gone over them
carefully enough in advance. True False
199. I rarely get involved in projects without first considering the potential
problems. True False
200. I am good at taking advantage of unexpected opportunities, where you have
to do something immediately or lose your chance. True False
201. I often make my mind up without taking the the time to consider the situation
from all angles. True False
202. I like to take part in really fast-paced conversations, where you don't have much
time to think before you speak. True False
203. I have often missed out on opportunities because I couldn't make my mind up
fast enough. True False
204. People have admired me because I can think quickly. True False
205. I try to avoid activities where you have to act without much time to think first. True False
206. Often, I don't spend enough time thinking over a situation before I act. True False
207. Most of the time, I can put my thoughts into words very rapidly. True False
208. I am uncomfortable when I have to make up my mind rapidly. True False
209. I will often say whatever comes into my head without thinking first. True False
210. I enjoy working out problems slowly and carefully. True False
211. I frequently make appointments without thinking about whether I will be able
to keep them. True False
212. I frequently buy things without thinking about whether or not I can really afford
them. True False
213. Before making any important decision, I carefully weigh the pros and cons. True False
214. I don't like to do things quickly, even when I am doing something that is not
very difficult. True False
215. I would enjoy working at a job that required me to make a lot of split-
second decisions. True False
216. I like sports and games in which you have to choose your next move very
quickly. True False
217. I am good at careful reasoning. True False
218. I often say and do things without considering the consequences. True False
Are male or female? Male Female
How old are you?
Which department and faculty are you in?
Survey of members of the Hearing Voices Network.
This anonymous survey is an attempt to learn more about the experience of hearing voices: who hears
them, when they are heard, and what they are like. If many people participate the results will provide rich
information for understanding these experiences. Once all the results have been analysed the findings of the
survey will be published in the Hearing Voices Newsletter. Please complete the questionnaire when you are
unlikely to be interrupted. Each answer will take the form of ticking one or more boxes. It would be very helpful
if you could provide fuller information where requested by writing a description in the spaces provided and by
continuing overleaf if necessary. Please answer the questions as accurately as you can, there is no need to
deliberate extensively over each question, as there are no right or wrong answers and peoples' answers are likely
to vary a lot.
1. Male CJ Female O Age
2. What kinds of unusual sounds have you experienced? (Please note as many as you like and feel free to
describe them in as much detail as you can.)




b) Identifiable but not a voice □
c) An unintelligible voice □
d) An intelligible voice but not personally meaningful □
e) A personally significant message □
f) A voice with which you have conversed □
Continue overleaf as needed
3. When you have these experiences of sounds do you see, smell or feel anything unusual at
exactly the same time?




Continue overleaf as needed
4. How many voices do you hear? (tick as many as appropriate)
a) One voice □ Description:
b) Two voices □
c) Three voices □
d) More than three voices □
Continue overleaf as needed
rn these questions tick one of the boxes in the scale ranging from one extreme to another eg., from pleasant to
mpleasant, the middle of the seven boxes indicates a neutral position eg., neither pleasant nor unpleasant.
a) Are the voices you usually hear? Pleasant O CJ □ □ □ □ n Unpleasant
b) Are the voices you usually hear? Friendly O CJ □ □ □ □ □ Hostile
c) Do the voices upset you? Never lJ O □ □ □ □ □ Always
d) Can you control the voices? Never O O □ □ □ □ □ Always
e) Have you tried to control the voices . How?
Description:
Continue overleaf as needed
LI. Have your experiences led you to receive medical care at any time? Yes O No lJ
L2. If you have been given a psychiatric diagnosis at any time what is it?
Description:
Continue overleaf as needed
l3. What is the best explanation that you have found for your experiences?
Description:
Continue overleaf as needed\
iSP refers to extrasensory perception, that is, communication through as yet, unknown channels. It is usually
haracterised as gaining information which you could not have gained through normal senses such as sight, hearing
tc. The terms 'psychic' and 'telepathy' refer to the ability to use ESP to acquire information by paranormal m.eans.
lack of these questions is answered by ticking one of the three boxes on the scale in the panel to the
ight. Each answer may take the form ofFalse, Uncertain or True.
ESP exists.
I have had personal experience of ESP.
I am psychic.
I have had at least one hunch that turned out to be correct and which
was not just a coincidence.
I have had at least one premonition about the future that came true and
which was not just a coincidence.
I have dreamt at least one dream that came true and which
was not just a coincidence.
I have had at least one vision that was not an hallucination and from
which I received information that I could not otherwise have
gained at that time and place.
Life after death exists.
Some people can contact spirits of the dead.














False □ □ □ True
False □ □ □ True
False □ □ □ True
False □ □ □ True
False □ □ □ True
False □ □ □ True
False □ □ □ True
False □ □ □ True
False □ □ □ True
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This is the end of this series
please name the picture and





'icture identification Task (Sample picture)
Begin
